- Add "DBG" or "REL" to indicate the DBG build or REL build explicityly;
- Change the build time format to "%F %T".
Example:
HV version 0.1-rc4-2018-04-28 14:20:32-b2d7282-dirty DBG build by like
Change-Id: Ib410064b0a6603e3c90f30dffa722237c07fc069
Signed-off-by: Yan, Like <like.yan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Split pm.c from cpu_state_tbl.c to put guest power management related
functions, keep cpu_state_tbl.c to store host cpu state table and
related functions.
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
The patch takes Intel ATOM A3960 as example that hard code all Px info
which is needed for Px control into Acrn HV and load it in boot process.
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
For trusty bring-up, key_info is needed.
Currently, bootloader did not transfer key_info to hypervisor.
So in this patch, use dummy key_info temporarily.
Derive vSeed from dSeed before trusty startup, the vSeed will
bind with UUID of each VM.
Remove key_info from sworld_control structure.
Signed-off-by: Qi Yadong <yadong.qi@intel.com>
For ARM, The SMC instruction is used to generate a synchronous
exception that is handled by Secure Monitor code running in EL3.
In the ARM architecture, synchronous control is transferred between
the normal Non-secure state and the Secure state through Secure
Monitor Call exceptions. SMC exceptions are generated by the SMC
instruction, and handled by the Secure Monitor.The operation of
the Secure Monitor is determined by the parameters that are passed
in through registers.
For ACRN, Hypervisor will simulate SMC by hypercall to switch vCPU
State between Normal World and Secure World.
There are 4 registers(RDI, RSI, RDX, RBX) reserved for paramters
passing between Normal World and Secure World.
Signed-off-by: Qi Yadong <yadong.qi@intel.com>
replace "=" with "?=", if variable is defined, don't redefine.
replace POSTLD with OBJCOPY
fix the variable LD assignment
Signed-off-by: Tianhua Sun <tianhuax.s.sun@intel.com>
microcode update from UOS is disabled.
microcode version checking is available for both SOS and UOS.
There are two TODOs of this patch:
1. This patch only update the uCode on pCPUs SOS owned. For the
pCPUs not owned by SOS, the uCode is not updated. To handle
this gap, we will have SOS own all pCPUs at boot time. So
all pCPUs could have uCode updated. This will be handled
in the patch to enable SOS own all pCPUs at boot time.
2. gva2gpa now doesn't check possible page table walk failure.
Will add the failure check in gva2gpa in different patch.
Signed-off-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Xu (anthony.xu@intel.com)
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tian, Kevin <kevin.tian@intel.com>
1. refine multiboot related code, move to /boot.
2. firmware files and ramdisk can be stitched in iasImage;
and they will be loaded as multiboot modules.
Signed-off-by: Minggui Cao <minggui.cao@intel.com>
This patch is prepared for enabling secure world feature.
this api will create new eptp for secure world, whose PDPT
entries are copied form normal world,the PML4/PDPT for secure
world are separated from Normal World, PD/PT are shared in the
Secure World's EPT and Normal World's EPT.Secure world can
access Normal World's memory, but Normal World can not access
Secure World's memory
This function implemented：
-- Unmap specific memory from guest ept mapping
-- Copy PDPT from Normal world to Secure world
-- Map specific memory for Secure world
-- Unmap specific memory from SOS ept mapping
Signed-off-by: Mingqiang Chi <mingqiang.chi@intel.com>
"-O2 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2":
GCC C-Compiler can analyze the source code to be compiled and detect
certain insecure sections, that might create a security problem. The
compiler will replace the insecure function calls with special hardened
code that will perform extra runtime checks while the process is
executed.
"-Wformat -Wformat-security":
It warns about calls to "printf" and "scanf" functions where the format
string is not a string literal and there are no format arguments, as in
"printf (foo);". This may be a security hole if the format string came
from untrusted input and contains %n.
Tracked-On: 224003
Signed-off-by: wenshelx <wenshengx.wang@intel.com>
