Files
falco/rules/falco_rules.yaml
Mark Stemm 38f488bfda Beta rule updates (#247)
* Updates from beta customers.

- add anacron as a cron program

* Reorganize package management binaries

Split package_management_binaries into two separate lists rpm_binaries
and deb_binaries. unattended-upgr is common to both worlds so it's still
in package_management_binaries.

Also change Write below rpm database to use rpm_binaries instead of its
own list.

Also add 75-system-updat (truncated) as a shell spawner.

* Add rules for jenkins

Add rules that allow jenkins to spawn shells, both in containers and
directly on the host.

Also handle jenkins slaves that run /tmp/slave.jar.

* Allow npm to run shells.

Not yet allowing node to run shells itself, although we want to add
something to reduce node-related FPs.

* Allow urlgrabber/git-remote to access /etc

urlgrabber and git-remote both try to access the RHEL nss database,
containing shared certificates. I may change this in a more general way
by changing open_read/open_write to only look for successful opens.

* Only look for successful open_read/open_writes

Change the macros open_read/open_write to only trigger on successful
opens (when fd.num > 0). This is a pretty big change to behavior, but
is more intuitive.

This required a small update to the open counts for a couple of unit
tests, but otherwise they still all passed with this change.

* Allow rename_device to write below /dev

Part of udev.

* Allow cloud-init to spawn shells.

Part of https://cloud-init.io/

* Allow python to run a shell that runs sdchecks

sdchecks is a part of the sysdig monitor agent.

* Allow dev creation binaries to write below etc.

Specifically this includes blkid and /etc/blkid/blkid.tab.

* Allow git binaries to spawn shells.

They were already allowed to run shells in a container.

* Add /dev/kmsg as an allowed /dev file

Allows userspace programs to write to kernel log.

* Allow other make programs to spawn shells.

Also allow gmake/cmake to spawn shells and put them in their own list
make_binaries.

* Add better mesos support.

Mesos slaves appear to be in a container due to their cgroup and can run
programs mesos-health-check/mesos-docker-exec to monitor the containers
on the slave, so allow them to run shells.

Add mesos-agent, mesos-logrotate, mesos-fetch as shell spawners both in
and out of containers.

Add gen_resolvconf. (short for gen_resolvconf.py) as a program that can
write to /etc.

Add toybox (used by mesos, part of http://landley.net/toybox/about.html)
as a shell spawner.

* systemd can listen on network ports.

Systemd can listen on network ports to launch daemons on demand, so
allow it to perform network activity.

* Let docker binaries setuid.

Let docker binaries setuid and add docker-entrypoi (truncation
intentional) to the set of docker binaries.

* Change cis-related rules to be less noisy

Change the two cis-related falco rules "File Open by Privileged
Container" and "Sensitive Mount by Container" to be less noisy. We found
in practice that tracking every open still results in too many falco
notifications.

For now, change the rules to only track the initial process start in the
container by looking for vpid=1. This should result in only triggering
when a privileged/sensitive mount container is started. This is slightly
less coverage but is far less noisy.

* Add quay.io/sysdig as trusted containers

These are used for sysdig cloud onpremise deployments.

* Add gitlab-runner-b(uild) as a gitlab binary.

Add gitlab-runner-b (truncated gitlab-runner-build) as a gitlab binary.

* Add ceph as a shell spawner.

Also allow ceph to spawn shells in a container.

* Allow some shells by command line.

For some mesos containers, where the container doesn't have an image and
is just a tarball in a cgroup/namespace, we don't have any image to work
with. In those cases, allow specific command lines.

* Allow user 'nobody' to setuid.

Allow the user nobody to setuid. This depends on the user nobody being
set up in the first place to have no access, but that should be an ok
assumption.

* Additional allowed shell commandlines

* Add additional shells.

* Allow multiple users to become themself.

Add rule somebody_becoming_themself that handles cases of nobody and
www-data trying to setuid to themself. The sysdig filter language
doesn't support template/variable values to allow "user.name=X and
evt.arg.uid=X for a given X", so we have to enumerate the users.

* More known spawn command lines

* Let make binaries be run in containers.

Some CI/CD pipelines build in containers.

* Add additional shell spawning command lines

* Add additional apt program apt-listchanges.

* Add gitlab-ce as shell spawning container.

* Allow PM2 to spawn shells in containers.

Was already in the general list, seen in some customers, so adding to
the in containers list.

* Clean up pass to fix long lines.

Take a pass through the rules making sure each line is < 120 characters.

* Change tests for privileged container rules.

Change unit tests to reflect the new privileged/sensitive mount
container rules that only detect container launch.
2017-06-19 11:28:15 -07:00

891 lines
35 KiB
YAML

#############
# Definitions
#############
# File actions
# Currently disabled as read/write are ignored syscalls. The nearly
# similar open_write/open_read check for files being opened for
# reading/writing.
# - macro: write
# condition: (syscall.type=write and fd.type in (file, directory))
# - macro: read
# condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory))
- macro: open_write
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: open_read
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: rename
condition: evt.type = rename
- macro: mkdir
condition: evt.type = mkdir
- macro: remove
condition: evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat)
- macro: modify
condition: rename or remove
- macro: spawned_process
condition: evt.type = execve and evt.dir=<
# File categories
- macro: terminal_file_fd
condition: fd.name=/dev/ptmx or fd.name startswith /dev/pts
- macro: bin_dir
condition: fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)
- macro: bin_dir_mkdir
condition: >
evt.arg[0] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: bin_dir_rename
condition: >
evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: etc_dir
condition: fd.name startswith /etc
- macro: ubuntu_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/sudo
- macro: centos_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/libexec
- macro: linux_so_dirs
condition: ubuntu_so_dirs or centos_so_dirs or fd.name=/etc/ld.so.cache
- list: shell_binaries
items: [bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]
- macro: shell_procs
condition: proc.name in (shell_binaries)
- list: coreutils_binaries
items: [
truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who,
groups, csplit, sort, expand, printf, printenv, unlink, tee, chcon, stat,
basename, split, nice, "yes", whoami, sha224sum, hostid, users, stdbuf,
base64, unexpand, cksum, od, paste, nproc, pathchk, sha256sum, wc, test,
comm, arch, du, factor, sha512sum, md5sum, tr, runcon, env, dirname,
tsort, join, shuf, install, logname, pinky, nohup, expr, pr, tty, timeout,
tail, "[", seq, sha384sum, nl, head, id, mkfifo, sum, dircolors, ptx, shred,
tac, link, chroot, vdir, chown, touch, ls, dd, uname, "true", pwd, date,
chgrp, chmod, mktemp, cat, mknod, sync, ln, "false", rm, mv, cp, echo,
readlink, sleep, stty, mkdir, df, dir, rmdir, touch
]
# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: login_binaries
items: [
login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su,
nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg
]
# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: passwd_binaries
items: [
shadowconfig, grpck, pwunconv, grpconv, pwck,
groupmod, vipw, pwconv, useradd, newusers, cppw, chpasswd, usermod,
groupadd, groupdel, grpunconv, chgpasswd, userdel, chage, chsh,
gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr
]
# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' |
# awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: shadowutils_binaries
items: [
chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd,
groupadd, groupdel, addgroup, delgroup, groupmems, groupmod, grpck, grpconv, grpunconv,
newusers, pwck, pwconv, pwunconv, useradd, userdel, usermod, vigr, vipw, unix_chkpwd
]
- list: sysdigcloud_binaries
items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks]
- list: docker_binaries
items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi]
- list: k8s_binaries
items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz]
- list: lxd_binaries
items: [lxd, lxcfs]
# Utility/etc programs known to run on mesos slaves. Truncation
# intentional.
- list: mesos_slave_binaries
items: [mesos-health-ch, mesos-docker-ex, mesos-agent, mesos-logrotate, mesos-fetcher]
- list: http_server_binaries
items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd]
- list: db_server_binaries
items: [mysqld]
- list: gitlab_binaries
items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git]
- macro: server_procs
condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)
# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being
# interpreted by the filter expression.
- list: rpm_binaries
items: [dnf, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"']
- macro: rpm_procs
condition: proc.name in (rpm_binaries)
- list: deb_binaries
items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr
]
# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are
# truncated at the sysdig level.
- list: package_mgmt_binaries
items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat]
- macro: package_mgmt_procs
condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)
- list: ssl_mgmt_binaries
items: [ca-certificates]
- list: dhcp_binaries
items: [dhclient, dhclient-script]
# A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different
# privileges or as a different user.
- list: userexec_binaries
items: [sudo, su]
- list: user_mgmt_binaries
items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries]
- list: dev_creation_binaries
items: [blkid, rename_device]
- list: aide_wrapper_binaries
items: [aide.wrapper, update-aide.con]
- list: hids_binaries
items: [aide]
- list: nids_binaries
items: [bro, broctl]
- list: monitoring_binaries
items: [icinga2, nrpe, npcd, check_sar_perf.]
- macro: system_procs
condition: proc.name in (coreutils_binaries, user_mgmt_binaries)
- list: mail_binaries
items: [sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4, pickup, showq]
- list: make_binaries
items: [make, gmake, cmake]
- macro: sensitive_files
condition: >
fd.name startswith /etc and
(fd.name in (/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf)
or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))
# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time
# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds.
- macro: proc_is_new
condition: proc.duration <= 5000000000
# Network
- macro: inbound
condition: ((evt.type=listen and evt.dir=>) or (evt.type=accept and evt.dir=<))
# Currently sendto is an ignored syscall, otherwise this could also
# check for (evt.type=sendto and evt.dir=>)
- macro: outbound
condition: evt.type=connect and evt.dir=< and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6)
- macro: ssh_port
condition: fd.lport=22
# Ssh
- macro: ssh_error_message
condition: >
(evt.arg.data contains "Invalid user" or
evt.arg.data contains "preauth" or
evt.arg.data contains "Failed password")
# System
- macro: modules
condition: evt.type in (delete_module, init_module)
# Use this to test whether the event occurred within a container.
# When displaying container information in the output field, use
# %container.info, without any leading term (file=%fd.name
# %container.info user=%user.name, and not file=%fd.name
# container=%container.info user=%user.name). The output will change
# based on the context and whether or not -pk/-pm/-pc was specified on
# the command line.
- macro: container
condition: container.id != host
- macro: interactive
condition: >
((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or
proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
- macro: syslog
condition: fd.name in (/dev/log, /run/systemd/journal/syslog)
- list: cron_binaries
items: [anacron, cron, crond]
# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own
# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here.
- macro: system_users
condition: user.name in (bin, daemon, games, lp, mail, nobody, sshd, sync, uucp, www-data)
# SPECIAL NOTE: This macro eliminates false positives that result from
# running python scripts as a part of ansible. However, the condition
# that the command line contains "ansible" is very
# permissive. Ideally, you should change this macro to explicitly
# scope the python scripts to a specific directory (namely, your
# configured remote_tmp directory).
- macro: parent_ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.pname in (python, pypy) and proc.pcmdline contains ansible)
- macro: ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy) and proc.cmdline contains ansible)
- macro: python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.name=python and
(proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.pname=python and
(proc.pcmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.pcmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_sdchecks
condition: >
(proc.name in (python, python2.7) and
(proc.cmdline contains /opt/draios/bin/sdchecks))
- macro: parent_bro_running_python
condition: (proc.pname=python and proc.cmdline contains /usr/share/broctl)
- macro: parent_java_running_jenkins
condition: >
(proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains jenkins.war
or proc.pcmdline contains /tmp/slave.jar)
# As a part of kernel upgrades, dpkg will spawn a perl script with the
# name linux-image-N.N. This macro matches that.
- macro: parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
condition: proc.pname startswith linux-image-
- macro: java_running_sdjagent
condition: proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains sdjagent.jar
###############
# General Rules
###############
- rule: Write below binary dir
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- macro: write_etc_common
condition: >
etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries,
dev_creation_binaries,
ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv,
apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst,
systemd-machine, debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv,
gen_resolvconf.)
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not fd.directory in (/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java)
and not ansible_running_python
and not python_running_denyhosts
- rule: Write below etc
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, not in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and not proc.sname=fbash
output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Within a fbash session, the severity is lowered to INFO
- rule: Write below etc in installer
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and proc.sname=fbash
output: >
File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
file=%fd.name) within pipe installer session
priority: INFO
tags: [filesystem]
- macro: cmp_cp_by_passwd
condition: proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname=passwd
- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files
at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
- list: read_sensitive_file_binaries
items: [iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd, vsftpd, systemd]
- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
condition: >
sensitive_files and open_read
and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries)
and not cmp_cp_by_passwd
and not ansible_running_python
and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name name=%proc.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
- rule: Write below rpm database
desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
condition: fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write and not rpm_procs and not ansible_running_python
output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt]
- rule: DB program spawned process
desc: >
a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself.
This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
condition: proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and spawned_process and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
output: >
Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name
program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process, database]
- rule: Modify binary dirs
desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
condition: bin_dir_rename and modify and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Don't load shared objects coming from unexpected places
# Commenting this out for now--there are lots of shared library
# locations below /usr/lib for things like python, perl, etc. We may
# want to just add /usr/lib to the list, but that is really
# permissive.
# - condition: open_read and fd.name contains .so and not (linux_so_dirs)
# output: "Loaded .so from unexpected dir (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Temporarily disabling this rule as it's tripping over https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/598
# - rule: Syscall returns eaccess
# desc: >
# any system call that returns EACCESS. This is not always a strong
# indication of a problem, hence the INFO priority.
# condition: evt.res = EACCESS
# output: >
# System call returned EACCESS (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
# syscall=%evt.type args=%evt.args)
# priority: INFO
- rule: Change thread namespace
desc: >
an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.
condition: >
evt.type = setns
and not proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, nsenter)
and not proc.name startswith "runc:"
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
output: >
Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
parent=%proc.pname %container.info)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- list: known_shell_spawn_binaries
items: [
sshd, sudo, su, tmux, screen, emacs, systemd, login, flock, fbash,
nginx, monit, supervisord, dragent, aws, initdb, docker-compose,
configure, awk, falco, fail2ban-server, fleetctl,
logrotate, ansible, less, adduser, pycompile, py3compile,
pyclean, py3clean, pip, pip2, ansible-playboo, man-db,
init, pluto, mkinitramfs, unattended-upgr, watch, sysdig,
landscape-sysin, nessusd, PM2, syslog-summary, erl_child_setup,
npm, cloud-init, toybox, ceph
]
- rule: Run shell untrusted
desc: an attempt to spawn a shell by a non-shell program. Exceptions are made for trusted binaries.
condition: >
spawned_process and not container
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, shell_binaries, make_binaries, known_shell_spawn_binaries, docker_binaries,
k8s_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries)
and not parent_ansible_running_python
and not parent_bro_running_python
and not parent_python_running_denyhosts
and not parent_python_running_sdchecks
and not parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
and not parent_java_running_jenkins
output: >
Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)
priority: DEBUG
tags: [host, shell]
- macro: trusted_containers
condition: (container.image startswith sysdig/agent or
(container.image startswith sysdig/falco and
not container.image startswith sysdig/falco-event-generator) or
container.image startswith quay.io/sysdig or
container.image startswith sysdig/sysdig or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube or
container.image startswith quay.io/coreos/flannel or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy)
# These containers are ones that are known to spawn lots of
# shells. Generally, they are for systems where the container is used
# as a packaging mechanism more than for a dedicated microservice.
- macro: shell_spawning_containers
condition: (container.image startswith jenkins or
container.image startswith gitlab/gitlab-ce)
- rule: Launch Privileged Container
desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and container.privileged=true and not trusted_containers
output: Privileged container started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
- macro: sensitive_mount
condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A")
- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
desc: >
Detect the initial process started by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory
(i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and sensitive_mount and not trusted_containers
output: Container with sensitive mount started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
# Anything run interactively by root
# - condition: evt.type != switch and user.name = root and proc.name != sshd and interactive
# output: "Interactive root (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
- rule: System user interactive
desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive
output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [users]
- rule: Terminal shell in container
desc: A shell was spawned by a program in a container with an attached terminal.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
output: >
A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to
# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't
# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we
# fall back to allowing certain command lines.
- list: known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines
items: [
'"bash -c curl -f localhost:$API_PORT/admin/healthcheck"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c pgrep java && exit 0 || exit 1 "',
'"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"',
'"sh -c echo healthy "',
'"sh -c echo alive "'
]
- rule: Run shell in container
desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints are excluded.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, make_binaries, docker_binaries, k8s_binaries,
lxd_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl, awk, falco, cron,
erl_child_setup, ceph, PM2)
and not trusted_containers
and not shell_spawning_containers
and not proc.cmdline in (known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
output: >
Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand
- rule: System procs network activity
desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
condition: (fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs) and (inbound or outbound) and not proc.name=systemd
output: >
Known system binary sent/received network traffic
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco
# (e.g. excluding read/write/sendto/recvfrom/etc, this rule won't
# trigger).
# - rule: Ssh error in syslog
# desc: any ssh errors (failed logins, disconnects, ...) sent to syslog
# condition: syslog and ssh_error_message and evt.dir = <
# output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)"
# priority: WARNING
- macro: somebody_becoming_themself
condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or
(user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data))
# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs
- rule: Non sudo setuid
desc: >
an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. users "root" and "nobody"
suing to itself are also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: >
evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> and
not user.name=root and not somebody_becoming_themself
and not proc.name in (userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries,
sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-)
output: >
Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname
command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [users]
- rule: User mgmt binaries
desc: >
activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded.
Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top
of a base linux distribution at startup.
condition: >
spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and
not proc.name in (su, sudo) and not container and
not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, run-parts)
output: >
User management binary command run outside of container
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [host, users]
- list: allowed_dev_files
items: [
/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr,
/dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg
]
# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see:
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
- rule: Create files below dev
desc: creating any files below /dev other than known programs that manage devices. Some rootkits hide files in /dev.
condition: >
fd.directory = /dev and
(evt.type = creat or (evt.type = open and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT))
and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries)
and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# fbash is a small shell script that runs bash, and is suitable for use in curl <curl> | fbash installers.
- rule: Installer bash starts network server
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start listening for network connections
condition: evt.type=listen and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected listen call by a process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
- rule: Installer bash starts session
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start a new session
condition: evt.type=setsid and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected setsid call by a process in fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- rule: Installer bash non https connection
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to make an outgoing connection on a non-http(s) port
condition: proc.sname=fbash and outbound and not fd.sport in (80, 443, 53)
output: >
Outbound connection on non-http(s) port by a process in a fbash session
(command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# It'd be nice if we could warn when processes in a fbash session try
# to download from any nonstandard location? This is probably blocked
# on https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/88 though.
# Notice when processes try to run chkconfig/systemctl.... to install a service.
# Note: this is not a WARNING, as you'd expect some service management
# as a part of doing the installation.
- rule: Installer bash manages service
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to manage a system service (systemd/chkconfig)
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.name in (chkconfig, systemctl) and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Service management program run by process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [software_mgmt]
# Notice when processes try to run any package management binary within a fbash session.
# Note: this is not a WARNING, as you'd expect some package management
# as a part of doing the installation
- rule: Installer bash runs pkgmgmt program
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to run a package management binary
condition: evt.type=execve and package_mgmt_procs and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Package management program run by process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [software_mgmt]
###########################
# Application-Related Rules
###########################
################################################################
# By default all application-related rules are disabled for
# performance reasons. Depending on the application(s) you use,
# uncomment the corresponding rule definitions for
# application-specific activity monitoring.
################################################################
# Elasticsearch ports
- macro: elasticsearch_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=9300
- macro: elasticsearch_api_port
condition: fd.sport=9200
- macro: elasticsearch_port
condition: elasticsearch_cluster_port or elasticsearch_api_port
# - rule: Elasticsearch unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to elasticsearch on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = elasticsearch and inbound and not elasticsearch_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Elasticsearch on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Elasticsearch unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from elasticsearch on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = elasticsearch and outbound and not elasticsearch_cluster_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Elasticsearch on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# ActiveMQ ports
- macro: activemq_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=61616
- macro: activemq_web_port
condition: fd.sport=8161
- macro: activemq_port
condition: activemq_web_port or activemq_cluster_port
# - rule: Activemq unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to activemq on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = activemq and inbound and not activemq_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to ActiveMQ on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Activemq unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from activemq on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = activemq and outbound and not activemq_cluster_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from ActiveMQ on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Cassandra ports
# https://docs.datastax.com/en/cassandra/2.0/cassandra/security/secureFireWall_r.html
- macro: cassandra_thrift_client_port
condition: fd.sport=9160
- macro: cassandra_cql_port
condition: fd.sport=9042
- macro: cassandra_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=7000
- macro: cassandra_ssl_cluster_port
condition: fd.sport=7001
- macro: cassandra_jmx_port
condition: fd.sport=7199
- macro: cassandra_port
condition: >
cassandra_thrift_client_port or
cassandra_cql_port or cassandra_cluster_port or
cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_jmx_port
# - rule: Cassandra unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to cassandra on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = cassandra and inbound and not cassandra_port
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Cassandra on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Cassandra unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from cassandra on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = cassandra and outbound and not (cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_cluster_port)
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Cassandra on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Couchdb ports
# https://github.com/davisp/couchdb/blob/master/etc/couchdb/local.ini
- macro: couchdb_httpd_port
condition: fd.sport=5984
- macro: couchdb_httpd_ssl_port
condition: fd.sport=6984
# xxx can't tell what clustering ports are used. not writing rules for this
# yet.
# Fluentd ports
- macro: fluentd_http_port
condition: fd.sport=9880
- macro: fluentd_forward_port
condition: fd.sport=24224
# - rule: Fluentd unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to fluentd on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = td-agent and inbound and not (fluentd_forward_port or fluentd_http_port)
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Fluentd on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Tdagent unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from fluentd on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = td-agent and outbound and not fluentd_forward_port
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Fluentd on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Gearman ports
# http://gearman.org/protocol/
# - rule: Gearman unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: outbound network traffic from gearman on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = gearman and outbound and outbound and not fd.sport = 4730
# output: "Outbound network traffic from Gearman on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Zookeeper
- macro: zookeeper_port
condition: fd.sport = 2181
# Kafka ports
# - rule: Kafka unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to kafka on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = kafka and inbound and fd.sport != 9092
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Kafka on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# Memcached ports
# - rule: Memcached unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to memcached on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = memcached and inbound and fd.sport != 11211
# output: "Inbound network traffic to Memcached on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: Memcached unexpected network outbound traffic
# desc: any outbound network traffic from memcached. memcached never initiates outbound connections.
# condition: user.name = memcached and outbound
# output: "Unexpected Memcached outbound connection (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# MongoDB ports
- macro: mongodb_server_port
condition: fd.sport = 27017
- macro: mongodb_shardserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 27018
- macro: mongodb_configserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 27019
- macro: mongodb_webserver_port
condition: fd.sport = 28017
# - rule: Mongodb unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to mongodb on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: >
# user.name = mongodb and inbound and not (mongodb_server_port or
# mongodb_shardserver_port or mongodb_configserver_port or mongodb_webserver_port)
# output: "Inbound network traffic to MongoDB on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# MySQL ports
# - rule: Mysql unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to mysql on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: user.name = mysql and inbound and fd.sport != 3306
# output: "Inbound network traffic to MySQL on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
# - rule: HTTP server unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to a http server program on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries) and inbound and fd.sport != 80 and fd.sport != 443
# output: "Inbound network traffic to HTTP Server on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING