update(rules): remove plugins ruleset files

Plugins' rules files now lives in their repositories. See https://github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/pull/98

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Grasso <me@leonardograsso.com>

rules/aws_cloudtrail_rules.yaml

@@ -1,442 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2022 The Falco Authors.
-#
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-#
-
-# All rules files related to plugins should require engine version 10
-- required_engine_version: 10
-
-# These rules can be read by cloudtrail plugin version 0.1.0, or
-# anything semver-compatible.
-- required_plugin_versions:
-  - name: cloudtrail
-    version: 0.2.3
-  - name: json
-    version: 0.2.2
-
-# Note that this rule is disabled by default. It's useful only to
-# verify that the cloudtrail plugin is sending events properly.  The
-# very broad condition evt.num > 0 only works because the rule source
-# is limited to aws_cloudtrail. This ensures that the only events that
-# are matched against the rule are from the cloudtrail plugin (or
-# a different plugin with the same source).
-- rule: All Cloudtrail Events
-  desc: Match all cloudtrail events.
-  condition:
-    evt.num > 0
-  output: Some Cloudtrail Event (evtnum=%evt.num info=%evt.plugininfo ts=%evt.time.iso8601 id=%ct.id error=%ct.error)
-  priority: DEBUG
-  tags:
-  - cloud
-  - aws
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: Console Login Through Assume Role
-  desc: Detect a console login through Assume Role.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="ConsoleLogin" and not ct.error exists
-    and ct.user.identitytype="AssumedRole"
-    and json.value[/responseElements/ConsoleLogin]="Success"
-  output:
-    Detected a console login through Assume Role
-    (principal=%ct.user.principalid,
-    assumedRole=%ct.user.arn,
-    requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-    AWS region=%ct.region)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-  - cloud
-  - aws
-  - aws_console
-  - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Console Login Without MFA
-  desc: Detect a console login without MFA.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="ConsoleLogin" and not ct.error exists
-    and ct.user.identitytype!="AssumedRole"
-    and json.value[/responseElements/ConsoleLogin]="Success"
-    and json.value[/additionalEventData/MFAUsed]="No"
-  output:
-    Detected a console login without MFA
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region)
-  priority: CRITICAL
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_console
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Console Root Login Without MFA
-  desc: Detect root console login without MFA.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="ConsoleLogin" and not ct.error exists
-    and json.value[/additionalEventData/MFAUsed]="No"
-    and ct.user.identitytype!="AssumedRole"
-    and json.value[/responseElements/ConsoleLogin]="Success"
-    and ct.user.identitytype="Root"
-  output:
-    Detected a root console login without MFA.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region)
-  priority: CRITICAL
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_console
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Deactivate MFA for Root User
-  desc: Detect deactivating MFA configuration for root.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="DeactivateMFADevice" and not ct.error exists
-    and ct.user.identitytype="Root"
-    and ct.request.username="AWS ROOT USER"
-  output:
-    Multi Factor Authentication configuration has been disabled for root
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     MFA serial number=%ct.request.serialnumber)
-  priority: CRITICAL
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Create AWS user
-  desc: Detect creation of a new AWS user.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="CreateUser" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A new AWS user has been created
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     new user created=%ct.request.username)
-  priority: INFO
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Create Group
-  desc: Detect creation of a new user group.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="CreateGroup" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A new user group has been created.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     group name=%ct.request.groupname)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Delete Group
-  desc: Detect deletion of a user group.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="DeleteGroup" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A user group has been deleted.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     group name=%ct.request.groupname)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_iam
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: ECS Service Created
-  desc: Detect a new service is created in ECS.
-  condition:
-    ct.src="ecs.amazonaws.com" and
-    ct.name="CreateService" and
-    not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A new service has been created in ECS
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-    requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-    AWS region=%ct.region,
-    cluster=%ct.request.cluster,
-    service name=%ct.request.servicename,
-    task definition=%ct.request.taskdefinition)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_ecs
-    - aws_fargate
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: ECS Task Run or Started
-  desc: Detect a new task is started in ECS.
-  condition:
-    ct.src="ecs.amazonaws.com" and
-    (ct.name="RunTask" or ct.name="StartTask") and
-    not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A new task has been started in ECS
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-    requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-    AWS region=%ct.region,
-    cluster=%ct.request.cluster,
-    task definition=%ct.request.taskdefinition)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_ecs
-    - aws_fargate
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Create Lambda Function
-  desc: Detect creation of a Lambda function.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="CreateFunction20150331" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    Lambda function has been created.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     lambda function=%ct.request.functionname)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_lambda
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Update Lambda Function Code
-  desc: Detect updates to a Lambda function code.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="UpdateFunctionCode20150331v2" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    The code of a Lambda function has been updated.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     lambda function=%ct.request.functionname)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_lambda
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Update Lambda Function Configuration
-  desc: Detect updates to a Lambda function configuration.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="UpdateFunctionConfiguration20150331v2" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    The configuration of a Lambda function has been updated.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     lambda function=%ct.request.functionname)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_lambda
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Run Instances
-  desc: Detect launching of a specified number of instances.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="RunInstances" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A number of instances have been launched.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     availability zone=%ct.request.availabilityzone,
-     subnet id=%ct.response.subnetid,
-     reservation id=%ct.response.reservationid)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_ec2
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-# Only instances launched on regions in this list are approved.
-- list: approved_regions
-  items:
-    - us-east-0
-
-- rule: Run Instances in Non-approved Region
-  desc: Detect launching of a specified number of instances in a non-approved region.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="RunInstances" and not ct.error exists and
-    not ct.region in (approved_regions)
-  output:
-    A number of instances have been launched in a non-approved region.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     availability zone=%ct.request.availabilityzone,
-     subnet id=%ct.response.subnetid,
-     reservation id=%ct.response.reservationid,
-     image id=%json.value[/responseElements/instancesSet/items/0/instanceId])
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_ec2
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Delete Bucket Encryption
-  desc: Detect deleting configuration to use encryption for bucket storage.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="DeleteBucketEncryption" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A encryption configuration for a bucket has been deleted
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     bucket=%s3.bucket)
-  priority: CRITICAL
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_s3
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Delete Bucket Public Access Block
-  desc: Detect deleting blocking public access to bucket.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="PutBucketPublicAccessBlock" and not ct.error exists and
-    json.value[/requestParameters/publicAccessBlock]="" and
-      (json.value[/requestParameters/PublicAccessBlockConfiguration/RestrictPublicBuckets]=false or
-      json.value[/requestParameters/PublicAccessBlockConfiguration/BlockPublicPolicy]=false or
-      json.value[/requestParameters/PublicAccessBlockConfiguration/BlockPublicAcls]=false or
-      json.value[/requestParameters/PublicAccessBlockConfiguration/IgnorePublicAcls]=false)
-  output:
-    A public access block for a bucket has been deleted
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     bucket=%s3.bucket)
-  priority: CRITICAL
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_s3
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: List Buckets
-  desc: Detect listing of all S3 buckets.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="ListBuckets" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A list of all S3 buckets has been requested.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     host=%ct.request.host)
-  priority: WARNING
-  enabled: false
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_s3
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Put Bucket ACL
-  desc: Detect setting the permissions on an existing bucket using access control lists.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="PutBucketAcl" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    The permissions on an existing bucket have been set using access control lists.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     bucket name=%s3.bucket)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_s3
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: Put Bucket Policy
-  desc: Detect applying an Amazon S3 bucket policy to an Amazon S3 bucket.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="PutBucketPolicy" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    An Amazon S3 bucket policy has been applied to an Amazon S3 bucket.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     bucket name=%s3.bucket,
-     policy=%ct.request.policy)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_s3
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: CloudTrail Trail Created
-  desc: Detect creation of a new trail.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="CreateTrail" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    A new trail has been created.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     trail name=%ct.request.name)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_cloudtrail
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-
-- rule: CloudTrail Logging Disabled
-  desc: The CloudTrail logging has been disabled, this could be potentially malicious.
-  condition:
-    ct.name="StopLogging" and not ct.error exists
-  output:
-    The CloudTrail logging has been disabled.
-    (requesting user=%ct.user,
-     requesting IP=%ct.srcip,
-     AWS region=%ct.region,
-     resource name=%ct.request.name)
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags:
-    - cloud
-    - aws
-    - aws_cloudtrail
-  source: aws_cloudtrail
-

rules/k8s_audit_rules.yaml

@@ -1,742 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2022 The Falco Authors.
-#
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-#
-- required_engine_version: 11
-
-- required_plugin_versions:
-  - name: k8saudit
-    version: 0.1.0
-  - name: json
-    version: 0.2.2
-
-# Like always_true/always_false, but works with k8s audit events
-- macro: k8s_audit_always_true
-  condition: (jevt.rawtime exists)
-
-- macro: k8s_audit_never_true
-  condition: (jevt.rawtime=0)
-
-# Generally only consider audit events once the response has completed
-- list: k8s_audit_stages
-  items: ["ResponseComplete"]
-
-# Generally exclude users starting with "system:"
-- macro: non_system_user
-  condition: (not ka.user.name startswith "system:")
-
-# This macro selects the set of Audit Events used by the below rules.
-- macro: kevt
-  condition: (jevt.value[/stage] in (k8s_audit_stages))
-
-- macro: kevt_started
-  condition: (jevt.value[/stage]=ResponseStarted)
-
-# If you wish to restrict activity to a specific set of users, override/append to this list.
-# users created by kops are included
-- list: vertical_pod_autoscaler_users
-  items: ["vpa-recommender", "vpa-updater"]
-
-- list: allowed_k8s_users
-  items: [
-    "minikube", "minikube-user", "kubelet", "kops", "admin", "kube", "kube-proxy", "kube-apiserver-healthcheck",
-    "kubernetes-admin",
-    vertical_pod_autoscaler_users,
-    cluster-autoscaler,
-    "system:addon-manager",
-    "cloud-controller-manager",
-    "system:kube-controller-manager"
-    ]
-
-- list: eks_allowed_k8s_users
-  items: [
-    "eks:node-manager",
-    "eks:certificate-controller",
-    "eks:fargate-scheduler",
-    "eks:k8s-metrics",
-    "eks:authenticator",
-    "eks:cluster-event-watcher",
-    "eks:nodewatcher",
-    "eks:pod-identity-mutating-webhook"
-    ]
--
-- rule: Disallowed K8s User
-  desc: Detect any k8s operation by users outside of an allowed set of users.
-  condition: kevt and non_system_user and not ka.user.name in (allowed_k8s_users) and not ka.user.name in (eks_allowed_k8s_users)
-  output: K8s Operation performed by user not in allowed list of users (user=%ka.user.name target=%ka.target.name/%ka.target.resource verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri resp=%ka.response.code)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
-# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to run in
-# your environment. In this main falco rules file, there isn't any way
-# to know all the containers that can run, so any container is
-# allowed, by using the always_true macro. In the overridden macro, the condition
-# would look something like (ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (my-repo/my-image))
-- macro: allowed_k8s_containers
-  condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
-
-- macro: response_successful
-  condition: (ka.response.code startswith 2)
-
-- macro: kget
-  condition: ka.verb=get
-
-- macro: kcreate
-  condition: ka.verb=create
-
-- macro: kmodify
-  condition: (ka.verb in (create,update,patch))
-
-- macro: kdelete
-  condition: ka.verb=delete
-
-- macro: pod
-  condition: ka.target.resource=pods and not ka.target.subresource exists
-
-- macro: pod_subresource
-  condition: ka.target.resource=pods and ka.target.subresource exists
-
-- macro: deployment
-  condition: ka.target.resource=deployments
-
-- macro: service
-  condition: ka.target.resource=services
-
-- macro: configmap
-  condition: ka.target.resource=configmaps
-
-- macro: namespace
-  condition: ka.target.resource=namespaces
-
-- macro: serviceaccount
-  condition: ka.target.resource=serviceaccounts
-
-- macro: clusterrole
-  condition: ka.target.resource=clusterroles
-
-- macro: clusterrolebinding
-  condition: ka.target.resource=clusterrolebindings
-
-- macro: role
-  condition: ka.target.resource=roles
-
-- macro: secret
-  condition: ka.target.resource=secrets
-
-- macro: health_endpoint
-  condition: ka.uri=/healthz
-
-- macro: live_endpoint
-  condition: ka.uri=/livez
-
-- macro: ready_endpoint
-  condition: ka.uri=/readyz
-
-- rule: Create Disallowed Pod
-  desc: >
-    Detect an attempt to start a pod with a container image outside of a list of allowed images.
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and not allowed_k8s_containers
-  output: Pod started with container not in allowed list (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: Create Privileged Pod
-  desc: >
-    Detect an attempt to start a pod with a privileged container
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.containers.privileged intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images)
-  output: Pod started with privileged container (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: sensitive_vol_mount
-  condition: >
-    (ka.req.pod.volumes.hostpath intersects (/proc, /var/run/docker.sock, /, /etc, /root, /var/run/crio/crio.sock, /home/admin, /var/lib/kubelet, /var/lib/kubelet/pki, /etc/kubernetes, /etc/kubernetes/manifests))
-
-- rule: Create Sensitive Mount Pod
-  desc: >
-    Detect an attempt to start a pod with a volume from a sensitive host directory (i.e. /proc).
-    Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and sensitive_vol_mount and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (falco_sensitive_mount_images)
-  output: Pod started with sensitive mount (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image volumes=%jevt.value[/requestObject/spec/volumes])
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# These container images are allowed to run with hostnetwork=true
-- list: falco_hostnetwork_images
-  items: [
-    gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
-    gcr.io/projectcalico-org/typha,
-    gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
-    gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
-    gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
-    gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
-    k8s.gcr.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64
-    k8s.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd,
-    ]
-
-# Corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark 1.7.4
-- rule: Create HostNetwork Pod
-  desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host network.
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_network intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (falco_hostnetwork_images)
-  output: Pod started using host network (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- list: falco_hostpid_images
-  items: []
-
-- rule: Create HostPid Pod
-  desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host pid namespace.
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_pid intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (falco_hostpid_images)
-  output: Pod started using host pid namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- list: falco_hostipc_images
-  items: []
-
-- rule: Create HostIPC Pod
-  desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host ipc namespace.
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_ipc intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (falco_hostipc_images)
-  output: Pod started using host ipc namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: user_known_node_port_service
-  condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
-
-- rule: Create NodePort Service
-  desc: >
-    Detect an attempt to start a service with a NodePort service type
-  condition: kevt and service and kcreate and ka.req.service.type=NodePort and not user_known_node_port_service
-  output: NodePort Service Created (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace ports=%ka.req.service.ports)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: contains_private_credentials
-  condition: >
-    (ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws_access_key_id" or
-     ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws-access-key-id" or
-     ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws_s3_access_key_id" or
-     ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws-s3-access-key-id" or
-     ka.req.configmap.obj contains "password" or
-     ka.req.configmap.obj contains "passphrase")
-
-- rule: Create/Modify Configmap With Private Credentials
-  desc: >
-     Detect creating/modifying a configmap containing a private credential (aws key, password, etc.)
-  condition: kevt and configmap and kmodify and contains_private_credentials
-  output: K8s configmap with private credential (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb configmap=%ka.req.configmap.name config=%ka.req.configmap.obj)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# Corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark, 1.1.1.
-- rule: Anonymous Request Allowed
-  desc: >
-    Detect any request made by the anonymous user that was allowed
-  condition: kevt and ka.user.name=system:anonymous and ka.auth.decision="allow" and not health_endpoint and not live_endpoint and not ready_endpoint
-  output: Request by anonymous user allowed (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri reason=%ka.auth.reason))
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# Roughly corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark, 1.1.12. In this case,
-# notifies an attempt to exec/attach to a privileged container.
-
-# Ideally, we'd add a more stringent rule that detects attaches/execs
-# to a privileged pod, but that requires the engine for k8s audit
-# events to be stateful, so it could know if a container named in an
-# attach request was created privileged or not. For now, we have a
-# less severe rule that detects attaches/execs to any pod.
-#
-# For the same reason, you can't use things like image names/prefixes,
-# as the event that creates the pod (which has the images) is a
-# separate event than the actual exec/attach to the pod.
-
-- macro: user_known_exec_pod_activities
-  condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
-
-- rule: Attach/Exec Pod
-  desc: >
-    Detect any attempt to attach/exec to a pod
-  condition: kevt_started and pod_subresource and kcreate and ka.target.subresource in (exec,attach) and not user_known_exec_pod_activities
-  output: Attach/Exec to pod (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace action=%ka.target.subresource command=%ka.uri.param[command])
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: user_known_pod_debug_activities
-  condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
-
-# Only works when feature gate EphemeralContainers is enabled
-- rule: EphemeralContainers Created
-  desc: >
-    Detect any ephemeral container created
-  condition: kevt and pod_subresource and kmodify and ka.target.subresource in (ephemeralcontainers) and not user_known_pod_debug_activities
-  output: Ephemeral container is created in pod (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace ephemeral_container_name=%jevt.value[/requestObject/ephemeralContainers/0/name] ephemeral_container_image=%jevt.value[/requestObject/ephemeralContainers/0/image])
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# In a local/user rules fie, you can append to this list to add additional allowed namespaces
-- list: allowed_namespaces
-  items: [kube-system, kube-public, default]
-
-- rule: Create Disallowed Namespace
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a namespace outside of a set of known namespaces
-  condition: kevt and namespace and kcreate and not ka.target.name in (allowed_namespaces)
-  output: Disallowed namespace created (user=%ka.user.name ns=%ka.target.name)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# Only defined for backwards compatibility. Use the more specific
-# user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list instead.
-- list: user_trusted_image_list
-  items: []
-
-- list: user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list
-  items: [user_trusted_image_list]
-
-# Only defined for backwards compatibility. Use the more specific
-# allowed_kube_namespace_image_list instead.
-- list: k8s_image_list
-  items: []
-
-- list: allowed_kube_namespace_image_list
-  items: [
-    gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
-    gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
-    gke.gcr.io/addon-resizer,
-    gke.gcr.io/heapster,
-    gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
-    k8s.gcr.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
-    k8s.gcr.io/kube-apiserver,
-    gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
-    gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
-    gke.gcr.io/watcher-daemonset,
-    k8s.gcr.io/addon-resizer
-    k8s.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd,
-    k8s.gcr.io/k8s-dns-dnsmasq-nanny-amd64,
-    k8s.gcr.io/k8s-dns-kube-dns-amd64,
-    k8s.gcr.io/k8s-dns-sidecar-amd64,
-    k8s.gcr.io/metrics-server-amd64,
-    kope/kube-apiserver-healthcheck,
-    k8s_image_list
-    ]
-
-- macro: allowed_kube_namespace_pods
-  condition: (ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list) or
-              ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (allowed_kube_namespace_image_list))
-
-# Detect any new pod created in the kube-system namespace
-- rule: Pod Created in Kube Namespace
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a pod in the kube-system or kube-public namespaces
-  condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.target.namespace in (kube-system, kube-public) and not allowed_kube_namespace_pods
-  output: Pod created in kube namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- list: user_known_sa_list
-  items: []
-
-- list: known_sa_list
-  items: [
-    coredns,
-    coredns-autoscaler,
-    cronjob-controller,
-    daemon-set-controller,
-    deployment-controller,
-    disruption-controller,
-    endpoint-controller,
-    endpointslice-controller,
-    endpointslicemirroring-controller,
-    generic-garbage-collector,
-    horizontal-pod-autoscaler,
-    job-controller,
-    namespace-controller,
-    node-controller,
-    persistent-volume-binder,
-    pod-garbage-collector,
-    pv-protection-controller,
-    pvc-protection-controller,
-    replicaset-controller,
-    resourcequota-controller,
-    root-ca-cert-publisher,
-    service-account-controller,
-    statefulset-controller
-    ]
-
-- macro: trusted_sa
-  condition: (ka.target.name in (known_sa_list, user_known_sa_list))
-
-# Detect creating a service account in the kube-system/kube-public namespace
-- rule: Service Account Created in Kube Namespace
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a serviceaccount in the kube-system or kube-public namespaces
-  condition: kevt and serviceaccount and kcreate and ka.target.namespace in (kube-system, kube-public) and response_successful and not trusted_sa
-  output: Service account created in kube namespace (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# Detect any modify/delete to any ClusterRole starting with
-# "system:". "system:coredns" is excluded as changes are expected in
-# normal operation.
-- rule: System ClusterRole Modified/Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to modify/delete a ClusterRole/Role starting with system
-  condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and (kmodify or kdelete) and (ka.target.name startswith "system:") and
-             not ka.target.name in (system:coredns, system:managed-certificate-controller)
-  output: System ClusterRole/Role modified or deleted (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace action=%ka.verb)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# Detect any attempt to create a ClusterRoleBinding to the cluster-admin user
-# (expand this to any built-in cluster role that does "sensitive" things)
-- rule: Attach to cluster-admin Role
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a ClusterRoleBinding to the cluster-admin user
-  condition: kevt and clusterrolebinding and kcreate and ka.req.binding.role=cluster-admin
-  output: Cluster Role Binding to cluster-admin role (user=%ka.user.name subject=%ka.req.binding.subjects)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: ClusterRole With Wildcard Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole with wildcard resources or verbs
-  condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and (ka.req.role.rules.resources intersects ("*") or ka.req.role.rules.verbs intersects ("*"))
-  output: Created Role/ClusterRole with wildcard (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: writable_verbs
-  condition: >
-    (ka.req.role.rules.verbs intersects (create, update, patch, delete, deletecollection))
-
-- rule: ClusterRole With Write Privileges Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole that can perform write-related actions
-  condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and writable_verbs
-  output: Created Role/ClusterRole with write privileges (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: ClusterRole With Pod Exec Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole that can exec to pods
-  condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and ka.req.role.rules.resources intersects ("pods/exec")
-  output: Created Role/ClusterRole with pod exec privileges (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# The rules below this point are less discriminatory and generally
-# represent a stream of activity for a cluster. If you wish to disable
-# these events, modify the following macro.
-- macro: consider_activity_events
-  condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
-
-- macro: kactivity
-  condition: (kevt and consider_activity_events)
-
-- rule: K8s Deployment Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a deployment
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and deployment and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Deployment Created (user=%ka.user.name deployment=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Deployment Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a deployment
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and deployment and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Deployment Deleted (user=%ka.user.name deployment=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Service Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a service
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and service and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Service Created (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Service Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a service
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and service and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Service Deleted (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s ConfigMap Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a configmap
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and configmap and response_successful)
-  output: K8s ConfigMap Created (user=%ka.user.name configmap=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s ConfigMap Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a configmap
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and configmap and response_successful)
-  output: K8s ConfigMap Deleted (user=%ka.user.name configmap=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Namespace Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a namespace
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and namespace and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Namespace Created (user=%ka.user.name namespace=%ka.target.name resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Namespace Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a namespace
-  condition: (kactivity and non_system_user and kdelete and namespace and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Namespace Deleted (user=%ka.user.name namespace=%ka.target.name resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Serviceaccount Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a service account
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and serviceaccount and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Serviceaccount Created (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Serviceaccount Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a service account
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and serviceaccount and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Serviceaccount Deleted (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrole Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a cluster role/role
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and (clusterrole or role) and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Cluster Role Created (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name rules=%ka.req.role.rules resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrole Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a cluster role/role
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and (clusterrole or role) and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Cluster Role Deleted (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrolebinding Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a clusterrolebinding
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and clusterrolebinding and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Cluster Role Binding Created (user=%ka.user.name binding=%ka.target.name subjects=%ka.req.binding.subjects role=%ka.req.binding.role resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrolebinding Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a clusterrolebinding
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and clusterrolebinding and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Cluster Role Binding Deleted (user=%ka.user.name binding=%ka.target.name resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Secret Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
-  condition: (kactivity and kcreate and secret and ka.target.namespace!=kube-system and non_system_user and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Secret Created (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Secret Deleted
-  desc: Detect any attempt to delete a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
-  condition: (kactivity and kdelete and secret and ka.target.namespace!=kube-system and non_system_user and response_successful)
-  output: K8s Secret Deleted (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: INFO
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: K8s Secret Get Successfully
-  desc: >
-    Detect any attempt to get a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
-  condition: >
-    secret and kget
-    and kactivity
-    and response_successful
-  output: K8s Secret Get Successfully (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: ERROR
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule:  K8s Secret Get Unsuccessfully Tried
-  desc: >
-    Detect an unsuccessful attempt to get the secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
-  condition: >
-    secret and kget
-    and kactivity
-    and not response_successful
-  output: K8s Secret Get Unsuccessfully Tried (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-# This rule generally matches all events, and as a result is disabled
-# by default. If you wish to enable these events, modify the
-# following macro.
-#  condition: (jevt.rawtime exists)
-- macro: consider_all_events
-  condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
-
-- macro: kall
-  condition: (kevt and consider_all_events)
-
-- rule: All K8s Audit Events
-  desc: Match all K8s Audit Events
-  condition: kall
-  output: K8s Audit Event received (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri obj=%jevt.obj)
-  priority: DEBUG
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-
-# This macro disables following rule, change to k8s_audit_never_true to enable it
-- macro: allowed_full_admin_users
-  condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
-
-# This list includes some of the default user names for an administrator in several K8s installations
-- list: full_admin_k8s_users
-  items: ["admin", "kubernetes-admin",  "kubernetes-admin@kubernetes", "kubernetes-admin@cluster.local", "minikube-user"]
-
-# This rules detect an operation triggered by an user name that is
-# included in the list of those that are default administrators upon
-# cluster creation. This may signify a permission setting too broader.
-# As we can't check for role of the user on a general ka.* event, this
-# may or may not be an administrator. Customize the full_admin_k8s_users
-# list to your needs, and activate at your discretion.
-
-# # How to test:
-# # Execute any kubectl command connected using default cluster user, as:
-# kubectl create namespace rule-test
-
-- rule: Full K8s Administrative Access
-  desc: Detect any k8s operation by a user name that may be an administrator with full access.
-  condition: >
-    kevt
-    and non_system_user
-    and ka.user.name in (full_admin_k8s_users)
-    and not allowed_full_admin_users
-  output: K8s Operation performed by full admin user (user=%ka.user.name target=%ka.target.name/%ka.target.resource verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri resp=%ka.response.code)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- macro: ingress
-  condition: ka.target.resource=ingresses
-
-- macro: ingress_tls
-  condition: (jevt.value[/requestObject/spec/tls] exists)
-
-# # How to test:
-# # Create an ingress.yaml file with content:
-# apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1beta1
-# kind: Ingress
-# metadata:
-#   name: test-ingress
-#   annotations:
-#     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: /
-# spec:
-#   rules:
-#   - http:
-#       paths:
-#       - path: /testpath
-#         backend:
-#           serviceName: test
-#           servicePort: 80
-# # Execute: kubectl apply -f ingress.yaml
-
-- rule: Ingress Object without TLS Certificate Created
-  desc: Detect any attempt to create an ingress without TLS certification.
-  condition: >
-    (kactivity and kcreate and ingress and response_successful and not ingress_tls)
-  output: >
-    K8s Ingress Without TLS Cert Created (user=%ka.user.name ingress=%ka.target.name
-    namespace=%ka.target.namespace)
-  source: k8s_audit
-  priority: WARNING
-  tags: [k8s, network]
-
-- macro: node
-  condition: ka.target.resource=nodes
-
-- macro: allow_all_k8s_nodes
-  condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
-
-- list: allowed_k8s_nodes
-  items: []
-
-# # How to test:
-# # Create a Falco monitored cluster with Kops
-# # Increase the number of minimum nodes with:
-# kops edit ig nodes
-# kops apply --yes
-
-- rule: Untrusted Node Successfully Joined the Cluster
-  desc: >
-    Detect a node successfully joined the cluster outside of the list of allowed nodes.
-  condition: >
-    kevt and node
-    and kcreate
-    and response_successful
-    and not allow_all_k8s_nodes
-    and not ka.target.name in (allowed_k8s_nodes)
-  output: Node not in allowed list successfully joined the cluster (user=%ka.user.name node=%ka.target.name)
-  priority: ERROR
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]
-
-- rule: Untrusted Node Unsuccessfully Tried to Join the Cluster
-  desc: >
-    Detect an unsuccessful attempt to join the cluster for a node not in the list of allowed nodes.
-  condition: >
-    kevt and node
-    and kcreate
-    and not response_successful
-    and not allow_all_k8s_nodes
-    and not ka.target.name in (allowed_k8s_nodes)
-  output: Node not in allowed list tried unsuccessfully to join the cluster  (user=%ka.user.name node=%ka.target.name reason=%ka.response.reason)
-  priority: WARNING
-  source: k8s_audit
-  tags: [k8s]

rules/okta_rules.yaml

@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-#Example Rule on login in to OKTA. Disabled by default since it might be noisy
-#- rule: User logged in to OKTA
-#  desc: Detect the user login in to OKTA
-#  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.session.start" 
-#  output: "A user has logged in toOKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-#       priority: NOTICE
-#  source: okta
-#  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: User Changing password in to OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user change password in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.account.update_password"
-  output: "A user has changed password from OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: Creating a new OKTA user account
-  desc: Detect a new OKTA user account created in the OKTA environment
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.lifecycle.create"
-  output: "A new OKTA user account created (user=%okta.actor.name, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User accessing app via single sign on OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user accessing an app via OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.authentication.sso"
-  output: "A user has accessed an app using OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, app=%okta.app)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User has been locked out in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who has been locked out in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.account.lock"
-  output: "A user has been locked out in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: User has been moved from suspended status in OKTA.
-  desc: Detect a user who has been moved from suspended status in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.lifecycle.unsuspend"
-  output: "A user has been moved from suspended status in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User has been activated in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who has been activated in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.lifecycle.activate"
-  output: "A user has been activated in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User has been deactivated in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who has been deactivated in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.lifecycle.deactivate"
-  output: "A user has been deactivated in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User has been suspended in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who has been suspended in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.lifecycle.suspended"
-  output: "A user has been suspended in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: Admin permission has been assigned to a user in OKTA
-  desc: Detect an admin permission assigned to a user in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.account.privilege.grant"
-  output: "A user has been locked out in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: Creating a new OKTA API token
-  desc: Detect a new OKTA API token created in the OKTA environment
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "system.api_token.create"
-  output: "A new OKTA API token has been created in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: User accessing OKTA admin section
-  desc: Detect a user accessing OKTA admin section of your OKTA instance
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.session.access_admin_app"
-  output: "A user accessed the OKTA admin section of your OKTA instance (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: Adding user in OKTA group
-  desc: Detect a new user added to an OKTA group
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "group.user_membership.add"
-  output: "A user has been added in an OKTA group (user=%okta.actor.name, target group=%okta.target.group.name, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: removing MFA factor from user in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a removing MFA activity on a user in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.mfa.factor.deactivate"
-  output: "A user has removed MFA factor in the OKTA account (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: removing all MFA factor from user in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a removing MFA activity on a user in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.mfa.factor.reset_all"
-  output: "A user has removed all MFA factor in the OKTA account (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: User password reset by OKTA admin
-  desc: Detect a password reset on a user done by OKTA Admin Account
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.account.reset_password"
-  output: "A user password has been reset by an OKTA Admin account (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: User hitting the rate limit on requests in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who hit the rate limit on requests in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "system.org.rate_limit.violation"
-  output: "A user has hitted the rate limit on requests in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-- rule: Adding user to application membership in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who has been added o application membership in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "application.user_membership.add"
-  output: "A user has been added to an application membership in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name, app=%okta.app)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false
-
-- rule: User initiating impersonation session in OKTA
-  desc: Detect a user who initiate an impersonation session in OKTA
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.session.impersonation.initiate"
-  output: "A user has initiated an impersonation session in OKTA (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, target user=%okta.target.user.name)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-
-# This list allows easily whitelisting countries that are
-# expected to see OKTA logins from.
-- list: allowed_countries_list
-  items: []
-
-- macro: user_known_countries
-  condition: (okta.client.geo.country in (allowed_countries_list))
-
-- rule: Detecting unknown logins using geolocation
-  desc: Detect a logins event based on user geolocation
-  condition: okta.evt.type = "user.session.start" and not user_known_countries
-  output: "A user logged in OKTA from a suspicious country (user=%okta.actor.name, ip=%okta.client.ip, country=%okta.client.geo.country)"
-  priority: NOTICE
-  source: okta
-  tags: [okta]
-  enabled: false