Files
falco/rules/falco_rules.yaml
Mark Stemm 1cdacc1494 Add macro to easily augment shell rule
Add a macro user_shell_container_exclusions that allows a second rules
file to easily extend the shelll in container rule without overriding
the entire rule.

Also add an exclusion node_running_edi_dynamodb which can be used for
that macro.
2017-10-09 09:20:00 -07:00

1035 lines
42 KiB
YAML

#############
# Definitions
#############
# File actions
# Currently disabled as read/write are ignored syscalls. The nearly
# similar open_write/open_read check for files being opened for
# reading/writing.
# - macro: write
# condition: (syscall.type=write and fd.type in (file, directory))
# - macro: read
# condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory))
- macro: open_write
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: open_read
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: rename
condition: evt.type = rename
- macro: mkdir
condition: evt.type = mkdir
- macro: remove
condition: evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat)
- macro: modify
condition: rename or remove
- macro: spawned_process
condition: evt.type = execve and evt.dir=<
# File categories
- macro: terminal_file_fd
condition: fd.name=/dev/ptmx or fd.name startswith /dev/pts
- macro: bin_dir
condition: fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)
- macro: bin_dir_mkdir
condition: >
evt.arg[0] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: bin_dir_rename
condition: >
evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: etc_dir
condition: fd.name startswith /etc
- macro: ubuntu_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/sudo
- macro: centos_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/libexec
- macro: linux_so_dirs
condition: ubuntu_so_dirs or centos_so_dirs or fd.name=/etc/ld.so.cache
- list: shell_binaries
items: [bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]
- list: shell_mgmt_binaries
items: [add-shell, remove-shell]
- macro: shell_procs
condition: proc.name in (shell_binaries)
- list: coreutils_binaries
items: [
truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who,
groups, csplit, sort, expand, printf, printenv, unlink, tee, chcon, stat,
basename, split, nice, "yes", whoami, sha224sum, hostid, users, stdbuf,
base64, unexpand, cksum, od, paste, nproc, pathchk, sha256sum, wc, test,
comm, arch, du, factor, sha512sum, md5sum, tr, runcon, env, dirname,
tsort, join, shuf, install, logname, pinky, nohup, expr, pr, tty, timeout,
tail, "[", seq, sha384sum, nl, head, id, mkfifo, sum, dircolors, ptx, shred,
tac, link, chroot, vdir, chown, touch, ls, dd, uname, "true", pwd, date,
chgrp, chmod, mktemp, cat, mknod, sync, ln, "false", rm, mv, cp, echo,
readlink, sleep, stty, mkdir, df, dir, rmdir, touch
]
# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: login_binaries
items: [
login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su,
nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg
]
# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: passwd_binaries
items: [
shadowconfig, grpck, pwunconv, grpconv, pwck,
groupmod, vipw, pwconv, useradd, newusers, cppw, chpasswd, usermod,
groupadd, groupdel, grpunconv, chgpasswd, userdel, chage, chsh,
gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr
]
# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' |
# awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: shadowutils_binaries
items: [
chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd,
groupadd, groupdel, addgroup, delgroup, groupmems, groupmod, grpck, grpconv, grpunconv,
newusers, pwck, pwconv, pwunconv, useradd, userdel, usermod, vigr, vipw, unix_chkpwd
]
- list: sysdigcloud_binaries
items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks]
- list: docker_binaries
items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi]
- list: k8s_binaries
items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz]
- list: lxd_binaries
items: [lxd, lxcfs]
# Utility/etc programs known to run on mesos slaves. Truncation
# intentional.
- list: mesos_slave_binaries
items: [mesos-health-ch, mesos-docker-ex, mesos-agent, mesos-slave, mesos-logrotate, mesos-fetcher, mesos-executor, 3dt]
- list: phusion_passenger_binaries
items: [PassengerAgent]
- list: chef_binaries
items: [chef-client]
- list: http_server_binaries
items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd]
- list: db_server_binaries
items: [mysqld]
- list: gitlab_binaries
items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git]
- macro: server_procs
condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)
# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being
# interpreted by the filter expression.
- list: rpm_binaries
items: [dnf, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"']
- macro: rpm_procs
condition: proc.name in (rpm_binaries)
- list: deb_binaries
items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dpkg-reconfigur, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr
]
# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are
# truncated at the sysdig level.
- list: package_mgmt_binaries
items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat]
- macro: package_mgmt_procs
condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)
- list: ssl_mgmt_binaries
items: [ca-certificates]
- list: dhcp_binaries
items: [dhclient, dhclient-script]
# A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different
# privileges or as a different user.
- list: userexec_binaries
items: [sudo, su]
- list: known_setuid_binaries
items: [sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-]
- list: user_mgmt_binaries
items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries]
- list: dev_creation_binaries
items: [blkid, rename_device, update_engine]
- list: aide_wrapper_binaries
items: [aide.wrapper, update-aide.con]
- list: hids_binaries
items: [aide]
- list: vpn_binaries
items: [openvpn]
- list: nomachine_binaries
items: [nxexec, nxnode.bin, nxserver.bin, nxclient.bin]
- list: nids_binaries
items: [bro, broctl]
- list: monitoring_binaries
items: [icinga2, nrpe, npcd, check_sar_perf., qualys-cloud-ag]
- macro: system_procs
condition: proc.name in (coreutils_binaries, user_mgmt_binaries)
- list: mail_binaries
items: [sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4, pickup, showq]
- list: sendmail_config_binaries
items: [
update_conf, parse_mc, makemap_hash, newaliases, update_mk, update_tlsm4,
update_db, update_mc, ssmtp.postinst
]
- list: make_binaries
items: [make, gmake, cmake]
- list: keepalived_binaries
items: [keepalived]
- macro: sensitive_files
condition: >
fd.name startswith /etc and
(fd.name in (/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf)
or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))
# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time
# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds.
- macro: proc_is_new
condition: proc.duration <= 5000000000
# Network
- macro: inbound
condition: ((evt.type=listen and evt.dir=>) or (evt.type=accept and evt.dir=<))
# Currently sendto is an ignored syscall, otherwise this could also
# check for (evt.type=sendto and evt.dir=>)
- macro: outbound
condition: evt.type=connect and evt.dir=< and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6)
- macro: ssh_port
condition: fd.lport=22
# Ssh
- macro: ssh_error_message
condition: >
(evt.arg.data contains "Invalid user" or
evt.arg.data contains "preauth" or
evt.arg.data contains "Failed password")
# System
- macro: modules
condition: evt.type in (delete_module, init_module)
# Use this to test whether the event occurred within a container.
# When displaying container information in the output field, use
# %container.info, without any leading term (file=%fd.name
# %container.info user=%user.name, and not file=%fd.name
# container=%container.info user=%user.name). The output will change
# based on the context and whether or not -pk/-pm/-pc was specified on
# the command line.
- macro: container
condition: container.id != host
- macro: interactive
condition: >
((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or
proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
- macro: syslog
condition: fd.name in (/dev/log, /run/systemd/journal/syslog)
- list: cron_binaries
items: [anacron, cron, crond]
# https://github.com/liske/needrestart
- list: needrestart_binaries
items: [needrestart, 10-dpkg, 20-rpm, 30-pacman]
# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own
# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here.
- macro: system_users
condition: user.name in (bin, daemon, games, lp, mail, nobody, sshd, sync, uucp, www-data)
# SPECIAL NOTE: This macro eliminates false positives that result from
# running python scripts as a part of ansible. However, the condition
# that the command line contains "ansible" is very
# permissive. Ideally, you should change this macro to explicitly
# scope the python scripts to a specific directory (namely, your
# configured remote_tmp directory).
- macro: parent_ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.pname in (python, pypy) and proc.pcmdline contains ansible)
- macro: ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy) and proc.cmdline contains ansible)
- macro: python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.name=python and
(proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.pname=python and
(proc.pcmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.pcmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_sdchecks
condition: >
(proc.pname in (python, python2.7) and
(proc.pcmdline contains /opt/draios/bin/sdchecks))
- macro: parent_bro_running_python
condition: (proc.pname=python and proc.cmdline contains /usr/share/broctl)
- macro: parent_java_running_jenkins
condition: >
(proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains jenkins.war
or proc.pcmdline contains /tmp/slave.jar)
- macro: parent_java_running_echo
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c echo")
- macro: parent_scripting_running_builds
condition: >
(proc.pname in (php,php5-fpm,python,ruby,ruby2.3,node) and (
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c git" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c date" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/bin/g++" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/bin/gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c if type gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c cd '/var/www/edi/';LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8 git"))
- macro: parent_node_running_npm
condition: proc.pcmdline startswith "node /usr/local/bin/npm"
- macro: parent_nginx_running_serf
condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c serf")
- macro: parent_Xvfb_running_xkbcomp
condition: (proc.pname=Xvfb and proc.cmdline startswith 'sh -c "/usr/bin/xkbcomp"')
- macro: mysql_image_running_healthcheck
condition: container.image=mysql and proc.cmdline="sh -c /healthcheck.sh"
# As a part of kernel upgrades, dpkg will spawn a perl script with the
# name linux-image-N.N. This macro matches that.
- macro: parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
condition: proc.pname startswith linux-image-
- macro: java_running_sdjagent
condition: proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains sdjagent.jar
###############
# General Rules
###############
- rule: Write below binary dir
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- list: safe_etc_dirs
items: [/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java, /etc/logstash, /etc/nginx/conf.d, /etc/container_environment]
- macro: fluentd_writing_fluentd_conf
condition: (proc.name=start-fluentd and fd.name=/etc/fluent/fluent.conf)
- macro: write_etc_common
condition: >
etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries,
dev_creation_binaries, shell_mgmt_binaries,
sendmail_config_binaries,
ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv,
apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst,
systemd, systemd-machine, systemd-sysuser,
debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv,
gen_resolvconf., update-ca-certi, certbot, runsv,
qualys-cloud-ag, locales.postins, nomachine_binaries)
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, sendmail_config_binaries)
and not fd.name pmatch (safe_etc_dirs)
and not fd.name in (/etc/container_environment.sh, /etc/container_environment.json)
and not ansible_running_python
and not python_running_denyhosts
and not fluentd_writing_fluentd_conf
- rule: Write below etc
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, not in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and not proc.sname=fbash
output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Within a fbash session, the severity is lowered to INFO
- rule: Write below etc in installer
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and proc.sname=fbash
output: >
File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
file=%fd.name) within pipe installer session
priority: INFO
tags: [filesystem]
- macro: cmp_cp_by_passwd
condition: proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname=passwd
- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files
at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2]
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
- list: read_sensitive_file_binaries
items: [
iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd,
vsftpd, systemd, mysql_install_d
]
- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
condition: >
sensitive_files and open_read
and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries,
vpn_binaries, sendmail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries)
and not cmp_cp_by_passwd
and not ansible_running_python
and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name name=%proc.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2])
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
- rule: Write below rpm database
desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
condition: fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write and not rpm_procs and not ansible_running_python
output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt]
- rule: DB program spawned process
desc: >
a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself.
This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
condition: proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and spawned_process and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
output: >
Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name
program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process, database]
- rule: Modify binary dirs
desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
condition: bin_dir_rename and modify and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Don't load shared objects coming from unexpected places
# Commenting this out for now--there are lots of shared library
# locations below /usr/lib for things like python, perl, etc. We may
# want to just add /usr/lib to the list, but that is really
# permissive.
# - condition: open_read and fd.name contains .so and not (linux_so_dirs)
# output: "Loaded .so from unexpected dir (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Temporarily disabling this rule as it's tripping over https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/598
# - rule: Syscall returns eaccess
# desc: >
# any system call that returns EACCESS. This is not always a strong
# indication of a problem, hence the INFO priority.
# condition: evt.res = EACCESS
# output: >
# System call returned EACCESS (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
# syscall=%evt.type args=%evt.args)
# priority: INFO
- rule: Change thread namespace
desc: >
an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.
condition: >
evt.type = setns
and not proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, nsenter)
and not proc.name startswith "runc:"
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
output: >
Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
parent=%proc.pname %container.info)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- list: known_shell_spawn_binaries
items: [
sshd, sudo, su, tmux, screen, emacs, systemd, login, flock, fbash,
nginx, monit, supervisord, dragent, aws, awslogs, initdb, docker-compose,
configure, awk, falco, fail2ban-server, fleetctl,
logrotate, ansible, less, adduser, pycompile, py3compile,
pyclean, py3clean, pip, pip2, ansible-playboo, man-db,
init, pluto, mkinitramfs, unattended-upgr, watch, sysdig,
landscape-sysin, nessusd, PM2, syslog-summary, erl_child_setup,
npm, cloud-init, toybox, ceph, hhvm, certbot, mysql_install_d,
serf, a2enmod, runsv, supervisord, varnishd, authconfig, tini,
x2goagent
]
- rule: Run shell untrusted
desc: an attempt to spawn a shell by a non-shell program. Exceptions are made for trusted binaries.
condition: >
spawned_process and not container
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, shell_binaries, make_binaries, known_shell_spawn_binaries, docker_binaries,
k8s_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries,
keepalived_binaries,
needrestart_binaries, phusion_passenger_binaries, chef_binaries, nomachine_binaries)
and not parent_ansible_running_python
and not parent_bro_running_python
and not parent_python_running_denyhosts
and not parent_python_running_sdchecks
and not parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
and not parent_java_running_jenkins
and not parent_java_running_echo
and not parent_scripting_running_builds
and not parent_Xvfb_running_xkbcomp
and not parent_nginx_running_serf
and not parent_node_running_npm
output: >
Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3])
priority: DEBUG
tags: [host, shell]
- macro: trusted_containers
condition: (container.image startswith sysdig/agent or
(container.image startswith sysdig/falco and
not container.image startswith sysdig/falco-event-generator) or
container.image startswith quay.io/sysdig or
container.image startswith sysdig/sysdig or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube or
container.image startswith quay.io/coreos/flannel or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy)
# These containers are ones that are known to spawn lots of
# shells. Generally, they are for systems where the container is used
# as a packaging mechanism more than for a dedicated microservice.
- macro: shell_spawning_containers
condition: (container.image startswith jenkins or
container.image startswith gitlab/gitlab-ce or
container.image startswith gitlab/gitlab-ee)
- rule: Launch Privileged Container
desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and container.privileged=true and not trusted_containers
output: Privileged container started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
- macro: sensitive_mount
condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A")
# The steps libcontainer performs to set up the root program for a container are:
# - clone + exec self to a program runc:[0:PARENT]
# - clone a program runc:[1:CHILD] which sets up all the namespaces
# - clone a second program runc:[2:INIT] + exec to the root program.
# The parent of runc:[2:INIT] is runc:0:PARENT]
# As soon as 1:CHILD is created, 0:PARENT exits, so there's a race
# where at the time 2:INIT execs the root program, 0:PARENT might have
# already exited, or might still be around. So we handle both.
- macro: container_entrypoint
condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname=runc:[0:PARENT])
- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
desc: >
Detect the initial process started by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory
(i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and sensitive_mount and not trusted_containers
output: Container with sensitive mount started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
# Anything run interactively by root
# - condition: evt.type != switch and user.name = root and proc.name != sshd and interactive
# output: "Interactive root (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
- rule: System user interactive
desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive
output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [users]
- rule: Terminal shell in container
desc: A shell was spawned by a program in a container with an attached terminal.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
output: >
A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to
# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't
# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we
# fall back to allowing certain command lines.
- list: known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines
items: [
'"bash -c curl -f localhost:$API_PORT/admin/healthcheck"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c pgrep java && exit 0 || exit 1 "',
'"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"',
'"sh -c echo healthy "',
'"sh -c echo alive "',
'"sh -c getconf CLK_TCK"',
'"sh -c getconf PAGESIZE"',
'"sh -c LC_ALL=C LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c stty -a 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c node index.js"',
'"sh -c node index"',
'"sh -c node ./src/start.js"',
'"sh -c node app.js"',
'"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\")"',
'"sh -c node $NODE_DEBUG_OPTION index.js "',
'"sh -c crontab -l 2"',
'"sh -c lsb_release -a"'
]
# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to without having to copy
# and override the entire run shell in container macro. Once
# https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/255 is fixed this will be a
# bit easier, as someone could append of any of the existing lists.
- list: user_known_container_shell_spawn_binaries
items: []
# This macro allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to override the entire
# rule. Its default value is an expression that always is false, which
# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied.
- macro: user_shell_container_exclusions
condition: (evt.num=0)
# Temporarily adding as an example
- macro: node_running_edi_dynamodb
condition: proc.pname=node and proc.pcmdline contains /var/www/edi/process.js
- rule: Run shell in container
desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints are excluded.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs
and not container_entrypoint
and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, make_binaries, docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
lxd_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
user_known_container_shell_spawn_binaries,
needrestart_binaries,
phusion_passenger_binaries,
chef_binaries,
nomachine_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl, awk, falco, cron,
erl_child_setup, ceph, PM2, pycompile, py3compile, hhvm, npm, mysql_install_d, serf,
runsv, supervisord, varnishd, crond, logrotate, x2goagent)
and not trusted_containers
and not shell_spawning_containers
and not parent_java_running_echo
and not parent_scripting_running_builds
and not parent_Xvfb_running_xkbcomp
and not mysql_image_running_healthcheck
and not parent_nginx_running_serf
and not proc.cmdline in (known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
and not parent_node_running_npm
and not user_shell_container_exclusions
and not node_running_edi_dynamodb
output: >
Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name %container.info image=%container.image
shell=%proc.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline cmdline=%proc.cmdline)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand
- rule: System procs network activity
desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
condition: (fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs) and (inbound or outbound) and not proc.name=systemd
output: >
Known system binary sent/received network traffic
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco
# (e.g. excluding read/write/sendto/recvfrom/etc, this rule won't
# trigger).
# - rule: Ssh error in syslog
# desc: any ssh errors (failed logins, disconnects, ...) sent to syslog
# condition: syslog and ssh_error_message and evt.dir = <
# output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)"
# priority: WARNING
- macro: somebody_becoming_themself
condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or
(user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data) or
(user.name=_apt and evt.arg.uid=_apt) or
(user.name=postfix and evt.arg.uid=postfix))
# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs
- rule: Non sudo setuid
desc: >
an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. users "root" and "nobody"
suing to itself are also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: >
evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> and
not user.name=root and not somebody_becoming_themself
and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries, nomachine_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
output: >
Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname
command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [users]
- rule: User mgmt binaries
desc: >
activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded.
Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top
of a base linux distribution at startup.
Some innocuous commandlines that don't actually change anything are excluded.
condition: >
spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and
not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog) and not container and
not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, run-parts) and
not proc.cmdline startswith "passwd -S" and
not proc.cmdline startswith "useradd -D"
output: >
User management binary command run outside of container
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3])
priority: NOTICE
tags: [host, users]
- list: allowed_dev_files
items: [
/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr,
/dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg
]
# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see:
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
- rule: Create files below dev
desc: creating any files below /dev other than known programs that manage devices. Some rootkits hide files in /dev.
condition: >
fd.directory = /dev and
(evt.type = creat or (evt.type = open and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT))
and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries)
and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# fbash is a small shell script that runs bash, and is suitable for use in curl <curl> | fbash installers.
- rule: Installer bash starts network server
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start listening for network connections
condition: evt.type=listen and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected listen call by a process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
- rule: Installer bash starts session
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start a new session
condition: evt.type=setsid and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected setsid call by a process in fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- rule: Installer bash non https connection
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to make an outgoing connection on a non-http(s) port
condition: proc.sname=fbash and outbound and not fd.sport in (80, 443, 53)
output: >
Outbound connection on non-http(s) port by a process in a fbash session
(command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# It'd be nice if we could warn when processes in a fbash session try
# to download from any nonstandard location? This is probably blocked
# on https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/88 though.
# Notice when processes try to run chkconfig/systemctl.... to install a service.
# Note: this is not a WARNING, as you'd expect some service management
# as a part of doing the installation.
- rule: Installer bash manages service
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to manage a system service (systemd/chkconfig)
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.name in (chkconfig, systemctl) and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Service management program run by process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [software_mgmt]
# Notice when processes try to run any package management binary within a fbash session.
# Note: this is not a WARNING, as you'd expect some package management
# as a part of doing the installation
- rule: Installer bash runs pkgmgmt program
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to run a package management binary
condition: evt.type=execve and package_mgmt_procs and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Package management program run by process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [software_mgmt]
###########################
# Application-Related Rules
###########################
################################################################
# By default all application-related rules are disabled for
# performance reasons. Depending on the application(s) you use,
# uncomment the corresponding rule definitions for
# application-specific activity monitoring.
################################################################
# Elasticsearch ports
- macro: elasticsearch_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=9300
- macro: elasticsearch_api_port
condition: fd.sport=9200
- macro: elasticsearch_port
condition: elasticsearch_cluster_port or elasticsearch_api_port
# - rule: Elasticsearch unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to elasticsearch on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = elasticsearch and inbound and not elasticsearch_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Elasticsearch on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Elasticsearch unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from elasticsearch on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = elasticsearch and outbound and not elasticsearch_cluster_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Elasticsearch on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# ActiveMQ ports
- macro: activemq_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=61616
- macro: activemq_web_port
condition: fd.sport=8161
- macro: activemq_port
condition: activemq_web_port or activemq_cluster_port
# - rule: Activemq unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to activemq on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = activemq and inbound and not activemq_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to ActiveMQ on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Activemq unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from activemq on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = activemq and outbound and not activemq_cluster_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from ActiveMQ on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Cassandra ports
# https://docs.datastax.com/en/cassandra/2.0/cassandra/security/secureFireWall_r.html
- macro: cassandra_thrift_client_port
condition: fd.sport=9160
- macro: cassandra_cql_port
condition: fd.sport=9042
- macro: cassandra_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=7000
- macro: cassandra_ssl_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=7001
- macro: cassandra_jmx_port
condition: fd.sport=7199
- macro: cassandra_port
condition: >
cassandra_thrift_client_port or
cassandra_cql_port or cassandra_cluster_port or
cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_jmx_port
# - rule: Cassandra unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to cassandra on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = cassandra and inbound and not cassandra_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Cassandra on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Cassandra unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from cassandra on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = cassandra and outbound and not (cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_cluster_port)
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Cassandra on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Couchdb ports
# https://github.com/davisp/couchdb/blob/master/etc/couchdb/local.ini
- macro: couchdb_httpd_port
condition: fd.sport=5984
- macro: couchdb_httpd_ssl_port
condition: fd.sport=6984
# xxx can't tell what clustering ports are used. not writing rules for this
# yet.
# Fluentd ports
- macro: fluentd_http_port
condition: fd.sport=9880
- macro: fluentd_forward_port
condition: fd.sport=24224
# - rule: Fluentd unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to fluentd on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = td-agent and inbound and not (fluentd_forward_port or fluentd_http_port)
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Fluentd on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Tdagent unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from fluentd on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = td-agent and outbound and not fluentd_forward_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Fluentd on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Gearman ports
# http://gearman.org/protocol/
# - rule: Gearman unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from gearman on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = gearman and outbound and outbound and not fd.sport = 4730
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Gearman on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Zookeeper
- macro: zookeeper_port
condition: fd.sport = 2181
# Kafka ports
# - rule: Kafka unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to kafka on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = kafka and inbound and fd.sport != 9092
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Kafka on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Memcached ports
# - rule: Memcached unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to memcached on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = memcached and inbound and fd.sport != 11211
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Memcached on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Memcached unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: any outbound network traffic from memcached. memcached never initiates outbound connections.
# condition: user.name = memcached and outbound
# output: "Unexpected Memcached outbound connection (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# MongoDB ports
- macro: mongodb_server_port
condition: fd.sport = 27017
- macro: mongodb_shardserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 27018
- macro: mongodb_configserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 27019
- macro: mongodb_webserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 28017
# - rule: Mongodb unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to mongodb on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: >
# user.name = mongodb and inbound and not (mongodb_server_port or
# mongodb_shardserver_port or mongodb_configserver_port or mongodb_webserver_port)
# output: "Inbound network traffic to MongoDB on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# MySQL ports
# - rule: Mysql unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to mysql on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = mysql and inbound and fd.sport != 3306
# output: "Inbound network traffic to MySQL on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: HTTP server unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to a http server program on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries) and inbound and fd.sport != 80 and fd.sport != 443
# output: "Inbound network traffic to HTTP Server on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING