# Release Notes for v0.3.0
Release Date: January 20th, 2023

Code Freeze: January 13th, 2023

Please see the [quickstart guide](../quickstart.md) for details on how to try out Confidential Containers

## What's new
- Support for pulling images from authenticated container registries. See [design info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/guest-components/blob/cf1f7f96eb60ec4cc4aaa671c04d574a4ea0e441/docs/image_auth.md).
- Significantly reduced resource requirements for image pulling
- Attestation support for AMD SEV-ES
- `kata-qemu-tdx` supports and has been tested with Verdictd
- Support for `get_resource` endpoint with SEV(-ES)
- Enabled cosign signature support in enclave-cc / SGX
- SEV attestation bug fixes
- Measured rootfs now works with `kata-clh`, `kata-qemu`, `kata-clh-tdx`, and `kata-qemu-tdx` runtime classes.
- IBM zSystems / LinuxONE (s390x) enablement and CI verification on non-TEE environments
- Enhanced docs, config, CI pipeline and test coverage for enclave-cc / SGX

## Hardware Support
Confidential Containers is tested with attestation on the following platforms:
- Intel TDX
- AMD SEV

The following platforms are untested or partially supported:
- Intel SGX
- AMD SEV-ES
- IBM Secure Execution (SE) on IBM zSystems & LinuxONE

The following platforms are in development:
- AMD SEV-SNP

## Limitations

The following are known limitations of this release:

- Platform support is currently limited, and rapidly changing
  * AMD SEV-ES is not tested in the CI.
  * Image signature validation has not been tested with AMD SEV.
  * s390x does not support cosign signature validation
- SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
- Attestation and key brokering support is still under development
  * The disk-based key broker client (KBC) is used for non-tee testing, but is not suitable for production, except with encrypted VM images.
  * Currently, there are two KBS that can be used:
    - simple-kbs:  simple key broker service (KBS) for SEV(-ES).
    - [Verdictd](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/verdictd): An external project with which Attestation Agent can conduct remote attestation communication and key acquisition via EAA KBC
  * The full-featured generic KBS and the corresponding KBC are still in the development stage.
  * For developers, other KBCs can be experimented with.
  * AMD SEV must use a KBS even for unencrypted images.
- The format of encrypted container images is still subject to change
  * The oci-crypt container image format itself may still change
  * The tools to generate images are not in their final form
  * The image format itself is subject to change in upcoming releases
  * Image repository support for encrypted images is unequal
- CoCo currently requires a custom build of `containerd`
  * The CoCo operator will deploy the correct version of `containerd` for you
  * Changes are required to delegate `PullImage` to the agent in the virtual machine
  * The required changes are not part of the vanilla `containerd`
  * The final form of the required changes in `containerd` is expected to be different
  * `crio` is not supported
- CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
  * OpenShift is a non-starter at the moment due to its dependency on [CRI-O](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o)
  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
  * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
  * Container image sharing is not possible in this release
  * Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
- The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
  * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased to 49% at the time of this release.
  * The main gaps are in test coverage, both general and security tests.
  * Vulnerability reporting mechanisms also need to be created. Public github issues are still appropriate for this release until private reporting is established.


## CVE Fixes

None