Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Stemm
8c6ebd586d Update nodejs example (#449)
Update the express version to mitigate some security vulnerabilities.

Update the port to match the one used by demo.yml.

Change to /usr/src/app so npm install works as expected.
2018-10-26 05:51:33 -07:00
Mark Stemm
d6d975e28c Refactor shell rules (#301)
* Refactor shell rules to avoid FPs.

Refactoring the shell related rules to avoid FPs. Instead of considering
all shells suspicious and trying to carve out exceptions for the
legitimate uses of shells, only consider shells spawned below certain
processes suspicious.

The set of processes is a collection of commonly used web servers,
databases, nosql document stores, mail programs, message queues, process
monitors, application servers, etc.

Also, runsv is also considered a top level process that denotes a
service. This allows a way for more flexible servers like ad-hoc nodejs
express apps, etc to denote themselves as a full server process.

* Update event generator to reflect new shell rules

spawn_shell is now a silent action. its replacement is
spawn_shell_under_httpd, which respawns itself as httpd and then runs a
shell.

db_program_spawn_binaries now runs ls instead of a shell so it only
matches db_program_spawn_process.

* Comment out old shell related rules

* Modify nodejs example to work w/ new shell rules

Start the express server using runit's runsv, which allows falco to
consider any shells run by it as suspicious.

* Use the updated argument for mkdir

In https://github.com/draios/sysdig/pull/757 the path argument for mkdir
moved to the second argument. This only became visible in the unit tests
once the trace files were updated to reflect the other shell rule
changes--the trace files had the old format.

* Update unit tests for shell rules changes

Shell in container doesn't exist any longer and its functionality has
been subsumed by run shell untrusted.

* Allow git binaries to run shells

In some cases, these are run below a service runsv so we still need
exceptions for them.

* Let consul agent spawn curl for health checks

* Don't protect tomcat

There's enough evidence of people spawning general commands that we
can't protect it.

* Reorder exceptions, add rabbitmq exception

Move the nginx exception to the main rule instead of the
protected_shell_spawner macro. Also add erl_child_setup (related to
rabbitmq) as an allowed shell spawner.

* Add additional spawn binaries

All off these are either below nginx, httpd, or runsv but should still
be allowed to spawn shells.

* Exclude shells when ancestor is a pkg mgmt binary

Skip shells when any process ancestor (parent, gparent, etc) is a
package management binary. This includes the program needrestart. This
is a deep search but should prevent a lot of other more detailed
exceptions trying to find the specific scripts run as a part of
installations.

* Skip shells related to serf

Serf is a service discovery tool and can in some cases be spawned by
apache/nginx. Also allow shells that are just checking the status of
pids via kill -0.

* Add several exclusions back

Add several exclusions back from the shell in container rule. These are
all allowed shell spawns that happen to be below
nginx/fluentd/apache/etc.

* Remove commented-out rules

This saves space as well as cleanup. I haven't yet removed the
macros/lists used by these rules and not used anywhere else. I'll do
that cleanup in a separate step.

* Also exclude based on command lines

Add back the exclusions based on command lines, using the existing set
of command lines.

* Add addl exclusions for shells

Of note is runsv, which means it can directly run shells (the ./run and
./finish scripts), but the things it runs can not.

* Don't trigger on shells spawning shells

We'll detect the first shell and not any other shells it spawns.

* Allow "runc:" parents to count as a cont entrypnt

In some cases, the initial process for a container can have a parent
"runc:[0:PARENT]", so also allow those cases to count as a container
entrypoint.

* Use container_entrypoint macro

Use the container_entrypoint macro to denote entering a container and
also allow exe to be one of the processes that's the parent of an
entrypoint.
2017-11-28 07:04:37 -08:00
Mark Stemm
30ebfd4bcc Switch port to 8181.
Won't conflict with k8s api server port.
2017-09-18 08:46:50 -07:00
Mark Stemm
646aed5b8b Explicitly spawn program via shell.
So example continues to work.
2017-06-14 15:26:17 -07:00
Mark Stemm
6356490b1c Misc demo improvements.
Small changes to improve the use of falco_event_generator with falco:

 - In event_generator, some actions like exec_ls won't trigger
   notifications on their own. So exclude them from -a all.
 - For all actions, print details on what the action will do.
 - For actions that won't result in a falco notification in containers,
   note that in the output.
 - The short version of --once wasn't working, fix the getopt.
 - Explicitly saying -a all wasn't working, fix.
 - Don't rely on an external ruleset in the nodejs docker-compose
   demo--the built in rules are sufficient now.
2017-02-01 14:51:18 -08:00
Mark Stemm
73e52e1e91 Don't run the spawned program in a shell.
Instead, run it directly. This avoids false positives when running
non-bash commands and false negatives when trying to run a shell.
2016-10-24 15:56:45 -07:00
Mark Stemm
4a941df787 Example showing running bash via a bad rest api.
Simple docker-compose environment that starts a simple express server
with a poorly-designed /api/exec/<cmd> endpoint that executes arbitrary
commands, and uses falco to detect running bash.
2016-07-07 15:35:11 -07:00