Merge pull request #1065 from devimc/2020-06-03/qemu5/updateDefaulconfigsPatches

qemu: add kata patches for QEMU 5

qemu/patches/5.0.x/0001-9p-removing-coroutines-of-9p-to-increase-the-I-O-per.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 3de89ce9fb5eda46f7cefd70e9090cb7cd7ec803 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 20:14:53 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] 9p: removing coroutines of 9p to increase the I/O
+ performance
+
+This is a quick workaround, need to be fixed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c   | 12 +++++-------
+ hw/9pfs/9p.h   |  6 +++---
+ hw/9pfs/coth.h |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 9e046f7acb..11c8ee08d9 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1082,10 +1082,7 @@ static void coroutine_fn pdu_complete(V9fsPDU *pdu, ssize_t len)
+ out_notify:
+     pdu->s->transport->push_and_notify(pdu);
+ 
+-    /* Now wakeup anybody waiting in flush for this request */
+-    if (!qemu_co_queue_next(&pdu->complete)) {
+-        pdu_free(pdu);
+-    }
++    pdu_free(pdu);
+ }
+ 
+ static mode_t v9mode_to_mode(uint32_t mode, V9fsString *extension)
+@@ -3997,7 +3994,7 @@ static inline bool is_read_only_op(V9fsPDU *pdu)
+ 
+ void pdu_submit(V9fsPDU *pdu, P9MsgHeader *hdr)
+ {
+-    Coroutine *co;
++//    Coroutine *co;
+     CoroutineEntry *handler;
+     V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
+ 
+@@ -4015,8 +4012,9 @@ void pdu_submit(V9fsPDU *pdu, P9MsgHeader *hdr)
+     }
+ 
+     qemu_co_queue_init(&pdu->complete);
+-    co = qemu_coroutine_create(handler, pdu);
+-    qemu_coroutine_enter(co);
++    handler(pdu);
++    //co = qemu_coroutine_create(handler, pdu);
++    //qemu_coroutine_enter(co);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 0 on success, 1 on failure. */
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.h b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+index b8f72a3bd9..d16bf9d05e 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+@@ -391,21 +391,21 @@ extern int total_open_fd;
+ static inline void v9fs_path_write_lock(V9fsState *s)
+ {
+     if (s->ctx.export_flags & V9FS_PATHNAME_FSCONTEXT) {
+-        qemu_co_rwlock_wrlock(&s->rename_lock);
++    //    qemu_co_rwlock_wrlock(&s->rename_lock);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void v9fs_path_read_lock(V9fsState *s)
+ {
+     if (s->ctx.export_flags & V9FS_PATHNAME_FSCONTEXT) {
+-        qemu_co_rwlock_rdlock(&s->rename_lock);
++     //   qemu_co_rwlock_rdlock(&s->rename_lock);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void v9fs_path_unlock(V9fsState *s)
+ {
+     if (s->ctx.export_flags & V9FS_PATHNAME_FSCONTEXT) {
+-        qemu_co_rwlock_unlock(&s->rename_lock);
++     //   qemu_co_rwlock_unlock(&s->rename_lock);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/coth.h b/hw/9pfs/coth.h
+index c2cdc7a9ea..0fe971d1f5 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/coth.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/coth.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
+         qemu_coroutine_yield();                                         \
+     } while (0)
+ 
++#undef v9fs_co_run_in_worker
++#define v9fs_co_run_in_worker(code_block) do {code_block} while(0);
++
+ void co_run_in_worker_bh(void *);
+ int coroutine_fn v9fs_co_readlink(V9fsPDU *, V9fsPath *, V9fsString *);
+ int coroutine_fn v9fs_co_readdir(V9fsPDU *, V9fsFidState *, struct dirent **);
+-- 
+2.21.0
+

qemu/patches/5.0.x/0002-memory-backend-file-nvdimm-support-read-only-files-a.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 3a6e5e157f355b3c42b6c2a0c85b4acaba849ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julio Montes <julio.montes@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 21:19:36 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] memory-backend-file/nvdimm: support read-only files as
+ memory-backends
+
+Currently it is not possible to use a file that is part of a read-only
+filesystem as memory backend for nvdimm devices, even if the file itself
+is not modified in the guest. Same goes for files that do not have write access.
+In order to improve the security of Virtual Machines that share
+and do not modify the memory-backend-file, QEMU should support
+read-only memory-backends.
+
+Use case:
+* Kata Containers use a memory-backed-file as read-only rootfs, and this
+  file is used to start all the virtual machines in the node.
+  It would be really bad if somehow a malicious container modified it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Julio Montes <julio.montes@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Archana Shinde <archana.m.shinde@intel.com>
+Message-Id: <20190708211936.8037-1-julio.montes@intel.com>
+---
+ exec.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/exec.c b/exec.c
+index 2874bb5088..ba2fff234b 100644
+--- a/exec.c
++++ b/exec.c
+@@ -1781,6 +1781,12 @@ static int file_ram_open(const char *path,
+                 break;
+             }
+             g_free(filename);
++        } else if (errno == EROFS || errno == EACCES) {
++            fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
++            if (fd >= 0) {
++                /* @path names an existing read-only file, use it */
++                break;
++            }
+         }
+         if (errno != EEXIST && errno != EINTR) {
+             error_setg_errno(errp, errno,
+-- 
+2.21.0
+