Files
falco/rules/falco_rules.yaml
Mark Stemm da6b0f16f1 Rule updates 2019 04.v2 (#573)
* Also let dockerd-current setns()

* Add additional setns programs

Let oci-umount (https://github.com/containers/oci-umount) setns().

* Let Openscap RPM probes touch rpm db

Define a list openscap_rpm_binaries containing openscap probes related
to rpm and let those binaries touch the rpm database.

* Let oc write to more directories below /etc

Make the prefix more general, allowing any path below /etc/origin/node.
2019-04-05 11:27:37 -07:00

1885 lines
75 KiB
YAML

#
# Copyright (C) 2016-2018 Draios Inc dba Sysdig.
#
# This file is part of falco.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
#
# See xxx for details on falco engine and rules versioning. Currently,
# this specific rules file is compatible with engine version 0
# (e.g. falco releases <= 0.13.1), so we'll keep the
# required_engine_version lines commented out, so maintain
# compatibility with older falco releases. With the first incompatible
# change to this rules file, we'll uncomment this line and set it to
# the falco engine version in use at the time.
#
#- required_engine_version: 2
# Currently disabled as read/write are ignored syscalls. The nearly
# similar open_write/open_read check for files being opened for
# reading/writing.
# - macro: write
# condition: (syscall.type=write and fd.type in (file, directory))
# - macro: read
# condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory))
- macro: open_write
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: open_read
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
- macro: never_true
condition: (evt.num=0)
- macro: always_true
condition: (evt.num=>0)
# In some cases, such as dropped system call events, information about
# the process name may be missing. For some rules that really depend
# on the identity of the process performing an action such as opening
# a file, etc., we require that the process name be known.
- macro: proc_name_exists
condition: (proc.name!="<NA>")
- macro: rename
condition: evt.type in (rename, renameat)
- macro: mkdir
condition: evt.type = mkdir
- macro: remove
condition: evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat)
- macro: modify
condition: rename or remove
- macro: spawned_process
condition: evt.type = execve and evt.dir=<
# File categories
- macro: bin_dir
condition: fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)
- macro: bin_dir_mkdir
condition: >
(evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/)
- macro: bin_dir_rename
condition: >
evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: etc_dir
condition: fd.name startswith /etc/
# This detects writes immediately below / or any write anywhere below /root
- macro: root_dir
condition: ((fd.directory=/ or fd.name startswith /root) and fd.name contains "/")
- list: shell_binaries
items: [bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]
- list: shell_mgmt_binaries
items: [add-shell, remove-shell]
- macro: shell_procs
condition: (proc.name in (shell_binaries))
- list: coreutils_binaries
items: [
truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who,
groups, csplit, sort, expand, printf, printenv, unlink, tee, chcon, stat,
basename, split, nice, "yes", whoami, sha224sum, hostid, users, stdbuf,
base64, unexpand, cksum, od, paste, nproc, pathchk, sha256sum, wc, test,
comm, arch, du, factor, sha512sum, md5sum, tr, runcon, env, dirname,
tsort, join, shuf, install, logname, pinky, nohup, expr, pr, tty, timeout,
tail, "[", seq, sha384sum, nl, head, id, mkfifo, sum, dircolors, ptx, shred,
tac, link, chroot, vdir, chown, touch, ls, dd, uname, "true", pwd, date,
chgrp, chmod, mktemp, cat, mknod, sync, ln, "false", rm, mv, cp, echo,
readlink, sleep, stty, mkdir, df, dir, rmdir, touch
]
# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: login_binaries
items: [
login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su,
nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg
]
# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: passwd_binaries
items: [
shadowconfig, grpck, pwunconv, grpconv, pwck,
groupmod, vipw, pwconv, useradd, newusers, cppw, chpasswd, usermod,
groupadd, groupdel, grpunconv, chgpasswd, userdel, chage, chsh,
gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr
]
# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' |
# awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: shadowutils_binaries
items: [
chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd,
groupadd, groupdel, addgroup, delgroup, groupmems, groupmod, grpck, grpconv, grpunconv,
newusers, pwck, pwconv, pwunconv, useradd, userdel, usermod, vigr, vipw, unix_chkpwd
]
- list: sysdigcloud_binaries
items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks]
- list: docker_binaries
items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi, docker-runc-cur, docker-current, dockerd-current]
- list: k8s_binaries
items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz, weave-net, loopback, bridge, openshift-sdn]
- list: lxd_binaries
items: [lxd, lxcfs]
- list: http_server_binaries
items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd, apache, apache2]
- list: db_server_binaries
items: [mysqld, postgres, sqlplus]
- list: mysql_mgmt_binaries
items: [mysql_install_d, mysql_ssl_rsa_s]
- list: postgres_mgmt_binaries
items: [pg_dumpall, pg_ctl, pg_lsclusters, pg_ctlcluster]
- list: db_mgmt_binaries
items: [mysql_mgmt_binaries, postgres_mgmt_binaries]
- list: nosql_server_binaries
items: [couchdb, memcached, redis-server, rabbitmq-server, mongod]
- list: gitlab_binaries
items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git]
- macro: server_procs
condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)
# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being
# interpreted by the filter expression.
- list: rpm_binaries
items: [dnf, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"', rhsmcertd-worke, subscription-ma,
repoquery, rpmkeys, rpmq, yum-cron, yum-config-mana, yum-debug-dump,
abrt-action-sav, rpmdb_stat, microdnf, rhn_check, yumdb]
- list: openscap_rpm_binaries
items: [probe_rpminfo, probe_rpmverify, probe_rpmverifyfile, probe_rpmverifypackage]
- macro: rpm_procs
condition: proc.name in (rpm_binaries, openscap_rpm_binaries) or proc.name in (salt-minion)
- list: deb_binaries
items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-divert, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr, apt-add-reposit, apt-config, apt-cache
]
# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are
# truncated at the sysdig level.
- list: package_mgmt_binaries
items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat, gem, pip, pip3, sane-utils.post, alternatives, chef-client, apk]
- macro: package_mgmt_procs
condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)
- macro: package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
condition: proc.pname in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
proc.aname[2] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
proc.aname[3] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
proc.aname[4] in (package_mgmt_binaries)
- macro: coreos_write_ssh_dir
condition: (proc.name=update-ssh-keys and fd.name startswith /home/core/.ssh)
- macro: run_by_package_mgmt_binaries
condition: proc.aname in (package_mgmt_binaries, needrestart)
- list: ssl_mgmt_binaries
items: [ca-certificates]
- list: dhcp_binaries
items: [dhclient, dhclient-script, 11-dhclient]
# A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different
# privileges or as a different user.
- list: userexec_binaries
items: [sudo, su, suexec, critical-stack]
- list: known_setuid_binaries
items: [
sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-, pmmcli,
filemng, PassengerAgent, bwrap, osdetect, nginxmng, sw-engine-fpm,
start-stop-daem
]
- list: user_mgmt_binaries
items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries]
- list: dev_creation_binaries
items: [blkid, rename_device, update_engine, sgdisk]
- list: hids_binaries
items: [aide, aide.wrapper, update-aide.con, logcheck, syslog-summary, osqueryd, ossec-syscheckd]
- list: vpn_binaries
items: [openvpn]
- list: nomachine_binaries
items: [nxexec, nxnode.bin, nxserver.bin, nxclient.bin]
- macro: system_procs
condition: proc.name in (coreutils_binaries, user_mgmt_binaries)
- list: mail_binaries
items: [
sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4,
pickup, showq, mailq, dovecot, imap-login, imap,
mailmng-core, pop3-login, dovecot-lda, pop3
]
- list: mail_config_binaries
items: [
update_conf, parse_mc, makemap_hash, newaliases, update_mk, update_tlsm4,
update_db, update_mc, ssmtp.postinst, mailq, postalias, postfix.config.,
postfix.config, postfix-script, postconf
]
- list: sensitive_file_names
items: [/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf]
- macro: sensitive_files
condition: >
fd.name startswith /etc and
(fd.name in (sensitive_file_names)
or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))
# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time
# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds.
- macro: proc_is_new
condition: proc.duration <= 5000000000
# Network
- macro: inbound
condition: >
(((evt.type in (accept,listen) and evt.dir=<) or
(evt.type in (recvfrom,recvmsg) and evt.dir=< and
fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and
(fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
(fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
(evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))
- macro: outbound
condition: >
(((evt.type = connect and evt.dir=<) or
(evt.type in (sendto,sendmsg) and evt.dir=< and
fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and
(fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
(fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
(evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))
# Very similar to inbound/outbound, but combines the tests together
# for efficiency.
- macro: inbound_outbound
condition: >
(((evt.type in (accept,listen,connect) and evt.dir=<)) or
(fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
(fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
(evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))
- macro: ssh_port
condition: fd.sport=22
# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# enumerate the servers for which ssh connections are allowed. For
# example, you might have a ssh gateway host for which ssh connections
# are allowed.
#
# In the main falco rules file, there isn't any way to know the
# specific hosts for which ssh access is allowed, so this macro just
# repeats ssh_port, which effectively allows ssh from all hosts. In
# the overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# "fd.sip="a.b.c.d" or fd.sip="e.f.g.h" or ..."
- macro: allowed_ssh_hosts
condition: ssh_port
- rule: Disallowed SSH Connection
desc: Detect any new ssh connection to a host other than those in an allowed group of hosts
condition: (inbound_outbound) and ssh_port and not allowed_ssh_hosts
output: Disallowed SSH Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# Use this to test whether the event occurred within a container.
# When displaying container information in the output field, use
# %container.info, without any leading term (file=%fd.name
# %container.info user=%user.name, and not file=%fd.name
# container=%container.info user=%user.name). The output will change
# based on the context and whether or not -pk/-pm/-pc was specified on
# the command line.
- macro: container
condition: container.id != host
- macro: container_started
condition: >
((evt.type = container or
(evt.type=execve and evt.dir=< and proc.vpid=1)) and
container.image.repository != incomplete)
- macro: interactive
condition: >
((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or
proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
- list: cron_binaries
items: [anacron, cron, crond, crontab]
# https://github.com/liske/needrestart
- list: needrestart_binaries
items: [needrestart, 10-dpkg, 20-rpm, 30-pacman]
# Possible scripts run by sshkit
- list: sshkit_script_binaries
items: [10_etc_sudoers., 10_passwd_group]
- list: plesk_binaries
items: [sw-engine, sw-engine-fpm, sw-engine-kv, filemng, f2bmng]
# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own
# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here.
- macro: system_users
condition: user.name in (bin, daemon, games, lp, mail, nobody, sshd, sync, uucp, www-data)
# These macros will be removed soon. Only keeping them to maintain
# compatiblity with some widely used rules files.
# Begin Deprecated
- macro: parent_ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.pname in (python, pypy) and proc.pcmdline contains ansible)
- macro: parent_bro_running_python
condition: (proc.pname=python and proc.cmdline contains /usr/share/broctl)
- macro: parent_python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.cmdline startswith "denyhosts.py /usr/bin/denyhosts.py" or
(proc.pname=python and
(proc.pcmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.pcmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py)))
- macro: parent_python_running_sdchecks
condition: >
(proc.pname in (python, python2.7) and
(proc.pcmdline contains /opt/draios/bin/sdchecks))
- macro: python_running_sdchecks
condition: >
(proc.name in (python, python2.7) and
(proc.cmdline contains /opt/draios/bin/sdchecks))
- macro: parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
condition: proc.pname startswith linux-image-
- macro: parent_java_running_echo
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c echo")
- macro: parent_scripting_running_builds
condition: >
(proc.pname in (php,php5-fpm,php-fpm7.1,python,ruby,ruby2.3,ruby2.1,node,conda) and (
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c git" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c date" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/bin/g++" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/bin/gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c if type gcc" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c cd '/var/www/edi/';LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8 git" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /var/www/edi/bin/sftp.sh" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/src/app/crxlsx/bin/linux/crxlsx" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c make parent" or
proc.cmdline startswith "node /jenkins/tools" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c '/usr/bin/node'" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c stty -a |" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /opt/nodejs/bin/yarn" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /usr/local/bin/yarn" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /root/.config/yarn" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /opt/yarn/bin/yarn.js"))
- macro: httpd_writing_ssl_conf
condition: >
(proc.pname=run-httpd and
(proc.cmdline startswith "sed -ri" or proc.cmdline startswith "sed -i") and
(fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf.d/ or fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf))
- macro: userhelper_writing_etc_security
condition: (proc.name=userhelper and fd.name startswith /etc/security)
- macro: parent_Xvfb_running_xkbcomp
condition: (proc.pname=Xvfb and proc.cmdline startswith 'sh -c "/usr/bin/xkbcomp"')
- macro: parent_nginx_running_serf
condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c serf")
- macro: parent_node_running_npm
condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "node /usr/local/bin/npm" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /usr/local/nodejs/bin/npm" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "node /opt/rh/rh-nodejs6/root/usr/bin/npm")
- macro: parent_java_running_sbt
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains sbt-launch.jar)
- list: known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines
items: []
- list: known_shell_spawn_binaries
items: []
## End Deprecated
- macro: ansible_running_python
condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy) and proc.cmdline contains ansible)
- macro: python_running_chef
condition: (proc.name=python and (proc.cmdline contains yum-dump.py or proc.cmdline="python /usr/bin/chef-monitor.py"))
- macro: python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.name=python and
(proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
# Qualys seems to run a variety of shell subprocesses, at various
# levels. This checks at a few levels without the cost of a full
# proc.aname, which traverses the full parent heirarchy.
- macro: run_by_qualys
condition: >
(proc.pname=qualys-cloud-ag or
proc.aname[2]=qualys-cloud-ag or
proc.aname[3]=qualys-cloud-ag or
proc.aname[4]=qualys-cloud-ag)
- macro: run_by_sumologic_securefiles
condition: >
((proc.cmdline="usermod -a -G sumologic_collector" or
proc.cmdline="groupadd sumologic_collector") and
(proc.pname=secureFiles.sh and proc.aname[2]=java))
- macro: run_by_yum
condition: ((proc.pname=sh and proc.aname[2]=yum) or
(proc.aname[2]=sh and proc.aname[3]=yum))
- macro: run_by_ms_oms
condition: >
(proc.aname[3] startswith omsagent- or
proc.aname[3] startswith scx-)
- macro: run_by_google_accounts_daemon
condition: >
(proc.aname[1] startswith google_accounts or
proc.aname[2] startswith google_accounts)
# Chef is similar.
- macro: run_by_chef
condition: (proc.aname[2]=chef_command_wr or proc.aname[3]=chef_command_wr or
proc.aname[2]=chef-client or proc.aname[3]=chef-client or
proc.name=chef-client)
- macro: run_by_adclient
condition: (proc.aname[2]=adclient or proc.aname[3]=adclient or proc.aname[4]=adclient)
- macro: run_by_centrify
condition: (proc.aname[2]=centrify or proc.aname[3]=centrify or proc.aname[4]=centrify)
- macro: run_by_puppet
condition: (proc.aname[2]=puppet or proc.aname[3]=puppet)
# Also handles running semi-indirectly via scl
- macro: run_by_foreman
condition: >
(user.name=foreman and
(proc.pname in (rake, ruby, scl) and proc.aname[5] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby)) or
(proc.pname=scl and proc.aname[2] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby)))
- macro: java_running_sdjagent
condition: proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains sdjagent.jar
- macro: kubelet_running_loopback
condition: (proc.pname=kubelet and proc.name=loopback)
- macro: python_mesos_marathon_scripting
condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "python3 /marathon-lb/marathon_lb.py")
- macro: splunk_running_forwarder
condition: (proc.pname=splunkd and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /opt/splunkforwarder")
- macro: parent_supervise_running_multilog
condition: (proc.name=multilog and proc.pname=supervise)
- macro: supervise_writing_status
condition: (proc.name in (supervise,svc) and fd.name startswith "/etc/sb/")
- macro: pki_realm_writing_realms
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash /usr/local/lib/pki/pki-realm" and fd.name startswith /etc/pki/realms)
- macro: htpasswd_writing_passwd
condition: (proc.name=htpasswd and fd.name=/etc/nginx/.htpasswd)
- macro: lvprogs_writing_conf
condition: >
(proc.name in (dmeventd,lvcreate,pvscan) and
(fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/archive or
fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/backup or
fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/cache))
- macro: ovsdb_writing_openvswitch
condition: (proc.name=ovsdb-server and fd.directory=/etc/openvswitch)
- macro: perl_running_plesk
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager" or
proc.pcmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager")
- macro: perl_running_updmap
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/bin/updmap")
- macro: perl_running_centrifydc
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/share/centrifydc")
- macro: runuser_reading_pam
condition: (proc.name=runuser and fd.directory=/etc/pam.d)
- macro: parent_ucf_writing_conf
condition: (proc.pname=ucf and proc.aname[2]=frontend)
- macro: consul_template_writing_conf
condition: >
((proc.name=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy) or
(proc.name=reload.sh and proc.aname[2]=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/ssl))
- macro: countly_writing_nginx_conf
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "nodejs /opt/countly/bin" and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx)
- list: ms_oms_binaries
items: [omi.postinst, omsconfig.posti, scx.postinst, omsadmin.sh, omiagent]
- macro: ms_oms_writing_conf
condition: >
((proc.name in (omiagent,omsagent,in_heartbeat_r*,omsadmin.sh,PerformInventor)
or proc.pname in (ms_oms_binaries)
or proc.aname[2] in (ms_oms_binaries))
and (fd.name startswith /etc/opt/omi or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/omsagent))
- macro: ms_scx_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name in (GetLinuxOS.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/scx)
- macro: azure_scripts_writing_conf
condition: (proc.pname startswith "bash /var/lib/waagent/" and fd.name startswith /etc/azure)
- macro: azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name in (NetworkWatcherA) and fd.name=/etc/init.d/AzureNetworkWatcherAgent)
- macro: couchdb_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=beam.smp and proc.cmdline contains couchdb and fd.name startswith /etc/couchdb)
- macro: update_texmf_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=update-texmf and fd.name startswith /etc/texmf)
- macro: slapadd_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=slapadd and fd.name startswith /etc/ldap)
- macro: openldap_writing_conf
condition: (proc.pname=run-openldap.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/openldap)
- macro: ucpagent_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=apiserver and container.image.repository=docker/ucp-agent and fd.name=/etc/authorization_config.cfg)
- macro: iscsi_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=iscsiadm and fd.name startswith /etc/iscsi)
- macro: istio_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=pilot-agent and fd.name startswith /etc/istio)
- macro: symantec_writing_conf
condition: >
((proc.name=symcfgd and fd.name startswith /etc/symantec) or
(proc.name=navdefutil and fd.name=/etc/symc-defutils.conf))
- macro: liveupdate_writing_conf
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "java LiveUpdate" and fd.name in (/etc/liveupdate.conf, /etc/Product.Catalog.JavaLiveUpdate))
- macro: rancher_agent
condition: (proc.name = agent and container.image.repository = rancher/agent)
- macro: sosreport_writing_files
condition: >
(proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.aname[3]=sosreport and
(fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb))
- macro: pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki
condition: >
(proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.pname in (yum, yum-cron, repoquery) and
(fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb))
- macro: update_ca_trust_writing_pki
condition: (proc.pname=update-ca-trust and proc.name=trust and fd.name startswith /etc/pki)
- macro: brandbot_writing_os_release
condition: proc.name=brandbot and fd.name=/etc/os-release
- macro: selinux_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name in (semodule,genhomedircon,sefcontext_comp) and fd.name startswith /etc/selinux)
- list: veritas_binaries
items: [vxconfigd, sfcache, vxclustadm, vxdctl, vxprint, vxdmpadm, vxdisk, vxdg, vxassist, vxtune]
- macro: veritas_driver_script
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/VRTSsfmh/bin/mh_driver.pl")
- macro: veritas_progs
condition: (proc.name in (veritas_binaries) or veritas_driver_script)
- macro: veritas_writing_config
condition: (veritas_progs and (fd.name startswith /etc/vx or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/VRTS or fd.name startswith /etc/vom))
- macro: nginx_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name in (nginx,nginx-ingress-c) and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx)
- macro: nginx_writing_certs
condition: >
(((proc.name=openssl and proc.pname=nginx-launch.sh) or proc.name=nginx-launch.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx/certs)
- macro: chef_client_writing_conf
condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "chef-client /opt/gitlab" and fd.name startswith /etc/gitlab)
- macro: centrify_writing_krb
condition: (proc.name in (adjoin,addns) and fd.name startswith /etc/krb5)
- macro: cockpit_writing_conf
condition: >
((proc.pname=cockpit-kube-la or proc.aname[2]=cockpit-kube-la)
and fd.name startswith /etc/cockpit)
- macro: ipsec_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=start-ipsec.sh and fd.directory=/etc/ipsec)
- macro: exe_running_docker_save
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "exe /var/lib/docker" and proc.pname in (dockerd, docker))
# Ideally we'd have a length check here as well but sysdig
# filterchecks don't have operators like len()
- macro: sed_temporary_file
condition: (proc.name=sed and fd.name startswith "/etc/sed")
- macro: python_running_get_pip
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python get-pip.py")
- macro: python_running_ms_oms
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python /var/lib/waagent/")
- macro: gugent_writing_guestagent_log
condition: (proc.name=gugent and fd.name=GuestAgent.log)
- macro: dse_writing_tmp
condition: (proc.name=dse-entrypoint and fd.name=/root/tmp__)
- macro: zap_writing_state
condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "jar /zap" and fd.name startswith /root/.ZAP)
- macro: airflow_writing_state
condition: (proc.name=airflow and fd.name startswith /root/airflow)
- macro: rpm_writing_root_rpmdb
condition: (proc.name=rpm and fd.directory=/root/.rpmdb)
- macro: maven_writing_groovy
condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "classpath /usr/local/apache-maven" and fd.name startswith /root/.groovy)
- macro: chef_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=chef-client and fd.name startswith /root/.chef)
- macro: kubectl_writing_state
condition: (proc.name in (kubectl,oc) and fd.name startswith /root/.kube)
- macro: java_running_cassandra
condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "cassandra.jar")
- macro: cassandra_writing_state
condition: (java_running_cassandra and fd.directory=/root/.cassandra)
- rule: Write below binary dir
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: >
bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and not package_mgmt_procs
and not exe_running_docker_save
and not python_running_get_pip
and not python_running_ms_oms
output: >
File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2])
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# If you'd like to generally monitor a wider set of directories on top
# of the ones covered by the rule Write below binary dir, you can use
# the following rule and lists.
- list: monitored_directories
items: [/boot, /lib, /lib64, /usr/lib, /usr/local/lib, /usr/local/sbin, /usr/local/bin, /root/.ssh, /etc/cardserver]
# Until https://github.com/draios/sysdig/pull/1153, which fixes
# https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/1152, is widely available,
# we can't use glob operators to match pathnames. Until then, we do a
# looser check to match ssh directories.
# When fixed, we will use "fd.name glob '/home/*/.ssh/*'"
- macro: user_ssh_directory
condition: (fd.name startswith '/home' and fd.name contains '.ssh')
# google_accounts_(daemon)
- macro: google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh
condition: (proc.name=google_accounts and user_ssh_directory)
- macro: cloud_init_writing_ssh
condition: (proc.name=cloud-init and user_ssh_directory)
- macro: mkinitramfs_writing_boot
condition: (proc.pname in (mkinitramfs, update-initramf) and fd.directory=/boot)
- macro: monitored_dir
condition: >
(fd.directory in (monitored_directories)
or user_ssh_directory)
and not mkinitramfs_writing_boot
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below monitored directories.
#
# Its default value is an expression that always is false, which
# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied.
- macro: user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions
condition: (never_true)
- rule: Write below monitored dir
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: >
evt.dir = < and open_write and monitored_dir
and not package_mgmt_procs
and not coreos_write_ssh_dir
and not exe_running_docker_save
and not python_running_get_pip
and not python_running_ms_oms
and not google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh
and not cloud_init_writing_ssh
and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions
output: >
File below a monitored directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2])
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- list: safe_etc_dirs
items: [/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java, /etc/logstash, /etc/nginx/conf.d, /etc/container_environment, /etc/hrmconfig]
- macro: fluentd_writing_conf_files
condition: (proc.name=start-fluentd and fd.name in (/etc/fluent/fluent.conf, /etc/td-agent/td-agent.conf))
- macro: qualys_writing_conf_files
condition: (proc.name=qualys-cloud-ag and fd.name=/etc/qualys/cloud-agent/qagent-log.conf)
- macro: git_writing_nssdb
condition: (proc.name=git-remote-http and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb)
- macro: plesk_writing_keys
condition: (proc.name in (plesk_binaries) and fd.name startswith /etc/sw/keys)
- macro: plesk_install_writing_apache_conf
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash -hB /usr/lib/plesk-9.0/services/webserver.apache configure"
and fd.name="/etc/apache2/apache2.conf.tmp")
- macro: plesk_running_mktemp
condition: (proc.name=mktemp and proc.aname[3] in (plesk_binaries))
- macro: networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf
condition: proc.aname[2]=nm-dispatcher and fd.name=/etc/resolv.conf
- macro: add_shell_writing_shells_tmp
condition: (proc.name=add-shell and fd.name=/etc/shells.tmp)
- macro: duply_writing_exclude_files
condition: (proc.name=touch and proc.pcmdline startswith "bash /usr/bin/duply" and fd.name startswith "/etc/duply")
- macro: xmlcatalog_writing_files
condition: (proc.name=update-xmlcatal and fd.directory=/etc/xml)
- macro: datadog_writing_conf
condition: ((proc.cmdline startswith "python /opt/datadog-agent" or
proc.cmdline startswith "entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh datadog start" or
proc.cmdline startswith "agent.py /opt/datadog-agent")
and fd.name startswith "/etc/dd-agent")
- macro: rancher_writing_conf
condition: (container.image.repository in (rancher_images)
and proc.name in (lib-controller,rancher-dns,healthcheck,rancher-metadat)
and (fd.name startswith "/etc/haproxy" or
fd.name startswith "/etc/rancher-dns")
)
- macro: curl_writing_pki_db
condition: (proc.name=curl and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb)
- macro: haproxy_writing_conf
condition: ((proc.name in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload.) or proc.pname in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload,haproxy_reload.))
and (fd.name=/etc/openvpn/client.map or fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy))
- macro: java_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=java and fd.name=/etc/.java/.systemPrefs/.system.lock)
- macro: rabbitmq_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=rabbitmq-server and fd.directory=/etc/rabbitmq)
- macro: rook_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=toolbox.sh and container.image.repository=rook/toolbox
and fd.directory=/etc/ceph)
- macro: httpd_writing_conf_logs
condition: (proc.name=httpd and fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/)
- macro: mysql_writing_conf
condition: >
((proc.name in (start-mysql.sh, run-mysqld) or proc.pname=start-mysql.sh) and
(fd.name startswith /etc/mysql or fd.directory=/etc/my.cnf.d))
- macro: redis_writing_conf
condition: >
(proc.name in (run-redis, redis-launcher.) and fd.name=/etc/redis.conf or fd.name startswith /etc/redis)
- macro: openvpn_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name in (openvpn,openvpn-entrypo) and fd.name startswith /etc/openvpn)
- macro: php_handlers_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=php_handlers_co and fd.name=/etc/psa/php_versions.json)
- macro: sed_writing_temp_file
condition: >
((proc.aname[3]=cron_start.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/security/sed) or
(proc.name=sed and (fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sources.list.d/sed or
fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sed or
fd.name startswith /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/sed)))
- macro: cron_start_writing_pam_env
condition: (proc.cmdline="bash /usr/sbin/start-cron" and fd.name=/etc/security/pam_env.conf)
# In some cases dpkg-reconfigur runs commands that modify /etc. Not
# putting the full set of package management programs yet.
- macro: dpkg_scripting
condition: (proc.aname[2] in (dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-preconfigu))
- macro: ufw_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=ufw and fd.directory=/etc/ufw)
- macro: calico_writing_conf
condition: >
(proc.name = calico-node and fd.name startswith /etc/calico)
- macro: prometheus_conf_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=prometheus-conf and fd.name startswith /etc/prometheus/config_out)
- macro: openshift_writing_conf
condition: (proc.name=oc and fd.name startswith /etc/origin/node)
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below specific directories below
# /etc. fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it
# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific
# files it is allowed to modify.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the programs in the base macro
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_known_write_etc_conditions
condition: proc.name=confd
- macro: write_etc_common
condition: >
etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and proc_name_exists
and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries,
dev_creation_binaries, shell_mgmt_binaries,
mail_config_binaries,
sshkit_script_binaries,
ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv,
apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst,
systemd, systemd-machine, systemd-sysuser,
debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv,
gen_resolvconf., update-ca-certi, certbot, runsv,
qualys-cloud-ag, locales.postins, nomachine_binaries,
adclient, certutil, crlutil, pam-auth-update, parallels_insta,
openshift-launc, update-rc.d, puppet)
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, mail_config_binaries, hddtemp.postins, sshkit_script_binaries, locales.postins, deb_binaries, dhcp_binaries)
and not fd.name pmatch (safe_etc_dirs)
and not fd.name in (/etc/container_environment.sh, /etc/container_environment.json, /etc/motd, /etc/motd.svc)
and not sed_temporary_file
and not exe_running_docker_save
and not ansible_running_python
and not python_running_denyhosts
and not fluentd_writing_conf_files
and not user_known_write_etc_conditions
and not run_by_centrify
and not run_by_adclient
and not qualys_writing_conf_files
and not git_writing_nssdb
and not plesk_writing_keys
and not plesk_install_writing_apache_conf
and not plesk_running_mktemp
and not networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf
and not run_by_chef
and not add_shell_writing_shells_tmp
and not duply_writing_exclude_files
and not xmlcatalog_writing_files
and not parent_supervise_running_multilog
and not supervise_writing_status
and not pki_realm_writing_realms
and not htpasswd_writing_passwd
and not lvprogs_writing_conf
and not ovsdb_writing_openvswitch
and not datadog_writing_conf
and not curl_writing_pki_db
and not haproxy_writing_conf
and not java_writing_conf
and not dpkg_scripting
and not parent_ucf_writing_conf
and not rabbitmq_writing_conf
and not rook_writing_conf
and not php_handlers_writing_conf
and not sed_writing_temp_file
and not cron_start_writing_pam_env
and not httpd_writing_conf_logs
and not mysql_writing_conf
and not openvpn_writing_conf
and not consul_template_writing_conf
and not countly_writing_nginx_conf
and not ms_oms_writing_conf
and not ms_scx_writing_conf
and not azure_scripts_writing_conf
and not azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf
and not couchdb_writing_conf
and not update_texmf_writing_conf
and not slapadd_writing_conf
and not symantec_writing_conf
and not liveupdate_writing_conf
and not sosreport_writing_files
and not selinux_writing_conf
and not veritas_writing_config
and not nginx_writing_conf
and not nginx_writing_certs
and not chef_client_writing_conf
and not centrify_writing_krb
and not cockpit_writing_conf
and not ipsec_writing_conf
and not httpd_writing_ssl_conf
and not userhelper_writing_etc_security
and not pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki
and not update_ca_trust_writing_pki
and not brandbot_writing_os_release
and not redis_writing_conf
and not openldap_writing_conf
and not ucpagent_writing_conf
and not iscsi_writing_conf
and not istio_writing_conf
and not ufw_writing_conf
and not calico_writing_conf
and not prometheus_conf_writing_conf
and not openshift_writing_conf
and not rancher_writing_conf
- rule: Write below etc
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc
condition: write_etc_common
output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name program=%proc.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4])"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- list: known_root_files
items: [/root/.monit.state, /root/.auth_tokens, /root/.bash_history, /root/.ash_history, /root/.aws/credentials,
/root/.viminfo.tmp, /root/.lesshst, /root/.bzr.log, /root/.gitconfig.lock, /root/.babel.json, /root/.localstack,
/root/.node_repl_history, /root/.mongorc.js, /root/.dbshell, /root/.augeas/history, /root/.rnd, /root/.wget-hsts, /health]
- list: known_root_directories
items: [/root/.oracle_jre_usage, /root/.ssh, /root/.subversion, /root/.nami]
- macro: known_root_conditions
condition: (fd.name startswith /root/orcexec.
or fd.name startswith /root/.m2
or fd.name startswith /root/.npm
or fd.name startswith /root/.pki
or fd.name startswith /root/.ivy2
or fd.name startswith /root/.config/Cypress
or fd.name startswith /root/.config/pulse
or fd.name startswith /root/.config/configstore
or fd.name startswith /root/jenkins/workspace
or fd.name startswith /root/.jenkins
or fd.name startswith /root/.cache
or fd.name startswith /root/.sbt
or fd.name startswith /root/.java
or fd.name startswith /root/.glide
or fd.name startswith /root/.sonar
or fd.name startswith /root/.v8flag
or fd.name startswith /root/infaagent
or fd.name startswith /root/.local/lib/python
or fd.name startswith /root/.pm2
or fd.name startswith /root/.gnupg
or fd.name startswith /root/.pgpass
or fd.name startswith /root/.theano
or fd.name startswith /root/.gradle
or fd.name startswith /root/.android
or fd.name startswith /root/.ansible
or fd.name startswith /root/.crashlytics
or fd.name startswith /root/.dbus
or fd.name startswith /root/.composer
or fd.name startswith /root/.gconf
or fd.name startswith /root/.nv
or fd.name startswith /root/.local/share/jupyter
or fd.name startswith /root/oradiag_root
or fd.name startswith /root/workspace
or fd.name startswith /root/jvm
or fd.name startswith /root/.node-gyp)
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below specific directories below
# / or /root.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_known_write_root_conditions
condition: fd.name=/root/.bash_history
- rule: Write below root
desc: an attempt to write to any file directly below / or /root
condition: >
root_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and not fd.name in (known_root_files)
and not fd.directory in (known_root_directories)
and not exe_running_docker_save
and not gugent_writing_guestagent_log
and not dse_writing_tmp
and not zap_writing_state
and not airflow_writing_state
and not rpm_writing_root_rpmdb
and not maven_writing_groovy
and not chef_writing_conf
and not kubectl_writing_state
and not cassandra_writing_state
and not known_root_conditions
and not user_known_write_root_conditions
output: "File below / or /root opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name program=%proc.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- macro: cmp_cp_by_passwd
condition: proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname in (passwd, run-parts)
- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files
at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2])
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
- list: read_sensitive_file_binaries
items: [
iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd,
vsftpd, systemd, mysql_install_d, psql, screen, debconf-show, sa-update,
pam-auth-update, pam-config, /usr/sbin/spamd, polkit-agent-he, lsattr, file, sosreport,
scxcimservera, adclient, rtvscand, cockpit-session, userhelper, ossec-syscheckd
]
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs accessing sensitive files.
# fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it
# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific
# files it is allowed to modify.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the macros in the base rule
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_read_sensitive_file_conditions
condition: cmp_cp_by_passwd
- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
condition: >
sensitive_files and open_read
and proc_name_exists
and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries,
vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries,
in.proftpd, mandb, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries)
and not cmp_cp_by_passwd
and not ansible_running_python
and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
and not run_by_qualys
and not run_by_chef
and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions
and not perl_running_plesk
and not perl_running_updmap
and not veritas_driver_script
and not perl_running_centrifydc
and not runuser_reading_pam
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name program=%proc.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4])
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
- rule: Write below rpm database
desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
condition: >
fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write
and not rpm_procs
and not ansible_running_python
and not python_running_chef
and not exe_running_docker_save
output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt]
- macro: postgres_running_wal_e
condition: (proc.pname=postgres and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir /etc/wal-e.d/env /usr/local/bin/wal-e")
- macro: redis_running_prepost_scripts
condition: (proc.aname[2]=redis-server and (proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.post-up.d" or proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.pre-up.d"))
- macro: rabbitmq_running_scripts
condition: >
(proc.pname=beam.smp and
(proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec ps" or
proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec inet_gethost" or
proc.cmdline= "sh -s unix:cmd" or
proc.cmdline= "sh -c exec /bin/sh -s unix:cmd 2>&1"))
- macro: rabbitmqctl_running_scripts
condition: (proc.aname[2]=rabbitmqctl and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c ")
- macro: run_by_appdynamics
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline startswith "java -jar -Dappdynamics")
- rule: DB program spawned process
desc: >
a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself.
This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
condition: >
proc.pname in (db_server_binaries)
and spawned_process
and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
and not postgres_running_wal_e
output: >
Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name
program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process, database]
- rule: Modify binary dirs
desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
condition: (bin_dir_rename) and modify and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save
output: >
File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to change thread namespace without having to copy and override the
# entire change thread namespace rule.
- list: user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries
items: []
- rule: Change thread namespace
desc: >
an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.
condition: >
evt.type = setns
and not proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
sysdig, nsenter, calico, oci-umount)
and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries)
and not proc.name startswith "runc:"
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not python_running_sdchecks
and not java_running_sdjagent
and not kubelet_running_loopback
and not rancher_agent
output: >
Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
parent=%proc.pname %container.info)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
# The binaries in this list and their descendents are *not* allowed
# spawn shells. This includes the binaries spawning shells directly as
# well as indirectly. For example, apache -> php/perl for
# mod_{php,perl} -> some shell is also not allowed, because the shell
# has apache as an ancestor.
- list: protected_shell_spawning_binaries
items: [
http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, nosql_server_binaries, mail_binaries,
fluentd, flanneld, splunkd, consul, smbd, runsv, PM2
]
- macro: parent_java_running_zookeeper
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.zookeeper.server)
- macro: parent_java_running_kafka
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains kafka.Kafka)
- macro: parent_java_running_elasticsearch
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.elasticsearch.bootstrap.Elasticsearch)
- macro: parent_java_running_activemq
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains activemq.jar)
- macro: parent_java_running_cassandra
condition: (proc.pname=java and (proc.pcmdline contains "-Dcassandra.config.loader" or proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.cassandra.service.CassandraDaemon))
- macro: parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.jboss)
- macro: parent_java_running_glassfish
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains com.sun.enterprise.glassfish)
- macro: parent_java_running_hadoop
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.hadoop)
- macro: parent_java_running_datastax
condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains com.datastax)
- macro: nginx_starting_nginx
condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline contains "/usr/sbin/nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf")
- macro: nginx_running_aws_s3_cp
condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/local/bin/aws s3 cp")
- macro: consul_running_net_scripts
condition: (proc.pname=consul and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c curl" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c nc"))
- macro: consul_running_alert_checks
condition: (proc.pname=consul and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /bin/consul-alerts")
- macro: serf_script
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c serf")
- macro: check_process_status
condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c kill -0 ")
# In some cases, you may want to consider node processes run directly
# in containers as protected shell spawners. Examples include using
# pm2-docker or pm2 start some-app.js --no-daemon-mode as the direct
# entrypoint of the container, and when the node app is a long-lived
# server using something like express.
#
# However, there are other uses of node related to build pipelines for
# which node is not really a server but instead a general scripting
# tool. In these cases, shells are very likely and in these cases you
# don't want to consider node processes protected shell spawners.
#
# We have to choose one of these cases, so we consider node processes
# as unprotected by default. If you want to consider any node process
# run in a container as a protected shell spawner, override the below
# macro to remove the "never_true" clause, which allows it to take effect.
- macro: possibly_node_in_container
condition: (never_true and (proc.pname=node and proc.aname[3]=docker-containe))
# Similarly, you may want to consider any shell spawned by apache
# tomcat as suspect. The famous apache struts attack (CVE-2017-5638)
# could be exploited to do things like spawn shells.
#
# However, many applications *do* use tomcat to run arbitrary shells,
# as a part of build pipelines, etc.
#
# Like for node, we make this case opt-in.
- macro: possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat
condition: (never_true and proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap)
- macro: protected_shell_spawner
condition: >
(proc.aname in (protected_shell_spawning_binaries)
or parent_java_running_zookeeper
or parent_java_running_kafka
or parent_java_running_elasticsearch
or parent_java_running_activemq
or parent_java_running_cassandra
or parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly
or parent_java_running_glassfish
or parent_java_running_hadoop
or parent_java_running_datastax
or possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat
or possibly_node_in_container)
- list: mesos_shell_binaries
items: [mesos-docker-ex, mesos-slave, mesos-health-ch]
# Note that runsv is both in protected_shell_spawner and the
# exclusions by pname. This means that runsv can itself spawn shells
# (the ./run and ./finish scripts), but the processes runsv can not
# spawn shells.
- rule: Run shell untrusted
desc: an attempt to spawn a shell below a non-shell application. Specific applications are monitored.
condition: >
spawned_process
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and protected_shell_spawner
and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries, cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries,
needrestart_binaries,
mesos_shell_binaries,
erl_child_setup, exechealthz,
PM2, PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd, logrotate, hhvm, serf,
lb-controller, nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec)
and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
and not proc.aname in (unicorn_launche)
and not consul_running_net_scripts
and not consul_running_alert_checks
and not nginx_starting_nginx
and not nginx_running_aws_s3_cp
and not run_by_package_mgmt_binaries
and not serf_script
and not check_process_status
and not run_by_foreman
and not python_mesos_marathon_scripting
and not splunk_running_forwarder
and not postgres_running_wal_e
and not redis_running_prepost_scripts
and not rabbitmq_running_scripts
and not rabbitmqctl_running_scripts
and not run_by_appdynamics
and not user_shell_container_exclusions
output: >
Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3]
aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5] aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7])
priority: DEBUG
tags: [shell]
- macro: allowed_openshift_registry_root
condition: >
(container.image.repository startswith openshift3/ or
container.image.repository startswith registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/)
# Source: https://docs.openshift.com/enterprise/3.2/install_config/install/disconnected_install.html
- macro: openshift_image
condition: >
(allowed_openshift_registry_root and
(container.image.repository contains logging-deployment or
container.image.repository contains logging-elasticsearch or
container.image.repository contains logging-kibana or
container.image.repository contains logging-fluentd or
container.image.repository contains logging-auth-proxy or
container.image.repository contains metrics-deployer or
container.image.repository contains metrics-hawkular-metrics or
container.image.repository contains metrics-cassandra or
container.image.repository contains metrics-heapster or
container.image.repository contains ose-haproxy-router or
container.image.repository contains ose-deployer or
container.image.repository contains ose-sti-builder or
container.image.repository contains ose-docker-builder or
container.image.repository contains ose-pod or
container.image.repository contains ose-docker-registry or
container.image.repository contains image-inspector))
- list: trusted_images
items: [
sysdig/agent, sysdig/falco, sysdig/sysdig, gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube,
quay.io/coreos/flannel, gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, calico/node,
rook/toolbox, cloudnativelabs/kube-router, consul, mesosphere/mesos-slave,
datadog/docker-dd-agent, datadog/agent, docker/ucp-agent, gliderlabs/logspout
]
- macro: trusted_containers
condition: (openshift_image or
container.image.repository in (trusted_images) or
container.image.repository startswith istio/proxy_ or
container.image.repository startswith quay.io/sysdig)
- list: rancher_images
items: [
rancher/network-manager, rancher/dns, rancher/agent,
rancher/lb-service-haproxy, rancher/metadata, rancher/healthcheck
]
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
# trusted and therefore allowed to run privileged.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the images in trusted_containers
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_trusted_containers
condition: (container.image.repository=sysdig/agent)
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
# allowed to perform sensitive mounts.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the images in trusted_containers
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_sensitive_mount_containers
condition: (container.image.repository=sysdig/agent)
- rule: Launch Privileged Container
desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: >
container_started and container
and container.privileged=true
and not trusted_containers
and not user_trusted_containers
output: Privileged container started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
# For now, only considering a full mount of /etc as
# sensitive. Ideally, this would also consider all subdirectories
# below /etc as well, but the globbing mechanism used by sysdig
# doesn't allow exclusions of a full pattern, only single characters.
- macro: sensitive_mount
condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/var/run/docker.sock] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet/pki] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/etc] != "N/A" or
container.mount.dest[/root*] != "N/A")
# The steps libcontainer performs to set up the root program for a container are:
# - clone + exec self to a program runc:[0:PARENT]
# - clone a program runc:[1:CHILD] which sets up all the namespaces
# - clone a second program runc:[2:INIT] + exec to the root program.
# The parent of runc:[2:INIT] is runc:0:PARENT]
# As soon as 1:CHILD is created, 0:PARENT exits, so there's a race
# where at the time 2:INIT execs the root program, 0:PARENT might have
# already exited, or might still be around. So we handle both.
# We also let runc:[1:CHILD] count as the parent process, which can occur
# when we lose events and lose track of state.
- macro: container_entrypoint
condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname in (runc:[0:PARENT], runc:[1:CHILD], docker-runc, exe))
- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
desc: >
Detect the initial process started by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory
(i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: >
container_started and container
and sensitive_mount
and not trusted_containers
and not user_sensitive_mount_containers
output: Container with sensitive mount started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag mounts=%container.mounts)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to run in
# your environment. In this main falco rules file, there isn't any way
# to know all the containers that can run, so any container is
# allowed, by using a filter that is guaranteed to evaluate to true.
# In the overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or
# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...)
- macro: allowed_containers
condition: (container.id exists)
- rule: Launch Disallowed Container
desc: >
Detect the initial process started by a container that is not in a list of allowed containers.
condition: container_started and container and not allowed_containers
output: Container started and not in allowed list (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: WARNING
tags: [container]
# Anything run interactively by root
# - condition: evt.type != switch and user.name = root and proc.name != sshd and interactive
# output: "Interactive root (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING
- rule: System user interactive
desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive
output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: INFO
tags: [users]
- rule: Terminal shell in container
desc: A shell was used as the entrypoint/exec point into a container with an attached terminal.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
and container_entrypoint
output: >
A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to
# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't
# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we
# fall back to allowing certain command lines.
- list: known_shell_spawn_cmdlines
items: [
'"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"',
'"sh -c uname -s 2>&1"',
'"sh -c uname -r 2>&1"',
'"sh -c uname -v 2>&1"',
'"sh -c uname -a 2>&1"',
'"sh -c ruby -v 2>&1"',
'"sh -c getconf CLK_TCK"',
'"sh -c getconf PAGESIZE"',
'"sh -c LC_ALL=C LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c stty -a 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c stty -a < /dev/tty"',
'"sh -c stty -g < /dev/tty"',
'"sh -c node index.js"',
'"sh -c node index"',
'"sh -c node ./src/start.js"',
'"sh -c node app.js"',
'"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\""',
'"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\")"',
'"sh -c node $NODE_DEBUG_OPTION index.js "',
'"sh -c crontab -l 2"',
'"sh -c lsb_release -a"',
'"sh -c lsb_release -is 2>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c whoami"',
'"sh -c node_modules/.bin/bower-installer"',
'"sh -c /bin/hostname -f 2> /dev/null"',
'"sh -c locale -a"',
'"sh -c -t -i"',
'"sh -c openssl version"',
'"bash -c id -Gn kafadmin"',
'"sh -c /bin/sh -c ''date +%%s''"'
]
# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to without having to copy
# and override the entire run shell in container macro. Once
# https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/255 is fixed this will be a
# bit easier, as someone could append of any of the existing lists.
- list: user_known_shell_spawn_binaries
items: []
# This macro allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to override the entire
# rule. Its default value is an expression that always is false, which
# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied.
- macro: user_shell_container_exclusions
condition: (never_true)
- macro: login_doing_dns_lookup
condition: (proc.name=login and fd.l4proto=udp and fd.sport=53)
# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand
- rule: System procs network activity
desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
condition: >
(fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs)
and (inbound_outbound)
and not proc.name in (systemd, hostid, id)
and not login_doing_dns_lookup
output: >
Known system binary sent/received network traffic
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
- list: openvpn_udp_ports
items: [1194, 1197, 1198, 8080, 9201]
- list: l2tp_udp_ports
items: [500, 1701, 4500, 10000]
- list: statsd_ports
items: [8125]
- list: ntp_ports
items: [123]
# Some applications will connect a udp socket to an address only to
# test connectivity. Assuming the udp connect works, they will follow
# up with a tcp connect that actually sends/receives data.
#
# With that in mind, we listed a few commonly seen ports here to avoid
# some false positives. In addition, we make the main rule opt-in, so
# it's disabled by default.
- list: test_connect_ports
items: [0, 9, 80, 3306]
- macro: do_unexpected_udp_check
condition: (never_true)
- list: expected_udp_ports
items: [53, openvpn_udp_ports, l2tp_udp_ports, statsd_ports, ntp_ports, test_connect_ports]
- macro: expected_udp_traffic
condition: fd.port in (expected_udp_ports)
- rule: Unexpected UDP Traffic
desc: UDP traffic not on port 53 (DNS) or other commonly used ports
condition: (inbound_outbound) and do_unexpected_udp_check and fd.l4proto=udp and not expected_udp_traffic
output: >
Unexpected UDP Traffic Seen
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name proto=%fd.l4proto evt=%evt.type %evt.args)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco
# (e.g. excluding read/write/sendto/recvfrom/etc, this rule won't
# trigger).
# - rule: Ssh error in syslog
# desc: any ssh errors (failed logins, disconnects, ...) sent to syslog
# condition: syslog and ssh_error_message and evt.dir = <
# output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)"
# priority: WARNING
- macro: somebody_becoming_themself
condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or
(user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data) or
(user.name=_apt and evt.arg.uid=_apt) or
(user.name=postfix and evt.arg.uid=postfix) or
(user.name=pki-agent and evt.arg.uid=pki-agent) or
(user.name=pki-acme and evt.arg.uid=pki-acme) or
(user.name=nfsnobody and evt.arg.uid=nfsnobody) or
(user.name=postgres and evt.arg.uid=postgres))
- macro: nrpe_becoming_nagios
condition: (proc.name=nrpe and evt.arg.uid=nagios)
# In containers, the user name might be for a uid that exists in the
# container but not on the host. (See
# https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/954). So in that case, allow
# a setuid.
- macro: known_user_in_container
condition: (container and user.name != "N/A")
# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs changing users by calling setuid.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions
condition: user.name=root
# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs
- rule: Non sudo setuid
desc: >
an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. users "root" and "nobody"
suing to itself are also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: >
evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=>
and (known_user_in_container or not container)
and not user.name=root
and not somebody_becoming_themself
and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries,
nomachine_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
and not nrpe_becoming_nagios
and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions
output: >
Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name cur_uid=%user.uid parent=%proc.pname
command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [users]
- rule: User mgmt binaries
desc: >
activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded.
Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top
of a base linux distribution at startup.
Some innocuous commandlines that don't actually change anything are excluded.
condition: >
spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and
not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog, nologin, unix_chkpwd) and not container and
not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, systemd.postins, udev.postinst, run-parts) and
not proc.cmdline startswith "passwd -S" and
not proc.cmdline startswith "useradd -D" and
not proc.cmdline startswith "systemd --version" and
not run_by_qualys and
not run_by_sumologic_securefiles and
not run_by_yum and
not run_by_ms_oms and
not run_by_google_accounts_daemon
output: >
User management binary command run outside of container
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4])
priority: NOTICE
tags: [host, users]
- list: allowed_dev_files
items: [
/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr,
/dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg
]
# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see:
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
- rule: Create files below dev
desc: creating any files below /dev other than known programs that manage devices. Some rootkits hide files in /dev.
condition: >
fd.directory = /dev and
(evt.type = creat or (evt.type = open and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT))
and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries)
and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to allow
# access to EC2 metadata. In this main falco rules file, there isn't
# any way to know all the containers that should have access, so any
# container is alllowed, by repeating the "container" macro. In the
# overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or
# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...)
- macro: ec2_metadata_containers
condition: container
# On EC2 instances, 169.254.169.254 is a special IP used to fetch
# metadata about the instance. It may be desirable to prevent access
# to this IP from containers.
- rule: Contact EC2 Instance Metadata Service From Container
desc: Detect attempts to contact the EC2 Instance Metadata Service from a container
condition: outbound and fd.sip="169.254.169.254" and container and not ec2_metadata_containers
output: Outbound connection to EC2 instance metadata service (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network, aws, container]
# In a local/user rules file, you should override this macro with the
# IP address of your k8s api server. The IP 1.2.3.4 is a placeholder
# IP that is not likely to be seen in practice.
- macro: k8s_api_server
condition: (fd.sip="1.2.3.4" and fd.sport=8080)
# In a local/user rules file, list the container images that are
# allowed to contact the K8s API Server from within a container. This
# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running
# within a container.
- macro: k8s_containers
condition: >
(container.image.repository in (gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube-amd64,
gcr.io/google_containers/kube2sky, sysdig/agent, sysdig/falco,
sysdig/sysdig))
- rule: Contact K8S API Server From Container
desc: Detect attempts to contact the K8S API Server from a container
condition: outbound and k8s_api_server and container and not k8s_containers
output: Unexpected connection to K8s API Server from container (command=%proc.cmdline %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network, k8s, container]
# In a local/user rules file, list the container images that are
# allowed to contact NodePort services from within a container. This
# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running
# within a container.
#
# By default, all containers are allowed to contact NodePort services.
- macro: nodeport_containers
condition: container
- rule: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection
desc: Detect attempts to use K8s NodePorts from a container
condition: (inbound_outbound) and fd.sport >= 30000 and fd.sport <= 32767 and container and not nodeport_containers
output: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network, k8s, container]
- list: network_tool_binaries
items: [nc, ncat, nmap]
- macro: network_tool_procs
condition: proc.name in (network_tool_binaries)
# Container is supposed to be immutable. Package management should be done in building the image.
- rule: Launch Package Management Process in Container
desc: Package management process ran inside container
condition: >
spawned_process and container and user.name != "_apt" and package_mgmt_procs and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
output: >
Package management process launched in container (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: ERROR
tags: [process]
- rule: Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container
desc: Netcat Program runs inside container that allows remote code execution
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
((proc.name = "nc" and (proc.args contains "-e" or proc.args contains "-c")) or
(proc.name = "ncat" and (proc.args contains "--sh-exec" or proc.args contains "--exec"))
)
output: >
Netcat runs inside container that allows remote code execution (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: WARNING
tags: [network, process]
- rule: Lauch Suspicious Network Tool in Container
desc: Detect network tools launched inside container
condition: >
spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs
output: >
Network tool launched in container (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network, process]
# Application rules have moved to application_rules.yaml. Please look
# there if you want to enable them by adding to
# falco_rules.local.yaml.