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5 Commits
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dae4c64333 |
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ magowan, James Magowan, IBM
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fitzthum, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum, IBM
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jiazhang0, Zhang Jia, Alibaba
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jiangliu, Jiang Liu, Alibaba
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larrydewey, Larry Dewey, AMD
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ryansavino, Ryan Savino, AMD
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sameo, Samuel Ortiz, Rivos
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zvonkok, Zvonko Kaiser, NVIDIA
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@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Further, as leaders in the community, the SC members will make themselves famili
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The current members of the SC are:
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* Larry Dewey (@larrydewey) and Ryan Savino (@ryansavino) - AMD
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* Ryan Savino (@ryansavino) - AMD
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* Jiang Liu (@jiangliu) and Jia Zhang (@jiazhang0) - Alibaba
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* James Magowan (@magowan) and Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (@fitzthum) - IBM
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* Peter Zhu (@peterzcst) and Mikko Ylinen (@mythi) - Intel
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@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ The current members of the SC are:
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### Emeritus Members
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* Dan Middleton [dcmiddle](https://github.com/dcmiddle) (he/him)
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* Larry Dewey (@larrydewey) - AMD
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#### Selection
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@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ spec:
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storage: 1Gi
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storageClassName: open-local-lvm
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```
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Before deploy the workload, we can follow this [documentation](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/CCv0/docs/how-to/how-to-build-and-test-ccv0.md) and use [ccv0.sh](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/CCv0/docs/how-to/ccv0.sh) to enable CoCo console debug(optional, check whether working as expected).
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Create the workload:
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```sh
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88
releases/v0.15.0.md
Normal file
88
releases/v0.15.0.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
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# Release Notes for v0.15.0
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Release Date: July 23rd, 2025
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This release is based on [3.19.1](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.19.1) of Kata Containers
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and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
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Trustee and the guest components use KBS protocol v0.4.0.
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Please see the [quickstart guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/) or [project documentation](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs) for more information.
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## What's New
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* Attestation can account for confidential devices attached to a guest in addition to the CPU.
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So far only one confidential device is supported (the Deep Computing Unit from Hygon),
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but more are coming soon.
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* The full (plaintext) Init-Data is transmitted to Trustee where it is provided as input
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to the KBS policy. This allows KBS policies to check configuration fields in the Init-Data.
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* The image-rs registry config file can be specified directly in the CDH config, allowing it
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to be provisioned via Init-Data.
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* Trustee has Prometheus support, allowing admins to track attestation metrics.
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* Trustee can store resources with HashiCorp Vault.
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* Trustee can be configured to allow cross-origin requests, such as from browser-based tools.
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* Trustee supports reference values of any type that can be represented as JSON including
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complex types like maps and lists.
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* The KBS-Client can be used to set reference values of multiple types using the KBS admin
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interface.
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* Trustee has more sophisticated [CC eventlog](https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.11/38_Confidential_Computing.html#virtual-platform-cc-event-log) parsing, allowing boot information to be parsed into TCB claims.
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* When using Trustee with Docker compose, the required admin keypair is automatically generated.
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* Trustee can attest SNP guests on Milan, Genoa, and Turin hosts with report version 3 or 4.
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## Hardware Support
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Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
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Not all features have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
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are expected to work on the platforms above.
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Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
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provisioned by CoCo.
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This release has been tested on the following stacks:
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### AMD SEV-SNP
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* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
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* Kernel: 6.12.0-snp-host-adc218676 (upstream 6.11+)
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* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
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* k8s: v1.30.1 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v4.5.4
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### Intel TDX
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* Kernel: [6.8.0-1022-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
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* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
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* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
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### Secure Execution on IBM zSystems (s390x) running LinuxONE
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* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
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* Kernel: 5.15.0-113-generic
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* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
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* k8s: v1.28.4 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v5.3.0
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## Limitations
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The following are limitations and known issues with this release.
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* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
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* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
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* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
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* Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
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* Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
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* Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
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* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
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* `crio` support is still evolving.
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* Platform support is rapidly changing
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* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
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* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
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* Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
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* Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
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* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
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## CVE Fixes
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None
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104
releases/v0.16.0.md
Normal file
104
releases/v0.16.0.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
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# Release Notes for v0.16.0
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Release Date: September 26th, 2025
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This release is based on [3.21.0](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.21.0) of Kata Containers
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and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
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Trustee and the guest components use KBS protocol v0.4.0.
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Please see the [quickstart guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/) or [project documentation](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs) for more information.
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## Deprecation Notices
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* Support for process-based confidential computing via enclave-cc will be removed in the v0.18.0 release.
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The enclave-cc project will be archived.
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* This will be the last release of CoCo and Trustee that supports `simple` attestation tokens.
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Today, EAR attestation tokens are the default, but Trustee can be configured to use `simple` tokens.
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This option will be removed.
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## Breaking Changes
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* Previously the Init-Data was set for a pod via the `io.katacontainers.config.runtime.cc_init_data` annotation.
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Now the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.cc_init_data` annotation must be used.
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## What's New
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* The affirming resource policy now checks that every submod is affirming. With multi-device attestation,
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KBS policies should be aware of all submods.
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* Experimental support for attesting some NVIDIA GPUs, such as the H100. Either ITA or the Trustee
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Attestation Service can be used to verify the device evidence, with some limitations.
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* Experimental support for using pre-provisioned VMs in cloud-api-adaptor via "bring-your-own-machine (BYOM) provider
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* Runtime measurements can be extended from inside a workload container using a REST API.
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* Improved support for runtime measurements with AAEL on TDX
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* Trustee supports AMD-SNP guests with report version 5.
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* Additional/improved TCB claims generated by TDX verifier.
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* Extractor modules can now receive configuration if required.
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* SWID/RIM-IM extractor improved.
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* Confidential guest kernel updated to v6.16.7 with certain security-focused configs.
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* CSV verifier supports AAEL.
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* Eventlog parsing supports SM3 hashes.
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* A default GPU attestation policy is provided by Trustee, but it is very limited.
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* eHSM sealed secret backend no longer enabled by default.
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* evidence-getter tool now exposes primary and additional evidence.
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## Bug Fixes
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* Fixed issue where Init-Data checks could be maliciously bypassed when using dm-verity rootfs, such as with the base `kata-qemu-tdx` runtime. [GHSA-989w-4xr2-ww9m](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/security/advisories/GHSA-989w-4xr2-ww9m)
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* Fixed issue with attestation service policy endpoint permissions
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* Fixed issue with AR4SI vectors containing underscores
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* Various RUST advisories resolved by updating crates.
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## Hardware Support
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Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
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Not all features have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
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are expected to work on the platforms above.
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Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
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provisioned by CoCo.
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This release has been tested on the following stacks:
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### AMD SEV-SNP
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* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
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* Kernel: 6.16.1
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* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
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* k8s: v1.33.0 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v5.6.0
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### Intel TDX
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* Kernel: [6.8.0-1028-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
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* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
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* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
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### IBM Secure Execution for Linux
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* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
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* Kernel: 6.8.0-60-generic
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* OS: Ubuntu Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS
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* k8s: v1.31.1 (Kubeadm)
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* Kustomize: v5.7.1
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## Limitations
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The following are limitations and known issues with this release.
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||||
* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
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* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
|
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* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
|
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* Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
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* Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
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* Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
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* There is an experimental option to force guest image pull without a snapshotter.
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This is also not mature.
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* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
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* `crio` support is still evolving.
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* Platform support is rapidly changing
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* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
|
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* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
|
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* Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
|
||||
* Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
|
||||
* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user