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design
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docs/proposals/security-context-constraints.md
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docs/proposals/security-context-constraints.md
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<!-- BEGIN MUNGE: UNVERSIONED_WARNING -->
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<!-- BEGIN STRIP_FOR_RELEASE -->
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<img src="http://kubernetes.io/img/warning.png" alt="WARNING"
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width="25" height="25">
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<img src="http://kubernetes.io/img/warning.png" alt="WARNING"
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width="25" height="25">
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<img src="http://kubernetes.io/img/warning.png" alt="WARNING"
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width="25" height="25">
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<img src="http://kubernetes.io/img/warning.png" alt="WARNING"
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width="25" height="25">
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<img src="http://kubernetes.io/img/warning.png" alt="WARNING"
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width="25" height="25">
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<h2>PLEASE NOTE: This document applies to the HEAD of the source tree</h2>
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If you are using a released version of Kubernetes, you should
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refer to the docs that go with that version.
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<strong>
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The latest 1.0.x release of this document can be found
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[here](http://releases.k8s.io/release-1.0/docs/proposals/security-context-constraints.md).
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Documentation for other releases can be found at
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[releases.k8s.io](http://releases.k8s.io).
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</strong>
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--
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<!-- END STRIP_FOR_RELEASE -->
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<!-- END MUNGE: UNVERSIONED_WARNING -->
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## Abstract
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PodSecurityPolicy allows cluster administrators to control the creation and validation of a security
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context for a pod and containers.
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## Motivation
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Administration of a multi-tenant cluster requires the ability to provide varying sets of permissions
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among the tenants, the infrastructure components, and end users of the system who may themselves be
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administrators within their own isolated namespace.
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Actors in a cluster may include infrastructure that is managed by administrators, infrastructure
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that is exposed to end users (builds, deployments), the isolated end user namespaces in the cluster, and
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the individual users inside those namespaces. Infrastructure components that operate on behalf of a
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user (builds, deployments) should be allowed to run at an elevated level of permissions without
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granting the user themselves an elevated set of permissions.
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## Goals
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1. Associate [service accounts](http://docs.k8s.io/design/service_accounts.md), groups, and users with
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a set of constraints that dictate how a security context is established for a pod and the pod's containers.
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1. Provide the ability for users and infrastructure components to run pods with elevated privileges
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on behalf of another user or within a namespace where privileges are more restrictive.
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1. Secure the ability to reference elevated permissions or to change the constraints under which
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a user runs.
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## Use Cases
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Use case 1:
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As an administrator, I can create a namespace for a person that can't create privileged containers
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AND enforces that the UID of the containers is set to a certain value
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Use case 2:
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As a cluster operator, an infrastructure component should be able to create a pod with elevated
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privileges in a namespace where regular users cannot create pods with these privileges or execute
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commands in that pod.
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Use case 3:
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As a cluster administrator, I can allow a given namespace (or service account) to create privileged
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pods or to run root pods
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Use case 4:
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As a cluster administrator, I can allow a project administrator to control the security contexts of
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pods and service accounts within a project
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## Requirements
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1. Provide a set of restrictions that controls how a security context is created for pods and containers
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as a new, cluster-scoped, object called PodSecurityPolicy.
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1. User information in `user.Info` must be available to admission controllers. (Completed in
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https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/kubernetes/pull/8203)
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1. Some authorizers may restrict a user’s ability to reference a service account. Systems requiring
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the ability to secure service accounts on a user level must be able to add a policy that enables
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referencing specific service accounts themselves.
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1. Admission control must validate the creation of Pods against the allowed set of constraints.
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## Design
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### Model
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PodSecurityPolicy objects exists in the root scope, outside of a namespace. The
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PodSecurityPolicy will reference users and groups that are allowed
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to operate under the constraints. In order to support this, `ServiceAccounts` must be mapped
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to a user name or group list by the authentication/authorization layers. This allows the security
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context to treat users, groups, and service accounts uniformly.
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Below is a list of PodSecurityPolicies which will likely serve most use cases:
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1. A default policy object. This object is permissioned to something covers all actors such
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as a `system:authenticated` group and will likely be the most restrictive set of constraints.
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1. A default constraints object for service accounts. This object can be identified as serving
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a group identified by `system:service-accounts` which can be imposed by the service account authenticator / token generator.
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1. Cluster admin constraints identified by `system:cluster-admins` group - a set of constraints with elevated privileges that can be used
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by an administrative user or group.
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1. Infrastructure components constraints which can be identified either by a specific service
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account or by a group containing all service accounts.
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```go
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// PodSecurityPolicy governs the ability to make requests that affect the SecurityContext
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// that will be applied to a pod and container.
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type PodSecurityPolicy struct {
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unversioned.TypeMeta `json:",inline"`
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api.ObjectMeta `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
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// Spec defines the policy enforced.
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Spec PodSecurityPolicySpec `json:"spec,omitempty"`
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}
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// PodSecurityPolicySpec defines the policy enforced.
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type PodSecurityPolicySpec struct {
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// Privileged determines if a pod can request to be run as privileged.
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Privileged bool `json:"privileged,omitempty"`
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// Capabilities is a list of capabilities that can be added.
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Capabilities []api.Capability `json:"capabilities,omitempty"`
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// Volumes allows and disallows the use of different types of volume plugins.
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Volumes VolumeSecurityPolicy `json:"volumes,omitempty"`
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// HostNetwork determines if the policy allows the use of HostNetwork in the pod spec.
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HostNetwork bool `json:"hostNetwork,omitempty"`
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// HostPorts determines which host port ranges are allowed to be exposed.
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HostPorts []HostPortRange `json:"hostPorts,omitempty"`
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// HostPID determines if the policy allows the use of HostPID in the pod spec.
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HostPID bool `json:"hostPID,omitempty"`
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// HostIPC determines if the policy allows the use of HostIPC in the pod spec.
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HostIPC bool `json:"hostIPC,omitempty"`
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// SELinuxContext is the strategy that will dictate the allowable labels that may be set.
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SELinuxContext SELinuxContextStrategyOptions `json:"seLinuxContext,omitempty"`
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// RunAsUser is the strategy that will dictate the allowable RunAsUser values that may be set.
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RunAsUser RunAsUserStrategyOptions `json:"runAsUser,omitempty"`
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// The users who have permissions to use this policy
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Users []string `json:"users,omitempty"`
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// The groups that have permission to use this policy
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Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
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}
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// HostPortRange defines a range of host ports that will be enabled by a policy
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// for pods to use. It requires both the start and end to be defined.
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type HostPortRange struct {
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// Start is the beginning of the port range which will be allowed.
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Start int `json:"start"`
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// End is the end of the port range which will be allowed.
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End int `json:"end"`
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}
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// VolumeSecurityPolicy allows and disallows the use of different types of volume plugins.
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type VolumeSecurityPolicy struct {
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// HostPath allows or disallows the use of the HostPath volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#hostpath
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HostPath bool `json:"hostPath,omitempty"`
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// EmptyDir allows or disallows the use of the EmptyDir volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#emptydir
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EmptyDir bool `json:"emptyDir,omitempty"`
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// GCEPersistentDisk allows or disallows the use of the GCEPersistentDisk volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#gcepersistentdisk
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GCEPersistentDisk bool `json:"gcePersistentDisk,omitempty"`
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// AWSElasticBlockStore allows or disallows the use of the AWSElasticBlockStore volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#awselasticblockstore
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AWSElasticBlockStore bool `json:"awsElasticBlockStore,omitempty"`
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// GitRepo allows or disallows the use of the GitRepo volume plugin.
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GitRepo bool `json:"gitRepo,omitempty"`
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// Secret allows or disallows the use of the Secret volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#secrets
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Secret bool `json:"secret,omitempty"`
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// NFS allows or disallows the use of the NFS volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/volumes.md#nfs
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NFS bool `json:"nfs,omitempty"`
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// ISCSI allows or disallows the use of the ISCSI volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/examples/iscsi/README.md
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ISCSI bool `json:"iscsi,omitempty"`
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// Glusterfs allows or disallows the use of the Glusterfs volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/examples/glusterfs/README.md
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Glusterfs bool `json:"glusterfs,omitempty"`
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// PersistentVolumeClaim allows or disallows the use of the PersistentVolumeClaim volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/user-guide/persistent-volumes.md#persistentvolumeclaims
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PersistentVolumeClaim bool `json:"persistentVolumeClaim,omitempty"`
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// RBD allows or disallows the use of the RBD volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/examples/rbd/README.md
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RBD bool `json:"rbd,omitempty"`
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// Cinder allows or disallows the use of the Cinder volume plugin.
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/examples/mysql-cinder-pd/README.md
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Cinder bool `json:"cinder,omitempty"`
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// CephFS allows or disallows the use of the CephFS volume plugin.
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CephFS bool `json:"cephfs,omitempty"`
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// DownwardAPI allows or disallows the use of the DownwardAPI volume plugin.
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DownwardAPI bool `json:"downwardAPI,omitempty"`
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// FC allows or disallows the use of the FC volume plugin.
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FC bool `json:"fc,omitempty"`
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}
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// SELinuxContextStrategyOptions defines the strategy type and any options used to create the strategy.
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type SELinuxContextStrategyOptions struct {
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// Type is the strategy that will dictate the allowable labels that may be set.
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Type SELinuxContextStrategy `json:"type"`
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// seLinuxOptions required to run as; required for MustRunAs
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// More info: http://releases.k8s.io/HEAD/docs/design/security_context.md#security-context
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SELinuxOptions *api.SELinuxOptions `json:"seLinuxOptions,omitempty"`
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}
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// SELinuxContextStrategyType denotes strategy types for generating SELinux options for a
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// SecurityContext.
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type SELinuxContextStrategy string
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const (
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// container must have SELinux labels of X applied.
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SELinuxStrategyMustRunAs SELinuxContextStrategy = "MustRunAs"
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// container may make requests for any SELinux context labels.
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SELinuxStrategyRunAsAny SELinuxContextStrategy = "RunAsAny"
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)
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// RunAsUserStrategyOptions defines the strategy type and any options used to create the strategy.
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type RunAsUserStrategyOptions struct {
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// Type is the strategy that will dictate the allowable RunAsUser values that may be set.
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Type RunAsUserStrategy `json:"type"`
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// UID is the user id that containers must run as. Required for the MustRunAs strategy if not using
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// a strategy that supports pre-allocated uids.
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UID *int64 `json:"uid,omitempty"`
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// UIDRangeMin defines the min value for a strategy that allocates by a range based strategy.
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UIDRangeMin *int64 `json:"uidRangeMin,omitempty"`
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// UIDRangeMax defines the max value for a strategy that allocates by a range based strategy.
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UIDRangeMax *int64 `json:"uidRangeMax,omitempty"`
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}
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// RunAsUserStrategyType denotes strategy types for generating RunAsUser values for a
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// SecurityContext.
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type RunAsUserStrategy string
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const (
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// container must run as a particular uid.
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RunAsUserStrategyMustRunAs RunAsUserStrategy = "MustRunAs"
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// container must run as a particular uid.
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RunAsUserStrategyMustRunAsRange RunAsUserStrategy = "MustRunAsRange"
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// container must run as a non-root uid
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RunAsUserStrategyMustRunAsNonRoot RunAsUserStrategy = "MustRunAsNonRoot"
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// container may make requests for any uid.
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RunAsUserStrategyRunAsAny RunAsUserStrategy = "RunAsAny"
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)
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```
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### PodSecurityPolicy Lifecycle
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As reusable objects in the root scope, PodSecurityPolicy follows the lifecycle of the
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cluster itself. Maintenance of constraints such as adding, assigning, or changing them is the
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responsibility of the cluster administrator.
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Creating a new user within a namespace should not require the cluster administrator to
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define the user's PodSecurityPolicy. They should receive the default set of policies
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that the administrator has defined for the groups they are assigned.
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## Default PodSecurityPolicy And Overrides
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In order to establish policy for service accounts and users there must be a way
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to identify the default set of constraints that is to be used. This is best accomplished by using
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groups. As mentioned above, groups may be used by the authentication/authorization layer to ensure
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that every user maps to at least one group (with a default example of `system:authenticated`) and it
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is up to the cluster administrator to ensure that a PodSecurityPolicy object exists that
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references the group.
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If an administrator would like to provide a user with a changed set of security context permissions
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they may do the following:
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1. Create a new PodSecurityPolicy object and add a reference to the user or a group
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that the user belongs to.
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1. Add the user (or group) to an existing PodSecurityPolicy object with the proper
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elevated privileges.
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## Admission
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Admission control using an authorizer allows the ability to control the creation of resources
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based on capabilities granted to a user. In terms of the PodSecurityPolicy it means
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that an admission controller may inspect the user info made available in the context to retrieve
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and appropriate set of policies for validation.
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The appropriate set of PodSecurityPolicies is defined as all of the policies
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available that have reference to the user or groups that the user belongs to.
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Admission will use the PodSecurityPolicy to ensure that any requests for a
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specific security context setting are valid and to generate settings using the following approach:
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1. Determine all the available PodSecurityPolicy objects that are allowed to be used
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1. Sort the PodSecurityPolicy objects in a most restrictive to least restrictive order.
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1. For each PodSecurityPolicy, generate a SecurityContext for each container. The generation phase will not override
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and user requested settings in the SecurityContext and will rely on the validation phase to ensure that
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the user requests are valid.
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1. Validate the generated SecurityContext to ensure it falls within the boundaries of the PodSecurityPolicy
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1. If all containers validate under a single PodSecurityPolicy then the pod will be admitted
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1. If all containers DO NOT validate under the PodSecurityPolicy then try the next PodSecurityPolicy
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1. If no PodSecurityPolicy validates for the pod then the pod will not be admitted
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## Creation of a SecurityContext Based on PodSecurityPolicy
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The creation of a SecurityContext based on a PodSecurityPolicy is based upon the configured
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settings of the PodSecurityPolicy.
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There are three scenarios under which a PodSecurityPolicy field may fall:
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1. Governed by a boolean: fields of this type will be defaulted to the most restrictive value.
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For instance, `AllowPrivileged` will always be set to false if unspecified.
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1. Governed by an allowable set: fields of this type will be checked against the set to ensure
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their value is allowed. For example, `AllowCapabilities` will ensure that only capabilities
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that are allowed to be requested are considered valid. `HostNetworkSources` will ensure that
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only pods created from source X are allowed to request access to the host network.
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1. Governed by a strategy: Items that have a strategy to generate a value will provide a
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mechanism to generate the value as well as a mechanism to ensure that a specified value falls into
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the set of allowable values. See the Types section for the description of the interfaces that
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strategies must implement.
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Strategies have the ability to become dynamic. In order to support a dynamic strategy it should be
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possible to make a strategy that has the ability to either be pre-populated with dynamic data by
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another component (such as an admission controller) or has the ability to retrieve the information
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itself based on the data in the pod. An example of this would be a pre-allocated UID for the namespace.
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A dynamic `RunAsUser` strategy could inspect the namespace of the pod in order to find the required pre-allocated
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UID and generate or validate requests based on that information.
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```go
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// SELinuxStrategy defines the interface for all SELinux constraint strategies.
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type SELinuxStrategy interface {
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// Generate creates the SELinuxOptions based on constraint rules.
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Generate(pod *api.Pod, container *api.Container) (*api.SELinuxOptions, error)
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// Validate ensures that the specified values fall within the range of the strategy.
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Validate(pod *api.Pod, container *api.Container) fielderrors.ValidationErrorList
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}
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// RunAsUserStrategy defines the interface for all uid constraint strategies.
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type RunAsUserStrategy interface {
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// Generate creates the uid based on policy rules.
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Generate(pod *api.Pod, container *api.Container) (*int64, error)
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// Validate ensures that the specified values fall within the range of the strategy.
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Validate(pod *api.Pod, container *api.Container) fielderrors.ValidationErrorList
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}
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```
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## Escalating Privileges by an Administrator
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An administrator may wish to create a resource in a namespace that runs with
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escalated privileges. By allowing security context
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constraints to operate on both the requesting user and pod's service account administrators are able to
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create pods in namespaces with elevated privileges based on the administrator's security context
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constraints.
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This also allows the system to guard commands being executed in the non-conforming container. For
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instance, an `exec` command can first check the security context of the pod against the security
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context constraints of the user or the user's ability to reference a service account.
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If it does not validate then it can block users from executing the command. Since the validation
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will be user aware administrators would still be able to run the commands that are restricted to normal users.
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## Interaction with the Kubelet
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In certain cases, the Kubelet may need provide information about
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the image in order to validate the security context. An example of this is a cluster
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that is configured to run with a UID strategy of `MustRunAsNonRoot`.
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In this case the admission controller can set the existing `MustRunAsNonRoot` flag on the SecurityContext
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based on the UID strategy of the SecurityPolicy. It should still validate any requests on the pod
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for a specific UID and fail early if possible. However, if the `RunAsUser` is not set on the pod
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it should still admit the pod and allow the Kubelet to ensure that the image does not run as
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root with the existing non-root checks.
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<!-- BEGIN MUNGE: GENERATED_ANALYTICS -->
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[]()
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<!-- END MUNGE: GENERATED_ANALYTICS -->
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