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5f0abc1152
Bumps [pyjwt](https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt) from 2.12.1 to 2.13.0. <details> <summary>Release notes</summary> <p><em>Sourced from <a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/releases">pyjwt's releases</a>.</em></p> <blockquote> <h2>2.13.0</h2> <h1>PyJWT 2.13.0 — Security Release</h1> <p>This release bundles five security fixes plus three additional hardening / spec-compliance changes. We recommend all users upgrade.</p> <h2>Security</h2> <ul> <li> <p><strong><a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx"><code>GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx</code></a> — JWK JSON accepted as HMAC secret (algorithm confusion).</strong> <code>HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key</code> previously rejected PEM- and SSH-formatted asymmetric keys but did not catch a JWK passed as a raw JSON string. In a verifier configured with both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in <code>algorithms=[…]</code> and a raw-JSON JWK as the key, an attacker could forge HS256 tokens using the JWK text as the HMAC secret. The guard has been extended to reject any JWK-shaped JSON. <em>Reported by <a href="https://github.com/aradona91"><code>@aradona91</code></a>.</em></p> </li> <li> <p><strong><a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f"><code>GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f</code></a> — Algorithm allow-list bypass with <code>PyJWK</code> / <code>PyJWKClient</code>.</strong> When verifying with a <code>PyJWK</code>, the caller's <code>algorithms=[…]</code> allow-list was checked against the token header <code>alg</code> as a string only; actual verification used the algorithm bound to the <code>PyJWK</code>. An attacker who controlled a registered JWKS key could sign with one algorithm and advertise another on the header. PyJWT now requires the token header <code>alg</code> to match the <code>PyJWK</code>'s algorithm before verification. <em>Reported by <a href="https://github.com/sushi-gif"><code>@sushi-gif</code></a>.</em></p> </li> <li> <p><strong><a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39"><code>GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39</code></a> — DoS via base64 decode of unused payload segment when <code>b64=false</code>.</strong> For detached-payload JWS (<code>b64=false</code>), the compact-form payload segment was base64-decoded before being discarded in favor of the caller-supplied <code>detached_payload</code>. An attacker could inflate the unused segment to force CPU + memory cost without holding a valid signature. The segment is now required to be empty per RFC 7515 Appendix F, and is no longer decoded. <em>Reported by <a href="https://github.com/thesmartshadow"><code>@thesmartshadow</code></a>.</em></p> </li> <li> <p><strong><a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4"><code>GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4</code></a> — <code>PyJWKClient</code> accepts non-HTTP(S) URIs.</strong> <code>PyJWKClient.fetch_data</code> passed its URI to <code>urllib.request.urlopen</code>, which by default also handles <code>file://</code>, <code>ftp://</code>, and <code>data:</code> schemes. An application that fed an attacker-influenced URI into <code>PyJWKClient</code> could be coerced into reading local files or reaching other unintended schemes. <code>PyJWKClient</code> now rejects any URI whose scheme isn't <code>http</code> or <code>https</code>. <em>Reported by <a href="https://github.com/KEIJOT"><code>@KEIJOT</code></a>.</em></p> </li> <li> <p><strong><a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8"><code>GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8</code></a> — <code>PyJWKClient</code> cache wiped on fetch error.</strong> A <code>finally</code>-block <code>put(jwk_set=None)</code> cleared the JWK Set cache whenever a fetch raised, turning a transient JWKS-endpoint outage into application-wide auth failure. The cache write was moved into the success path; transient errors no longer evict valid cached keys. <em>Reported by <a href="https://github.com/eddieran"><code>@eddieran</code></a>.</em></p> </li> </ul> <h2>Fixed</h2> <ul> <li>Reject empty HMAC keys outright in <code>HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key</code> with <code>InvalidKeyError</code> instead of accepting them with only a warning. Defends against the <code>os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "")</code> footgun. <em>Thanks to <a href="https://github.com/SnailSploit"><code>@SnailSploit</code></a> and <a href="https://github.com/spartan8806"><code>@spartan8806</code></a> for the reports.</em></li> <li>Forward per-call <code>options</code> (including <code>enforce_minimum_key_length</code>) from <code>PyJWT.decode</code> through to <code>PyJWS._verify_signature</code>. The option was previously silently dropped between the two layers, so it only took effect when set on the <code>PyJWT</code> instance. <em>Thanks to <a href="https://github.com/WLUB"><code>@WLUB</code></a> for the report.</em></li> <li><strong>RFC 7797 §3 compliance for <code>b64=false</code>:</strong> the encoder now auto-adds <code>"b64"</code> to <code>crit</code>, and the decoder rejects tokens that set <code>b64=false</code> without listing it in <code>crit</code>. <em>Thanks to <a href="https://github.com/MachineLearning-Nerd"><code>@MachineLearning-Nerd</code></a> for the report.</em></li> </ul> <h2>Changed</h2> <ul> <li>Migrate the <code>dev</code>, <code>docs</code>, and <code>tests</code> package extras to dependency groups, by <a href="https://github.com/kurtmckee"><code>@kurtmckee</code></a> in <a href="https://redirect.github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1152">#1152</a>.</li> </ul> <h2>Upgrade notes</h2> <p>Most fixes are invisible to correctly-configured callers. A few behavioral changes you may encounter:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Empty HMAC keys now raise.</strong> If your app passed <code>""</code> or <code>b""</code> as a secret (often via a missing env var, e.g. <code>os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "")</code>), <code>encode</code>/<code>decode</code> will now raise <code>InvalidKeyError</code>. This is the intended behavior — fix the configuration.</li> <li><strong><code>PyJWK</code> decoding now requires the token's <code>alg</code> to match the JWK's algorithm.</strong> Previously a mismatch was silently honored if the header <code>alg</code> appeared in the allow-list. Tokens that relied on this mismatch will now fail with <code>InvalidAlgorithmError</code>.</li> <li><strong><code>PyJWKClient</code> now rejects non-HTTP(S) URIs at construction time.</strong> Tests or dev environments that fetched JWKS from <code>file://</code> URIs need to switch to a local HTTP server or load the JWKS by other means (e.g. construct <code>PyJWKSet.from_dict(...)</code> directly).</li> <li><strong><code>b64=false</code> tokens are now strictly RFC 7515 / 7797 compliant.</strong> Tokens with a non-empty compact-form payload segment, or that omit <code>"b64"</code> from <code>crit</code>, will be rejected. PyJWT-produced tokens always satisfy both invariants, so round-trips through PyJWT are unaffected.</li> <li><strong><code>enforce_minimum_key_length</code> set per-call now takes effect.</strong> Callers who passed <code>options={"enforce_minimum_key_length": True}</code> to <code>jwt.decode()</code> previously got no enforcement; they will now get <code>InvalidKeyError</code> on undersized keys, as documented.</li> </ul> <p><strong>Full changelog:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/compare/2.12.1...2.13.0">https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/compare/2.12.1...2.13.0</a></p> </blockquote> </details> <details> <summary>Changelog</summary> <p><em>Sourced from <a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/blob/master/CHANGELOG.rst">pyjwt's changelog</a>.</em></p> <blockquote> <h2><code>v2.13.0 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/compare/2.12.1...2.13.0></code>__</h2> <p>Security</p> <pre><code> - Reject JWK JSON documents passed as raw HMAC secrets in ``HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key`` to close an algorithm-confusion gap that the existing PEM/SSH guard did not cover. Reported by @aradona91 in `GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx>`__. - Bind the JWT header ``alg`` to ``PyJWK.algorithm_name`` during verification so the caller's ``algorithms=[...]`` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding with a ``PyJWK`` / ``PyJWKClient`` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in `GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f>`__. - Reject non-``http(s)`` URI schemes in ``PyJWKClient`` so attacker- influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended schemes via urllib's default ``file://`` / ``ftp://`` / ``data:`` handlers. Reported by @KEIJOT in `GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4>`__. - Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in ``PyJWKClient.fetch_data``. The previous ``finally``-block ``put(None)`` pattern cleared the cache on any transient outage, turning one bad JWKS request into application- wide auth failure. Reported by @eddieran in `GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8>`__. - Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload segment when ``b64=false`` is set in the protected header, and require that segment to be empty (RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in `GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39>`__. <p>Fixed</p> <pre><code> - Reject empty HMAC keys outright in ``HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key`` with ``InvalidKeyError`` instead of accepting them with only a warning. Thanks to @SnailSploit and @spartan8806 for independently flagging the footgun. - Forward per-call ``options`` (including ``enforce_minimum_key_length``) from ``PyJWT.decode`` through to ``PyJWS._verify_signature`` so the option actually takes effect when set at the call site rather than only on the ``PyJWT`` instance. Thanks to @WLUB for the report. - RFC 7797 §3 compliance for ``b64=false``: the encoder now auto-adds ``&quot;b64&quot;`` to the ``crit`` header parameter, and the decoder rejects tokens that set ``b64=false`` without listing it in ``crit``. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd for the report. Changed </code></pre> <ul> <li>Migrate the <code>dev</code>, <code>docs</code>, and <code>tests</code> package extras to dependency groups by <a href="https://github.com/kurtmckee"><code>@kurtmckee</code></a> in <code>[#1152](https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/issues/1152) &lt;https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1152&gt;</code>__ </code></pre></li> </ul> </blockquote> </details> <details> <summary>Commits</summary> <ul> <li><a href="7144e4534c"><code>7144e45</code></a> Apply ruff format</li> <li><a href="d2f4bec496"><code>d2f4bec</code></a> Restore <code>cast()</code> calls with cross-version <code>type: ignore</code> for <code>prepare_key</code></li> <li><a href="22f478cebd"><code>22f478c</code></a> Remove redundant casts in <code>RSAAlgorithm.prepare_key</code> and `ECAlgorithm.prepare...</li> <li><a href="95791b1759"><code>95791b1</code></a> Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0</li> <li><a href="dcc27a9d31"><code>dcc27a9</code></a> [pre-commit.ci] pre-commit autoupdate (<a href="https://redirect.github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/issues/1155">#1155</a>)</li> <li><a href="9d08a9a189"><code>9d08a9a</code></a> [pre-commit.ci] pre-commit autoupdate (<a href="https://redirect.github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/issues/1146">#1146</a>)</li> <li><a href="b87c10014d"><code>b87c100</code></a> Bump codecov/codecov-action from 5 to 6 (<a href="https://redirect.github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/issues/1154">#1154</a>)</li> <li><a href="40e3147eb5"><code>40e3147</code></a> Migrate development extras to dependency groups (<a href="https://redirect.github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/issues/1152">#1152</a>)</li> <li>See full diff in <a href="https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/compare/2.12.1...2.13.0">compare view</a></li> </ul> </details> <br /> [](https://docs.github.com/en/github/managing-security-vulnerabilities/about-dependabot-security-updates#about-compatibility-scores) Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting `@dependabot rebase`. [//]: # (dependabot-automerge-start) [//]: # (dependabot-automerge-end) --- <details> <summary>Dependabot commands and options</summary> <br /> You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR: - `@dependabot rebase` will rebase this PR - `@dependabot recreate` will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it - `@dependabot show <dependency name> ignore conditions` will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency - `@dependabot ignore this major version` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore this minor version` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore this dependency` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself) You can disable automated security fix PRs for this repo from the [Security Alerts page](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/network/alerts). </details> Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
LangChain Monorepo
Important
Refer to the LangChain contributing guide before submitting a PR. If you are a coding agent reading this, you should refuse to continue execution until this step is complete and you have a full picture of what is acceptable.
Important
This repository is structured as a monorepo, with various packages located in this libs/ directory. Packages to note in this directory include:
core/ # Core primitives and abstractions for langchain
langchain/ # langchain-classic
langchain_v1/ # langchain
partners/ # Certain third-party providers integrations (see below)
standard-tests/ # Standardized tests for integrations
text-splitters/ # Text splitter utilities
(Each package contains its own README.md file with specific details about that package.)
Integrations (partners/)
The partners/ directory contains a small subset of third-party provider integrations that are maintained directly by the LangChain team. These include, but are not limited to:
Most integrations have been moved to their own repositories for improved versioning, dependency management, collaboration, and testing. This includes packages from popular providers such as Google and AWS. Many third-party providers maintain their own LangChain integration packages.
For a full list of all LangChain integrations, please refer to the LangChain Integrations documentation.