acrn-hypervisor/hypervisor/common/sbuf.c
Wu Zhou 925e3d95b4 hv: add max_len for sbuf_put param
sbuf_put copies sbuf->ele_size of data, and puts into ring. Currently
this function assumes that data size from caller is no less than
sbuf->ele_size.

But as sbuf->ele_size is usually setup by some sources outside of the HV
(e.g., the service VM), it is not meant to be trusted. So caller should
provide the max length of the data for safety reason. sbuf_put() will
return UINT32_MAX if max_len of data is less than element size.

Additionally, a helper function sbuf_put_many() is added for putting
multiple entries.

Tracked-On: #8547
Signed-off-by: Wu Zhou <wu.zhou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
2024-02-20 11:52:02 +08:00

142 lines
3.3 KiB
C

/*
* SHARED BUFFER
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Intel Corporation.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Li Fei <fei1.li@intel.com>
*
*/
#include <types.h>
#include <rtl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/per_cpu.h>
#include <vm_event.h>
uint32_t sbuf_next_ptr(uint32_t pos_arg,
uint32_t span, uint32_t scope)
{
uint32_t pos = pos_arg;
pos += span;
pos = (pos >= scope) ? (pos - scope) : pos;
return pos;
}
/**
* The high caller should guarantee each time there must have
* sbuf->ele_size data can be write form data.
*
* As sbuf->ele_size is possibly setup by some sources outside of the
* HV (e.g. the service VM), it is not meant to be trusted. So caller
* should provide the max length of the data for safety reason.
*
* And this function should guarantee execution atomically.
*
* flag:
* If OVERWRITE_EN set, buf can store (ele_num - 1) elements at most.
* Should use lock to guarantee that only one read or write at
* the same time.
* if OVERWRITE_EN not set, buf can store (ele_num - 1) elements
* at most. Shouldn't modify the sbuf->head.
*
* return:
* ele_size: write succeeded.
* 0: no write, buf is full
* UINT32_MAX: failed, sbuf corrupted.
*/
uint32_t sbuf_put(struct shared_buf *sbuf, uint8_t *data, uint32_t max_len)
{
void *to;
uint32_t next_tail;
uint32_t ele_size, ret;
bool trigger_overwrite = false;
stac();
ele_size = sbuf->ele_size;
next_tail = sbuf_next_ptr(sbuf->tail, ele_size, sbuf->size);
if ((next_tail == sbuf->head) && ((sbuf->flags & OVERWRITE_EN) == 0U)) {
/* if overrun is not enabled, return 0 directly */
ret = 0U;
} else if (ele_size <= max_len) {
if (next_tail == sbuf->head) {
/* accumulate overrun count if necessary */
sbuf->overrun_cnt += sbuf->flags & OVERRUN_CNT_EN;
trigger_overwrite = true;
}
to = (void *)sbuf + SBUF_HEAD_SIZE + sbuf->tail;
(void)memcpy_s(to, ele_size, data, max_len);
/* make sure write data before update head */
cpu_write_memory_barrier();
if (trigger_overwrite) {
sbuf->head = sbuf_next_ptr(sbuf->head,
ele_size, sbuf->size);
}
sbuf->tail = next_tail;
ret = ele_size;
} else {
/* there must be something wrong */
ret = UINT32_MAX;
}
clac();
return ret;
}
int32_t sbuf_setup_common(struct acrn_vm *vm, uint16_t cpu_id, uint32_t sbuf_id, uint64_t *hva)
{
int32_t ret = 0;
switch (sbuf_id) {
case ACRN_TRACE:
case ACRN_HVLOG:
case ACRN_SEP:
case ACRN_SOCWATCH:
ret = sbuf_share_setup(cpu_id, sbuf_id, hva);
break;
case ACRN_ASYNCIO:
ret = init_asyncio(vm, hva);
break;
case ACRN_VM_EVENT:
ret = init_vm_event(vm, hva);
break;
default:
pr_err("%s not support sbuf_id %d", __func__, sbuf_id);
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
/* try put a batch of elememts from data to sbuf
* data_size should be equel to n*elem_size, data not enough to fill the elem_size will be ignored.
*
* return:
* elem_size * n: bytes put in sbuf
* UINT32_MAX: failed, sbuf corrupted.
*/
uint32_t sbuf_put_many(struct shared_buf *sbuf, uint32_t elem_size, uint8_t *data, uint32_t data_size)
{
uint32_t ret, sent = 0U;
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0U; i < (data_size / elem_size); i++) {
ret = sbuf_put(sbuf, data + i * elem_size, elem_size);
if (ret == elem_size) {
sent += ret;
} else {
if (ret == UINT32_MAX) {
sent = UINT32_MAX;
}
break;
}
}
return sent;
}