Improve ruleset based on falco event-generator.

Improve ruleset after using with falco event_generator:

 - Instead of assuming all shells are bash, add a list shell_binaries
   and macro shell_procs, and replace references to bash with
   shell_procs. This revealed some other programs that can spawn shells.

 - Add "login" as an interactive command. systemd-login isn't in alpine
   linux, which is the linux distro used for the container.

 - Move read_sensitive_file_untrusted before
   read_sensitive_file_trusted_after_startup, so it can hit first.

rules/falco_rules.yaml

@@ -54,6 +54,12 @@
 - macro: linux_so_dirs
   condition: ubuntu_so_dirs or centos_so_dirs or fd.name=/etc/ld.so.cache
 
+- list: shell_binaries
+  items: [bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]
+
+- macro: shell_procs
+  condition: proc.name in (shell_binaries)
+
 - list: coreutils_binaries
   items: [
     truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who,
@@ -161,7 +167,7 @@
 - macro: container
   condition: container.id != host
 - macro: interactive
-  condition: ((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or proc.name=systemd-logind)
+  condition: ((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
 - macro: syslog
   condition: fd.name in (/dev/log, /run/systemd/journal/syslog)
 - list: cron_binaries
@@ -203,18 +209,18 @@
   output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name) within pipe installer session"
   priority: INFO
 
-- rule: read_sensitive_file_untrusted
-  desc: an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
-  condition: sensitive_files and open_read and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, bash, sshd) and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
-  output: "Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
-  priority: WARNING
-
 - rule: read_sensitive_file_trusted_after_startup
   desc: an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
   condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
   output: "Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
   priority: WARNING
 
+- rule: read_sensitive_file_untrusted
+  desc: an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
+  condition: sensitive_files and open_read and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, shell_binaries, sshd) and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
+  output: "Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name name=%proc.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
+  priority: WARNING
+
 # Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
 - rule: write_rpm_database
   desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
@@ -264,7 +270,7 @@
 
 - rule: run_shell_untrusted
   desc: an attempt to spawn a shell by a non-shell program. Exceptions are made for trusted binaries.
-  condition: spawned_process and not container and proc.name = bash and proc.pname exists and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, bash, sshd, sudo, docker_binaries, su, tmux, screen, emacs, systemd, login, flock, fbash, nginx, monit, supervisord, dragent)
+  condition: spawned_process and not container and shell_procs and proc.pname exists and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, shell_binaries, sshd, sudo, docker_binaries, su, tmux, screen, emacs, systemd, login, flock, fbash, nginx, monit, supervisord, dragent, aws, initdb, docker-compose)
   output: "Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
   priority: WARNING
 
@@ -281,7 +287,7 @@
 
 - rule: run_shell_in_container
   desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints are excluded.
-  condition: spawned_process and container and proc.name = bash and proc.pname exists and not proc.pname in (sh, bash, docker_binaries)
+  condition: spawned_process and container and shell_procs and proc.pname exists and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, docker_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl)
   output: "Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
   priority: WARNING