Files
acrn-hypervisor/devicemodel
Li Fei1 2fa4448930 dm: mitigate reset attack
When a platform reboots or shuts down, the contents of RAM are not immediately
lost but begins to decay. During this period, there is a short timeframe during
which an attacker can turn the platform back on to boot into a program that
dumps the contents of memory (e.g., cold boot attacks). Encryption keys and
other secrets can be easily compromised through this method.

We already erasing the guest memory data when the guest is shut down normally.
However, if the guest is shut down abnormally, the contents of RAM may still
there. This patch mitigate this kind reset attack for a DM launched VM by
erasing the guest memory data by the guest has been created.

Tracked-On: #6061
Signed-off-by: Li Fei1 <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wang, Yu1 <yu1.wang@intel.com>
2021-05-26 09:23:46 +08:00
..
2021-05-21 09:39:40 +08:00
2021-05-26 09:23:46 +08:00
2018-05-15 17:19:39 +08:00
2021-05-20 10:02:33 +08:00
2021-01-27 11:08:28 +08:00

ACRN Device Model
#################

Introduction
============
The ACRN Device Model provides **device sharing** capabilities between the
Service OS and Guest OSs. It is a component that is used in conjunction with
the `ACRN Hypervisor`_ and this is installed within the Service OS. You can
find out more about Project ACRN on the `Project ACRN documentation`_ website.

.. _`ACRN Hypervisor`: https://github.com/projectacrn/acrn-hypervisor
.. _`Project ACRN documentation`: https://projectacrn.github.io/