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vc: validate container path when cleaning up

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A malicious can trick us with a crafted container
rootfs symlink and make runtime umount other mountpoints.
Make sure we do not walk through symlinks when umounting.

Signed-off-by: Peng Tao <bergwolf@hyper.sh>
This commit is contained in:
Peng Tao 2020-02-19 06:40:58 -08:00
parent 5bf3231213
commit 5f9a77cccc
1 changed files with 17 additions and 0 deletions
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17
virtcontainers/mount.go
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@ -331,11 +331,24 @@ type Mount struct {
BlockDeviceID string
}
func isSymlink(path string) bool {
stat, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return stat.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0
}
func bindUnmountContainerRootfs(ctx context.Context, sharedDir, sandboxID, cID string) error {
span, _ := trace(ctx, "bindUnmountContainerRootfs")
defer span.Finish()
rootfsDest := filepath.Join(sharedDir, sandboxID, cID, rootfsDir)
if isSymlink(filepath.Join(sharedDir, sandboxID, cID)) || isSymlink(rootfsDest) {
logrus.Warnf("container dir %s is a symlink, malicious guest?", cID)
return nil
}
err := syscall.Unmount(rootfsDest, syscall.MNT_DETACH|UmountNoFollow)
if err == syscall.ENOENT {
logrus.Warnf("%s: %s", err, rootfsDest)
@ -350,6 +363,10 @@ func bindUnmountAllRootfs(ctx context.Context, sharedDir string, sandbox *Sandbo
var errors *merr.Error
for _, c := range sandbox.containers {
if isSymlink(filepath.Join(sharedDir, sandbox.id, c.id)) {
logrus.Warnf("container dir %s is a symlink, malicious guest?", c.id)
continue
}
c.unmountHostMounts()
if c.state.Fstype == "" {
// even if error found, don't break out of loop until all mounts attempted