These tests are not passing, or being maintained,
so as discussed on the AC meeting, we will skip them
from automatically running until they can be reviewed
and re-worked, so avoid wasting CI cycles.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
Instead of building it every time, we can store the regorus
binary in OCI registry using oras and download it from there.
This reduces the install time from ~1m40s to ~15s.
Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
Pin Github owned actions to specific hashes as recommended
as tags are mutable see https://pin-gh-actions.kammel.dev/.
This one of the recommendations that scorecard gives us.
Note this was generated with `frizbee actions`
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
Switch the hyper for an underscore, so the ghcr
helm publish can work properly.
Co-authored-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio@northflank.com>
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
At the moment if any of the tests in the matric fails
then the rest of the jobs are cancelled, so we have to
re-run everything. Add `fail-fast: false` to stop this
behaviour.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
This adds govulncheck vulnerability scanning as a non-blocking check in
the static checks workflow. The check scans Go runtime binaries for known
vulnerabilities while filtering out verified false positives.
Signed-off-by: Mitch Zhu <mitchzhu@microsoft.com>
containerd-sandboxapi fails with `containerd v2.0.x` and passes with
`containerd v1.7.x` regardless kata-containers. And it was not tested
with `containerd v2.0.x` because `containerd v2.0.x` could not
recognize `[plugins.cri.containerd]` in `config.toml`.
Signed-off-by: Seunguk Shin <seunguk.shin@arm.com>
This reverts commit 2ee3470627.
This is mostly redundant given we already have workflow approval for external
contributors.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Bombo <abombo@microsoft.com>
By default the checkout action leave the credentials
in the checked-out repo's `.git/config`, which means
they could get exposed. Use persist-credentials: false
to prevent this happening.
Note: static-checks.yaml does use git diff after the checkout,
but the git docs state that git diff is just local, so doesn't
need authentication.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
This removes the ok-to-test label on every push, except if the PR author
has write access to the repo (ie. permission to modify labels).
This protects against attackers who would initially open a genuine PR,
then push malicious code after the initial review.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Bombo <abombo@microsoft.com>
This completely eliminates the Azure secret from the repo, following the below
guidance:
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-hardening-your-deployments/configuring-openid-connect-in-azure
The federated identity is scoped to the `ci` environment, meaning:
* I had to specify this environment in some YAMLs. I don't believe there's any
downside to this.
* As previously, the CI works seamlessly both from PRs and in the manual
workflow.
I also deleted the tools/packaging/kata-deploy/action folder as it doesn't seem
to be used anymore, and it contains a reference to the secret.
Signed-off-by: Aurélien Bombo <abombo@microsoft.com>
Having secrets unconditionally being inherited is
bad practice, so update the workflows to only pass
through the minimal secrets that are needed
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
We have a number of jobs that either need,or nest workflows
that need gh permissions, such as for pushing to ghcr,
or doing attest build provenance. This means they need write
permissions on things like `packages`, `id-token` and `attestations`,
so we need to set these permissions at the job-level
(along with `contents: read`), so they are not restricted by our
safe defaults.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
I shortsightedly forgot that gatekeeper would need
to read more than just the commit content in it's
python scripts, so add read permissions to actions
issues which it uses in it's processing
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
We have a number of jobs that nest the build-static-tarball
workflows later on. Due to these doing attest build provenance,
and pushing to ghcr.io, t hey need write permissions on
`packages`, `id-token` and `attestations`, so we need to set
these permissions on the top-level jobs (along with `contents: read`),
so they are not blocked.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
Some legacy workflows require write access to github which
is a security weakness and don't provide much value,
so lets remove them.
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
The edk2 is required for memory hot plug on qemu for arm64.
This adds the edk2 to static tarball for arm64.
Signed-off-by: Seunguk Shin <seunguk.shin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Connolly <nick.connolly@arm.com>
Let's take advantage that helm take and OCI registry as the charts, and
upload our charts to the OCI registries we've been using so far.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio@northflank.com>
As discussed in #9538, with anyhow >=1.0.77 we have test failures due to backtrace behaviour
changing, so set RUST_LIB_BACKTRACE=0,
so that we only have backtrace on panics
Signed-off-by: stevenhorsman <steven@uk.ibm.com>
