runtime: Removing runtime logic for SEV

Removing runtime SEV functionality,
such as the kbs, ovmf, VMSA handling,
and SEV configs as part of deprecating
SEV from kata.

Co-authored-by: Adithya Krishnan Kannan <AdithyaKrishnan.Kannan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Arvind Kumar <arvinkum@amd.com>
This commit is contained in:
Arvind Kumar 2025-06-03 18:45:43 +00:00
parent 8eebcef8fb
commit ecac3d2d28
14 changed files with 1 additions and 1346 deletions

View File

@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 5
run: bash tests/integration/kubernetes/gha-run.sh delete-csi-driver
# AMD has deprecated SEV support on Kata and henceforth SNP will be the only feature supported for Kata Containers.
run-k8s-tests-sev-snp:
strategy:
fail-fast: false

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@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ GENERATED_VARS = \
CONFIG_QEMU_NVIDIA_GPU_IN \
CONFIG_QEMU_NVIDIA_GPU_SNP_IN \
CONFIG_QEMU_NVIDIA_GPU_TDX_IN \
CONFIG_QEMU_SEV_IN \
CONFIG_QEMU_TDX_IN \
CONFIG_QEMU_SNP_IN \
CONFIG_CLH_IN \
@ -149,7 +148,6 @@ FIRMWAREVOLUMEPATH :=
FIRMWARETDVFPATH := PLACEHOLDER_FOR_DISTRO_OVMF_WITH_TDX_SUPPORT
FIRMWARETDVFVOLUMEPATH :=
FIRMWARESEVPATH := $(PREFIXDEPS)/share/ovmf/OVMF.fd
FIRMWARESNPPATH := $(PREFIXDEPS)/share/ovmf/AMDSEV.fd
ROOTMEASURECONFIG ?= ""
@ -238,11 +236,10 @@ DEFVALIDENTROPYSOURCES := [\"/dev/urandom\",\"/dev/random\",\"\"]
DEFDISABLEBLOCK := false
DEFSHAREDFS_CLH_VIRTIOFS := virtio-fs
DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_VIRTIOFS := virtio-fs
# Please keep DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_COCO_DEV_VIRTIOFS in sync with TDX/SEV/SNP
# Please keep DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_COCO_DEV_VIRTIOFS in sync with TDX/SNP
DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_COCO_DEV_VIRTIOFS := none
DEFSHAREDFS_STRATOVIRT_VIRTIOFS := virtio-fs
DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_TDX_VIRTIOFS := none
DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_SEV_VIRTIOFS := none
DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_SNP_VIRTIOFS := none
DEFVIRTIOFSDAEMON := $(LIBEXECDIR)/virtiofsd
DEFVALIDVIRTIOFSDAEMONPATHS := [\"$(DEFVIRTIOFSDAEMON)\"]
@ -345,18 +342,6 @@ ifneq (,$(QEMUCMD))
CONFIGS += $(CONFIG_QEMU_TDX)
CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SEV = configuration-qemu-sev.toml
CONFIG_QEMU_SEV = config/$(CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SEV)
CONFIG_QEMU_SEV_IN = $(CONFIG_QEMU_SEV).in
CONFIG_PATH_QEMU_SEV = $(abspath $(CONFDIR)/$(CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SEV))
CONFIG_PATHS += $(CONFIG_PATH_QEMU_SEV)
SYSCONFIG_QEMU_SEV = $(abspath $(SYSCONFDIR)/$(CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SEV))
SYSCONFIG_PATHS_SEV += $(SYSCONFIG_QEMU_SEV)
CONFIGS += $(CONFIG_QEMU_SEV)
CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SNP = configuration-qemu-snp.toml
CONFIG_QEMU_SNP = config/$(CONFIG_FILE_QEMU_SNP)
CONFIG_QEMU_SNP_IN = $(CONFIG_QEMU_SNP).in
@ -660,7 +645,6 @@ USER_VARS += KERNELPATH_FC
USER_VARS += KERNELPATH_STRATOVIRT
USER_VARS += KERNELVIRTIOFSPATH
USER_VARS += FIRMWAREPATH
USER_VARS += FIRMWARESEVPATH
USER_VARS += FIRMWARETDVFPATH
USER_VARS += FIRMWAREVOLUMEPATH
USER_VARS += FIRMWARETDVFVOLUMEPATH
@ -728,7 +712,6 @@ USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_COCO_DEV_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_STRATOVIRT_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_TDX_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_SEV_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_SNP_VIRTIOFS
USER_VARS += DEFVIRTIOFSDAEMON
USER_VARS += DEFVALIDVIRTIOFSDAEMONPATHS

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@ -1,636 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 2022 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# XXX: WARNING: this file is auto-generated.
# XXX:
# XXX: Source file: "@CONFIG_QEMU_SEV_IN@"
# XXX: Project:
# XXX: Name: @PROJECT_NAME@
# XXX: Type: @PROJECT_TYPE@
[hypervisor.qemu]
path = "@QEMUPATH@"
kernel = "@KERNELCONFIDENTIALPATH@"
initrd = "@INITRDCONFIDENTIALPATH@"
machine_type = "@MACHINETYPE@"
# Enable confidential guest support.
# Toggling that setting may trigger different hardware features, ranging
# from memory encryption to both memory and CPU-state encryption and integrity.
# The Kata Containers runtime dynamically detects the available feature set and
# aims at enabling the largest possible one, returning an error if none is
# available, or none is supported by the hypervisor.
#
# Known limitations:
# * Does not work by design:
# - CPU Hotplug
# - Memory Hotplug
# - NVDIMM devices
#
# Default false
confidential_guest = true
# Enable running QEMU VMM as a non-root user.
# By default QEMU VMM run as root. When this is set to true, QEMU VMM process runs as
# a non-root random user. See documentation for the limitations of this mode.
# rootless = true
# List of valid annotation names for the hypervisor
# Each member of the list is a regular expression, which is the base name
# of the annotation, e.g. "path" for io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.path"
enable_annotations = @DEFENABLEANNOTATIONS@
# List of valid annotations values for the hypervisor
# Each member of the list is a path pattern as described by glob(3).
# The default if not set is empty (all annotations rejected.)
# Your distribution recommends: @QEMUVALIDHYPERVISORPATHS@
valid_hypervisor_paths = @QEMUVALIDHYPERVISORPATHS@
# Optional space-separated list of options to pass to the guest kernel.
# For example, use `kernel_params = "vsyscall=emulate"` if you are having
# trouble running pre-2.15 glibc.
#
# WARNING: - any parameter specified here will take priority over the default
# parameter value of the same name used to start the virtual machine.
# Do not set values here unless you understand the impact of doing so as you
# may stop the virtual machine from booting.
# To see the list of default parameters, enable hypervisor debug, create a
# container and look for 'default-kernel-parameters' log entries.
kernel_params = "@KERNELPARAMS@"
# Path to the firmware.
# If you want that qemu uses the default firmware leave this option empty
firmware = "@FIRMWARESEVPATH@"
# Path to the firmware volume.
# firmware TDVF or OVMF can be split into FIRMWARE_VARS.fd (UEFI variables
# as configuration) and FIRMWARE_CODE.fd (UEFI program image). UEFI variables
# can be customized per each user while UEFI code is kept same.
firmware_volume = "@FIRMWAREVOLUMEPATH@"
# Machine accelerators
# comma-separated list of machine accelerators to pass to the hypervisor.
# For example, `machine_accelerators = "nosmm,nosmbus,nosata,nopit,static-prt,nofw"`
machine_accelerators="@MACHINEACCELERATORS@"
# Qemu seccomp sandbox feature
# comma-separated list of seccomp sandbox features to control the syscall access.
# For example, `seccompsandbox= "on,obsolete=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny"`
# Note: "elevateprivileges=deny" doesn't work with daemonize option, so it's removed from the seccomp sandbox
# Another note: enabling this feature may reduce performance, you may enable
# /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable to reduce the impact. see https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/bpfc.8.html
#seccompsandbox="@DEFSECCOMPSANDBOXPARAM@"
# CPU features
# comma-separated list of cpu features to pass to the cpu
# For example, `cpu_features = "pmu=off,vmx=off"
cpu_features="@CPUFEATURES@"
# Default number of vCPUs per SB/VM:
# unspecified or 0 --> will be set to @DEFVCPUS@
# < 0 --> will be set to the actual number of physical cores
# > 0 <= number of physical cores --> will be set to the specified number
# > number of physical cores --> will be set to the actual number of physical cores
default_vcpus = 1
# Default maximum number of vCPUs per SB/VM:
# unspecified or == 0 --> will be set to the actual number of physical cores or to the maximum number
# of vCPUs supported by KVM if that number is exceeded
# > 0 <= number of physical cores --> will be set to the specified number
# > number of physical cores --> will be set to the actual number of physical cores or to the maximum number
# of vCPUs supported by KVM if that number is exceeded
# WARNING: Depending of the architecture, the maximum number of vCPUs supported by KVM is used when
# the actual number of physical cores is greater than it.
# WARNING: Be aware that this value impacts the virtual machine's memory footprint and CPU
# the hotplug functionality. For example, `default_maxvcpus = 240` specifies that until 240 vCPUs
# can be added to a SB/VM, but the memory footprint will be big. Another example, with
# `default_maxvcpus = 8` the memory footprint will be small, but 8 will be the maximum number of
# vCPUs supported by the SB/VM. In general, we recommend that you do not edit this variable,
# unless you know what are you doing.
# NOTICE: on arm platform with gicv2 interrupt controller, set it to 8.
default_maxvcpus = @DEFMAXVCPUS@
# Bridges can be used to hot plug devices.
# Limitations:
# * Currently only pci bridges are supported
# * Until 30 devices per bridge can be hot plugged.
# * Until 5 PCI bridges can be cold plugged per VM.
# This limitation could be a bug in qemu or in the kernel
# Default number of bridges per SB/VM:
# unspecified or 0 --> will be set to @DEFBRIDGES@
# > 1 <= 5 --> will be set to the specified number
# > 5 --> will be set to 5
default_bridges = @DEFBRIDGES@
# Default memory size in MiB for SB/VM.
# If unspecified then it will be set @DEFMEMSZ@ MiB.
default_memory = @DEFMEMSZ@
#
# Default memory slots per SB/VM.
# If unspecified then it will be set @DEFMEMSLOTS@.
# This is will determine the times that memory will be hotadded to sandbox/VM.
#memory_slots = @DEFMEMSLOTS@
# Default maximum memory in MiB per SB / VM
# unspecified or == 0 --> will be set to the actual amount of physical RAM
# > 0 <= amount of physical RAM --> will be set to the specified number
# > amount of physical RAM --> will be set to the actual amount of physical RAM
default_maxmemory = @DEFMAXMEMSZ@
# The size in MiB will be plused to max memory of hypervisor.
# It is the memory address space for the NVDIMM device.
# If set block storage driver (block_device_driver) to "nvdimm",
# should set memory_offset to the size of block device.
# Default 0
#memory_offset = 0
# Specifies virtio-mem will be enabled or not.
# Please note that this option should be used with the command
# "echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory".
# Default false
#enable_virtio_mem = true
# Disable block device from being used for a container's rootfs.
# In case of a storage driver like devicemapper where a container's
# root file system is backed by a block device, the block device is passed
# directly to the hypervisor for performance reasons.
# This flag prevents the block device from being passed to the hypervisor,
# virtio-fs is used instead to pass the rootfs.
disable_block_device_use = @DEFDISABLEBLOCK@
# Shared file system type:
# - virtio-fs (default)
# - virtio-9p
# - virtio-fs-nydus
# - none
shared_fs = "@DEFSHAREDFS_QEMU_SEV_VIRTIOFS@"
# Path to vhost-user-fs daemon.
virtio_fs_daemon = "@DEFVIRTIOFSDAEMON@"
# List of valid annotations values for the virtiofs daemon
# The default if not set is empty (all annotations rejected.)
# Your distribution recommends: @DEFVALIDVIRTIOFSDAEMONPATHS@
valid_virtio_fs_daemon_paths = @DEFVALIDVIRTIOFSDAEMONPATHS@
# Default size of DAX cache in MiB
virtio_fs_cache_size = @DEFVIRTIOFSCACHESIZE@
# Extra args for virtiofsd daemon
#
# Format example:
# ["-o", "arg1=xxx,arg2", "-o", "hello world", "--arg3=yyy"]
# Examples:
# Set virtiofsd log level to debug : ["-o", "log_level=debug"] or ["-d"]
#
# see `virtiofsd -h` for possible options.
virtio_fs_extra_args = @DEFVIRTIOFSEXTRAARGS@
# Cache mode:
#
# - none
# Metadata, data, and pathname lookup are not cached in guest. They are
# always fetched from host and any changes are immediately pushed to host.
#
# - auto
# Metadata and pathname lookup cache expires after a configured amount of
# time (default is 1 second). Data is cached while the file is open (close
# to open consistency).
#
# - always
# Metadata, data, and pathname lookup are cached in guest and never expire.
virtio_fs_cache = "@DEFVIRTIOFSCACHE@"
# Block storage driver to be used for the hypervisor in case the container
# rootfs is backed by a block device. This is virtio-scsi, virtio-blk
# or nvdimm.
block_device_driver = "@DEFBLOCKSTORAGEDRIVER_QEMU@"
# Specifies cache-related options will be set to block devices or not.
# Default false
#block_device_cache_set = true
# Specifies cache-related options for block devices.
# Denotes whether use of O_DIRECT (bypass the host page cache) is enabled.
# Default false
#block_device_cache_direct = true
# Specifies cache-related options for block devices.
# Denotes whether flush requests for the device are ignored.
# Default false
#block_device_cache_noflush = true
# Enable iothreads (data-plane) to be used. This causes IO to be
# handled in a separate IO thread. This is currently only implemented
# for SCSI.
#
enable_iothreads = @DEFENABLEIOTHREADS@
# Enable pre allocation of VM RAM, default false
# Enabling this will result in lower container density
# as all of the memory will be allocated and locked
# This is useful when you want to reserve all the memory
# upfront or in the cases where you want memory latencies
# to be very predictable
# Default false
#enable_mem_prealloc = true
# Enable huge pages for VM RAM, default false
# Enabling this will result in the VM memory
# being allocated using huge pages.
# This is useful when you want to use vhost-user network
# stacks within the container. This will automatically
# result in memory pre allocation
#enable_hugepages = true
# Enable vhost-user storage device, default false
# Enabling this will result in some Linux reserved block type
# major range 240-254 being chosen to represent vhost-user devices.
enable_vhost_user_store = @DEFENABLEVHOSTUSERSTORE@
# The base directory specifically used for vhost-user devices.
# Its sub-path "block" is used for block devices; "block/sockets" is
# where we expect vhost-user sockets to live; "block/devices" is where
# simulated block device nodes for vhost-user devices to live.
vhost_user_store_path = "@DEFVHOSTUSERSTOREPATH@"
# Enable vIOMMU, default false
# Enabling this will result in the VM having a vIOMMU device
# This will also add the following options to the kernel's
# command line: intel_iommu=on,iommu=pt
#enable_iommu = true
# Enable IOMMU_PLATFORM, default false
# Enabling this will result in the VM device having iommu_platform=on set
#enable_iommu_platform = true
# List of valid annotations values for the vhost user store path
# The default if not set is empty (all annotations rejected.)
# Your distribution recommends: @DEFVALIDVHOSTUSERSTOREPATHS@
valid_vhost_user_store_paths = @DEFVALIDVHOSTUSERSTOREPATHS@
# Enable file based guest memory support. The default is an empty string which
# will disable this feature. In the case of virtio-fs, this is enabled
# automatically and '/dev/shm' is used as the backing folder.
# This option will be ignored if VM templating is enabled.
#file_mem_backend = "@DEFFILEMEMBACKEND@"
# List of valid annotations values for the file_mem_backend annotation
# The default if not set is empty (all annotations rejected.)
# Your distribution recommends: @DEFVALIDFILEMEMBACKENDS@
valid_file_mem_backends = @DEFVALIDFILEMEMBACKENDS@
# -pflash can add image file to VM. The arguments of it should be in format
# of ["/path/to/flash0.img", "/path/to/flash1.img"]
pflashes = []
# This option changes the default hypervisor and kernel parameters
# to enable debug output where available.
#
# Default false
#enable_debug = true
# Disable the customizations done in the runtime when it detects
# that it is running on top a VMM. This will result in the runtime
# behaving as it would when running on bare metal.
#
#disable_nesting_checks = true
# This is the msize used for 9p shares. It is the number of bytes
# used for 9p packet payload.
#msize_9p = @DEFMSIZE9P@
# If false and nvdimm is supported, use nvdimm device to plug guest image.
# Otherwise virtio-block device is used.
#
# nvdimm is not supported when `confidential_guest = true`.
disable_image_nvdimm = @DEFDISABLEIMAGENVDIMM@
# Before hot plugging a PCIe device, you need to add a pcie_root_port device.
# Use this parameter when using some large PCI bar devices, such as Nvidia GPU
# The value means the number of pcie_root_port
# Default 0
#pcie_root_port = 2
# If vhost-net backend for virtio-net is not desired, set to true. Default is false, which trades off
# security (vhost-net runs ring0) for network I/O performance.
#disable_vhost_net = true
#
# Default entropy source.
# The path to a host source of entropy (including a real hardware RNG)
# /dev/urandom and /dev/random are two main options.
# Be aware that /dev/random is a blocking source of entropy. If the host
# runs out of entropy, the VMs boot time will increase leading to get startup
# timeouts.
# The source of entropy /dev/urandom is non-blocking and provides a
# generally acceptable source of entropy. It should work well for pretty much
# all practical purposes.
#entropy_source= "@DEFENTROPYSOURCE@"
# List of valid annotations values for entropy_source
# The default if not set is empty (all annotations rejected.)
# Your distribution recommends: @DEFVALIDENTROPYSOURCES@
valid_entropy_sources = @DEFVALIDENTROPYSOURCES@
# Path to OCI hook binaries in the *guest rootfs*.
# This does not affect host-side hooks which must instead be added to
# the OCI spec passed to the runtime.
#
# You can create a rootfs with hooks by customizing the osbuilder scripts:
# https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/tree/main/tools/osbuilder
#
# Hooks must be stored in a subdirectory of guest_hook_path according to their
# hook type, i.e. "guest_hook_path/{prestart,poststart,poststop}".
# The agent will scan these directories for executable files and add them, in
# lexicographical order, to the lifecycle of the guest container.
# Hooks are executed in the runtime namespace of the guest. See the official documentation:
# https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/v1.0.1/config.md#posix-platform-hooks
# Warnings will be logged if any error is encountered while scanning for hooks,
# but it will not abort container execution.
#guest_hook_path = "/usr/share/oci/hooks"
#
# Use rx Rate Limiter to control network I/O inbound bandwidth(size in bits/sec for SB/VM).
# In Qemu, we use classful qdiscs HTB(Hierarchy Token Bucket) to discipline traffic.
# Default 0-sized value means unlimited rate.
#rx_rate_limiter_max_rate = 0
# Use tx Rate Limiter to control network I/O outbound bandwidth(size in bits/sec for SB/VM).
# In Qemu, we use classful qdiscs HTB(Hierarchy Token Bucket) and ifb(Intermediate Functional Block)
# to discipline traffic.
# Default 0-sized value means unlimited rate.
#tx_rate_limiter_max_rate = 0
# Set where to save the guest memory dump file.
# If set, when GUEST_PANICKED event occurred,
# guest memeory will be dumped to host filesystem under guest_memory_dump_path,
# This directory will be created automatically if it does not exist.
#
# The dumped file(also called vmcore) can be processed with crash or gdb.
#
# WARNING:
# Dump guests memory can take very long depending on the amount of guest memory
# and use much disk space.
#guest_memory_dump_path="/var/crash/kata"
# If enable paging.
# Basically, if you want to use "gdb" rather than "crash",
# or need the guest-virtual addresses in the ELF vmcore,
# then you should enable paging.
#
# See: https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/qemu-qmp-ref.html#Dump-guest-memory for details
#guest_memory_dump_paging=false
# Enable swap in the guest. Default false.
# When enable_guest_swap is enabled, insert a raw file to the guest as the swap device
# if the swappiness of a container (set by annotation "io.katacontainers.container.resource.swappiness")
# is bigger than 0.
# The size of the swap device should be
# swap_in_bytes (set by annotation "io.katacontainers.container.resource.swap_in_bytes") - memory_limit_in_bytes.
# If swap_in_bytes is not set, the size should be memory_limit_in_bytes.
# If swap_in_bytes and memory_limit_in_bytes is not set, the size should
# be default_memory.
#enable_guest_swap = true
# use legacy serial for guest console if available and implemented for architecture. Default false
#use_legacy_serial = true
# disable applying SELinux on the VMM process (default false)
disable_selinux=@DEFDISABLESELINUX@
# disable applying SELinux on the container process
# If set to false, the type `container_t` is applied to the container process by default.
# Note: To enable guest SELinux, the guest rootfs must be CentOS that is created and built
# with `SELINUX=yes`.
# (default: true)
disable_guest_selinux=@DEFDISABLEGUESTSELINUX@
[factory]
# VM templating support. Once enabled, new VMs are created from template
# using vm cloning. They will share the same initial kernel, initramfs and
# agent memory by mapping it readonly. It helps speeding up new container
# creation and saves a lot of memory if there are many kata containers running
# on the same host.
#
# When disabled, new VMs are created from scratch.
#
# Note: Requires "initrd=" to be set ("image=" is not supported).
#
# Default false
#enable_template = true
# Specifies the path of template.
#
# Default "/run/vc/vm/template"
#template_path = "/run/vc/vm/template"
# The number of caches of VMCache:
# unspecified or == 0 --> VMCache is disabled
# > 0 --> will be set to the specified number
#
# VMCache is a function that creates VMs as caches before using it.
# It helps speed up new container creation.
# The function consists of a server and some clients communicating
# through Unix socket. The protocol is gRPC in protocols/cache/cache.proto.
# The VMCache server will create some VMs and cache them by factory cache.
# It will convert the VM to gRPC format and transport it when gets
# requestion from clients.
# Factory grpccache is the VMCache client. It will request gRPC format
# VM and convert it back to a VM. If VMCache function is enabled,
# kata-runtime will request VM from factory grpccache when it creates
# a new sandbox.
#
# Default 0
#vm_cache_number = 0
# Specify the address of the Unix socket that is used by VMCache.
#
# Default /var/run/kata-containers/cache.sock
#vm_cache_endpoint = "/var/run/kata-containers/cache.sock"
[agent.@PROJECT_TYPE@]
# If enabled, make the agent display debug-level messages.
# (default: disabled)
#enable_debug = true
# Enable agent tracing.
#
# If enabled, the agent will generate OpenTelemetry trace spans.
#
# Notes:
#
# - If the runtime also has tracing enabled, the agent spans will be
# associated with the appropriate runtime parent span.
# - If enabled, the runtime will wait for the container to shutdown,
# increasing the container shutdown time slightly.
#
# (default: disabled)
#enable_tracing = true
# Comma separated list of kernel modules and their parameters.
# These modules will be loaded in the guest kernel using modprobe(8).
# The following example can be used to load two kernel modules with parameters
# - kernel_modules=["e1000e InterruptThrottleRate=3000,3000,3000 EEE=1", "i915 enable_ppgtt=0"]
# The first word is considered as the module name and the rest as its parameters.
# Container will not be started when:
# * A kernel module is specified and the modprobe command is not installed in the guest
# or it fails loading the module.
# * The module is not available in the guest or it doesn't met the guest kernel
# requirements, like architecture and version.
#
kernel_modules=[]
# Enable debug console.
# If enabled, user can connect guest OS running inside hypervisor
# through "kata-runtime exec <sandbox-id>" command
#debug_console_enabled = true
# Agent connection dialing timeout value in seconds
# (default: 90)
dial_timeout = 90
[runtime]
# If enabled, the runtime will log additional debug messages to the
# system log
# (default: disabled)
#enable_debug = true
#
# Internetworking model
# Determines how the VM should be connected to the
# the container network interface
# Options:
#
# - macvtap
# Used when the Container network interface can be bridged using
# macvtap.
#
# - none
# Used when customize network. Only creates a tap device. No veth pair.
#
# - tcfilter
# Uses tc filter rules to redirect traffic from the network interface
# provided by plugin to a tap interface connected to the VM.
#
internetworking_model="@DEFNETWORKMODEL_QEMU@"
# disable guest seccomp
# Determines whether container seccomp profiles are passed to the virtual
# machine and applied by the kata agent. If set to true, seccomp is not applied
# within the guest
# (default: true)
disable_guest_seccomp=@DEFDISABLEGUESTSECCOMP@
# Apply a custom SELinux security policy to the container process inside the VM.
# This is used when you want to apply a type other than the default `container_t`,
# so general users should not uncomment and apply it.
# (format: "user:role:type")
# Note: You cannot specify MCS policy with the label because the sensitivity levels and
# categories are determined automatically by high-level container runtimes such as containerd.
#guest_selinux_label="@DEFGUESTSELINUXLABEL@"
# If enabled, the runtime will create opentracing.io traces and spans.
# (See https://www.jaegertracing.io/docs/getting-started).
# (default: disabled)
#enable_tracing = true
# Set the full url to the Jaeger HTTP Thrift collector.
# The default if not set will be "http://localhost:14268/api/traces"
#jaeger_endpoint = ""
# Sets the username to be used if basic auth is required for Jaeger.
#jaeger_user = ""
# Sets the password to be used if basic auth is required for Jaeger.
#jaeger_password = ""
# If enabled, the runtime will not create a network namespace for shim and hypervisor processes.
# This option may have some potential impacts to your host. It should only be used when you know what you're doing.
# `disable_new_netns` conflicts with `internetworking_model=tcfilter` and `internetworking_model=macvtap`. It works only
# with `internetworking_model=none`. The tap device will be in the host network namespace and can connect to a bridge
# (like OVS) directly.
# (default: false)
#disable_new_netns = true
# if enabled, the runtime will add all the kata processes inside one dedicated cgroup.
# The container cgroups in the host are not created, just one single cgroup per sandbox.
# The runtime caller is free to restrict or collect cgroup stats of the overall Kata sandbox.
# The sandbox cgroup path is the parent cgroup of a container with the PodSandbox annotation.
# The sandbox cgroup is constrained if there is no container type annotation.
# See: https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtime/virtcontainers#ContainerType
sandbox_cgroup_only=@DEFSANDBOXCGROUPONLY@
# If enabled, the runtime will attempt to determine appropriate sandbox size (memory, CPU) before booting the virtual machine. In
# this case, the runtime will not dynamically update the amount of memory and CPU in the virtual machine. This is generally helpful
# when a hardware architecture or hypervisor solutions is utilized which does not support CPU and/or memory hotplug.
# Compatibility for determining appropriate sandbox (VM) size:
# - When running with pods, sandbox sizing information will only be available if using Kubernetes >= 1.23 and containerd >= 1.6. CRI-O
# does not yet support sandbox sizing annotations.
# - When running single containers using a tool like ctr, container sizing information will be available.
static_sandbox_resource_mgmt=@DEFSTATICRESOURCEMGMT_TEE@
# If specified, sandbox_bind_mounts identifieds host paths to be mounted (ro) into the sandboxes shared path.
# This is only valid if filesystem sharing is utilized. The provided path(s) will be bindmounted into the shared fs directory.
# If defaults are utilized, these mounts should be available in the guest at `/run/kata-containers/shared/containers/sandbox-mounts`
# These will not be exposed to the container workloads, and are only provided for potential guest services.
sandbox_bind_mounts=@DEFBINDMOUNTS@
# VFIO Mode
# Determines how VFIO devices should be be presented to the container.
# Options:
#
# - vfio
# Matches behaviour of OCI runtimes (e.g. runc) as much as
# possible. VFIO devices will appear in the container as VFIO
# character devices under /dev/vfio. The exact names may differ
# from the host (they need to match the VM's IOMMU group numbers
# rather than the host's)
#
# - guest-kernel
# This is a Kata-specific behaviour that's useful in certain cases.
# The VFIO device is managed by whatever driver in the VM kernel
# claims it. This means it will appear as one or more device nodes
# or network interfaces depending on the nature of the device.
# Using this mode requires specially built workloads that know how
# to locate the relevant device interfaces within the VM.
#
vfio_mode="@DEFVFIOMODE@"
# If enabled, the runtime will not create Kubernetes emptyDir mounts on the guest filesystem. Instead, emptyDir mounts will
# be created on the host and shared via virtio-fs. This is potentially slower, but allows sharing of files from host to guest.
disable_guest_empty_dir=@DEFDISABLEGUESTEMPTYDIR@
# Enabled experimental feature list, format: ["a", "b"].
# Experimental features are features not stable enough for production,
# they may break compatibility, and are prepared for a big version bump.
# Supported experimental features:
# (default: [])
experimental=@DEFAULTEXPFEATURES@
# If enabled, user can run pprof tools with shim v2 process through kata-monitor.
# (default: false)
# enable_pprof = true
# Indicates the CreateContainer request timeout needed for the workload(s)
# It using guest_pull this includes the time to pull the image inside the guest
# Defaults to @DEFCREATECONTAINERTIMEOUT@ second(s)
# Note: The effective timeout is determined by the lesser of two values: runtime-request-timeout from kubelet config
# (https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/#:~:text=runtime%2Drequest%2Dtimeout) and create_container_timeout.
# In essence, the timeout used for guest pull=runtime-request-timeout<create_container_timeout?runtime-request-timeout:create_container_timeout.
create_container_timeout = @DEFCREATECONTAINERTIMEOUT@
# Base directory of directly attachable network config.
# Network devices for VM-based containers are allowed to be placed in the
# host netns to eliminate as many hops as possible, which is what we
# called a "Directly Attachable Network". The config, set by special CNI
# plugins, is used to tell the Kata containers what devices are attached
# to the hypervisor.
# (default: /run/kata-containers/dans)
dan_conf = "@DEFDANCONF@"
# Enforce guest pull. This instructs the runtime to communicate to the agent via annotations that
# the container image should be pulled in the guest, without using an external snapshotter.
# This is an experimental feature and might be removed in the future.
experimental_force_guest_pull = @DEFFORCEGUESTPULL@

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@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# AMD SEV confidential guest utilities
This package provides utilities for launching AMD SEV confidential guests.
## Calculating expected launch digests
The `CalculateLaunchDigest` function can be used to calculate the expected
SHA-256 of an SEV confidential guest given its firmware, kernel, initrd, and
kernel command-line.
### Unit test data
The [`testdata`](testdata) directory contains file used for testing
`CalculateLaunchDigest`.

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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
// Package kbs can be used interact with simple-kbs, the key broker
// server for SEV and SEV-ES pre-attestation
package kbs
const (
Offline = "offline"
OfflineSecretType = "bundle"
OfflineSecretGuid = "e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910"
Online = "online"
OnlineBootParam = "online_sev_kbc"
OnlineSecretType = "connection"
OnlineSecretGuid = "1ee27366-0c87-43a6-af48-28543eaf7cb0"
)
type GuestPreAttestationConfig struct {
Proxy string
Keyset string
LaunchId string
KernelPath string
InitrdPath string
FwPath string
KernelParameters string
CertChainPath string
SecretType string
SecretGuid string
Policy uint32
}

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@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package sev
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"os"
)
// GUID 96b582de-1fb2-45f7-baea-a366c55a082d
var ovmfTableFooterGuid = guidLE{0xde, 0x82, 0xb5, 0x96, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0xf7, 0x45, 0xba, 0xea, 0xa3, 0x66, 0xc5, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x2d}
// GUID 00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e
var sevEsResetBlockGuid = guidLE{0xde, 0x71, 0xf7, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x89, 0x0e, 0x68, 0xc7, 0x7e, 0x2f, 0xb4, 0x4e}
type ovmfFooterTableEntry struct {
Size uint16
Guid guidLE
}
type ovmf struct {
table map[guidLE][]byte
}
func NewOvmf(filename string) (ovmf, error) {
buf, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
if err != nil {
return ovmf{}, err
}
table, err := parseFooterTable(buf)
if err != nil {
return ovmf{}, err
}
return ovmf{table}, nil
}
// Parse the OVMF footer table and return a map from GUID to entry value
func parseFooterTable(data []byte) (map[guidLE][]byte, error) {
table := make(map[guidLE][]byte)
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
err := binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, ovmfFooterTableEntry{})
if err != nil {
return table, err
}
entryHeaderSize := buf.Len()
// The OVMF table ends 32 bytes before the end of the firmware binary
startOfFooterTable := len(data) - 32 - entryHeaderSize
footerBytes := bytes.NewReader(data[startOfFooterTable:])
var footer ovmfFooterTableEntry
err = binary.Read(footerBytes, binary.LittleEndian, &footer)
if err != nil {
return table, err
}
if footer.Guid != ovmfTableFooterGuid {
// No OVMF footer table
return table, nil
}
tableSize := int(footer.Size) - entryHeaderSize
if tableSize < 0 {
return table, nil
}
tableBytes := data[(startOfFooterTable - tableSize):startOfFooterTable]
for len(tableBytes) >= entryHeaderSize {
tsize := len(tableBytes)
entryBytes := bytes.NewReader(tableBytes[tsize-entryHeaderSize:])
var entry ovmfFooterTableEntry
err := binary.Read(entryBytes, binary.LittleEndian, &entry)
if err != nil {
return table, err
}
if int(entry.Size) < entryHeaderSize {
return table, errors.New("Invalid entry size")
}
entryData := tableBytes[tsize-int(entry.Size) : tsize-entryHeaderSize]
table[entry.Guid] = entryData
tableBytes = tableBytes[:tsize-int(entry.Size)]
}
return table, nil
}
func (o *ovmf) tableItem(guid guidLE) ([]byte, error) {
value, ok := o.table[guid]
if !ok {
return []byte{}, errors.New("OVMF footer table entry not found")
}
return value, nil
}
func (o *ovmf) sevEsResetEip() (uint32, error) {
value, err := o.tableItem(sevEsResetBlockGuid)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(value), nil
}

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@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
// Package sev can be used to compute the expected hash values for
// SEV/-ES pre-launch attestation
package sev
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"os"
)
type guidLE [16]byte
// The following definitions must be identical to those in QEMU target/i386/sev.c
// GUID: 9438d606-4f22-4cc9-b479-a793d411fd21
var sevHashTableHeaderGuid = guidLE{0x06, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x94, 0x22, 0x4f, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0xb4, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x93, 0xd4, 0x11, 0xfd, 0x21}
// GUID: 4de79437-abd2-427f-b835-d5b172d2045b
var sevKernelEntryGuid = guidLE{0x37, 0x94, 0xe7, 0x4d, 0xd2, 0xab, 0x7f, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xb1, 0x72, 0xd2, 0x04, 0x5b}
// GUID: 44baf731-3a2f-4bd7-9af1-41e29169781d
var sevInitrdEntryGuid = guidLE{0x31, 0xf7, 0xba, 0x44, 0x2f, 0x3a, 0xd7, 0x4b, 0x9a, 0xf1, 0x41, 0xe2, 0x91, 0x69, 0x78, 0x1d}
// GUID: 97d02dd8-bd20-4c94-aa78-e7714d36ab2a
var sevCmdlineEntryGuid = guidLE{0xd8, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x97, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x94, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x71, 0x4d, 0x36, 0xab, 0x2a}
type sevHashTableEntry struct {
entryGuid guidLE
length uint16
hash [sha256.Size]byte
}
type sevHashTable struct {
tableGuid guidLE
length uint16
cmdline sevHashTableEntry
initrd sevHashTableEntry
kernel sevHashTableEntry
}
type paddedSevHashTable struct {
table sevHashTable
padding [8]byte
}
func fileSha256(filename string) (res [sha256.Size]byte, err error) {
f, err := os.Open(filename)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
defer f.Close()
digest := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(digest, f); err != nil {
return res, err
}
copy(res[:], digest.Sum(nil))
return res, nil
}
func constructSevHashesTable(kernelPath, initrdPath, cmdline string) ([]byte, error) {
kernelHash, err := fileSha256(kernelPath)
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
initrdHash, err := fileSha256(initrdPath)
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
cmdlineHash := sha256.Sum256(append([]byte(cmdline), 0))
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
err = binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, sevHashTableEntry{})
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
entrySize := uint16(buf.Len())
buf = new(bytes.Buffer)
err = binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, sevHashTable{})
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
tableSize := uint16(buf.Len())
ht := paddedSevHashTable{
table: sevHashTable{
tableGuid: sevHashTableHeaderGuid,
length: tableSize,
cmdline: sevHashTableEntry{
entryGuid: sevCmdlineEntryGuid,
length: entrySize,
hash: cmdlineHash,
},
initrd: sevHashTableEntry{
entryGuid: sevInitrdEntryGuid,
length: entrySize,
hash: initrdHash,
},
kernel: sevHashTableEntry{
entryGuid: sevKernelEntryGuid,
length: entrySize,
hash: kernelHash,
},
},
padding: [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
}
htBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)
err = binary.Write(htBuf, binary.LittleEndian, ht)
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
return htBuf.Bytes(), nil
}
// CalculateLaunchDigest returns the sha256 encoded SEV launch digest based off
// the current firmware, kernel, initrd, and the kernel cmdline
func CalculateLaunchDigest(firmwarePath, kernelPath, initrdPath, cmdline string) (res [sha256.Size]byte, err error) {
f, err := os.Open(firmwarePath)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
defer f.Close()
digest := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(digest, f); err != nil {
return res, err
}
// When used for confidential containers in kata-containers, kernelPath
// is always set (direct boot). However, this current package can also
// be used by other programs which may calculate launch digests of
// arbitrary SEV guests without SEV kernel hashes table.
if kernelPath != "" {
ht, err := constructSevHashesTable(kernelPath, initrdPath, cmdline)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
digest.Write(ht)
}
copy(res[:], digest.Sum(nil))
return res, nil
}
// CalculateSEVESLaunchDigest returns the sha256 encoded SEV-ES launch digest
// based off the current firmware, kernel, initrd, and the kernel cmdline, and
// the number of vcpus and their type
func CalculateSEVESLaunchDigest(vcpus int, vcpuSig VCPUSig, firmwarePath, kernelPath, initrdPath, cmdline string) (res [sha256.Size]byte, err error) {
f, err := os.Open(firmwarePath)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
defer f.Close()
digest := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(digest, f); err != nil {
return res, err
}
// When used for confidential containers in kata-containers, kernelPath
// is always set (direct boot). However, this current package can also
// be used by other programs which may calculate launch digests of
// arbitrary SEV guests without SEV kernel hashes table.
if kernelPath != "" {
ht, err := constructSevHashesTable(kernelPath, initrdPath, cmdline)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
digest.Write(ht)
}
o, err := NewOvmf(firmwarePath)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
resetEip, err := o.sevEsResetEip()
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
v := vmsaBuilder{uint64(resetEip), vcpuSig}
for i := 0; i < vcpus; i++ {
vmsaPage, err := v.buildPage(i)
if err != nil {
return res, err
}
digest.Write(vmsaPage)
}
copy(res[:], digest.Sum(nil))
return res, nil
}

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@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package sev
import (
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
)
func TestCalculateLaunchDigestWithoutKernelHashes(t *testing.T) {
ld, err := CalculateLaunchDigest("testdata/ovmf_suffix.bin", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err value: %s", err)
}
hexld := hex.EncodeToString(ld[:])
if hexld != "b184e06e012366fd7b33ebfb361a515d05f00d354dca07b36abbc1e1e177ced5" {
t.Fatalf("wrong measurement: %s", hexld)
}
}
func TestCalculateLaunchDigestWithKernelHashes(t *testing.T) {
ld, err := CalculateLaunchDigest("testdata/ovmf_suffix.bin", "/dev/null", "/dev/null", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err value: %s", err)
}
hexld := hex.EncodeToString(ld[:])
if hexld != "d59d7696efd7facfaa653758586e6120c4b6eaec3e327771d278cc6a44786ba5" {
t.Fatalf("wrong measurement: %s", hexld)
}
}
func TestCalculateLaunchDigestWithKernelHashesSevEs(t *testing.T) {
ld, err := CalculateSEVESLaunchDigest(1, SigEpycV4, "testdata/ovmf_suffix.bin", "/dev/null", "/dev/null", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err value: %s", err)
}
hexld := hex.EncodeToString(ld[:])
if hexld != "7e5c26fb454621eb466978b4d0242b3c04b44a034de7fc0a2d8dac60ea2b6403" {
t.Fatalf("wrong measurement: %s", hexld)
}
}
func TestCalculateLaunchDigestWithKernelHashesSevEsAndSmp(t *testing.T) {
ld, err := CalculateSEVESLaunchDigest(4, SigEpycV4, "testdata/ovmf_suffix.bin", "/dev/null", "/dev/null", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err value: %s", err)
}
hexld := hex.EncodeToString(ld[:])
if hexld != "b2111b0051fc3a06ec216899b2c78da99fb9d56c6ff2e8261dd3fe6cff79ecbc" {
t.Fatalf("wrong measurement: %s", hexld)
}
}

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@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# sev/testdata
The `ovmf_suffix.bin` contains the last 4KB of the `OVMF.fd` binary from edk2's
`OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc` build. To save space, we committed only the
last 4KB instead of the the full 4MB binary.
The end of the file contains a GUIDed footer table with entries that hold the
SEV-ES AP reset vector address, which is needed in order to compute VMSAs for
SEV-ES guests.

Binary file not shown.

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@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package sev
type VCPUSig uint64
const (
// 'EPYC': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpyc VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-v1': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpycV1 VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-v2': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpycV2 VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-IBPB': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpycIBPB VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-v3': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpycV3 VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-v4': family=23, model=1, stepping=2
SigEpycV4 VCPUSig = 0x800f12
// 'EPYC-Rome': family=23, model=49, stepping=0
SigEpycRome VCPUSig = 0x830f10
// 'EPYC-Rome-v1': family=23, model=49, stepping=0
SigEpycRomeV1 VCPUSig = 0x830f10
// 'EPYC-Rome-v2': family=23, model=49, stepping=0
SigEpycRomeV2 VCPUSig = 0x830f10
// 'EPYC-Rome-v3': family=23, model=49, stepping=0
SigEpycRomeV3 VCPUSig = 0x830f10
// 'EPYC-Milan': family=25, model=1, stepping=1
SigEpycMilan VCPUSig = 0xa00f11
// 'EPYC-Milan-v1': family=25, model=1, stepping=1
SigEpycMilanV1 VCPUSig = 0xa00f11
// 'EPYC-Milan-v2': family=25, model=1, stepping=1
SigEpycMilanV2 VCPUSig = 0xa00f11
)
// NewVCPUSig computes the CPU signature (32-bit value) from the given family,
// model, and stepping.
//
// This computation is described in AMD's CPUID Specification, publication #25481
// https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/25481.pdf
// See section: CPUID Fn0000_0001_EAX Family, Model, Stepping Identifiers
func NewVCPUSig(family, model, stepping uint32) VCPUSig {
var family_low, family_high uint32
if family > 0xf {
family_low = 0xf
family_high = (family - 0x0f) & 0xff
} else {
family_low = family
family_high = 0
}
model_low := model & 0xf
model_high := (model >> 4) & 0xf
stepping_low := stepping & 0xf
return VCPUSig((family_high << 20) |
(model_high << 16) |
(family_low << 8) |
(model_low << 4) |
stepping_low)
}

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@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package sev
import (
"testing"
)
func TestNewVCPUSig(t *testing.T) {
if NewVCPUSig(23, 1, 2) != SigEpyc {
t.Errorf("wrong EPYC CPU signature")
}
if NewVCPUSig(23, 49, 0) != SigEpycRome {
t.Errorf("wrong EPYC-Rome CPU signature")
}
if NewVCPUSig(25, 1, 1) != SigEpycMilan {
t.Errorf("wrong EPYC-Milan CPU signature")
}
}

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@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
// Copyright contributors to AMD SEV/-ES in Go
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package sev
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
)
// VMCB Segment (struct vmcb_seg in the linux kernel)
type vmcbSeg struct {
selector uint16
attrib uint16
limit uint32
base uint64
}
// VMSA page
//
// The names of the fields are taken from struct sev_es_work_area in the linux kernel:
// https://github.com/AMDESE/linux/blob/sev-snp-v12/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h#L318
// (following the definitions in AMD APM Vol 2 Table B-4)
type sevEsSaveArea struct {
es vmcbSeg
cs vmcbSeg
ss vmcbSeg
ds vmcbSeg
fs vmcbSeg
gs vmcbSeg
gdtr vmcbSeg
ldtr vmcbSeg
idtr vmcbSeg
tr vmcbSeg
vmpl0_ssp uint64 // nolint: unused
vmpl1_ssp uint64 // nolint: unused
vmpl2_ssp uint64 // nolint: unused
vmpl3_ssp uint64 // nolint: unused
u_cet uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_1 [2]uint8 // nolint: unused
vmpl uint8 // nolint: unused
cpl uint8 // nolint: unused
reserved_2 [4]uint8 // nolint: unused
efer uint64
reserved_3 [104]uint8 // nolint: unused
xss uint64 // nolint: unused
cr4 uint64
cr3 uint64 // nolint: unused
cr0 uint64
dr7 uint64
dr6 uint64
rflags uint64
rip uint64
dr0 uint64 // nolint: unused
dr1 uint64 // nolint: unused
dr2 uint64 // nolint: unused
dr3 uint64 // nolint: unused
dr0_addr_mask uint64 // nolint: unused
dr1_addr_mask uint64 // nolint: unused
dr2_addr_mask uint64 // nolint: unused
dr3_addr_mask uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_4 [24]uint8 // nolint: unused
rsp uint64 // nolint: unused
s_cet uint64 // nolint: unused
ssp uint64 // nolint: unused
isst_addr uint64 // nolint: unused
rax uint64 // nolint: unused
star uint64 // nolint: unused
lstar uint64 // nolint: unused
cstar uint64 // nolint: unused
sfmask uint64 // nolint: unused
kernel_gs_base uint64 // nolint: unused
sysenter_cs uint64 // nolint: unused
sysenter_esp uint64 // nolint: unused
sysenter_eip uint64 // nolint: unused
cr2 uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_5 [32]uint8 // nolint: unused
g_pat uint64
dbgctrl uint64 // nolint: unused
br_from uint64 // nolint: unused
br_to uint64 // nolint: unused
last_excp_from uint64 // nolint: unused
last_excp_to uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_7 [80]uint8 // nolint: unused
pkru uint32 // nolint: unused
reserved_8 [20]uint8 // nolint: unused
reserved_9 uint64 // nolint: unused
rcx uint64 // nolint: unused
rdx uint64
rbx uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_10 uint64 // nolint: unused
rbp uint64 // nolint: unused
rsi uint64 // nolint: unused
rdi uint64 // nolint: unused
r8 uint64 // nolint: unused
r9 uint64 // nolint: unused
r10 uint64 // nolint: unused
r11 uint64 // nolint: unused
r12 uint64 // nolint: unused
r13 uint64 // nolint: unused
r14 uint64 // nolint: unused
r15 uint64 // nolint: unused
reserved_11 [16]uint8 // nolint: unused
guest_exit_info_1 uint64 // nolint: unused
guest_exit_info_2 uint64 // nolint: unused
guest_exit_int_info uint64 // nolint: unused
guest_nrip uint64 // nolint: unused
sev_features uint64
vintr_ctrl uint64 // nolint: unused
guest_exit_code uint64 // nolint: unused
virtual_tom uint64 // nolint: unused
tlb_id uint64 // nolint: unused
pcpu_id uint64 // nolint: unused
event_inj uint64 // nolint: unused
xcr0 uint64
reserved_12 [16]uint8 // nolint: unused
x87_dp uint64 // nolint: unused
mxcsr uint32 // nolint: unused
x87_ftw uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_fsw uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_fcw uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_fop uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_ds uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_cs uint16 // nolint: unused
x87_rip uint64 // nolint: unused
fpreg_x87 [80]uint8 // nolint: unused
fpreg_xmm [256]uint8 // nolint: unused
fpreg_ymm [256]uint8 // nolint: unused
unused [2448]uint8 // nolint: unused
}
type vmsaBuilder struct {
apEIP uint64
vcpuSig VCPUSig
}
func (v *vmsaBuilder) buildPage(i int) ([]byte, error) {
eip := uint64(0xfffffff0) // BSP (first vcpu)
if i > 0 {
eip = v.apEIP
}
saveArea := sevEsSaveArea{
es: vmcbSeg{0, 0x93, 0xffff, 0},
cs: vmcbSeg{0xf000, 0x9b, 0xffff, eip & 0xffff0000},
ss: vmcbSeg{0, 0x93, 0xffff, 0},
ds: vmcbSeg{0, 0x93, 0xffff, 0},
fs: vmcbSeg{0, 0x93, 0xffff, 0},
gs: vmcbSeg{0, 0x93, 0xffff, 0},
gdtr: vmcbSeg{0, 0, 0xffff, 0},
idtr: vmcbSeg{0, 0, 0xffff, 0},
ldtr: vmcbSeg{0, 0x82, 0xffff, 0},
tr: vmcbSeg{0, 0x8b, 0xffff, 0},
efer: 0x1000, // KVM enables EFER_SVME
cr4: 0x40, // KVM enables X86_CR4_MCE
cr0: 0x10,
dr7: 0x400,
dr6: 0xffff0ff0,
rflags: 0x2,
rip: eip & 0xffff,
g_pat: 0x7040600070406, // PAT MSR: See AMD APM Vol 2, Section A.3
rdx: uint64(v.vcpuSig),
sev_features: 0, // SEV-ES
xcr0: 0x1,
}
page := new(bytes.Buffer)
err := binary.Write(page, binary.LittleEndian, saveArea)
if err != nil {
return []byte{}, err
}
return page.Bytes(), nil
}

View File

@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import "os"
const (
tdxKvmParameterPath = "/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/tdx"
sevKvmParameterPath = "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev"
snpKvmParameterPath = "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev_snp"
)
@ -30,12 +28,6 @@ func availableGuestProtection() (guestProtection, error) {
return snpProtection, nil
}
}
// SEV is supported and enabled when the kvm module `sev` parameter is set to `1` (or `Y` for linux >= 5.12)
if _, err := os.Stat(sevKvmParameterPath); err == nil {
if c, err := os.ReadFile(sevKvmParameterPath); err == nil && len(c) > 0 && (c[0] == '1' || c[0] == 'Y') {
return sevProtection, nil
}
}
return noneProtection, nil
}