* Signed SSH commits can look in the UI like on GitHub, just like gpg keys today in Gitea
* SSH format can be added in gitea config
* SSH Signing worked before with DEFAULT_TRUST_MODEL=committer
`TRUSTED_SSH_KEYS` can be a list of additional ssh public key contents
to trust for every user of this instance
Closes#34329
Related #31392
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This PR moved git attributes related code to `modules/git/attribute` sub
package and moved language stats related code to
`modules/git/languagestats` sub package to make it easier to maintain.
And it also introduced a performance improvement which use the `git
check-attr --source` which can be run in a bare git repository so that
we don't need to create a git index file. The new parameter need a git
version >= 2.40 . If git version less than 2.40, it will fall back to
previous implementation.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: yp05327 <576951401@qq.com>
This PR uniform all temporary directory usage so that it will be easier
to manage.
Relate to #31792
- [x] Added a new setting to allow users to configure the global
temporary directory.
- [x] Move all temporary files and directories to be placed under
os.Temp()/gitea.
- [x] `setting.Repository.Local.LocalCopyPath` now will be
`setting.TempPath/local-repo` and the customized path is removed.
```diff
-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
-;[repository.local]
-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
-;;
-;; Path for local repository copy. Defaults to TEMP_PATH + `local-repo`, this is deprecated and cannot be changed
-;LOCAL_COPY_PATH = local-repo
```
- [x] `setting.Repository.Upload.TempPath` now will be
`settting.TempPath/uploads` and the customized path is removed.
```diff
;[repository.upload]
-;;
-;; Path for uploads. Defaults to TEMP_PATH + `uploads`
-;TEMP_PATH = uploads
```
- [x] `setting.Packages.ChunkedUploadPath` now will be
`settting.TempPath/package-upload` and the customized path is removed.
```diff
;[packages]
-;;
-;; Path for chunked uploads. Defaults it's `package-upload` under `TEMP_PATH` unless it's an absolute path.
-;CHUNKED_UPLOAD_PATH = package-upload
```
- [x] `setting.SSH.KeyTestPath` now will be
`settting.TempPath/ssh_key_test` and the customized path is removed.
```diff
[server]
-;;
-;; Directory to create temporary files in when testing public keys using ssh-keygen,
-;; default is the system temporary directory.
-;SSH_KEY_TEST_PATH =
```
TODO:
- [ ] setting.PprofDataPath haven't been changed because it may need to
be kept until somebody read it but temp path may be clean up any time.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This PR tries to finally fix the bug mentioned in #30011 and #15504,
where the user repo limit is checked when creating a repo in an
organization.
Fix#30011
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Follow #33127Fix#8649, fix#639
This is a complete solution. A repo unit could be set to:
* Anonymous read (non-signed-in user)
* Everyone read (signed-in user)
* Everyone write (wiki-only)
Follow #33127
This PR add backend logic and test for "anonymous access", it shares the
same logic as "everyone access", so not too much change.
By the way, split `SettingsPost` into small functions to make it easier
to make frontend-related changes in the future.
Next PR will add frontend support for "anonymous access"
- Find the runner before deleting
- Move the main logic from `routers/web/repo/setting/runners.go` to
`routers/web/shared/actions/runners.go`.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
- Find the variable before updating or deleting
- Move the main logic from `routers/web/repo/setting/variables.go` to
`routers/web/shared/actions/variables.go`.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
- Both have `RejectTransfer` and `CancelTransfer` because the permission
checks are not the same. `CancelTransfer` can be done by the doer or
those who have admin permission to access this repository.
`RejectTransfer` can be done by the receiver user if it's an individual
or those who can create repositories if it's an organization.
- Some tests are wrong, this PR corrects them.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Extract from #33320
This PR uses a map instead of a struct to store webhook event
information. It removes many duplicated functions and makes the logic
clearer.
After the RefName refactoring, the `ctx.Repo.CommitID` is only set when
there is a `RepoRefByType` middleware.
Many handlers do not use that middleware and they only use "default
branch"
Currently, anyone with write permissions to a repo are able to rename
default or protected branches.
This change follows
[GitHub's](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-branches-in-your-repository/renaming-a-branch)
design by only allowing repo/site admins to change these branches.
However, it also follows are current design for protected branches and
only allows admins to modify branch names == branch protection rule
names. Glob-based rules cannot be renamed by anyone (as was already the
case, but we now catch `ErrBranchIsProtected` which we previously did
not catch, throwing a 500).
In history (from some legacy frameworks), both `:name` and `name` are
supported as path path name, `:name` is an alias to `name`.
To make code consistent, now we should only use `name` but not `:name`.
Also added panic check in related functions to make sure the name won't
be abused in case some downstreams still use them.
`RepoTransfer` now is at models, but if we want to move it into `repo`
model, it will depend on `Team`. So this PR also makes repo model depend
on org model to make it possible. Just refactor, no code change.
- [x] Move `DeleteOrganization` from `models/organization` to service
layer
- [x] Move `AccessibleTeamReposEnv` to `models/repo`
- [x] Move `RepoTransfer` from `models` to `models/repo`
- [x] Merge `getUserTeamIDs` and `GetUserTeamIDs`, Merge `GetUserTeams`
and `getUserTeams`.
- [x] Remove `Team`'s `Repos []*repo_model.Repository` to avoid dependency recycle.
There are still some functions under `models` after last big refactor
about `models`. This change will move all team related functions to
service layer with no code change.
## Solves
Currently for rules to re-order them you have to alter the creation
date. so you basicly have to delete and recreate them in the right
order. This is more than just inconvinient ...
## Solution
Add a new col for prioritization
## Demo WebUI Video
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/92182a31-9705-4ac5-b6e3-9bb74108cbd1
---
*Sponsored by Kithara Software GmbH*
- [x] Move `CreateRepositoryByExample` to service layer
- [x] Move `AddCollabrator` to service layer
- [x] Add a new parameter for `AddCollabrator` so that changing mode
immediately after that will become unnecessary.
This introduces a new flag `BlockAdminMergeOverride` on the branch
protection rules that prevents admins/repo owners from bypassing branch
protection rules and merging without approvals or failing status checks.
Fixes#17131
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
We have some instances that only allow using an external authentication
source for authentication. In this case, users changing their email,
password, or linked OpenID connections will not have any effect, and
we'd like to prevent showing that to them to prevent confusion.
Included in this are several changes to support this:
* A new setting to disable user managed authentication credentials
(email, password & OpenID connections)
* A new setting to disable user managed MFA (2FA codes & WebAuthn)
* Fix an issue where some templates had separate logic for determining
if a feature was disabled since it didn't check the globally disabled
features
* Hide more user setting pages in the navbar when their settings aren't
enabled
---------
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Fixes#22722
### Problem
Currently, it is not possible to force push to a branch with branch
protection rules in place. There are often times where this is necessary
(CI workflows/administrative tasks etc).
The current workaround is to rename/remove the branch protection,
perform the force push, and then reinstate the protections.
### Solution
Provide an additional section in the branch protection rules to allow
users to specify which users with push access can also force push to the
branch. The default value of the rule will be set to `Disabled`, and the
UI is intuitive and very similar to the `Push` section.
It is worth noting in this implementation that allowing force push does
not override regular push access, and both will need to be enabled for a
user to force push.
This applies to manual force push to a remote, and also in Gitea UI
updating a PR by rebase (which requires force push)
This modifies the `BranchProtection` API structs to add:
- `enable_force_push bool`
- `enable_force_push_whitelist bool`
- `force_push_whitelist_usernames string[]`
- `force_push_whitelist_teams string[]`
- `force_push_whitelist_deploy_keys bool`
### Updated Branch Protection UI:
<img width="943" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/79623665/7491899c-d816-45d5-be84-8512abd156bf">
### Pull Request `Update branch by Rebase` option enabled with source
branch `test` being a protected branch:

<img width="1038" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/assets/79623665/57ead13e-9006-459f-b83c-7079e6f4c654">
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This PR only does "renaming":
* `Route` should be `Router` (and chi router is also called "router")
* `Params` should be `PathParam` (to distingush it from URL query param, and to match `FormString`)
* Use lower case for private functions to avoid exposing or abusing