github/kata-containers
1
0
Fork 1
mirror of https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers.git synced 2025-04-28 11:44:38 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #8944 from zvonkok/update-threat-model

Browse Source 
threat-model: Add VFIO, ACPI and KVM/VMM threat-model descriptions
This commit is contained in:
Zvonko Kaiser 2024-05-31 10:38:27 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 0321a3adcc
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
1 changed files with 205 additions and 71 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

276
docs/threat-model/threat-model.md
View File

@ -1,95 +1,157 @@
# Kata Containers threat model # Kata Containers threat model
This document discusses threat models associated with the Kata Containers project. This document discusses threat models associated with the Kata Containers
Kata was designed to provide additional isolation of container workloads, protecting project. Kata was designed to provide additional isolation of container
the host infrastructure from potentially malicious container users or workloads. Since workloads, protecting the host infrastructure from potentially malicious
Kata Containers adds a level of isolation on top of traditional containers, the focus container users or workloads. Since Kata Containers adds a level of isolation on
is on the additional layer provided, not on traditional container security. top of traditional containers, the focus is on the additional layer provided,
not on traditional container security.
This document provides a brief background on containers and layered security, describes This document provides a brief background on containers and layered security,
the interface to Kata from CRI runtimes, a review of utilized virtual machine interfaces, and then describes the interface to Kata from CRI runtimes, a review of utilized virtual
a review of threats. machine interfaces, and then a review of threats.
## Kata security objective ## Kata security objective
Kata seeks to prevent an untrusted container workload or user of that container workload to gain Kata seeks to prevent an untrusted container workload or user of that container
control of, obtain information from, or tamper with the host infrastructure. workload to gain control of, obtain information from, or tamper with the host
infrastructure.
In our scenario, an asset is anything on the host system, or elsewhere in the cluster In our scenario, an asset is anything on the host system, or elsewhere in the
infrastructure. The attacker is assumed to be either a malicious user or the workload itself cluster infrastructure. The attacker is assumed to be either a malicious user or
running within the container. The goal of Kata is to prevent attacks which would allow the workload itself running within the container. The goal of Kata is to prevent
any access to the defined assets. attacks which would allow any access to the defined assets.
## Background on containers, layered security ## Background on containers, layered security
Traditional containers leverage several key Linux kernel features to provide isolation and Traditional containers leverage several key Linux kernel features to provide
a view that the container workload is the only entity running on the host. Key features include isolation and a view that the container workload is the only entity running on
`Namespaces`, `cgroups`, `capablities`, `SELinux` and `seccomp`. The canonical runtime for creating such the host. Key features include `Namespaces`, `cgroups`, `capablities`, `SELinux`
a container is `runc`. In the remainder of the document, the term `traditional-container` will be used and `seccomp`. The canonical runtime for creating such a container is `runc`. In
to describe a container workload created by runc. the remainder of the document, the term `traditional-container` will be used to
describe a container workload created by runc.
Kata Containers provides a second layer of isolation on top of those provided by traditional-containers. Kata Containers provides a second layer of isolation on top of those provided by
The hardware virtualization interface is the basis of this additional layer. Kata launches a lightweight traditional-containers. The hardware virtualization interface is the basis of
virtual machine, and uses the guest’s Linux kernel to create a container workload, or workloads in the case this additional layer. Kata launches a lightweight virtual machine, and uses the
of multi-container pods. In Kubernetes and in the Kata implementation, the sandbox is carried out at the guest’s Linux kernel to create a container workload, or workloads in the case of
pod level. In Kata, this sandbox is created using a virtual machine. multi-container pods. In Kubernetes and in the Kata implementation, the sandbox
is carried out at the pod level. In Kata, this sandbox is created using a
virtual machine.
## Interface to Kata Containers: CRI, v2-shim, OCI ## Interface to Kata Containers: CRI, v2-shim, OCI
A typical Kata Containers deployment uses Kubernetes with a CRI implementation. A typical Kata Containers deployment uses Kubernetes with a CRI implementation.
On every node, Kubelet will interact with a CRI implementor, which will in turn interface with On every node, Kubelet will interact with a CRI implementor, which will in turn
an OCI based runtime, such as Kata Containers. Typical CRI implementors are `cri-o` and `containerd`. interface with an OCI based runtime, such as Kata Containers. Typical CRI
implementors are `cri-o` and `containerd`.
The CRI API, as defined at the Kubernetes [CRI-API repo](https://github.com/kubernetes/cri-api/), The CRI API, as defined at the Kubernetes [CRI-API
results in a few constructs being supported by the CRI implementation, and ultimately in the OCI repo](https://github.com/kubernetes/cri-api/), results in a few constructs being
runtime creating the workloads. supported by the CRI implementation, and ultimately in the OCI runtime creating
the workloads.
In order to run a container inside of the Kata sandbox, several virtual machine devices and interfaces In order to run a container inside of the Kata sandbox, several virtual machine
are required. Kata translates sandbox and container definitions to underlying virtualization technologies provided devices and interfaces are required. Kata translates sandbox and container
by a set of virtual machine monitors (VMMs) and hypervisors. These devices and their underlying definitions to underlying virtualization technologies provided by a set of
implementations are discussed in detail in the following section. virtual machine monitors (VMMs) and hypervisors. These devices and their
underlying implementations are discussed in detail in the following section.
## Interface to the Kata sandbox/virtual machine ## Interface to the Kata sandbox/virtual machine
In case of Kata, today the devices which we need in the guest are: In case of Kata, today the devices which we need in the guest are:
- Storage: In the current design of Kata Containers, we are reliant on the CRI implementor to - Storage: In the current design of Kata Containers, we are reliant on the CRI
assist in image handling and volume management on the host. As a result, we need to support a way of passing to the sandbox the container rootfs, volumes requested implementor to assist in image handling and volume management on the host. As a
by the workload, and any other volumes created to facilitate sharing of secrets and `configmaps` with the containers. Depending on how these are managed, a block based device or file-system result, we need to support a way of passing to the sandbox the container
sharing is required. Kata Containers does this by way of `virtio-blk` and/or `virtio-fs`. rootfs, volumes requested by the workload, and any other volumes created to
- Networking: A method for enabling network connectivity with the workload is required. Typically this will be done providing a `TAP` device facilitate sharing of secrets and `configmaps` with the containers. Depending
to the VMM, and this will be exposed to the guest as a `virtio-net` device. It is feasible to pass in a NIC device directly, in which case `VFIO` is leveraged on how these are managed, a block based device or file-system sharing is
and the device itself will be exposed to the guest. required. Kata Containers does this by way of `virtio-blk` and/or `virtio-fs`.
- Control: In order to interact with the guest agent and retrieve `STDIO` from containers, a medium of communication is required. - Networking: A method for enabling network connectivity with the workload is
This is available via `virtio-vsock`. required. Typically this will be done providing a `TAP` device to the VMM, and
- Devices: `VFIO` is utilized when devices are passed directly to the virtual machine and exposed to the container. this will be exposed to the guest as a `virtio-net` device. It is feasible to
- Dynamic Resource Management: `ACPI` is utilized to allow for dynamic VM resource management (for example: CPU, memory, device hotplug). This is required when containers are resized, pass in a NIC device directly, in which case `VFIO` is leveraged and the device
or more generally when containers are added to a pod. itself will be exposed to the guest.
- Control: In order to interact with the guest agent and retrieve `STDIO` from
containers, a medium of communication is required. This is available via
`virtio-vsock`.
- Devices: `VFIO` is utilized when devices are passed directly to the virtual
machine and exposed to the container.
- Dynamic Resource Management: `ACPI` is utilized to allow for dynamic VM
resource management (for example: CPU, memory, device hotplug). This is
required when containers are resized, or more generally when containers are
added to a pod.
How these devices are utilized varies depending on the VMM utilized. We clarify the default settings provided when integrating Kata How these devices are utilized varies depending on the VMM utilized. We clarify
with the QEMU, Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor VMMs in the following sections. the default settings provided when integrating Kata with the QEMU, Dragonball,
Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor VMMs in the following sections.
### Virtual Machine Monitor(s)
In a KVM/QEMU (any other VMM utilizing KVM) virtualization setup, all virtual
machines (VMs) share the same host kernel. This shared environment can lead to
scenarios where one VM could potentially impact the performance or stability of
other VMs, including the possibility of a Denial of Service attack.
- Kernel Vulnerabilities: Since all VMs rely on the host's kernel, a
vulnerability in the kernel could be exploited by a process running within one
VM to affect the entire system. This could lead to scenarios where the
compromised VM impacts other VMs or even takes down the host.
- Improper Isolation and Containment: If the virtualization environment is not
correctly configured, processes in one VM might impact other VMs. This could
occur through improper isolation of network traffic, shared file systems, or
other inter-VM communication channels.
- Hypervisor Vulnerabilities: Flaws in the KVM hypervisor or QEMU could be
exploited to cause information disclosure, data tampering, elevation of
privileges, denial of service, and others. Since KVM/QEMU leverages the host
kernel for its operation, any exploit at this level can have widespread impacts.
- Malicious or Flawed Guest Operating Systems: A guest operating system that is
maliciously designed or has serious flaws could engage in activities that
disrupt the normal operation of the host or other guests. This might include
aggressive network activity or interactions with the virtualization stack that
lead to instability.
- Resource Exhaustion: A VM could consume excessive shared resources such as
CPU, memory, or I/O bandwidth, leading to resource starvation for other VMs.
This could be due to misconfiguration, a runaway process, or a deliberate
denial of service attack from a compromised VM.
### Devices ### Devices
Each virtio device is implemented by a backend, which may execute within userspace on the host (vhost-user), the VMM itself, or within the host kernel (vhost). While it may provide enhanced performance, Each virtio device is implemented by a backend, which may execute within
vhost devices are often seen as higher risk since an exploit would be already running within the kernel space. While VMM and vhost-user are both in userspace on the host, `vhost-user` generally allows for the back-end process to require less system calls and capabilities compared to a full VMM. userspace on the host (vhost-user), the VMM itself, or within the host kernel
(vhost). While it may provide enhanced performance, vhost devices are often seen
as higher risk since an exploit would be already running within the kernel
space. While VMM and vhost-user are both in userspace on the host, `vhost-user`
generally allows for the back-end process to require less system calls and
capabilities compared to a full VMM.
#### `virtio-blk` and `virtio-scsi` #### `virtio-blk` and `virtio-scsi`
The backend for `virtio-blk` and `virtio-scsi` are based in the VMM itself (ring3 in the context of x86) by default for Cloud Hypervisor, Firecracker and QEMU. The backend for `virtio-blk` and `virtio-scsi` are based in the VMM itself
While `vhost` based back-ends are available for QEMU, it is not recommended. `vhost-user` back-ends are being added for Cloud Hypervisor, they are not utilized in Kata today. (ring3 in the context of x86) by default for Cloud Hypervisor, Firecracker and
QEMU. While `vhost` based back-ends are available for QEMU, it is not
recommended. `vhost-user` back-ends are being added for Cloud Hypervisor, they
are not utilized in Kata today.
#### `virtio-fs` #### `virtio-fs`
`virtio-fs` is supported in Cloud Hypervisor and QEMU. `virtio-fs`'s interaction with the host filesystem is done through a vhost-user daemon, `virtiofsd`. `virtio-fs` is supported in Cloud Hypervisor and QEMU. `virtio-fs`'s interaction
The `virtio-fs` client, running in the guest, will generate requests to access files. `virtiofsd` will receive requests, open the file, and request the VMM with the host filesystem is done through a vhost-user daemon, `virtiofsd`. The
to `mmap` it into the guest. When DAX is utilized, the guest will access the host's page cache, avoiding the need for copy and duplication. DAX is still an experimental feature, `virtio-fs` client, running in the guest, will generate requests to access
and is not enabled by default. files. `virtiofsd` will receive requests, open the file, and request the VMM to
`mmap` it into the guest. When DAX is utilized, the guest will access the host's
page cache, avoiding the need for copy and duplication. DAX is still an
experimental feature, and is not enabled by default.
From the `virtiofsd` [documentation](https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd/-/blob/main/README.md): From the `virtiofsd` [documentation](https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd/-/blob/main/README.md):
```This program must be run as the root user. Upon startup the program will switch into a new file system namespace with the shared directory tree as its root. This prevents “file system escapes” due to symlinks and other file system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory. The program also sandboxes itself using seccomp(2) to prevent ptrace(2) and other vectors that could allow an attacker to compromise the system after gaining control of the virtiofsd process.``` ```This program must be run as the root user. Upon startup the program will switch into a new file system namespace with the shared directory tree as its root. This prevents “file system escapes” due to symlinks and other file system objects that might lead to files outside the shared directory. The program also sandboxes itself using seccomp(2) to prevent ptrace(2) and other vectors that could allow an attacker to compromise the system after gaining control of the virtiofsd process.```
DAX-less support for `virtio-fs` is available as of the 5.4 Linux kernel. QEMU VMM supports virtio-fs as of v4.2. Cloud Hypervisor DAX-less support for `virtio-fs` is available as of the 5.4 Linux kernel. QEMU
supports `virtio-fs`. VMM supports virtio-fs as of v4.2. Cloud Hypervisor supports `virtio-fs`.
#### `virtio-net` #### `virtio-net`
@ -97,9 +159,9 @@ supports `virtio-fs`.
##### QEMU networking ##### QEMU networking
While QEMU has options for `vhost`, `virtio-net` and `vhost-user`, the `virtio-net` backend While QEMU has options for `vhost`, `virtio-net` and `vhost-user`, the
for Kata defaults to `vhost-net` for performance reasons. The default configuration is being `virtio-net` backend for Kata defaults to `vhost-net` for performance reasons.
reevaluated. The default configuration is being reevaluated.
##### Firecracker networking ##### Firecracker networking
@ -107,8 +169,14 @@ For Firecracker, the `virtio-net` backend is within Firecracker's VMM.
##### Cloud Hypervisor networking ##### Cloud Hypervisor networking
For Cloud Hypervisor, the current backend default is within the VMM. `vhost-user-net` support For Cloud Hypervisor, the current backend default is within the VMM.
is being added (written in rust, Cloud Hypervisor specific). `vhost-user-net` support is being added (written in rust, Cloud Hypervisor
specific).
##### Dragonball networking
For Dragonball, the `virtio-net` backend default is within Dragonbasll's VMM.
#### virtio-vsock #### virtio-vsock
@ -116,22 +184,88 @@ is being added (written in rust, Cloud Hypervisor specific).
In QEMU, vsock is backed by `vhost_vsock`, which runs within the kernel itself. In QEMU, vsock is backed by `vhost_vsock`, which runs within the kernel itself.
##### Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor ##### Dragonball, Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor
In Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor, vsock is backed by a unix-domain-socket in the hosts userspace. In Dragonball, Firecracker and Cloud Hypervisor, vsock is backed by a unix-domain-socket in
the hosts userspace.
#### VFIO #### VFIO
Utilizing VFIO, devices can be passed through to the virtual machine. We will assess this separately. Exposure to Utilizing VFIO, devices can be passed through to the virtual machine. Exposure
host is limited to gaps in device pass-through handling. This is supported in QEMU and Cloud Hypervisor, but not to the host is limited to gaps in device pass-through handling. This is
Firecracker. supported in QEMU and Cloud Hypervisor, but not Firecracker.
- Device Isolation Failure: One of the primary risks associated with VFIO is the
failure to isolate the physical device. If a VM can affect the operation of the
physical device in a way that impacts other VMs or the host system, it could
lead to security breaches or system instability.
- DMA Attacks: Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks are a significant concern with
VFIO. Since the device has direct access to the system's memory, there's a risk
that a compromised VM could use its assigned device to read or write memory
outside of its allocated space, potentially accessing sensitive information or
affecting the host or other VMs.
- Firmware Vulnerabilities: Devices attached via VFIO rely on their firmware,
which can have vulnerabilities. A compromised device firmware could be exploited
to gain unauthorized access or to disrupt the system. Resource Starvation:
Improperly managed, a VM with direct access to hardware resources could
monopolize those resources, leading to performance degradation or denial of
service for other VMs or the host system.
- Escalation of Privileges: If a VM with VFIO access is compromised, it could
potentially be used to gain higher privileges than intended, especially if the
I/O devices have capabilities that are not adequately controlled or monitored.
- Improper Configuration and Management: Human errors in configuring VFIO, such
as incorrect group or user permissions, can expose the system to risks.
Additionally, inadequate monitoring and management of the VMs and their devices
can lead to security lapses.
- Software Vulnerabilities: Like any software, the components of VFIO (like the
kernel modules, device drivers, and management tools) can have vulnerabilities
that might be exploited by an attacker to compromise the security of the system.
Inter-VM Interference and Side-Channel Attacks: Even with device assignment,
there could be side-channel attacks where an attacker VM infers sensitive
information from the physical device's behavior or through shared resources like
cache.
#### ACPI (Dragonball uses Upcall)
ACPI is necessary for hotplugging of CPU, memory and devices. ACPI is available
in QEMU and Cloud Hypervisor. Device, CPU and memory hotplug are not available
in Firecracker.
- Hypervisor Vulnerabilities: In virtualized environments, the hypervisor
manages ACPI calls for virtual machines (VMs). If the hypervisor has
vulnerabilities in handling ACPI requests, it could lead to escalated privileges
or other security breaches.
- VM Escape: A sophisticated attack could exploit ACPI functionality to achieve
a VM escape, where malicious code in a VM breaks out to the host system or other
VMs. Firmware Attacks in a Virtualized Context: Similar to physical
environments, firmware-based attacks (including those targeting ACPI) in
virtualized systems can be persistent and difficult to detect. In a virtualized
environment, such attacks might not only compromise the host system but also all
the VMs running on it.
- Resource Starvation Attacks: ACPI functionality could be exploited to
manipulate power management features, causing denial of service through
resource starvation. For example, an attacker could force a VM into a low-power
state, degrading its performance or availability.
- Compromised VMs Affecting Host ACPI Settings: If a VM is compromised, it might
be used to alter ACPI settings on the host, affecting all VMs on that host. This
could lead to various impacts, from performance degradation to system
instability.
- Supply Chain Risks: As with non-virtualized environments, the firmware,
including ACPI firmware used in virtualized environments, could be compromised
during the supply chain process, leading to vulnerabilities that affect all VMs
running on the hardware.
#### ACPI
ACPI is necessary for hotplug of CPU, memory and devices. ACPI is available in QEMU and Cloud Hypervisor. Device, CPU and memory hotplug
are not available in Firecracker.
## Devices and threat model ## Devices and threat model
![Threat model](threat-model-boundaries.svg "threat-model") ![Threat model](threat-model-boundaries.svg "threat-model")