Update dependencies to use sirupsen not Sirupsen

That entailed a few other fixes, eg small Notary API changes.

Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
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vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+<img src="docs/images/notary-blk.svg" alt="Notary" width="400px"/>
+
+[![Circle CI](https://circleci.com/gh/theupdateframework/notary/tree/master.svg?style=shield)](https://circleci.com/gh/theupdateframework/notary/tree/master) [![CodeCov](https://codecov.io/github/theupdateframework/notary/coverage.svg?branch=master)](https://codecov.io/github/theupdateframework/notary) [![GoReportCard](https://goreportcard.com/badge/theupdateframework/notary)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/theupdateframework/notary)
+[![FOSSA Status](https://app.fossa.io/api/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Ftheupdateframework%2Fnotary.svg?type=shield)](https://app.fossa.io/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Ftheupdateframework%2Fnotary?ref=badge_shield)
+
+# Notice
+
+The Notary project has officially been accepted in to the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF).
+It has moved to https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary. Any downstream consumers should update
+their Go imports to use this new location, which will be the canonical location going forward.
+
+We have moved the repo in GitHub, which will allow existing importers to continue using the old
+location via GitHub's redirect.
+
+# Overview
+
+The Notary project comprises a [server](cmd/notary-server) and a [client](cmd/notary) for running and interacting
+with trusted collections.  Please see the [service architecture](docs/service_architecture.md) documentation
+for more information.
+
+Notary aims to make the internet more secure by making it easy for people to
+publish and verify content. We often rely on TLS to secure our communications
+with a web server which is inherently flawed, as any compromise of the server
+enables malicious content to be substituted for the legitimate content.
+
+With Notary, publishers can sign their content offline using keys kept highly
+secure. Once the publisher is ready to make the content available, they can
+push their signed trusted collection to a Notary Server.
+
+Consumers, having acquired the publisher's public key through a secure channel,
+can then communicate with any notary server or (insecure) mirror, relying
+only on the publisher's key to determine the validity and integrity of the
+received content.
+
+## Goals
+
+Notary is based on [The Update Framework](https://www.theupdateframework.com/), a secure general design for the problem of software distribution and updates. By using TUF, notary achieves a number of key advantages:
+
+* **Survivable Key Compromise**: Content publishers must manage keys in order to sign their content. Signing keys may be compromised or lost so systems must be designed in order to be flexible and recoverable in the case of key compromise. TUF's notion of key roles is utilized to separate responsibilities across a hierarchy of keys such that loss of any particular key (except the root role) by itself is not fatal to the security of the system.
+* **Freshness Guarantees**: Replay attacks are a common problem in designing secure systems, where previously valid payloads are replayed to trick another system. The same problem exists in the software update systems, where old signed can be presented as the most recent. notary makes use of timestamping on publishing so that consumers can know that they are receiving the most up to date content. This is particularly important when dealing with software update where old vulnerable versions could be used to attack users.
+* **Configurable Trust Thresholds**: Oftentimes there are a large number of publishers that are allowed to publish a particular piece of content. For example, open source projects where there are a number of core maintainers. Trust thresholds can be used so that content consumers require a configurable number of signatures on a piece of content in order to trust it. Using thresholds increases security so that loss of individual signing keys doesn't allow publishing of malicious content.
+* **Signing Delegation**: To allow for flexible publishing of trusted collections, a content publisher can delegate part of their collection to another signer. This delegation is represented as signed metadata so that a consumer of the content can verify both the content and the delegation.
+* **Use of Existing Distribution**: Notary's trust guarantees are not tied at all to particular distribution channels from which content is delivered. Therefore, trust can be added to any existing content delivery mechanism.
+* **Untrusted Mirrors and Transport**: All of the notary metadata can be mirrored and distributed via arbitrary channels.
+
+## Security
+
+Please see our [service architecture docs](docs/service_architecture.md#threat-model) for more information about our threat model, which details the varying survivability and severities for key compromise as well as mitigations.
+
+Our last security audit was on July 31, 2015 by NCC ([results](docs/resources/ncc_docker_notary_audit_2015_07_31.pdf)).
+
+Any security vulnerabilities can be reported to security@docker.com.
+
+# Getting started with the Notary CLI
+
+Please get the Notary Client CLI binary from [the official releases page](https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary/releases) or you can [build one yourself](#building-notary).
+The version of Notary server and signer should be greater than or equal to Notary CLI's version to ensure feature compatibility (ex: CLI version 0.2, server/signer version >= 0.2), and all official releases are associated with GitHub tags.
+
+To use the Notary CLI with Docker hub images, please have a look at our
+[getting started docs](docs/getting_started.md).
+
+For more advanced usage, please see the
+[advanced usage docs](docs/advanced_usage.md).
+
+To use the CLI against a local Notary server rather than against Docker Hub:
+
+1. Please ensure that you have [docker and docker-compose](http://docs.docker.com/compose/install/) installed.
+1. `git clone https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary.git` and from the cloned repository path,
+    start up a local Notary server and signer and copy the config file and testing certs to your
+    local notary config directory:
+
+    ```sh
+    $ docker-compose build
+    $ docker-compose up -d
+    $ mkdir -p ~/.notary && cp cmd/notary/config.json cmd/notary/root-ca.crt ~/.notary
+    ```
+
+1. Add `127.0.0.1 notary-server` to your `/etc/hosts`, or if using docker-machine,
+    add `$(docker-machine ip) notary-server`).
+
+You can run through the examples in the
+[getting started docs](docs/getting_started.md) and
+[advanced usage docs](docs/advanced_usage.md), but
+without the `-s` (server URL) argument to the `notary` command since the server
+URL is specified already in the configuration, file you copied.
+
+You can also leave off the `-d ~/.docker/trust` argument if you do not care
+to use `notary` with Docker images.
+
+
+## Building Notary
+
+Note that our [latest stable release](https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary/releases) is at the head of the
+[releases branch](https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tree/releases).  The master branch is the development
+branch and contains features for the next release.
+
+Prerequisites:
+
+- Go >= 1.7.1
+- [godep](https://github.com/tools/godep) installed
+- libtool development headers installed
+    - Ubuntu: `apt-get install libltdl-dev`
+    - CentOS/RedHat: `yum install libtool-ltdl-devel`
+    - Mac OS ([Homebrew](http://brew.sh/)): `brew install libtool`
+
+Run `make client`, which creates the Notary Client CLI binary at `bin/notary`.
+Note that `make client` assumes a standard Go directory structure, in which
+Notary is checked out to the `src` directory in your `GOPATH`. For example:
+```
+$GOPATH/
+    src/
+        github.com/
+            docker/
+                notary/
+```
+
+To build the server and signer, please run `docker-compose build`.
+
+
+## License
+[![FOSSA Status](https://app.fossa.io/api/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Ftheupdateframework%2Fnotary.svg?type=large)](https://app.fossa.io/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Ftheupdateframework%2Fnotary?ref=badge_large)

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist/change.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package changelist
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// Scopes for TUFChanges are simply the TUF roles.
+// Unfortunately because of targets delegations, we can only
+// cover the base roles.
+const (
+	ScopeRoot    = "root"
+	ScopeTargets = "targets"
+)
+
+// Types for TUFChanges are namespaced by the Role they
+// are relevant for. The Root and Targets roles are the
+// only ones for which user action can cause a change, as
+// all changes in Snapshot and Timestamp are programmatically
+// generated base on Root and Targets changes.
+const (
+	TypeBaseRole          = "role"
+	TypeTargetsTarget     = "target"
+	TypeTargetsDelegation = "delegation"
+	TypeWitness           = "witness"
+)
+
+// TUFChange represents a change to a TUF repo
+type TUFChange struct {
+	// Abbreviated because Go doesn't permit a field and method of the same name
+	Actn       string        `json:"action"`
+	Role       data.RoleName `json:"role"`
+	ChangeType string        `json:"type"`
+	ChangePath string        `json:"path"`
+	Data       []byte        `json:"data"`
+}
+
+// TUFRootData represents a modification of the keys associated
+// with a role that appears in the root.json
+type TUFRootData struct {
+	Keys     data.KeyList  `json:"keys"`
+	RoleName data.RoleName `json:"role"`
+}
+
+// NewTUFChange initializes a TUFChange object
+func NewTUFChange(action string, role data.RoleName, changeType, changePath string, content []byte) *TUFChange {
+	return &TUFChange{
+		Actn:       action,
+		Role:       role,
+		ChangeType: changeType,
+		ChangePath: changePath,
+		Data:       content,
+	}
+}
+
+// Action return c.Actn
+func (c TUFChange) Action() string {
+	return c.Actn
+}
+
+// Scope returns c.Role
+func (c TUFChange) Scope() data.RoleName {
+	return c.Role
+}
+
+// Type returns c.ChangeType
+func (c TUFChange) Type() string {
+	return c.ChangeType
+}
+
+// Path return c.ChangePath
+func (c TUFChange) Path() string {
+	return c.ChangePath
+}
+
+// Content returns c.Data
+func (c TUFChange) Content() []byte {
+	return c.Data
+}
+
+// TUFDelegation represents a modification to a target delegation
+// this includes creating a delegations. This format is used to avoid
+// unexpected race conditions between humans modifying the same delegation
+type TUFDelegation struct {
+	NewName       data.RoleName `json:"new_name,omitempty"`
+	NewThreshold  int           `json:"threshold, omitempty"`
+	AddKeys       data.KeyList  `json:"add_keys, omitempty"`
+	RemoveKeys    []string      `json:"remove_keys,omitempty"`
+	AddPaths      []string      `json:"add_paths,omitempty"`
+	RemovePaths   []string      `json:"remove_paths,omitempty"`
+	ClearAllPaths bool          `json:"clear_paths,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ToNewRole creates a fresh role object from the TUFDelegation data
+func (td TUFDelegation) ToNewRole(scope data.RoleName) (*data.Role, error) {
+	name := scope
+	if td.NewName != "" {
+		name = td.NewName
+	}
+	return data.NewRole(name, td.NewThreshold, td.AddKeys.IDs(), td.AddPaths)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist/changelist.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package changelist
+
+// memChangeList implements a simple in memory change list.
+type memChangelist struct {
+	changes []Change
+}
+
+// NewMemChangelist instantiates a new in-memory changelist
+func NewMemChangelist() Changelist {
+	return &memChangelist{}
+}
+
+// List returns a list of Changes
+func (cl memChangelist) List() []Change {
+	return cl.changes
+}
+
+// Add adds a change to the in-memory change list
+func (cl *memChangelist) Add(c Change) error {
+	cl.changes = append(cl.changes, c)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Location returns the string "memory"
+func (cl memChangelist) Location() string {
+	return "memory"
+}
+
+// Remove deletes the changes found at the given indices
+func (cl *memChangelist) Remove(idxs []int) error {
+	remove := make(map[int]struct{})
+	for _, i := range idxs {
+		remove[i] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	var keep []Change
+
+	for i, c := range cl.changes {
+		if _, ok := remove[i]; ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		keep = append(keep, c)
+	}
+	cl.changes = keep
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Clear empties the changelist file.
+func (cl *memChangelist) Clear(archive string) error {
+	// appending to a nil list initializes it.
+	cl.changes = nil
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Close is a no-op in this in-memory change-list
+func (cl *memChangelist) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (cl *memChangelist) NewIterator() (ChangeIterator, error) {
+	return &MemChangeListIterator{index: 0, collection: cl.changes}, nil
+}
+
+// MemChangeListIterator is a concrete instance of ChangeIterator
+type MemChangeListIterator struct {
+	index      int
+	collection []Change // Same type as memChangeList.changes
+}
+
+// Next returns the next Change
+func (m *MemChangeListIterator) Next() (item Change, err error) {
+	if m.index >= len(m.collection) {
+		return nil, IteratorBoundsError(m.index)
+	}
+	item = m.collection[m.index]
+	m.index++
+	return item, err
+}
+
+// HasNext indicates whether the iterator is exhausted
+func (m *MemChangeListIterator) HasNext() bool {
+	return m.index < len(m.collection)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist/file_changelist.go

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+package changelist
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/docker/distribution/uuid"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// FileChangelist stores all the changes as files
+type FileChangelist struct {
+	dir string
+}
+
+// NewFileChangelist is a convenience method for returning FileChangeLists
+func NewFileChangelist(dir string) (*FileChangelist, error) {
+	logrus.Debug("Making dir path: ", dir)
+	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &FileChangelist{dir: dir}, nil
+}
+
+// getFileNames reads directory, filtering out child directories
+func getFileNames(dirName string) ([]os.FileInfo, error) {
+	var dirListing, fileInfos []os.FileInfo
+	dir, err := os.Open(dirName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fileInfos, err
+	}
+	defer dir.Close()
+	dirListing, err = dir.Readdir(0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fileInfos, err
+	}
+	for _, f := range dirListing {
+		if f.IsDir() {
+			continue
+		}
+		fileInfos = append(fileInfos, f)
+	}
+	sort.Sort(fileChanges(fileInfos))
+	return fileInfos, nil
+}
+
+// Read a JSON formatted file from disk; convert to TUFChange struct
+func unmarshalFile(dirname string, f os.FileInfo) (*TUFChange, error) {
+	c := &TUFChange{}
+	raw, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dirname, f.Name()))
+	if err != nil {
+		return c, err
+	}
+	err = json.Unmarshal(raw, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c, err
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// List returns a list of sorted changes
+func (cl FileChangelist) List() []Change {
+	var changes []Change
+	fileInfos, err := getFileNames(cl.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return changes
+	}
+	for _, f := range fileInfos {
+		c, err := unmarshalFile(cl.dir, f)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Warn(err.Error())
+			continue
+		}
+		changes = append(changes, c)
+	}
+	return changes
+}
+
+// Add adds a change to the file change list
+func (cl FileChangelist) Add(c Change) error {
+	cJSON, err := json.Marshal(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	filename := fmt.Sprintf("%020d_%s.change", time.Now().UnixNano(), uuid.Generate())
+	return ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(cl.dir, filename), cJSON, 0644)
+}
+
+// Remove deletes the changes found at the given indices
+func (cl FileChangelist) Remove(idxs []int) error {
+	fileInfos, err := getFileNames(cl.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	remove := make(map[int]struct{})
+	for _, i := range idxs {
+		remove[i] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for i, c := range fileInfos {
+		if _, ok := remove[i]; ok {
+			file := filepath.Join(cl.dir, c.Name())
+			if err := os.Remove(file); err != nil {
+				logrus.Errorf("could not remove change %d: %s", i, err.Error())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Clear clears the change list
+// N.B. archiving not currently implemented
+func (cl FileChangelist) Clear(archive string) error {
+	dir, err := os.Open(cl.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer dir.Close()
+	files, err := dir.Readdir(0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, f := range files {
+		os.Remove(filepath.Join(cl.dir, f.Name()))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Close is a no-op
+func (cl FileChangelist) Close() error {
+	// Nothing to do here
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Location returns the file path to the changelist
+func (cl FileChangelist) Location() string {
+	return cl.dir
+}
+
+// NewIterator creates an iterator from FileChangelist
+func (cl FileChangelist) NewIterator() (ChangeIterator, error) {
+	fileInfos, err := getFileNames(cl.dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &FileChangeListIterator{}, err
+	}
+	return &FileChangeListIterator{dirname: cl.dir, collection: fileInfos}, nil
+}
+
+// IteratorBoundsError is an Error type used by Next()
+type IteratorBoundsError int
+
+// Error implements the Error interface
+func (e IteratorBoundsError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Iterator index (%d) out of bounds", e)
+}
+
+// FileChangeListIterator is a concrete instance of ChangeIterator
+type FileChangeListIterator struct {
+	index      int
+	dirname    string
+	collection []os.FileInfo
+}
+
+// Next returns the next Change in the FileChangeList
+func (m *FileChangeListIterator) Next() (item Change, err error) {
+	if m.index >= len(m.collection) {
+		return nil, IteratorBoundsError(m.index)
+	}
+	f := m.collection[m.index]
+	m.index++
+	item, err = unmarshalFile(m.dirname, f)
+	return
+}
+
+// HasNext indicates whether iterator is exhausted
+func (m *FileChangeListIterator) HasNext() bool {
+	return m.index < len(m.collection)
+}
+
+type fileChanges []os.FileInfo
+
+// Len returns the length of a file change list
+func (cs fileChanges) Len() int {
+	return len(cs)
+}
+
+// Less compares the names of two different file changes
+func (cs fileChanges) Less(i, j int) bool {
+	return cs[i].Name() < cs[j].Name()
+}
+
+// Swap swaps the position of two file changes
+func (cs fileChanges) Swap(i, j int) {
+	tmp := cs[i]
+	cs[i] = cs[j]
+	cs[j] = tmp
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist/interface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package changelist
+
+import "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+
+// Changelist is the interface for all TUF change lists
+type Changelist interface {
+	// List returns the ordered list of changes
+	// currently stored
+	List() []Change
+
+	// Add change appends the provided change to
+	// the list of changes
+	Add(Change) error
+
+	// Clear empties the current change list.
+	// Archive may be provided as a directory path
+	// to save a copy of the changelist in that location
+	Clear(archive string) error
+
+	// Remove deletes the changes corresponding with the indices given
+	Remove(idxs []int) error
+
+	// Close syncronizes any pending writes to the underlying
+	// storage and closes the file/connection
+	Close() error
+
+	// NewIterator returns an iterator for walking through the list
+	// of changes currently stored
+	NewIterator() (ChangeIterator, error)
+
+	// Location returns the place the changelist is stores
+	Location() string
+}
+
+const (
+	// ActionCreate represents a Create action
+	ActionCreate = "create"
+	// ActionUpdate represents an Update action
+	ActionUpdate = "update"
+	// ActionDelete represents a Delete action
+	ActionDelete = "delete"
+)
+
+// Change is the interface for a TUF Change
+type Change interface {
+	// "create","update", or "delete"
+	Action() string
+
+	// Where the change should be made.
+	// For TUF this will be the role
+	Scope() data.RoleName
+
+	// The content type being affected.
+	// For TUF this will be "target", or "delegation".
+	// If the type is "delegation", the Scope will be
+	// used to determine if a root role is being updated
+	// or a target delegation.
+	Type() string
+
+	// Path indicates the entry within a role to be affected by the
+	// change. For targets, this is simply the target's path,
+	// for delegations it's the delegated role name.
+	Path() string
+
+	// Serialized content that the interpreter of a changelist
+	// can use to apply the change.
+	// For TUF this will be the serialized JSON that needs
+	// to be inserted or merged. In the case of a "delete"
+	// action, it will be nil.
+	Content() []byte
+}
+
+// ChangeIterator is the interface for iterating across collections of
+// TUF Change items
+type ChangeIterator interface {
+	Next() (Change, error)
+	HasNext() bool
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/delegations.go

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist"
+	store "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// AddDelegation creates changelist entries to add provided delegation public keys and paths.
+// This method composes AddDelegationRoleAndKeys and AddDelegationPaths (each creates one changelist if called).
+func (r *repository) AddDelegation(name data.RoleName, delegationKeys []data.PublicKey, paths []string) error {
+	if len(delegationKeys) > 0 {
+		err := r.AddDelegationRoleAndKeys(name, delegationKeys)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if len(paths) > 0 {
+		err := r.AddDelegationPaths(name, paths)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// AddDelegationRoleAndKeys creates a changelist entry to add provided delegation public keys.
+// This method is the simplest way to create a new delegation, because the delegation must have at least
+// one key upon creation to be valid since we will reject the changelist while validating the threshold.
+func (r *repository) AddDelegationRoleAndKeys(name data.RoleName, delegationKeys []data.PublicKey) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Adding delegation "%s" with threshold %d, and %d keys\n`,
+		name, notary.MinThreshold, len(delegationKeys))
+
+	// Defaulting to threshold of 1, since we don't allow for larger thresholds at the moment.
+	tdJSON, err := json.Marshal(&changelist.TUFDelegation{
+		NewThreshold: notary.MinThreshold,
+		AddKeys:      data.KeyList(delegationKeys),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	template := newCreateDelegationChange(name, tdJSON)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+// AddDelegationPaths creates a changelist entry to add provided paths to an existing delegation.
+// This method cannot create a new delegation itself because the role must meet the key threshold upon creation.
+func (r *repository) AddDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName, paths []string) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Adding %s paths to delegation %s\n`, paths, name)
+
+	tdJSON, err := json.Marshal(&changelist.TUFDelegation{
+		AddPaths: paths,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	template := newCreateDelegationChange(name, tdJSON)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+// RemoveDelegationKeysAndPaths creates changelist entries to remove provided delegation key IDs and paths.
+// This method composes RemoveDelegationPaths and RemoveDelegationKeys (each creates one changelist if called).
+func (r *repository) RemoveDelegationKeysAndPaths(name data.RoleName, keyIDs, paths []string) error {
+	if len(paths) > 0 {
+		err := r.RemoveDelegationPaths(name, paths)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if len(keyIDs) > 0 {
+		err := r.RemoveDelegationKeys(name, keyIDs)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RemoveDelegationRole creates a changelist to remove all paths and keys from a role, and delete the role in its entirety.
+func (r *repository) RemoveDelegationRole(name data.RoleName) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Removing delegation "%s"\n`, name)
+
+	template := newDeleteDelegationChange(name, nil)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+// RemoveDelegationPaths creates a changelist entry to remove provided paths from an existing delegation.
+func (r *repository) RemoveDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName, paths []string) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Removing %s paths from delegation "%s"\n`, paths, name)
+
+	tdJSON, err := json.Marshal(&changelist.TUFDelegation{
+		RemovePaths: paths,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	template := newUpdateDelegationChange(name, tdJSON)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+// RemoveDelegationKeys creates a changelist entry to remove provided keys from an existing delegation.
+// When this changelist is applied, if the specified keys are the only keys left in the role,
+// the role itself will be deleted in its entirety.
+// It can also delete a key from all delegations under a parent using a name
+// with a wildcard at the end.
+func (r *repository) RemoveDelegationKeys(name data.RoleName, keyIDs []string) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) && !data.IsWildDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Removing %s keys from delegation "%s"\n`, keyIDs, name)
+
+	tdJSON, err := json.Marshal(&changelist.TUFDelegation{
+		RemoveKeys: keyIDs,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	template := newUpdateDelegationChange(name, tdJSON)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+// ClearDelegationPaths creates a changelist entry to remove all paths from an existing delegation.
+func (r *repository) ClearDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName) error {
+
+	if !data.IsDelegation(name) {
+		return data.ErrInvalidRole{Role: name, Reason: "invalid delegation role name"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf(`Removing all paths from delegation "%s"\n`, name)
+
+	tdJSON, err := json.Marshal(&changelist.TUFDelegation{
+		ClearAllPaths: true,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	template := newUpdateDelegationChange(name, tdJSON)
+	return addChange(r.changelist, template, name)
+}
+
+func newUpdateDelegationChange(name data.RoleName, content []byte) *changelist.TUFChange {
+	return changelist.NewTUFChange(
+		changelist.ActionUpdate,
+		name,
+		changelist.TypeTargetsDelegation,
+		"", // no path for delegations
+		content,
+	)
+}
+
+func newCreateDelegationChange(name data.RoleName, content []byte) *changelist.TUFChange {
+	return changelist.NewTUFChange(
+		changelist.ActionCreate,
+		name,
+		changelist.TypeTargetsDelegation,
+		"", // no path for delegations
+		content,
+	)
+}
+
+func newDeleteDelegationChange(name data.RoleName, content []byte) *changelist.TUFChange {
+	return changelist.NewTUFChange(
+		changelist.ActionDelete,
+		name,
+		changelist.TypeTargetsDelegation,
+		"", // no path for delegations
+		content,
+	)
+}
+
+// GetDelegationRoles returns the keys and roles of the repository's delegations
+// Also converts key IDs to canonical key IDs to keep consistent with signing prompts
+func (r *repository) GetDelegationRoles() ([]data.Role, error) {
+	// Update state of the repo to latest
+	if err := r.Update(false); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// All top level delegations (ex: targets/level1) are stored exclusively in targets.json
+	_, ok := r.tufRepo.Targets[data.CanonicalTargetsRole]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, store.ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: data.CanonicalTargetsRole.String()}
+	}
+
+	// make a copy for traversing nested delegations
+	allDelegations := []data.Role{}
+
+	// Define a visitor function to populate the delegations list and translate their key IDs to canonical IDs
+	delegationCanonicalListVisitor := func(tgt *data.SignedTargets, validRole data.DelegationRole) interface{} {
+		// For the return list, update with a copy that includes canonicalKeyIDs
+		// These aren't validated by the validRole
+		canonicalDelegations, err := translateDelegationsToCanonicalIDs(tgt.Signed.Delegations)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		allDelegations = append(allDelegations, canonicalDelegations...)
+		return nil
+	}
+	err := r.tufRepo.WalkTargets("", "", delegationCanonicalListVisitor)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return allDelegations, nil
+}
+
+func translateDelegationsToCanonicalIDs(delegationInfo data.Delegations) ([]data.Role, error) {
+	canonicalDelegations := make([]data.Role, len(delegationInfo.Roles))
+	// Do a copy by value to ensure local delegation metadata is untouched
+	for idx, origRole := range delegationInfo.Roles {
+		canonicalDelegations[idx] = *origRole
+	}
+	delegationKeys := delegationInfo.Keys
+	for i, delegation := range canonicalDelegations {
+		canonicalKeyIDs := []string{}
+		for _, keyID := range delegation.KeyIDs {
+			pubKey, ok := delegationKeys[keyID]
+			if !ok {
+				return []data.Role{}, fmt.Errorf("Could not translate canonical key IDs for %s", delegation.Name)
+			}
+			canonicalKeyID, err := utils.CanonicalKeyID(pubKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				return []data.Role{}, fmt.Errorf("Could not translate canonical key IDs for %s: %v", delegation.Name, err)
+			}
+			canonicalKeyIDs = append(canonicalKeyIDs, canonicalKeyID)
+		}
+		canonicalDelegations[i].KeyIDs = canonicalKeyIDs
+	}
+	return canonicalDelegations, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// ErrRepoNotInitialized is returned when trying to publish an uninitialized
+// notary repository
+type ErrRepoNotInitialized struct{}
+
+func (err ErrRepoNotInitialized) Error() string {
+	return "repository has not been initialized"
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidRemoteRole is returned when the server is requested to manage
+// a key type that is not permitted
+type ErrInvalidRemoteRole struct {
+	Role data.RoleName
+}
+
+func (err ErrInvalidRemoteRole) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(
+		"notary does not permit the server managing the %s key", err.Role.String())
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidLocalRole is returned when the client wants to manage
+// a key type that is not permitted
+type ErrInvalidLocalRole struct {
+	Role data.RoleName
+}
+
+func (err ErrInvalidLocalRole) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(
+		"notary does not permit the client managing the %s key", err.Role)
+}
+
+// ErrRepositoryNotExist is returned when an action is taken on a remote
+// repository that doesn't exist
+type ErrRepositoryNotExist struct {
+	remote string
+	gun    data.GUN
+}
+
+func (err ErrRepositoryNotExist) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s does not have trust data for %s", err.remote, err.gun.String())
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/helpers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist"
+	store "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// Use this to initialize remote HTTPStores from the config settings
+func getRemoteStore(baseURL string, gun data.GUN, rt http.RoundTripper) (store.RemoteStore, error) {
+	s, err := store.NewHTTPStore(
+		baseURL+"/v2/"+gun.String()+"/_trust/tuf/",
+		"",
+		"json",
+		"key",
+		rt,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return store.OfflineStore{}, err
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+func applyChangelist(repo *tuf.Repo, invalid *tuf.Repo, cl changelist.Changelist) error {
+	it, err := cl.NewIterator()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	index := 0
+	for it.HasNext() {
+		c, err := it.Next()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		isDel := data.IsDelegation(c.Scope()) || data.IsWildDelegation(c.Scope())
+		switch {
+		case c.Scope() == changelist.ScopeTargets || isDel:
+			err = applyTargetsChange(repo, invalid, c)
+		case c.Scope() == changelist.ScopeRoot:
+			err = applyRootChange(repo, c)
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("scope not supported: %s", c.Scope().String())
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("error attempting to apply change #%d: %s, on scope: %s path: %s type: %s", index, c.Action(), c.Scope(), c.Path(), c.Type())
+			return err
+		}
+		index++
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("applied %d change(s)", index)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func applyTargetsChange(repo *tuf.Repo, invalid *tuf.Repo, c changelist.Change) error {
+	switch c.Type() {
+	case changelist.TypeTargetsTarget:
+		return changeTargetMeta(repo, c)
+	case changelist.TypeTargetsDelegation:
+		return changeTargetsDelegation(repo, c)
+	case changelist.TypeWitness:
+		return witnessTargets(repo, invalid, c.Scope())
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("only target meta and delegations changes supported")
+	}
+}
+
+func changeTargetsDelegation(repo *tuf.Repo, c changelist.Change) error {
+	switch c.Action() {
+	case changelist.ActionCreate:
+		td := changelist.TUFDelegation{}
+		err := json.Unmarshal(c.Content(), &td)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		// Try to create brand new role or update one
+		// First add the keys, then the paths.  We can only add keys and paths in this scenario
+		err = repo.UpdateDelegationKeys(c.Scope(), td.AddKeys, []string{}, td.NewThreshold)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return repo.UpdateDelegationPaths(c.Scope(), td.AddPaths, []string{}, false)
+	case changelist.ActionUpdate:
+		td := changelist.TUFDelegation{}
+		err := json.Unmarshal(c.Content(), &td)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if data.IsWildDelegation(c.Scope()) {
+			return repo.PurgeDelegationKeys(c.Scope(), td.RemoveKeys)
+		}
+
+		delgRole, err := repo.GetDelegationRole(c.Scope())
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		// We need to translate the keys from canonical ID to TUF ID for compatibility
+		canonicalToTUFID := make(map[string]string)
+		for tufID, pubKey := range delgRole.Keys {
+			canonicalID, err := utils.CanonicalKeyID(pubKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			canonicalToTUFID[canonicalID] = tufID
+		}
+
+		removeTUFKeyIDs := []string{}
+		for _, canonID := range td.RemoveKeys {
+			removeTUFKeyIDs = append(removeTUFKeyIDs, canonicalToTUFID[canonID])
+		}
+
+		err = repo.UpdateDelegationKeys(c.Scope(), td.AddKeys, removeTUFKeyIDs, td.NewThreshold)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return repo.UpdateDelegationPaths(c.Scope(), td.AddPaths, td.RemovePaths, td.ClearAllPaths)
+	case changelist.ActionDelete:
+		return repo.DeleteDelegation(c.Scope())
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported action against delegations: %s", c.Action())
+	}
+
+}
+
+func changeTargetMeta(repo *tuf.Repo, c changelist.Change) error {
+	var err error
+	switch c.Action() {
+	case changelist.ActionCreate:
+		logrus.Debug("changelist add: ", c.Path())
+		meta := &data.FileMeta{}
+		err = json.Unmarshal(c.Content(), meta)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		files := data.Files{c.Path(): *meta}
+
+		// Attempt to add the target to this role
+		if _, err = repo.AddTargets(c.Scope(), files); err != nil {
+			logrus.Errorf("couldn't add target to %s: %s", c.Scope(), err.Error())
+		}
+
+	case changelist.ActionDelete:
+		logrus.Debug("changelist remove: ", c.Path())
+
+		// Attempt to remove the target from this role
+		if err = repo.RemoveTargets(c.Scope(), c.Path()); err != nil {
+			logrus.Errorf("couldn't remove target from %s: %s", c.Scope(), err.Error())
+		}
+
+	default:
+		err = fmt.Errorf("action not yet supported: %s", c.Action())
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+func applyRootChange(repo *tuf.Repo, c changelist.Change) error {
+	var err error
+	switch c.Type() {
+	case changelist.TypeBaseRole:
+		err = applyRootRoleChange(repo, c)
+	default:
+		err = fmt.Errorf("type of root change not yet supported: %s", c.Type())
+	}
+	return err // might be nil
+}
+
+func applyRootRoleChange(repo *tuf.Repo, c changelist.Change) error {
+	switch c.Action() {
+	case changelist.ActionCreate:
+		// replaces all keys for a role
+		d := &changelist.TUFRootData{}
+		err := json.Unmarshal(c.Content(), d)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		err = repo.ReplaceBaseKeys(d.RoleName, d.Keys...)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("action not yet supported for root: %s", c.Action())
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func nearExpiry(r data.SignedCommon) bool {
+	plus6mo := time.Now().AddDate(0, 6, 0)
+	return r.Expires.Before(plus6mo)
+}
+
+func warnRolesNearExpiry(r *tuf.Repo) {
+	//get every role and its respective signed common and call nearExpiry on it
+	//Root check
+	if nearExpiry(r.Root.Signed.SignedCommon) {
+		logrus.Warn("root is nearing expiry, you should re-sign the role metadata")
+	}
+	//Targets and delegations check
+	for role, signedTOrD := range r.Targets {
+		//signedTOrD is of type *data.SignedTargets
+		if nearExpiry(signedTOrD.Signed.SignedCommon) {
+			logrus.Warn(role, " metadata is nearing expiry, you should re-sign the role metadata")
+		}
+	}
+	//Snapshot check
+	if nearExpiry(r.Snapshot.Signed.SignedCommon) {
+		logrus.Warn("snapshot is nearing expiry, you should re-sign the role metadata")
+	}
+	//do not need to worry about Timestamp, notary signer will re-sign with the timestamp key
+}
+
+// Fetches a public key from a remote store, given a gun and role
+func getRemoteKey(role data.RoleName, remote store.RemoteStore) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	rawPubKey, err := remote.GetKey(role)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	pubKey, err := data.UnmarshalPublicKey(rawPubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return pubKey, nil
+}
+
+// Rotates a private key in a remote store and returns the public key component
+func rotateRemoteKey(role data.RoleName, remote store.RemoteStore) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	rawPubKey, err := remote.RotateKey(role)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	pubKey, err := data.UnmarshalPublicKey(rawPubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return pubKey, nil
+}
+
+// signs and serializes the metadata for a canonical role in a TUF repo to JSON
+func serializeCanonicalRole(tufRepo *tuf.Repo, role data.RoleName, extraSigningKeys data.KeyList) (out []byte, err error) {
+	var s *data.Signed
+	switch {
+	case role == data.CanonicalRootRole:
+		s, err = tufRepo.SignRoot(data.DefaultExpires(role), extraSigningKeys)
+	case role == data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
+		s, err = tufRepo.SignSnapshot(data.DefaultExpires(role))
+	case tufRepo.Targets[role] != nil:
+		s, err = tufRepo.SignTargets(
+			role, data.DefaultExpires(data.CanonicalTargetsRole))
+	default:
+		err = fmt.Errorf("%s not supported role to sign on the client", role)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	return json.Marshal(s)
+}
+
+func getAllPrivKeys(rootKeyIDs []string, cryptoService signed.CryptoService) ([]data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if cryptoService == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no crypto service available to get private keys from")
+	}
+
+	privKeys := make([]data.PrivateKey, 0, len(rootKeyIDs))
+	for _, keyID := range rootKeyIDs {
+		privKey, _, err := cryptoService.GetPrivateKey(keyID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		privKeys = append(privKeys, privKey)
+	}
+	if len(privKeys) == 0 {
+		var rootKeyID string
+		rootKeyList := cryptoService.ListKeys(data.CanonicalRootRole)
+		if len(rootKeyList) == 0 {
+			rootPublicKey, err := cryptoService.Create(data.CanonicalRootRole, "", data.ECDSAKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			rootKeyID = rootPublicKey.ID()
+		} else {
+			rootKeyID = rootKeyList[0]
+		}
+		privKey, _, err := cryptoService.GetPrivateKey(rootKeyID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		privKeys = append(privKeys, privKey)
+	}
+
+	return privKeys, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/interface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+)
+
+// Repository represents the set of options that must be supported over a TUF repo.
+type Repository interface {
+	// General management operations
+	Initialize(rootKeyIDs []string, serverManagedRoles ...data.RoleName) error
+	InitializeWithCertificate(rootKeyIDs []string, rootCerts []data.PublicKey, serverManagedRoles ...data.RoleName) error
+	Publish() error
+
+	// Target Operations
+	AddTarget(target *Target, roles ...data.RoleName) error
+	RemoveTarget(targetName string, roles ...data.RoleName) error
+	ListTargets(roles ...data.RoleName) ([]*TargetWithRole, error)
+	GetTargetByName(name string, roles ...data.RoleName) (*TargetWithRole, error)
+	GetAllTargetMetadataByName(name string) ([]TargetSignedStruct, error)
+
+	// Changelist operations
+	GetChangelist() (changelist.Changelist, error)
+
+	// Role operations
+	ListRoles() ([]RoleWithSignatures, error)
+	GetDelegationRoles() ([]data.Role, error)
+	AddDelegation(name data.RoleName, delegationKeys []data.PublicKey, paths []string) error
+	AddDelegationRoleAndKeys(name data.RoleName, delegationKeys []data.PublicKey) error
+	AddDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName, paths []string) error
+	RemoveDelegationKeysAndPaths(name data.RoleName, keyIDs, paths []string) error
+	RemoveDelegationRole(name data.RoleName) error
+	RemoveDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName, paths []string) error
+	RemoveDelegationKeys(name data.RoleName, keyIDs []string) error
+	ClearDelegationPaths(name data.RoleName) error
+
+	// Witness and other re-signing operations
+	Witness(roles ...data.RoleName) ([]data.RoleName, error)
+
+	// Key Operations
+	RotateKey(role data.RoleName, serverManagesKey bool, keyList []string) error
+
+	GetCryptoService() signed.CryptoService
+	SetLegacyVersions(int)
+	GetGUN() data.GUN
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/repo.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// +build !pkcs11
+
+package client
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+)
+
+func getKeyStores(baseDir string, retriever notary.PassRetriever) ([]trustmanager.KeyStore, error) {
+	fileKeyStore, err := trustmanager.NewKeyFileStore(baseDir, retriever)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create private key store in directory: %s", baseDir)
+	}
+	return []trustmanager.KeyStore{fileKeyStore}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/repo_pkcs11.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// +build pkcs11
+
+package client
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey"
+)
+
+func getKeyStores(baseDir string, retriever notary.PassRetriever) ([]trustmanager.KeyStore, error) {
+	fileKeyStore, err := trustmanager.NewKeyFileStore(baseDir, retriever)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create private key store in directory: %s", baseDir)
+	}
+
+	keyStores := []trustmanager.KeyStore{fileKeyStore}
+	yubiKeyStore, _ := yubikey.NewYubiStore(fileKeyStore, retriever)
+	if yubiKeyStore != nil {
+		keyStores = []trustmanager.KeyStore{yubiKeyStore, fileKeyStore}
+	}
+	return keyStores, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/tufclient.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	store "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustpinning"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+)
+
+// tufClient is a usability wrapper around a raw TUF repo
+type tufClient struct {
+	remote     store.RemoteStore
+	cache      store.MetadataStore
+	oldBuilder tuf.RepoBuilder
+	newBuilder tuf.RepoBuilder
+}
+
+// newTufClient initialized a tufClient with the given repo, remote source of content, and cache
+func newTufClient(oldBuilder, newBuilder tuf.RepoBuilder, remote store.RemoteStore, cache store.MetadataStore) *tufClient {
+	return &tufClient{
+		oldBuilder: oldBuilder,
+		newBuilder: newBuilder,
+		remote:     remote,
+		cache:      cache,
+	}
+}
+
+// Update performs an update to the TUF repo as defined by the TUF spec
+func (c *tufClient) Update() (*tuf.Repo, *tuf.Repo, error) {
+	// 1. Get timestamp
+	//   a. If timestamp error (verification, expired, etc...) download new root and return to 1.
+	// 2. Check if local snapshot is up to date
+	//   a. If out of date, get updated snapshot
+	//     i. If snapshot error, download new root and return to 1.
+	// 3. Check if root correct against snapshot
+	//   a. If incorrect, download new root and return to 1.
+	// 4. Iteratively download and search targets and delegations to find target meta
+	logrus.Debug("updating TUF client")
+	err := c.update()
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debug("Error occurred. Root will be downloaded and another update attempted")
+		logrus.Debug("Resetting the TUF builder...")
+
+		c.newBuilder = c.newBuilder.BootstrapNewBuilder()
+
+		if err := c.updateRoot(); err != nil {
+			logrus.Debug("Client Update (Root): ", err)
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+		// If we error again, we now have the latest root and just want to fail
+		// out as there's no expectation the problem can be resolved automatically
+		logrus.Debug("retrying TUF client update")
+		if err := c.update(); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return c.newBuilder.Finish()
+}
+
+func (c *tufClient) update() error {
+	if err := c.downloadTimestamp(); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Client Update (Timestamp): %s", err.Error())
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := c.downloadSnapshot(); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Client Update (Snapshot): %s", err.Error())
+		return err
+	}
+	// will always need top level targets at a minimum
+	if err := c.downloadTargets(); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Client Update (Targets): %s", err.Error())
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// updateRoot checks if there is a newer version of the root available, and if so
+// downloads all intermediate root files to allow proper key rotation.
+func (c *tufClient) updateRoot() error {
+	// Get current root version
+	currentRootConsistentInfo := c.oldBuilder.GetConsistentInfo(data.CanonicalRootRole)
+	currentVersion := c.oldBuilder.GetLoadedVersion(currentRootConsistentInfo.RoleName)
+
+	// Get new root version
+	raw, err := c.downloadRoot()
+
+	switch err.(type) {
+	case *trustpinning.ErrRootRotationFail:
+		// Rotation errors are okay since we haven't yet downloaded
+		// all intermediate root files
+		break
+	case nil:
+		// No error updating root - we were at most 1 version behind
+		return nil
+	default:
+		// Return any non-rotation error.
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Load current version into newBuilder
+	currentRaw, err := c.cache.GetSized(data.CanonicalRootRole.String(), -1)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("error loading %d.%s: %s", currentVersion, data.CanonicalRootRole, err)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := c.newBuilder.LoadRootForUpdate(currentRaw, currentVersion, false); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("%d.%s is invalid: %s", currentVersion, data.CanonicalRootRole, err)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Extract newest version number
+	signedRoot := &data.Signed{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, signedRoot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	newestRoot, err := data.RootFromSigned(signedRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	newestVersion := newestRoot.Signed.SignedCommon.Version
+
+	// Update from current + 1 (current already loaded) to newest - 1 (newest loaded below)
+	if err := c.updateRootVersions(currentVersion+1, newestVersion-1); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Already downloaded newest, verify it against newest - 1
+	if err := c.newBuilder.LoadRootForUpdate(raw, newestVersion, true); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("downloaded %d.%s is invalid: %s", newestVersion, data.CanonicalRootRole, err)
+		return err
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("successfully verified downloaded %d.%s", newestVersion, data.CanonicalRootRole)
+
+	// Write newest to cache
+	if err := c.cache.Set(data.CanonicalRootRole.String(), raw); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("unable to write %s to cache: %d.%s", newestVersion, data.CanonicalRootRole, err)
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("finished updating root files")
+	return nil
+}
+
+// updateRootVersions updates the root from it's current version to a target, rotating keys
+// as they are found
+func (c *tufClient) updateRootVersions(fromVersion, toVersion int) error {
+	for v := fromVersion; v <= toVersion; v++ {
+		logrus.Debugf("updating root from version %d to version %d, currently fetching %d", fromVersion, toVersion, v)
+
+		versionedRole := fmt.Sprintf("%d.%s", v, data.CanonicalRootRole)
+
+		raw, err := c.remote.GetSized(versionedRole, -1)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("error downloading %s: %s", versionedRole, err)
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := c.newBuilder.LoadRootForUpdate(raw, v, false); err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("downloaded %s is invalid: %s", versionedRole, err)
+			return err
+		}
+		logrus.Debugf("successfully verified downloaded %s", versionedRole)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// downloadTimestamp is responsible for downloading the timestamp.json
+// Timestamps are special in that we ALWAYS attempt to download and only
+// use cache if the download fails (and the cache is still valid).
+func (c *tufClient) downloadTimestamp() error {
+	logrus.Debug("Loading timestamp...")
+	role := data.CanonicalTimestampRole
+	consistentInfo := c.newBuilder.GetConsistentInfo(role)
+
+	// always get the remote timestamp, since it supersedes the local one
+	cachedTS, cachedErr := c.cache.GetSized(role.String(), notary.MaxTimestampSize)
+	_, remoteErr := c.tryLoadRemote(consistentInfo, cachedTS)
+
+	// check that there was no remote error, or if there was a network problem
+	// If there was a validation error, we should error out so we can download a new root or fail the update
+	switch remoteErr.(type) {
+	case nil:
+		return nil
+	case store.ErrMetaNotFound, store.ErrServerUnavailable, store.ErrOffline, store.NetworkError:
+		break
+	default:
+		return remoteErr
+	}
+
+	// since it was a network error: get the cached timestamp, if it exists
+	if cachedErr != nil {
+		logrus.Debug("no cached or remote timestamp available")
+		return remoteErr
+	}
+
+	logrus.Warn("Error while downloading remote metadata, using cached timestamp - this might not be the latest version available remotely")
+	err := c.newBuilder.Load(role, cachedTS, 1, false)
+	if err == nil {
+		logrus.Debug("successfully verified cached timestamp")
+	}
+	return err
+
+}
+
+// downloadSnapshot is responsible for downloading the snapshot.json
+func (c *tufClient) downloadSnapshot() error {
+	logrus.Debug("Loading snapshot...")
+	role := data.CanonicalSnapshotRole
+	consistentInfo := c.newBuilder.GetConsistentInfo(role)
+
+	_, err := c.tryLoadCacheThenRemote(consistentInfo)
+	return err
+}
+
+// downloadTargets downloads all targets and delegated targets for the repository.
+// It uses a pre-order tree traversal as it's necessary to download parents first
+// to obtain the keys to validate children.
+func (c *tufClient) downloadTargets() error {
+	toDownload := []data.DelegationRole{{
+		BaseRole: data.BaseRole{Name: data.CanonicalTargetsRole},
+		Paths:    []string{""},
+	}}
+
+	for len(toDownload) > 0 {
+		role := toDownload[0]
+		toDownload = toDownload[1:]
+
+		consistentInfo := c.newBuilder.GetConsistentInfo(role.Name)
+		if !consistentInfo.ChecksumKnown() {
+			logrus.Debugf("skipping %s because there is no checksum for it", role.Name)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		children, err := c.getTargetsFile(role, consistentInfo)
+		switch err.(type) {
+		case signed.ErrExpired, signed.ErrRoleThreshold:
+			if role.Name == data.CanonicalTargetsRole {
+				return err
+			}
+			logrus.Warnf("Error getting %s: %s", role.Name, err)
+			break
+		case nil:
+			toDownload = append(children, toDownload...)
+		default:
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c tufClient) getTargetsFile(role data.DelegationRole, ci tuf.ConsistentInfo) ([]data.DelegationRole, error) {
+	logrus.Debugf("Loading %s...", role.Name)
+	tgs := &data.SignedTargets{}
+
+	raw, err := c.tryLoadCacheThenRemote(ci)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// we know it unmarshals because if `tryLoadCacheThenRemote` didn't fail, then
+	// the raw has already been loaded into the builder
+	json.Unmarshal(raw, tgs)
+	return tgs.GetValidDelegations(role), nil
+}
+
+// downloadRoot is responsible for downloading the root.json
+func (c *tufClient) downloadRoot() ([]byte, error) {
+	role := data.CanonicalRootRole
+	consistentInfo := c.newBuilder.GetConsistentInfo(role)
+
+	// We can't read an exact size for the root metadata without risking getting stuck in the TUF update cycle
+	// since it's possible that downloading timestamp/snapshot metadata may fail due to a signature mismatch
+	if !consistentInfo.ChecksumKnown() {
+		logrus.Debugf("Loading root with no expected checksum")
+
+		// get the cached root, if it exists, just for version checking
+		cachedRoot, _ := c.cache.GetSized(role.String(), -1)
+		// prefer to download a new root
+		return c.tryLoadRemote(consistentInfo, cachedRoot)
+	}
+	return c.tryLoadCacheThenRemote(consistentInfo)
+}
+
+func (c *tufClient) tryLoadCacheThenRemote(consistentInfo tuf.ConsistentInfo) ([]byte, error) {
+	cachedTS, err := c.cache.GetSized(consistentInfo.RoleName.String(), consistentInfo.Length())
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("no %s in cache, must download", consistentInfo.RoleName)
+		return c.tryLoadRemote(consistentInfo, nil)
+	}
+
+	if err = c.newBuilder.Load(consistentInfo.RoleName, cachedTS, 1, false); err == nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("successfully verified cached %s", consistentInfo.RoleName)
+		return cachedTS, nil
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("cached %s is invalid (must download): %s", consistentInfo.RoleName, err)
+	return c.tryLoadRemote(consistentInfo, cachedTS)
+}
+
+func (c *tufClient) tryLoadRemote(consistentInfo tuf.ConsistentInfo, old []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	consistentName := consistentInfo.ConsistentName()
+	raw, err := c.remote.GetSized(consistentName, consistentInfo.Length())
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("error downloading %s: %s", consistentName, err)
+		return old, err
+	}
+
+	// try to load the old data into the old builder - only use it to validate
+	// versions if it loads successfully.  If it errors, then the loaded version
+	// will be 1
+	c.oldBuilder.Load(consistentInfo.RoleName, old, 1, true)
+	minVersion := c.oldBuilder.GetLoadedVersion(consistentInfo.RoleName)
+	if err := c.newBuilder.Load(consistentInfo.RoleName, raw, minVersion, false); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("downloaded %s is invalid: %s", consistentName, err)
+		return raw, err
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("successfully verified downloaded %s", consistentName)
+	if err := c.cache.Set(consistentInfo.RoleName.String(), raw); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Unable to write %s to cache: %s", consistentInfo.RoleName, err)
+	}
+	return raw, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/witness.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/client/changelist"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// Witness creates change objects to witness (i.e. re-sign) the given
+// roles on the next publish. One change is created per role
+func (r *repository) Witness(roles ...data.RoleName) ([]data.RoleName, error) {
+	var err error
+	successful := make([]data.RoleName, 0, len(roles))
+	for _, role := range roles {
+		// scope is role
+		c := changelist.NewTUFChange(
+			changelist.ActionUpdate,
+			role,
+			changelist.TypeWitness,
+			"",
+			nil,
+		)
+		err = r.changelist.Add(c)
+		if err != nil {
+			break
+		}
+		successful = append(successful, role)
+	}
+	return successful, err
+}
+
+func witnessTargets(repo *tuf.Repo, invalid *tuf.Repo, role data.RoleName) error {
+	if r, ok := repo.Targets[role]; ok {
+		// role is already valid, mark for re-signing/updating
+		r.Dirty = true
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if roleObj, err := repo.GetDelegationRole(role); err == nil && invalid != nil {
+		// A role with a threshold > len(keys) is technically invalid, but we let it build in the builder because
+		// we want to be able to download the role (which may still have targets on it), add more keys, and then
+		// witness the role, thus bringing it back to valid.  However, if no keys have been added before witnessing,
+		// then it is still an invalid role, and can't be witnessed because nothing can bring it back to valid.
+		if roleObj.Threshold > len(roleObj.Keys) {
+			return data.ErrInvalidRole{
+				Role:   role,
+				Reason: "role does not specify enough valid signing keys to meet its required threshold",
+			}
+		}
+		if r, ok := invalid.Targets[role]; ok {
+			// role is recognized but invalid, move to valid data and mark for re-signing
+			repo.Targets[role] = r
+			r.Dirty = true
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	// role isn't recognized, even as invalid
+	return data.ErrInvalidRole{
+		Role:   role,
+		Reason: "this role is not known",
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/const.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package notary
+
+import (
+	"time"
+)
+
+// application wide constants
+const (
+	// MaxDownloadSize is the maximum size we'll download for metadata if no limit is given
+	MaxDownloadSize int64 = 100 << 20
+	// MaxTimestampSize is the maximum size of timestamp metadata - 1MiB.
+	MaxTimestampSize int64 = 1 << 20
+	// MinRSABitSize is the minimum bit size for RSA keys allowed in notary
+	MinRSABitSize = 2048
+	// MinThreshold requires a minimum of one threshold for roles; currently we do not support a higher threshold
+	MinThreshold = 1
+	// SHA256HexSize is how big a SHA256 hex is in number of characters
+	SHA256HexSize = 64
+	// SHA512HexSize is how big a SHA512 hex is in number of characters
+	SHA512HexSize = 128
+	// SHA256 is the name of SHA256 hash algorithm
+	SHA256 = "sha256"
+	// SHA512 is the name of SHA512 hash algorithm
+	SHA512 = "sha512"
+	// TrustedCertsDir is the directory, under the notary repo base directory, where trusted certs are stored
+	TrustedCertsDir = "trusted_certificates"
+	// PrivDir is the directory, under the notary repo base directory, where private keys are stored
+	PrivDir = "private"
+	// RootKeysSubdir is the subdirectory under PrivDir where root private keys are stored
+	// DEPRECATED: The only reason we need this constant is compatibility with older versions
+	RootKeysSubdir = "root_keys"
+	// NonRootKeysSubdir is the subdirectory under PrivDir where non-root private keys are stored
+	// DEPRECATED: The only reason we need this constant is compatibility with older versions
+	NonRootKeysSubdir = "tuf_keys"
+	// KeyExtension is the file extension to use for private key files
+	KeyExtension = "key"
+
+	// Day is a duration of one day
+	Day  = 24 * time.Hour
+	Year = 365 * Day
+
+	// NotaryRootExpiry is the duration representing the expiry time of the Root role
+	NotaryRootExpiry      = 10 * Year
+	NotaryTargetsExpiry   = 3 * Year
+	NotarySnapshotExpiry  = 3 * Year
+	NotaryTimestampExpiry = 14 * Day
+
+	ConsistentMetadataCacheMaxAge = 30 * Day
+	CurrentMetadataCacheMaxAge    = 5 * time.Minute
+	// CacheMaxAgeLimit is the generally recommended maximum age for Cache-Control headers
+	// (one year, in seconds, since one year is forever in terms of internet
+	// content)
+	CacheMaxAgeLimit = 1 * Year
+
+	MySQLBackend     = "mysql"
+	MemoryBackend    = "memory"
+	PostgresBackend  = "postgres"
+	SQLiteBackend    = "sqlite3"
+	RethinkDBBackend = "rethinkdb"
+	FileBackend      = "file"
+
+	DefaultImportRole = "delegation"
+
+	// HealthCheckKeyManagement and HealthCheckSigner are the grpc service name
+	// for "KeyManagement" and "Signer" respectively which used for health check.
+	// The "Overall" indicates the querying for overall status of the server.
+	HealthCheckKeyManagement = "grpc.health.v1.Health.KeyManagement"
+	HealthCheckSigner        = "grpc.health.v1.Health.Signer"
+	HealthCheckOverall       = "grpc.health.v1.Health.Overall"
+
+	// PrivExecPerms indicates the file permissions for directory
+	// and PrivNoExecPerms for file.
+	PrivExecPerms   = 0700
+	PrivNoExecPerms = 0600
+
+	// DefaultPageSize is the default number of records to return from the changefeed
+	DefaultPageSize = 100
+)
+
+// enum to use for setting and retrieving values from contexts
+const (
+	CtxKeyMetaStore CtxKey = iota
+	CtxKeyKeyAlgo
+	CtxKeyCryptoSvc
+	CtxKeyRepo
+)
+
+// NotarySupportedBackends contains the backends we would like to support at present
+var NotarySupportedBackends = []string{
+	MemoryBackend,
+	MySQLBackend,
+	SQLiteBackend,
+	RethinkDBBackend,
+	PostgresBackend,
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/const_nowindows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// +build !windows
+
+package notary
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+// NotarySupportedSignals contains the signals we would like to capture:
+// - SIGUSR1, indicates a increment of the log level.
+// - SIGUSR2, indicates a decrement of the log level.
+var NotarySupportedSignals = []os.Signal{
+	syscall.SIGUSR1,
+	syscall.SIGUSR2,
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/const_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+// +build windows
+
+package notary
+
+import "os"
+
+// NotarySupportedSignals does not contain any signals, because SIGUSR1/2 are not supported on windows
+var NotarySupportedSignals = []os.Signal{}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/cryptoservice/certificate.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package cryptoservice
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// GenerateCertificate generates an X509 Certificate from a template, given a GUN and validity interval
+func GenerateCertificate(rootKey data.PrivateKey, gun data.GUN, startTime, endTime time.Time) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	signer := rootKey.CryptoSigner()
+	if signer == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("key type not supported for Certificate generation: %s", rootKey.Algorithm())
+	}
+
+	return generateCertificate(signer, gun, startTime, endTime)
+}
+
+func generateCertificate(signer crypto.Signer, gun data.GUN, startTime, endTime time.Time) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	template, err := utils.NewCertificate(gun.String(), startTime, endTime)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create the certificate template for: %s (%v)", gun, err)
+	}
+
+	derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, signer.Public(), signer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create the certificate for: %s (%v)", gun, err)
+	}
+
+	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse the certificate for key: %s (%v)", gun, err)
+	}
+
+	return cert, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/cryptoservice/crypto_service.go

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+package cryptoservice
+
+import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrNoValidPrivateKey is returned if a key being imported doesn't
+	// look like a private key
+	ErrNoValidPrivateKey = errors.New("no valid private key found")
+
+	// ErrRootKeyNotEncrypted is returned if a root key being imported is
+	// unencrypted
+	ErrRootKeyNotEncrypted = errors.New("only encrypted root keys may be imported")
+)
+
+// CryptoService implements Sign and Create, holding a specific GUN and keystore to
+// operate on
+type CryptoService struct {
+	keyStores []trustmanager.KeyStore
+}
+
+// NewCryptoService returns an instance of CryptoService
+func NewCryptoService(keyStores ...trustmanager.KeyStore) *CryptoService {
+	return &CryptoService{keyStores: keyStores}
+}
+
+// Create is used to generate keys for targets, snapshots and timestamps
+func (cs *CryptoService) Create(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, algorithm string) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	if algorithm == data.RSAKey {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s keys can only be imported", data.RSAKey)
+	}
+
+	privKey, err := utils.GenerateKey(algorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate %s key: %v", algorithm, err)
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("generated new %s key for role: %s and keyID: %s", algorithm, role.String(), privKey.ID())
+	pubKey := data.PublicKeyFromPrivate(privKey)
+
+	return pubKey, cs.AddKey(role, gun, privKey)
+}
+
+// GetPrivateKey returns a private key and role if present by ID.
+func (cs *CryptoService) GetPrivateKey(keyID string) (k data.PrivateKey, role data.RoleName, err error) {
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		if k, role, err = ks.GetKey(keyID); err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		switch err.(type) {
+		case trustmanager.ErrPasswordInvalid, trustmanager.ErrAttemptsExceeded:
+			return
+		default:
+			continue
+		}
+	}
+	return // returns whatever the final values were
+}
+
+// GetKey returns a key by ID
+func (cs *CryptoService) GetKey(keyID string) data.PublicKey {
+	privKey, _, err := cs.GetPrivateKey(keyID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return data.PublicKeyFromPrivate(privKey)
+}
+
+// GetKeyInfo returns role and GUN info of a key by ID
+func (cs *CryptoService) GetKeyInfo(keyID string) (trustmanager.KeyInfo, error) {
+	for _, store := range cs.keyStores {
+		if info, err := store.GetKeyInfo(keyID); err == nil {
+			return info, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return trustmanager.KeyInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("Could not find info for keyID %s", keyID)
+}
+
+// RemoveKey deletes a key by ID
+func (cs *CryptoService) RemoveKey(keyID string) (err error) {
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		ks.RemoveKey(keyID)
+	}
+	return // returns whatever the final values were
+}
+
+// AddKey adds a private key to a specified role.
+// The GUN is inferred from the cryptoservice itself for non-root roles
+func (cs *CryptoService) AddKey(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, key data.PrivateKey) (err error) {
+	// First check if this key already exists in any of our keystores
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		if keyInfo, err := ks.GetKeyInfo(key.ID()); err == nil {
+			if keyInfo.Role != role {
+				return fmt.Errorf("key with same ID already exists for role: %s", keyInfo.Role.String())
+			}
+			logrus.Debugf("key with same ID %s and role %s already exists", key.ID(), keyInfo.Role.String())
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	// If the key didn't exist in any of our keystores, add and return on the first successful keystore
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		// Try to add to this keystore, return if successful
+		if err = ks.AddKey(trustmanager.KeyInfo{Role: role, Gun: gun}, key); err == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return // returns whatever the final values were
+}
+
+// ListKeys returns a list of key IDs valid for the given role
+func (cs *CryptoService) ListKeys(role data.RoleName) []string {
+	var res []string
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		for k, r := range ks.ListKeys() {
+			if r.Role == role {
+				res = append(res, k)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+// ListAllKeys returns a map of key IDs to role
+func (cs *CryptoService) ListAllKeys() map[string]data.RoleName {
+	res := make(map[string]data.RoleName)
+	for _, ks := range cs.keyStores {
+		for k, r := range ks.ListKeys() {
+			res[k] = r.Role // keys are content addressed so don't care about overwrites
+		}
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+// CheckRootKeyIsEncrypted makes sure the root key is encrypted. We have
+// internal assumptions that depend on this.
+func CheckRootKeyIsEncrypted(pemBytes []byte) error {
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
+	if block == nil {
+		return ErrNoValidPrivateKey
+	}
+
+	if block.Type == "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if !notary.FIPSEnabled() && x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return ErrRootKeyNotEncrypted
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/fips.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+package notary
+
+import "os"
+
+// FIPSEnvVar is the name of the environment variable that is being used to switch
+// between FIPS and non-FIPS mode
+const FIPSEnvVar = "GOFIPS"
+
+// FIPSEnabled returns true if environment variable `GOFIPS` has been set to enable
+// FIPS mode
+func FIPSEnabled() bool {
+	return os.Getenv(FIPSEnvVar) != ""
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/notary.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+package notary
+
+// PassRetriever is a callback function that should retrieve a passphrase
+// for a given named key. If it should be treated as new passphrase (e.g. with
+// confirmation), createNew will be true. Attempts is passed in so that implementers
+// decide how many chances to give to a human, for example.
+type PassRetriever func(keyName, alias string, createNew bool, attempts int) (passphrase string, giveup bool, err error)
+
+// CtxKey is a wrapper type for use in context.WithValue() to satisfy golint
+// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17293
+// https://github.com/golang/lint/pull/245
+type CtxKey int

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrPathOutsideStore indicates that the returned path would be
+	// outside the store
+	ErrPathOutsideStore = errors.New("path outside file store")
+)
+
+// ErrMetaNotFound indicates we did not find a particular piece
+// of metadata in the store
+type ErrMetaNotFound struct {
+	Resource string
+}
+
+func (err ErrMetaNotFound) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s trust data unavailable.  Has a notary repository been initialized?", err.Resource)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/filestore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+)
+
+// NewFileStore creates a fully configurable file store
+func NewFileStore(baseDir, fileExt string) (*FilesystemStore, error) {
+	baseDir = filepath.Clean(baseDir)
+	if err := createDirectory(baseDir, notary.PrivExecPerms); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(fileExt, ".") {
+		fileExt = "." + fileExt
+	}
+
+	return &FilesystemStore{
+		baseDir: baseDir,
+		ext:     fileExt,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewPrivateKeyFileStorage initializes a new filestore for private keys, appending
+// the notary.PrivDir to the baseDir.
+func NewPrivateKeyFileStorage(baseDir, fileExt string) (*FilesystemStore, error) {
+	baseDir = filepath.Join(baseDir, notary.PrivDir)
+	myStore, err := NewFileStore(baseDir, fileExt)
+	myStore.migrateTo0Dot4()
+	return myStore, err
+}
+
+// NewPrivateSimpleFileStore is a wrapper to create an owner readable/writeable
+// _only_ filestore
+func NewPrivateSimpleFileStore(baseDir, fileExt string) (*FilesystemStore, error) {
+	return NewFileStore(baseDir, fileExt)
+}
+
+// FilesystemStore is a store in a locally accessible directory
+type FilesystemStore struct {
+	baseDir string
+	ext     string
+}
+
+func (f *FilesystemStore) moveKeyTo0Dot4Location(file string) {
+	keyID := filepath.Base(file)
+	fileDir := filepath.Dir(file)
+	d, _ := f.Get(file)
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(d)
+	if block == nil {
+		logrus.Warn("Key data for", file, "could not be decoded as a valid PEM block. The key will not been migrated and may not be available")
+		return
+	}
+	fileDir = strings.TrimPrefix(fileDir, notary.RootKeysSubdir)
+	fileDir = strings.TrimPrefix(fileDir, notary.NonRootKeysSubdir)
+	if fileDir != "" {
+		block.Headers["gun"] = filepath.ToSlash(fileDir[1:])
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(keyID, "_") {
+		role := strings.Split(keyID, "_")[1]
+		keyID = strings.TrimSuffix(keyID, "_"+role)
+		block.Headers["role"] = role
+	}
+	var keyPEM bytes.Buffer
+	// since block came from decoding the PEM bytes in the first place, and all we're doing is adding some headers we ignore the possibility of an error while encoding the block
+	pem.Encode(&keyPEM, block)
+	f.Set(keyID, keyPEM.Bytes())
+}
+
+func (f *FilesystemStore) migrateTo0Dot4() {
+	rootKeysSubDir := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(f.Location(), notary.RootKeysSubdir))
+	nonRootKeysSubDir := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(f.Location(), notary.NonRootKeysSubdir))
+	if _, err := os.Stat(rootKeysSubDir); !os.IsNotExist(err) && f.Location() != rootKeysSubDir {
+		if rootKeysSubDir == "" || rootKeysSubDir == "/" {
+			// making sure we don't remove a user's homedir
+			logrus.Warn("The directory for root keys is an unsafe value, we are not going to delete the directory. Please delete it manually")
+		} else {
+			// root_keys exists, migrate things from it
+			listOnlyRootKeysDirStore, _ := NewFileStore(rootKeysSubDir, f.ext)
+			for _, file := range listOnlyRootKeysDirStore.ListFiles() {
+				f.moveKeyTo0Dot4Location(filepath.Join(notary.RootKeysSubdir, file))
+			}
+			// delete the old directory
+			os.RemoveAll(rootKeysSubDir)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, err := os.Stat(nonRootKeysSubDir); !os.IsNotExist(err) && f.Location() != nonRootKeysSubDir {
+		if nonRootKeysSubDir == "" || nonRootKeysSubDir == "/" {
+			// making sure we don't remove a user's homedir
+			logrus.Warn("The directory for non root keys is an unsafe value, we are not going to delete the directory. Please delete it manually")
+		} else {
+			// tuf_keys exists, migrate things from it
+			listOnlyNonRootKeysDirStore, _ := NewFileStore(nonRootKeysSubDir, f.ext)
+			for _, file := range listOnlyNonRootKeysDirStore.ListFiles() {
+				f.moveKeyTo0Dot4Location(filepath.Join(notary.NonRootKeysSubdir, file))
+			}
+			// delete the old directory
+			os.RemoveAll(nonRootKeysSubDir)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// if we have a trusted_certificates folder, let's delete for a complete migration since it is unused by new clients
+	certsSubDir := filepath.Join(f.Location(), "trusted_certificates")
+	if certsSubDir == "" || certsSubDir == "/" {
+		logrus.Warn("The directory for trusted certificate is an unsafe value, we are not going to delete the directory. Please delete it manually")
+	} else {
+		os.RemoveAll(certsSubDir)
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *FilesystemStore) getPath(name string) (string, error) {
+	fileName := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", name, f.ext)
+	fullPath := filepath.Join(f.baseDir, fileName)
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(fullPath, f.baseDir) {
+		return "", ErrPathOutsideStore
+	}
+	return fullPath, nil
+}
+
+// GetSized returns the meta for the given name (a role) up to size bytes
+// If size is "NoSizeLimit", this corresponds to "infinite," but we cut off at a
+// predefined threshold "notary.MaxDownloadSize". If the file is larger than size
+// we return ErrMaliciousServer for consistency with the HTTPStore
+func (f *FilesystemStore) GetSized(name string, size int64) ([]byte, error) {
+	p, err := f.getPath(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	file, err := os.OpenFile(p, os.O_RDONLY, notary.PrivNoExecPerms)
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			err = ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: name}
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer file.Close()
+
+	if size == NoSizeLimit {
+		size = notary.MaxDownloadSize
+	}
+
+	stat, err := file.Stat()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if stat.Size() > size {
+		return nil, ErrMaliciousServer{}
+	}
+
+	l := io.LimitReader(file, size)
+	return ioutil.ReadAll(l)
+}
+
+// Get returns the meta for the given name.
+func (f *FilesystemStore) Get(name string) ([]byte, error) {
+	p, err := f.getPath(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	meta, err := ioutil.ReadFile(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			err = ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: name}
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return meta, nil
+}
+
+// SetMulti sets the metadata for multiple roles in one operation
+func (f *FilesystemStore) SetMulti(metas map[string][]byte) error {
+	for role, blob := range metas {
+		err := f.Set(role, blob)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Set sets the meta for a single role
+func (f *FilesystemStore) Set(name string, meta []byte) error {
+	fp, err := f.getPath(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Ensures the parent directories of the file we are about to write exist
+	err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(fp), notary.PrivExecPerms)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// if something already exists, just delete it and re-write it
+	os.RemoveAll(fp)
+
+	// Write the file to disk
+	return ioutil.WriteFile(fp, meta, notary.PrivNoExecPerms)
+}
+
+// RemoveAll clears the existing filestore by removing its base directory
+func (f *FilesystemStore) RemoveAll() error {
+	return os.RemoveAll(f.baseDir)
+}
+
+// Remove removes the metadata for a single role - if the metadata doesn't
+// exist, no error is returned
+func (f *FilesystemStore) Remove(name string) error {
+	p, err := f.getPath(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.RemoveAll(p) // RemoveAll succeeds if path doesn't exist
+}
+
+// Location returns a human readable name for the storage location
+func (f FilesystemStore) Location() string {
+	return f.baseDir
+}
+
+// ListFiles returns a list of all the filenames that can be used with Get*
+// to retrieve content from this filestore
+func (f FilesystemStore) ListFiles() []string {
+	files := make([]string, 0, 0)
+	filepath.Walk(f.baseDir, func(fp string, fi os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		// If there are errors, ignore this particular file
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		// Ignore if it is a directory
+		if fi.IsDir() {
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		// If this is a symlink, ignore it
+		if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == os.ModeSymlink {
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		// Only allow matches that end with our certificate extension (e.g. *.crt)
+		matched, _ := filepath.Match("*"+f.ext, fi.Name())
+
+		if matched {
+			// Find the relative path for this file relative to the base path.
+			fp, err = filepath.Rel(f.baseDir, fp)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			trimmed := strings.TrimSuffix(fp, f.ext)
+			files = append(files, trimmed)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	return files
+}
+
+// createDirectory receives a string of the path to a directory.
+// It does not support passing files, so the caller has to remove
+// the filename by doing filepath.Dir(full_path_to_file)
+func createDirectory(dir string, perms os.FileMode) error {
+	// This prevents someone passing /path/to/dir and 'dir' not being created
+	// If two '//' exist, MkdirAll deals it with correctly
+	dir = dir + "/"
+	return os.MkdirAll(dir, perms)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/httpstore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+// A Store that can fetch and set metadata on a remote server.
+// Some API constraints:
+// - Response bodies for error codes should be unmarshallable as:
+//   {"errors": [{..., "detail": <serialized validation error>}]}
+//   else validation error details, etc. will be unparsable.  The errors
+//   should have a github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/validation/SerializableError
+//   in the Details field.
+//   If writing your own server, please have a look at
+//   github.com/docker/distribution/registry/api/errcode
+
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"path"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/validation"
+)
+
+const (
+	// MaxErrorResponseSize is the maximum size for an error message - 1KiB
+	MaxErrorResponseSize int64 = 1 << 10
+	// MaxKeySize is the maximum size for a stored TUF key - 256KiB
+	MaxKeySize = 256 << 10
+)
+
+// ErrServerUnavailable indicates an error from the server. code allows us to
+// populate the http error we received
+type ErrServerUnavailable struct {
+	code int
+}
+
+// NetworkError represents any kind of network error when attempting to make a request
+type NetworkError struct {
+	Wrapped error
+}
+
+func (n NetworkError) Error() string {
+	if _, ok := n.Wrapped.(*url.Error); ok {
+		// QueryUnescape does the inverse transformation of QueryEscape,
+		// converting %AB into the byte 0xAB and '+' into ' ' (space).
+		// It returns an error if any % is not followed by two hexadecimal digits.
+		//
+		// If this happens, we log out the QueryUnescape error and return the
+		// original error to client.
+		res, err := url.QueryUnescape(n.Wrapped.Error())
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Errorf("unescape network error message failed: %s", err)
+			return n.Wrapped.Error()
+		}
+		return res
+	}
+
+	return n.Wrapped.Error()
+}
+
+func (err ErrServerUnavailable) Error() string {
+	if err.code == 401 {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("you are not authorized to perform this operation: server returned 401.")
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("unable to reach trust server at this time: %d.", err.code)
+}
+
+// ErrMaliciousServer indicates the server returned a response that is highly suspected
+// of being malicious. i.e. it attempted to send us more data than the known size of a
+// particular role metadata.
+type ErrMaliciousServer struct{}
+
+func (err ErrMaliciousServer) Error() string {
+	return "trust server returned a bad response."
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidOperation indicates that the server returned a 400 response and
+// propagate any body we received.
+type ErrInvalidOperation struct {
+	msg string
+}
+
+func (err ErrInvalidOperation) Error() string {
+	if err.msg != "" {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("trust server rejected operation: %s", err.msg)
+	}
+	return "trust server rejected operation."
+}
+
+// HTTPStore manages pulling and pushing metadata from and to a remote
+// service over HTTP. It assumes the URL structure of the remote service
+// maps identically to the structure of the TUF repo:
+// <baseURL>/<metaPrefix>/(root|targets|snapshot|timestamp).json
+// <baseURL>/<targetsPrefix>/foo.sh
+//
+// If consistent snapshots are disabled, it is advised that caching is not
+// enabled. Simple set a cachePath (and ensure it's writeable) to enable
+// caching.
+type HTTPStore struct {
+	baseURL       url.URL
+	metaPrefix    string
+	metaExtension string
+	keyExtension  string
+	roundTrip     http.RoundTripper
+}
+
+// NewHTTPStore initializes a new store against a URL and a number of configuration options.
+//
+// In case of a nil `roundTrip`, a default offline store is used instead.
+func NewHTTPStore(baseURL, metaPrefix, metaExtension, keyExtension string, roundTrip http.RoundTripper) (RemoteStore, error) {
+	base, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !base.IsAbs() {
+		return nil, errors.New("HTTPStore requires an absolute baseURL")
+	}
+	if roundTrip == nil {
+		return &OfflineStore{}, nil
+	}
+	return &HTTPStore{
+		baseURL:       *base,
+		metaPrefix:    metaPrefix,
+		metaExtension: metaExtension,
+		keyExtension:  keyExtension,
+		roundTrip:     roundTrip,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func tryUnmarshalError(resp *http.Response, defaultError error) error {
+	b := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxErrorResponseSize)
+	bodyBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return defaultError
+	}
+	var parsedErrors struct {
+		Errors []struct {
+			Detail validation.SerializableError `json:"detail"`
+		} `json:"errors"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(bodyBytes, &parsedErrors); err != nil {
+		return defaultError
+	}
+	if len(parsedErrors.Errors) != 1 {
+		return defaultError
+	}
+	err = parsedErrors.Errors[0].Detail.Error
+	if err == nil {
+		return defaultError
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+func translateStatusToError(resp *http.Response, resource string) error {
+	switch resp.StatusCode {
+	case http.StatusOK:
+		return nil
+	case http.StatusNotFound:
+		return ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: resource}
+	case http.StatusBadRequest:
+		return tryUnmarshalError(resp, ErrInvalidOperation{})
+	default:
+		return ErrServerUnavailable{code: resp.StatusCode}
+	}
+}
+
+// GetSized downloads the named meta file with the given size. A short body
+// is acceptable because in the case of timestamp.json, the size is a cap,
+// not an exact length.
+// If size is "NoSizeLimit", this corresponds to "infinite," but we cut off at a
+// predefined threshold "notary.MaxDownloadSize".
+func (s HTTPStore) GetSized(name string, size int64) ([]byte, error) {
+	url, err := s.buildMetaURL(name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url.String(), nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.roundTrip.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, NetworkError{Wrapped: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if err := translateStatusToError(resp, name); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("received HTTP status %d when requesting %s.", resp.StatusCode, name)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if size == NoSizeLimit {
+		size = notary.MaxDownloadSize
+	}
+	if resp.ContentLength > size {
+		return nil, ErrMaliciousServer{}
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("%d when retrieving metadata for %s", resp.StatusCode, name)
+	b := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, size)
+	body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return body, nil
+}
+
+// Set sends a single piece of metadata to the TUF server
+func (s HTTPStore) Set(name string, blob []byte) error {
+	return s.SetMulti(map[string][]byte{name: blob})
+}
+
+// Remove always fails, because we should never be able to delete metadata
+// remotely
+func (s HTTPStore) Remove(name string) error {
+	return ErrInvalidOperation{msg: "cannot delete individual metadata files"}
+}
+
+// NewMultiPartMetaRequest builds a request with the provided metadata updates
+// in multipart form
+func NewMultiPartMetaRequest(url string, metas map[string][]byte) (*http.Request, error) {
+	body := &bytes.Buffer{}
+	writer := multipart.NewWriter(body)
+	for role, blob := range metas {
+		part, err := writer.CreateFormFile("files", role)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		_, err = io.Copy(part, bytes.NewBuffer(blob))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	err := writer.Close()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", writer.FormDataContentType())
+	return req, nil
+}
+
+// SetMulti does a single batch upload of multiple pieces of TUF metadata.
+// This should be preferred for updating a remote server as it enable the server
+// to remain consistent, either accepting or rejecting the complete update.
+func (s HTTPStore) SetMulti(metas map[string][]byte) error {
+	url, err := s.buildMetaURL("")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	req, err := NewMultiPartMetaRequest(url.String(), metas)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.roundTrip.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return NetworkError{Wrapped: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	// if this 404's something is pretty wrong
+	return translateStatusToError(resp, "POST metadata endpoint")
+}
+
+// RemoveAll will attempt to delete all TUF metadata for a GUN
+func (s HTTPStore) RemoveAll() error {
+	url, err := s.buildMetaURL("")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("DELETE", url.String(), nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.roundTrip.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return NetworkError{Wrapped: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	return translateStatusToError(resp, "DELETE metadata for GUN endpoint")
+}
+
+func (s HTTPStore) buildMetaURL(name string) (*url.URL, error) {
+	var filename string
+	if name != "" {
+		filename = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name, s.metaExtension)
+	}
+	uri := path.Join(s.metaPrefix, filename)
+	return s.buildURL(uri)
+}
+
+func (s HTTPStore) buildKeyURL(name data.RoleName) (*url.URL, error) {
+	filename := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name.String(), s.keyExtension)
+	uri := path.Join(s.metaPrefix, filename)
+	return s.buildURL(uri)
+}
+
+func (s HTTPStore) buildURL(uri string) (*url.URL, error) {
+	sub, err := url.Parse(uri)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return s.baseURL.ResolveReference(sub), nil
+}
+
+// GetKey retrieves a public key from the remote server
+func (s HTTPStore) GetKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error) {
+	url, err := s.buildKeyURL(role)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url.String(), nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.roundTrip.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, NetworkError{Wrapped: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if err := translateStatusToError(resp, role.String()+" key"); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxKeySize)
+	body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return body, nil
+}
+
+// RotateKey rotates a private key and returns the public component from the remote server
+func (s HTTPStore) RotateKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error) {
+	url, err := s.buildKeyURL(role)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url.String(), nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	resp, err := s.roundTrip.RoundTrip(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, NetworkError{Wrapped: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if err := translateStatusToError(resp, role.String()+" key"); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxKeySize)
+	body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return body, nil
+}
+
+// Location returns a human readable name for the storage location
+func (s HTTPStore) Location() string {
+	return s.baseURL.String()
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/interfaces.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// NoSizeLimit is represented as -1 for arguments to GetMeta
+const NoSizeLimit int64 = -1
+
+// MetadataStore must be implemented by anything that intends to interact
+// with a store of TUF files
+type MetadataStore interface {
+	GetSized(name string, size int64) ([]byte, error)
+	Set(name string, blob []byte) error
+	SetMulti(map[string][]byte) error
+	RemoveAll() error
+	Remove(name string) error
+}
+
+// PublicKeyStore must be implemented by a key service
+type PublicKeyStore interface {
+	GetKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error)
+	RotateKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// RemoteStore is similar to LocalStore with the added expectation that it should
+// provide a way to download targets once located
+type RemoteStore interface {
+	MetadataStore
+	PublicKeyStore
+}
+
+// Bootstrapper is a thing that can set itself up
+type Bootstrapper interface {
+	// Bootstrap instructs a configured Bootstrapper to perform
+	// its setup operations.
+	Bootstrap() error
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/memorystore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// NewMemoryStore returns a MetadataStore that operates entirely in memory.
+// Very useful for testing
+func NewMemoryStore(seed map[data.RoleName][]byte) *MemoryStore {
+	var (
+		consistent = make(map[string][]byte)
+		initial    = make(map[string][]byte)
+	)
+	// add all seed meta to consistent
+	for name, d := range seed {
+		checksum := sha256.Sum256(d)
+		path := utils.ConsistentName(name.String(), checksum[:])
+		initial[name.String()] = d
+		consistent[path] = d
+	}
+
+	return &MemoryStore{
+		data:       initial,
+		consistent: consistent,
+	}
+}
+
+// MemoryStore implements a mock RemoteStore entirely in memory.
+// For testing purposes only.
+type MemoryStore struct {
+	data       map[string][]byte
+	consistent map[string][]byte
+}
+
+// GetSized returns up to size bytes of data references by name.
+// If size is "NoSizeLimit", this corresponds to "infinite," but we cut off at a
+// predefined threshold "notary.MaxDownloadSize", as we will always know the
+// size for everything but a timestamp and sometimes a root,
+// neither of which should be exceptionally large
+func (m MemoryStore) GetSized(name string, size int64) ([]byte, error) {
+	d, ok := m.data[name]
+	if ok {
+		if size == NoSizeLimit {
+			size = notary.MaxDownloadSize
+		}
+		if int64(len(d)) < size {
+			return d, nil
+		}
+		return d[:size], nil
+	}
+	d, ok = m.consistent[name]
+	if ok {
+		if int64(len(d)) < size {
+			return d, nil
+		}
+		return d[:size], nil
+	}
+	return nil, ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: name}
+}
+
+// Get returns the data associated with name
+func (m MemoryStore) Get(name string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if d, ok := m.data[name]; ok {
+		return d, nil
+	}
+	if d, ok := m.consistent[name]; ok {
+		return d, nil
+	}
+	return nil, ErrMetaNotFound{Resource: name}
+}
+
+// Set sets the metadata value for the given name
+func (m *MemoryStore) Set(name string, meta []byte) error {
+	m.data[name] = meta
+
+	parsedMeta := &data.SignedMeta{}
+	err := json.Unmarshal(meta, parsedMeta)
+	if err == nil {
+		// no parse error means this is metadata and not a key, so store by version
+		version := parsedMeta.Signed.Version
+		versionedName := fmt.Sprintf("%d.%s", version, name)
+		m.data[versionedName] = meta
+	}
+
+	checksum := sha256.Sum256(meta)
+	path := utils.ConsistentName(name, checksum[:])
+	m.consistent[path] = meta
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SetMulti sets multiple pieces of metadata for multiple names
+// in a single operation.
+func (m *MemoryStore) SetMulti(metas map[string][]byte) error {
+	for role, blob := range metas {
+		m.Set(role, blob)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Remove removes the metadata for a single role - if the metadata doesn't
+// exist, no error is returned
+func (m *MemoryStore) Remove(name string) error {
+	if meta, ok := m.data[name]; ok {
+		checksum := sha256.Sum256(meta)
+		path := utils.ConsistentName(name, checksum[:])
+		delete(m.data, name)
+		delete(m.consistent, path)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RemoveAll clears the existing memory store by setting this store as new empty one
+func (m *MemoryStore) RemoveAll() error {
+	*m = *NewMemoryStore(nil)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Location provides a human readable name for the storage location
+func (m MemoryStore) Location() string {
+	return "memory"
+}
+
+// ListFiles returns a list of all files. The names returned should be
+// usable with Get directly, with no modification.
+func (m *MemoryStore) ListFiles() []string {
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(m.data))
+	for n := range m.data {
+		names = append(names, n)
+	}
+	return names
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage/offlinestore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// ErrOffline is used to indicate we are operating offline
+type ErrOffline struct{}
+
+func (e ErrOffline) Error() string {
+	return "client is offline"
+}
+
+var err = ErrOffline{}
+
+// OfflineStore is to be used as a placeholder for a nil store. It simply
+// returns ErrOffline for every operation
+type OfflineStore struct{}
+
+// GetSized returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) GetSized(name string, size int64) ([]byte, error) {
+	return nil, err
+}
+
+// Set returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) Set(name string, blob []byte) error {
+	return err
+}
+
+// SetMulti returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) SetMulti(map[string][]byte) error {
+	return err
+}
+
+// Remove returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) Remove(name string) error {
+	return err
+}
+
+// GetKey returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) GetKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error) {
+	return nil, err
+}
+
+// RotateKey returns ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) RotateKey(role data.RoleName) ([]byte, error) {
+	return nil, err
+}
+
+// RemoveAll return ErrOffline
+func (es OfflineStore) RemoveAll() error {
+	return err
+}
+
+// Location returns a human readable name for the storage location
+func (es OfflineStore) Location() string {
+	return "offline"
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package trustmanager
+
+import "fmt"
+
+// ErrAttemptsExceeded is returned when too many attempts have been made to decrypt a key
+type ErrAttemptsExceeded struct{}
+
+// ErrAttemptsExceeded is returned when too many attempts have been made to decrypt a key
+func (err ErrAttemptsExceeded) Error() string {
+	return "maximum number of passphrase attempts exceeded"
+}
+
+// ErrPasswordInvalid is returned when signing fails. It could also mean the signing
+// key file was corrupted, but we have no way to distinguish.
+type ErrPasswordInvalid struct{}
+
+// ErrPasswordInvalid is returned when signing fails. It could also mean the signing
+// key file was corrupted, but we have no way to distinguish.
+func (err ErrPasswordInvalid) Error() string {
+	return "password invalid, operation has failed."
+}
+
+// ErrKeyNotFound is returned when the keystore fails to retrieve a specific key.
+type ErrKeyNotFound struct {
+	KeyID string
+}
+
+// ErrKeyNotFound is returned when the keystore fails to retrieve a specific key.
+func (err ErrKeyNotFound) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("signing key not found: %s", err.KeyID)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/interfaces.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package trustmanager
+
+import (
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// Storage implements the bare bones primitives (no hierarchy)
+type Storage interface {
+	// Add writes a file to the specified location, returning an error if this
+	// is not possible (reasons may include permissions errors). The path is cleaned
+	// before being made absolute against the store's base dir.
+	Set(fileName string, data []byte) error
+
+	// Remove deletes a file from the store relative to the store's base directory.
+	// The path is cleaned before being made absolute to ensure no path traversal
+	// outside the base directory is possible.
+	Remove(fileName string) error
+
+	// Get returns the file content found at fileName relative to the base directory
+	// of the file store. The path is cleaned before being made absolute to ensure
+	// path traversal outside the store is not possible. If the file is not found
+	// an error to that effect is returned.
+	Get(fileName string) ([]byte, error)
+
+	// ListFiles returns a list of paths relative to the base directory of the
+	// filestore. Any of these paths must be retrievable via the
+	// Storage.Get method.
+	ListFiles() []string
+
+	// Location returns a human readable name indicating where the implementer
+	// is storing keys
+	Location() string
+}
+
+// KeyInfo stores the role and gun for a corresponding private key ID
+// It is assumed that each private key ID is unique
+type KeyInfo struct {
+	Gun  data.GUN
+	Role data.RoleName
+}
+
+// KeyStore is a generic interface for private key storage
+type KeyStore interface {
+	// AddKey adds a key to the KeyStore, and if the key already exists,
+	// succeeds.  Otherwise, returns an error if it cannot add.
+	AddKey(keyInfo KeyInfo, privKey data.PrivateKey) error
+	// Should fail with ErrKeyNotFound if the keystore is operating normally
+	// and knows that it does not store the requested key.
+	GetKey(keyID string) (data.PrivateKey, data.RoleName, error)
+	GetKeyInfo(keyID string) (KeyInfo, error)
+	ListKeys() map[string]KeyInfo
+	RemoveKey(keyID string) error
+	Name() string
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/keys.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+package trustmanager
+
+import (
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	tufdata "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// Exporter is a simple interface for the two functions we need from the Storage interface
+type Exporter interface {
+	Get(string) ([]byte, error)
+	ListFiles() []string
+}
+
+// Importer is a simple interface for the one function we need from the Storage interface
+type Importer interface {
+	Set(string, []byte) error
+}
+
+// ExportKeysByGUN exports all keys filtered to a GUN
+func ExportKeysByGUN(to io.Writer, s Exporter, gun string) error {
+	keys := s.ListFiles()
+	sort.Strings(keys) // ensure consistency. ListFiles has no order guarantee
+	for _, loc := range keys {
+		keyFile, err := s.Get(loc)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Warn("Could not parse key file at ", loc)
+			continue
+		}
+		block, _ := pem.Decode(keyFile)
+		keyGun := block.Headers["gun"]
+		if keyGun == gun { // must be full GUN match
+			if err := ExportKeys(to, s, loc); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ExportKeysByID exports all keys matching the given ID
+func ExportKeysByID(to io.Writer, s Exporter, ids []string) error {
+	want := make(map[string]struct{})
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		want[id] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	keys := s.ListFiles()
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		id := filepath.Base(k)
+		if _, ok := want[id]; ok {
+			if err := ExportKeys(to, s, k); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ExportKeys copies a key from the store to the io.Writer
+func ExportKeys(to io.Writer, s Exporter, from string) error {
+	// get PEM block
+	k, err := s.Get(from)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// parse PEM blocks if there are more than one
+	for block, rest := pem.Decode(k); block != nil; block, rest = pem.Decode(rest) {
+		// add from path in a header for later import
+		block.Headers["path"] = from
+		// write serialized PEM
+		err = pem.Encode(to, block)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ImportKeys expects an io.Reader containing one or more PEM blocks.
+// It reads PEM blocks one at a time until pem.Decode returns a nil
+// block.
+// Each block is written to the subpath indicated in the "path" PEM
+// header. If the file already exists, the file is truncated. Multiple
+// adjacent PEMs with the same "path" header are appended together.
+func ImportKeys(from io.Reader, to []Importer, fallbackRole string, fallbackGUN string, passRet notary.PassRetriever) error {
+	// importLogic.md contains a small flowchart I made to clear up my understand while writing the cases in this function
+	// it is very rough, but it may help while reading this piece of code
+	data, err := ioutil.ReadAll(from)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	var (
+		writeTo string
+		toWrite []byte
+	)
+	for block, rest := pem.Decode(data); block != nil; block, rest = pem.Decode(rest) {
+		handleLegacyPath(block)
+		setFallbacks(block, fallbackGUN, fallbackRole)
+
+		loc, err := checkValidity(block)
+		if err != nil {
+			// already logged in checkValidity
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// the path header is not of any use once we've imported the key so strip it away
+		delete(block.Headers, "path")
+
+		// we are now all set for import but let's first encrypt the key
+		blockBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(block)
+		// check if key is encrypted, note: if it is encrypted at this point, it will have had a path header
+		if privKey, err := utils.ParsePEMPrivateKey(blockBytes, ""); err == nil {
+			// Key is not encrypted- ask for a passphrase and encrypt this key
+			var chosenPassphrase string
+			for attempts := 0; ; attempts++ {
+				var giveup bool
+				chosenPassphrase, giveup, err = passRet(loc, block.Headers["role"], true, attempts)
+				if err == nil {
+					break
+				}
+				if giveup || attempts > 10 {
+					return errors.New("maximum number of passphrase attempts exceeded")
+				}
+			}
+			blockBytes, err = utils.ConvertPrivateKeyToPKCS8(privKey, tufdata.RoleName(block.Headers["role"]), tufdata.GUN(block.Headers["gun"]), chosenPassphrase)
+			if err != nil {
+				return errors.New("failed to encrypt key with given passphrase")
+			}
+		}
+
+		if loc != writeTo {
+			// next location is different from previous one. We've finished aggregating
+			// data for the previous file. If we have data, write the previous file,
+			// clear toWrite and set writeTo to the next path we're going to write
+			if toWrite != nil {
+				if err = importToStores(to, writeTo, toWrite); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+			}
+			// set up for aggregating next file's data
+			toWrite = nil
+			writeTo = loc
+		}
+
+		toWrite = append(toWrite, blockBytes...)
+	}
+	if toWrite != nil { // close out final iteration if there's data left
+		return importToStores(to, writeTo, toWrite)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func handleLegacyPath(block *pem.Block) {
+	// if there is a legacy path then we set the gun header from this path
+	// this is the case when a user attempts to import a key bundle generated by an older client
+	if rawPath := block.Headers["path"]; rawPath != "" && rawPath != filepath.Base(rawPath) {
+		// this is a legacy filepath and we should try to deduce the gun name from it
+		pathWOFileName := filepath.Dir(rawPath)
+		if strings.HasPrefix(pathWOFileName, notary.NonRootKeysSubdir) {
+			// remove the notary keystore-specific segment of the path, and any potential leading or trailing slashes
+			gunName := strings.Trim(strings.TrimPrefix(pathWOFileName, notary.NonRootKeysSubdir), "/")
+			if gunName != "" {
+				block.Headers["gun"] = gunName
+			}
+		}
+		block.Headers["path"] = filepath.Base(rawPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func setFallbacks(block *pem.Block, fallbackGUN, fallbackRole string) {
+	if block.Headers["gun"] == "" {
+		if fallbackGUN != "" {
+			block.Headers["gun"] = fallbackGUN
+		}
+	}
+
+	if block.Headers["role"] == "" {
+		if fallbackRole == "" {
+			block.Headers["role"] = notary.DefaultImportRole
+		} else {
+			block.Headers["role"] = fallbackRole
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// checkValidity ensures the fields in the pem headers are valid and parses out the location.
+// While importing a collection of keys, errors from this function should result in only the
+// current pem block being skipped.
+func checkValidity(block *pem.Block) (string, error) {
+	// A root key or a delegations key should not have a gun
+	// Note that a key that is not any of the canonical roles (except root) is a delegations key and should not have a gun
+	switch block.Headers["role"] {
+	case tufdata.CanonicalSnapshotRole.String(), tufdata.CanonicalTargetsRole.String(), tufdata.CanonicalTimestampRole.String():
+		// check if the key is missing a gun header or has an empty gun and error out since we don't know what gun it belongs to
+		if block.Headers["gun"] == "" {
+			logrus.Warnf("failed to import key (%s) to store: Cannot have canonical role key without a gun, don't know what gun it belongs to", block.Headers["path"])
+			return "", errors.New("invalid key pem block")
+		}
+	default:
+		delete(block.Headers, "gun")
+	}
+
+	loc, ok := block.Headers["path"]
+	// only if the path isn't specified do we get into this parsing path logic
+	if !ok || loc == "" {
+		// if the path isn't specified, we will try to infer the path rel to trust dir from the role (and then gun)
+		// parse key for the keyID which we will save it by.
+		// if the key is encrypted at this point, we will generate an error and continue since we don't know the ID to save it by
+
+		decodedKey, err := utils.ParsePEMPrivateKey(pem.EncodeToMemory(block), "")
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Warn("failed to import key to store: Invalid key generated, key may be encrypted and does not contain path header")
+			return "", errors.New("invalid key pem block")
+		}
+		loc = decodedKey.ID()
+	}
+	return loc, nil
+}
+
+func importToStores(to []Importer, path string, bytes []byte) error {
+	var err error
+	for _, i := range to {
+		if err = i.Set(path, bytes); err != nil {
+			logrus.Errorf("failed to import key to store: %s", err.Error())
+			continue
+		}
+		break
+	}
+	return err
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/keystore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+package trustmanager
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	store "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/storage"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+type keyInfoMap map[string]KeyInfo
+
+type cachedKey struct {
+	role data.RoleName
+	key  data.PrivateKey
+}
+
+// GenericKeyStore is a wrapper for Storage instances that provides
+// translation between the []byte form and Public/PrivateKey objects
+type GenericKeyStore struct {
+	store Storage
+	sync.Mutex
+	notary.PassRetriever
+	cachedKeys map[string]*cachedKey
+	keyInfoMap
+}
+
+// NewKeyFileStore returns a new KeyFileStore creating a private directory to
+// hold the keys.
+func NewKeyFileStore(baseDir string, p notary.PassRetriever) (*GenericKeyStore, error) {
+	fileStore, err := store.NewPrivateKeyFileStorage(baseDir, notary.KeyExtension)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return NewGenericKeyStore(fileStore, p), nil
+}
+
+// NewKeyMemoryStore returns a new KeyMemoryStore which holds keys in memory
+func NewKeyMemoryStore(p notary.PassRetriever) *GenericKeyStore {
+	memStore := store.NewMemoryStore(nil)
+	return NewGenericKeyStore(memStore, p)
+}
+
+// NewGenericKeyStore creates a GenericKeyStore wrapping the provided
+// Storage instance, using the PassRetriever to enc/decrypt keys
+func NewGenericKeyStore(s Storage, p notary.PassRetriever) *GenericKeyStore {
+	ks := GenericKeyStore{
+		store:         s,
+		PassRetriever: p,
+		cachedKeys:    make(map[string]*cachedKey),
+		keyInfoMap:    make(keyInfoMap),
+	}
+	ks.loadKeyInfo()
+	return &ks
+}
+
+func generateKeyInfoMap(s Storage) map[string]KeyInfo {
+	keyInfoMap := make(map[string]KeyInfo)
+	for _, keyPath := range s.ListFiles() {
+		d, err := s.Get(keyPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Error(err)
+			continue
+		}
+		keyID, keyInfo, err := KeyInfoFromPEM(d, keyPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Error(err)
+			continue
+		}
+		keyInfoMap[keyID] = keyInfo
+	}
+	return keyInfoMap
+}
+
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) loadKeyInfo() {
+	s.keyInfoMap = generateKeyInfoMap(s.store)
+}
+
+// GetKeyInfo returns the corresponding gun and role key info for a keyID
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) GetKeyInfo(keyID string) (KeyInfo, error) {
+	if info, ok := s.keyInfoMap[keyID]; ok {
+		return info, nil
+	}
+	return KeyInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("Could not find info for keyID %s", keyID)
+}
+
+// AddKey stores the contents of a PEM-encoded private key as a PEM block
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) AddKey(keyInfo KeyInfo, privKey data.PrivateKey) error {
+	var (
+		chosenPassphrase string
+		giveup           bool
+		err              error
+		pemPrivKey       []byte
+	)
+	s.Lock()
+	defer s.Unlock()
+	if keyInfo.Role == data.CanonicalRootRole || data.IsDelegation(keyInfo.Role) || !data.ValidRole(keyInfo.Role) {
+		keyInfo.Gun = ""
+	}
+	keyID := privKey.ID()
+	for attempts := 0; ; attempts++ {
+		chosenPassphrase, giveup, err = s.PassRetriever(keyID, keyInfo.Role.String(), true, attempts)
+		if err == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if giveup || attempts > 10 {
+			return ErrAttemptsExceeded{}
+		}
+	}
+
+	pemPrivKey, err = utils.ConvertPrivateKeyToPKCS8(privKey, keyInfo.Role, keyInfo.Gun, chosenPassphrase)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	s.cachedKeys[keyID] = &cachedKey{role: keyInfo.Role, key: privKey}
+	err = s.store.Set(keyID, pemPrivKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	s.keyInfoMap[privKey.ID()] = keyInfo
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GetKey returns the PrivateKey given a KeyID
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) GetKey(keyID string) (data.PrivateKey, data.RoleName, error) {
+	s.Lock()
+	defer s.Unlock()
+
+	cachedKeyEntry, ok := s.cachedKeys[keyID]
+	if ok {
+		return cachedKeyEntry.key, cachedKeyEntry.role, nil
+	}
+
+	role, err := getKeyRole(s.store, keyID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	keyBytes, err := s.store.Get(keyID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	// See if the key is encrypted. If its encrypted we'll fail to parse the private key
+	privKey, err := utils.ParsePEMPrivateKey(keyBytes, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		privKey, _, err = GetPasswdDecryptBytes(s.PassRetriever, keyBytes, keyID, string(role))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, "", err
+		}
+	}
+	s.cachedKeys[keyID] = &cachedKey{role: role, key: privKey}
+	return privKey, role, nil
+}
+
+// ListKeys returns a list of unique PublicKeys present on the KeyFileStore, by returning a copy of the keyInfoMap
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) ListKeys() map[string]KeyInfo {
+	return copyKeyInfoMap(s.keyInfoMap)
+}
+
+// RemoveKey removes the key from the keyfilestore
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) RemoveKey(keyID string) error {
+	s.Lock()
+	defer s.Unlock()
+	delete(s.cachedKeys, keyID)
+
+	err := s.store.Remove(keyID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	delete(s.keyInfoMap, keyID)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Name returns a user friendly name for the location this store
+// keeps its data
+func (s *GenericKeyStore) Name() string {
+	return s.store.Location()
+}
+
+// copyKeyInfoMap returns a deep copy of the passed-in keyInfoMap
+func copyKeyInfoMap(keyInfoMap map[string]KeyInfo) map[string]KeyInfo {
+	copyMap := make(map[string]KeyInfo)
+	for keyID, keyInfo := range keyInfoMap {
+		copyMap[keyID] = KeyInfo{Role: keyInfo.Role, Gun: keyInfo.Gun}
+	}
+	return copyMap
+}
+
+// KeyInfoFromPEM attempts to get a keyID and KeyInfo from the filename and PEM bytes of a key
+func KeyInfoFromPEM(pemBytes []byte, filename string) (string, KeyInfo, error) {
+	var keyID string
+	keyID = filepath.Base(filename)
+	role, gun, err := utils.ExtractPrivateKeyAttributes(pemBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", KeyInfo{}, err
+	}
+	return keyID, KeyInfo{Gun: gun, Role: role}, nil
+}
+
+// getKeyRole finds the role for the given keyID. It attempts to look
+// both in the newer format PEM headers, and also in the legacy filename
+// format. It returns: the role, and an error
+func getKeyRole(s Storage, keyID string) (data.RoleName, error) {
+	name := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(filepath.Base(keyID), filepath.Ext(keyID)))
+
+	for _, file := range s.ListFiles() {
+		filename := filepath.Base(file)
+		if strings.HasPrefix(filename, name) {
+			d, err := s.Get(file)
+			if err != nil {
+				return "", err
+			}
+
+			role, _, err := utils.ExtractPrivateKeyAttributes(d)
+			if err != nil {
+				return "", err
+			}
+			return role, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return "", ErrKeyNotFound{KeyID: keyID}
+}
+
+// GetPasswdDecryptBytes gets the password to decrypt the given pem bytes.
+// Returns the password and private key
+func GetPasswdDecryptBytes(passphraseRetriever notary.PassRetriever, pemBytes []byte, name, alias string) (data.PrivateKey, string, error) {
+	var (
+		passwd  string
+		privKey data.PrivateKey
+	)
+	for attempts := 0; ; attempts++ {
+		var (
+			giveup bool
+			err    error
+		)
+		if attempts > 10 {
+			return nil, "", ErrAttemptsExceeded{}
+		}
+		passwd, giveup, err = passphraseRetriever(name, alias, false, attempts)
+		// Check if the passphrase retriever got an error or if it is telling us to give up
+		if giveup || err != nil {
+			return nil, "", ErrPasswordInvalid{}
+		}
+
+		// Try to convert PEM encoded bytes back to a PrivateKey using the passphrase
+		privKey, err = utils.ParsePEMPrivateKey(pemBytes, passwd)
+		if err == nil {
+			// We managed to parse the PrivateKey. We've succeeded!
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return privKey, passwd, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/import.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// +build pkcs11
+
+package yubikey
+
+import (
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// YubiImport is a wrapper around the YubiStore that allows us to import private
+// keys to the yubikey
+type YubiImport struct {
+	dest          *YubiStore
+	passRetriever notary.PassRetriever
+}
+
+// NewImporter returns a wrapper for the YubiStore provided that enables importing
+// keys via the simple Set(string, []byte) interface
+func NewImporter(ys *YubiStore, ret notary.PassRetriever) *YubiImport {
+	return &YubiImport{
+		dest:          ys,
+		passRetriever: ret,
+	}
+}
+
+// Set determines if we are allowed to set the given key on the Yubikey and
+// calls through to YubiStore.AddKey if it's valid
+func (s *YubiImport) Set(name string, bytes []byte) error {
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(bytes)
+	if block == nil {
+		return errors.New("invalid PEM data, could not parse")
+	}
+	role, ok := block.Headers["role"]
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("no role found for key")
+	}
+	ki := trustmanager.KeyInfo{
+		// GUN is ignored by YubiStore
+		Role: data.RoleName(role),
+	}
+	privKey, err := utils.ParsePEMPrivateKey(bytes, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		privKey, _, err = trustmanager.GetPasswdDecryptBytes(
+			s.passRetriever,
+			bytes,
+			name,
+			ki.Role.String(),
+		)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return s.dest.AddKey(ki, privKey)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/non_pkcs11.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// go list ./... and go test ./... will not pick up this package without this
+// file, because go ? ./... does not honor build tags.
+
+// e.g. "go list -tags pkcs11 ./..." will not list this package if all the
+// files in it have a build tag.
+
+// See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/11246
+
+package yubikey

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/pkcs11_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// +build pkcs11,darwin
+
+package yubikey
+
+var possiblePkcs11Libs = []string{
+	"/usr/local/lib/libykcs11.dylib",
+	"/usr/local/docker/lib/libykcs11.dylib",
+	"/usr/local/docker-experimental/lib/libykcs11.dylib",
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/pkcs11_interface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// +build pkcs11
+
+// an interface around the pkcs11 library, so that things can be mocked out
+// for testing
+
+package yubikey
+
+import "github.com/miekg/pkcs11"
+
+// IPKCS11 is an interface for wrapping github.com/miekg/pkcs11
+type pkcs11LibLoader func(module string) IPKCS11Ctx
+
+func defaultLoader(module string) IPKCS11Ctx {
+	return pkcs11.New(module)
+}
+
+// IPKCS11Ctx is an interface for wrapping the parts of
+// github.com/miekg/pkcs11.Ctx that yubikeystore requires
+type IPKCS11Ctx interface {
+	Destroy()
+	Initialize() error
+	Finalize() error
+	GetSlotList(tokenPresent bool) ([]uint, error)
+	OpenSession(slotID uint, flags uint) (pkcs11.SessionHandle, error)
+	CloseSession(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle) error
+	Login(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, userType uint, pin string) error
+	Logout(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle) error
+	CreateObject(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, temp []*pkcs11.Attribute) (
+		pkcs11.ObjectHandle, error)
+	DestroyObject(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, oh pkcs11.ObjectHandle) error
+	GetAttributeValue(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, o pkcs11.ObjectHandle,
+		a []*pkcs11.Attribute) ([]*pkcs11.Attribute, error)
+	FindObjectsInit(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, temp []*pkcs11.Attribute) error
+	FindObjects(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, max int) (
+		[]pkcs11.ObjectHandle, bool, error)
+	FindObjectsFinal(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle) error
+	SignInit(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, m []*pkcs11.Mechanism,
+		o pkcs11.ObjectHandle) error
+	Sign(sh pkcs11.SessionHandle, message []byte) ([]byte, error)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/pkcs11_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// +build pkcs11,linux
+
+package yubikey
+
+var possiblePkcs11Libs = []string{
+	"/usr/lib/libykcs11.so",
+	"/usr/lib64/libykcs11.so",
+	"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libykcs11.so",
+	"/usr/local/lib/libykcs11.so",
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager/yubikey/yubikeystore.go

@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+// +build pkcs11
+
+package yubikey
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/pkcs11"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+const (
+	// UserPin is the user pin of a yubikey (in PIV parlance, is the PIN)
+	UserPin = "123456"
+	// SOUserPin is the "Security Officer" user pin - this is the PIV management
+	// (MGM) key, which is different than the admin pin of the Yubikey PGP interface
+	// (which in PIV parlance is the PUK, and defaults to 12345678)
+	SOUserPin = "010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708"
+	numSlots  = 4 // number of slots in the yubikey
+
+	// KeymodeNone means that no touch or PIN is required to sign with the yubikey
+	KeymodeNone = 0
+	// KeymodeTouch means that only touch is required to sign with the yubikey
+	KeymodeTouch = 1
+	// KeymodePinOnce means that the pin entry is required once the first time to sign with the yubikey
+	KeymodePinOnce = 2
+	// KeymodePinAlways means that pin entry is required every time to sign with the yubikey
+	KeymodePinAlways = 4
+
+	// the key size, when importing a key into yubikey, MUST be 32 bytes
+	ecdsaPrivateKeySize = 32
+
+	sigAttempts = 5
+)
+
+// what key mode to use when generating keys
+var (
+	yubikeyKeymode = KeymodeTouch | KeymodePinOnce
+	// order in which to prefer token locations on the yubikey.
+	// corresponds to: 9c, 9e, 9d, 9a
+	slotIDs = []int{2, 1, 3, 0}
+)
+
+// SetYubikeyKeyMode - sets the mode when generating yubikey keys.
+// This is to be used for testing.  It does nothing if not building with tag
+// pkcs11.
+func SetYubikeyKeyMode(keyMode int) error {
+	// technically 7 (1 | 2 | 4) is valid, but KeymodePinOnce +
+	// KeymdoePinAlways don't really make sense together
+	if keyMode < 0 || keyMode > 5 {
+		return errors.New("Invalid key mode")
+	}
+	yubikeyKeymode = keyMode
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SetTouchToSignUI - allows configurable UX for notifying a user that they
+// need to touch the yubikey to sign. The callback may be used to provide a
+// mechanism for updating a GUI (such as removing a modal) after the touch
+// has been made
+func SetTouchToSignUI(notifier func(), callback func()) {
+	touchToSignUI = notifier
+	if callback != nil {
+		touchDoneCallback = callback
+	}
+}
+
+var touchToSignUI = func() {
+	fmt.Println("Please touch the attached Yubikey to perform signing.")
+}
+
+var touchDoneCallback = func() {
+	// noop
+}
+
+var pkcs11Lib string
+
+func init() {
+	for _, loc := range possiblePkcs11Libs {
+		_, err := os.Stat(loc)
+		if err == nil {
+			p := pkcs11.New(loc)
+			if p != nil {
+				pkcs11Lib = loc
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// ErrBackupFailed is returned when a YubiStore fails to back up a key that
+// is added
+type ErrBackupFailed struct {
+	err string
+}
+
+func (err ErrBackupFailed) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Failed to backup private key to: %s", err.err)
+}
+
+// An error indicating that the HSM is not present (as opposed to failing),
+// i.e. that we can confidently claim that the key is not stored in the HSM
+// without notifying the user about a missing or failing HSM.
+type errHSMNotPresent struct {
+	err string
+}
+
+func (err errHSMNotPresent) Error() string {
+	return err.err
+}
+
+type yubiSlot struct {
+	role   data.RoleName
+	slotID []byte
+}
+
+// YubiPrivateKey represents a private key inside of a yubikey
+type YubiPrivateKey struct {
+	data.ECDSAPublicKey
+	passRetriever notary.PassRetriever
+	slot          []byte
+	libLoader     pkcs11LibLoader
+}
+
+// yubikeySigner wraps a YubiPrivateKey and implements the crypto.Signer interface
+type yubikeySigner struct {
+	YubiPrivateKey
+}
+
+// NewYubiPrivateKey returns a YubiPrivateKey, which implements the data.PrivateKey
+// interface except that the private material is inaccessible
+func NewYubiPrivateKey(slot []byte, pubKey data.ECDSAPublicKey,
+	passRetriever notary.PassRetriever) *YubiPrivateKey {
+
+	return &YubiPrivateKey{
+		ECDSAPublicKey: pubKey,
+		passRetriever:  passRetriever,
+		slot:           slot,
+		libLoader:      defaultLoader,
+	}
+}
+
+// Public is a required method of the crypto.Signer interface
+func (ys *yubikeySigner) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	publicKey, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(ys.YubiPrivateKey.Public())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return publicKey
+}
+
+func (y *YubiPrivateKey) setLibLoader(loader pkcs11LibLoader) {
+	y.libLoader = loader
+}
+
+// CryptoSigner returns a crypto.Signer tha wraps the YubiPrivateKey. Needed for
+// Certificate generation only
+func (y *YubiPrivateKey) CryptoSigner() crypto.Signer {
+	return &yubikeySigner{YubiPrivateKey: *y}
+}
+
+// Private is not implemented in hardware  keys
+func (y *YubiPrivateKey) Private() []byte {
+	// We cannot return the private material from a Yubikey
+	// TODO(david): We probably want to return an error here
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm returns which algorithm this key uses to sign - currently
+// hardcoded to ECDSA
+func (y YubiPrivateKey) SignatureAlgorithm() data.SigAlgorithm {
+	return data.ECDSASignature
+}
+
+// Sign is a required method of the crypto.Signer interface and the data.PrivateKey
+// interface
+func (y *YubiPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, y.libLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+
+	v := signed.Verifiers[data.ECDSASignature]
+	for i := 0; i < sigAttempts; i++ {
+		sig, err := sign(ctx, session, y.slot, y.passRetriever, msg)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign using Yubikey: %v", err)
+		}
+		if err := v.Verify(&y.ECDSAPublicKey, sig, msg); err == nil {
+			return sig, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("failed to generate signature on Yubikey")
+}
+
+// If a byte array is less than the number of bytes specified by
+// ecdsaPrivateKeySize, left-zero-pad the byte array until
+// it is the required size.
+func ensurePrivateKeySize(payload []byte) []byte {
+	final := payload
+	if len(payload) < ecdsaPrivateKeySize {
+		final = make([]byte, ecdsaPrivateKeySize)
+		copy(final[ecdsaPrivateKeySize-len(payload):], payload)
+	}
+	return final
+}
+
+// addECDSAKey adds a key to the yubikey
+func addECDSAKey(
+	ctx IPKCS11Ctx,
+	session pkcs11.SessionHandle,
+	privKey data.PrivateKey,
+	pkcs11KeyID []byte,
+	passRetriever notary.PassRetriever,
+	role data.RoleName,
+) error {
+	logrus.Debugf("Attempting to add key to yubikey with ID: %s", privKey.ID())
+
+	err := login(ctx, session, passRetriever, pkcs11.CKU_SO, SOUserPin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer ctx.Logout(session)
+
+	// Create an ecdsa.PrivateKey out of the private key bytes
+	ecdsaPrivKey, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(privKey.Private())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	ecdsaPrivKeyD := ensurePrivateKeySize(ecdsaPrivKey.D.Bytes())
+
+	// Hard-coded policy: the generated certificate expires in 10 years.
+	startTime := time.Now()
+	template, err := utils.NewCertificate(role.String(), startTime, startTime.AddDate(10, 0, 0))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to create the certificate template: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	certBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, ecdsaPrivKey.Public(), ecdsaPrivKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to create the certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	certTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_CERTIFICATE),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_VALUE, certBytes),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, pkcs11KeyID),
+	}
+
+	privateKeyTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_KEY_TYPE, pkcs11.CKK_ECDSA),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, pkcs11KeyID),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_EC_PARAMS, []byte{0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07}),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_VALUE, ecdsaPrivKeyD),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED, yubikeyKeymode),
+	}
+
+	_, err = ctx.CreateObject(session, certTemplate)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error importing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, err = ctx.CreateObject(session, privateKeyTemplate)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error importing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func getECDSAKey(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle, pkcs11KeyID []byte) (*data.ECDSAPublicKey, data.RoleName, error) {
+	findTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_TOKEN, true),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, pkcs11KeyID),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_PUBLIC_KEY),
+	}
+
+	attrTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_KEY_TYPE, []byte{0}),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_EC_POINT, []byte{0}),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_EC_PARAMS, []byte{0}),
+	}
+
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsInit(session, findTemplate); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to init: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	obj, _, err := ctx.FindObjects(session, 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to find objects: %v", err)
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsFinal(session); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to finalize: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	if len(obj) != 1 {
+		logrus.Debugf("should have found one object")
+		return nil, "", errors.New("no matching keys found inside of yubikey")
+	}
+
+	// Retrieve the public-key material to be able to create a new ECSAKey
+	attr, err := ctx.GetAttributeValue(session, obj[0], attrTemplate)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to get Attribute for: %v", obj[0])
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	// Iterate through all the attributes of this key and saves CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT and CKA_MODULUS. Removes ordering specific issues.
+	var rawPubKey []byte
+	for _, a := range attr {
+		if a.Type == pkcs11.CKA_EC_POINT {
+			rawPubKey = a.Value
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	ecdsaPubKey := ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: elliptic.P256(), X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(rawPubKey[3:35]), Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(rawPubKey[35:])}
+	pubBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(&ecdsaPubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to Marshal public key")
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	return data.NewECDSAPublicKey(pubBytes), data.CanonicalRootRole, nil
+}
+
+// sign returns a signature for a given signature request
+func sign(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle, pkcs11KeyID []byte, passRetriever notary.PassRetriever, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	err := login(ctx, session, passRetriever, pkcs11.CKU_USER, UserPin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error logging in: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer ctx.Logout(session)
+
+	// Define the ECDSA Private key template
+	class := pkcs11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
+	privateKeyTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, class),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_KEY_TYPE, pkcs11.CKK_ECDSA),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, pkcs11KeyID),
+	}
+
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsInit(session, privateKeyTemplate); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to init find objects: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	obj, _, err := ctx.FindObjects(session, 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to find objects: %v", err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err = ctx.FindObjectsFinal(session); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to finalize find objects: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if len(obj) != 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New("length of objects found not 1")
+	}
+
+	var sig []byte
+	err = ctx.SignInit(
+		session, []*pkcs11.Mechanism{pkcs11.NewMechanism(pkcs11.CKM_ECDSA, nil)}, obj[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Get the SHA256 of the payload
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(payload)
+
+	if (yubikeyKeymode & KeymodeTouch) > 0 {
+		touchToSignUI()
+		defer touchDoneCallback()
+	}
+	// a call to Sign, whether or not Sign fails, will clear the SignInit
+	sig, err = ctx.Sign(session, digest[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Error while signing: %s", err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if sig == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("Failed to create signature")
+	}
+	return sig[:], nil
+}
+
+func yubiRemoveKey(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle, pkcs11KeyID []byte, passRetriever notary.PassRetriever, keyID string) error {
+	err := login(ctx, session, passRetriever, pkcs11.CKU_SO, SOUserPin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer ctx.Logout(session)
+
+	template := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_TOKEN, true),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, pkcs11KeyID),
+		//pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_CERTIFICATE),
+	}
+
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsInit(session, template); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to init find objects: %s", err.Error())
+		return err
+	}
+	obj, b, err := ctx.FindObjects(session, 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to find objects: %s %v", err.Error(), b)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsFinal(session); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to finalize find objects: %s", err.Error())
+		return err
+	}
+	if len(obj) != 1 {
+		logrus.Debugf("should have found exactly one object")
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Delete the certificate
+	err = ctx.DestroyObject(session, obj[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to delete cert")
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func yubiListKeys(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle) (keys map[string]yubiSlot, err error) {
+	keys = make(map[string]yubiSlot)
+
+	attrTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, []byte{0}),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_VALUE, []byte{0}),
+	}
+
+	objs, err := listObjects(ctx, session)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if len(objs) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("no keys found in yubikey")
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("Found %d objects matching list filters", len(objs))
+	for _, obj := range objs {
+		var (
+			cert *x509.Certificate
+			slot []byte
+		)
+		// Retrieve the public-key material to be able to create a new ECDSA
+		attr, err := ctx.GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrTemplate)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("Failed to get Attribute for: %v", obj)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Iterate through all the attributes of this key and saves CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT and CKA_MODULUS. Removes ordering specific issues.
+		for _, a := range attr {
+			if a.Type == pkcs11.CKA_ID {
+				slot = a.Value
+			}
+			if a.Type == pkcs11.CKA_VALUE {
+				cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(a.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					continue
+				}
+				if !data.ValidRole(data.RoleName(cert.Subject.CommonName)) {
+					continue
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		// we found nothing
+		if cert == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		var ecdsaPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
+		switch cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
+		case x509.ECDSA:
+			ecdsaPubKey = cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+		default:
+			logrus.Infof("Unsupported x509 PublicKeyAlgorithm: %d", cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		pubBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(ecdsaPubKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("Failed to Marshal public key")
+			continue
+		}
+
+		keys[data.NewECDSAPublicKey(pubBytes).ID()] = yubiSlot{
+			role:   data.RoleName(cert.Subject.CommonName),
+			slotID: slot,
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func listObjects(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle) ([]pkcs11.ObjectHandle, error) {
+	findTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_TOKEN, true),
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_CERTIFICATE),
+	}
+
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsInit(session, findTemplate); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to init: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	objs, b, err := ctx.FindObjects(session, numSlots)
+	for err == nil {
+		var o []pkcs11.ObjectHandle
+		o, b, err = ctx.FindObjects(session, numSlots)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(o) == 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		objs = append(objs, o...)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to find: %s %v", err.Error(), b)
+		if len(objs) == 0 {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsFinal(session); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to finalize: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return objs, nil
+}
+
+func getNextEmptySlot(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle) ([]byte, error) {
+	findTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_TOKEN, true),
+	}
+	attrTemplate := []*pkcs11.Attribute{
+		pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_ID, []byte{0}),
+	}
+
+	if err := ctx.FindObjectsInit(session, findTemplate); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to init: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	objs, b, err := ctx.FindObjects(session, numSlots)
+	// if there are more objects than `numSlots`, get all of them until
+	// there are no more to get
+	for err == nil {
+		var o []pkcs11.ObjectHandle
+		o, b, err = ctx.FindObjects(session, numSlots)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(o) == 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		objs = append(objs, o...)
+	}
+	taken := make(map[int]bool)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to find: %s %v", err.Error(), b)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err = ctx.FindObjectsFinal(session); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to finalize: %s\n", err.Error())
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for _, obj := range objs {
+		// Retrieve the slot ID
+		attr, err := ctx.GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrTemplate)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Iterate through attributes. If an ID attr was found, mark it as taken
+		for _, a := range attr {
+			if a.Type == pkcs11.CKA_ID {
+				if len(a.Value) < 1 {
+					continue
+				}
+				// a byte will always be capable of representing all slot IDs
+				// for the Yubikeys
+				slotNum := int(a.Value[0])
+				if slotNum >= numSlots {
+					// defensive
+					continue
+				}
+				taken[slotNum] = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// iterate the token locations in our preferred order and use the first
+	// available one. Otherwise exit the loop and return an error.
+	for _, loc := range slotIDs {
+		if !taken[loc] {
+			return []byte{byte(loc)}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("yubikey has no available slots")
+}
+
+// YubiStore is a KeyStore for private keys inside a Yubikey
+type YubiStore struct {
+	passRetriever notary.PassRetriever
+	keys          map[string]yubiSlot
+	backupStore   trustmanager.KeyStore
+	libLoader     pkcs11LibLoader
+}
+
+// NewYubiStore returns a YubiStore, given a backup key store to write any
+// generated keys to (usually a KeyFileStore)
+func NewYubiStore(backupStore trustmanager.KeyStore, passphraseRetriever notary.PassRetriever) (
+	*YubiStore, error) {
+
+	s := &YubiStore{
+		passRetriever: passphraseRetriever,
+		keys:          make(map[string]yubiSlot),
+		backupStore:   backupStore,
+		libLoader:     defaultLoader,
+	}
+	s.ListKeys() // populate keys field
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+// Name returns a user friendly name for the location this store
+// keeps its data
+func (s YubiStore) Name() string {
+	return "yubikey"
+}
+
+func (s *YubiStore) setLibLoader(loader pkcs11LibLoader) {
+	s.libLoader = loader
+}
+
+// ListKeys returns a list of keys in the yubikey store
+func (s *YubiStore) ListKeys() map[string]trustmanager.KeyInfo {
+	if len(s.keys) > 0 {
+		return buildKeyMap(s.keys)
+	}
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, s.libLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("No yubikey found, using alternative key storage: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+
+	keys, err := yubiListKeys(ctx, session)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to list key from the yubikey: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.keys = keys
+
+	return buildKeyMap(keys)
+}
+
+// AddKey puts a key inside the Yubikey, as well as writing it to the backup store
+func (s *YubiStore) AddKey(keyInfo trustmanager.KeyInfo, privKey data.PrivateKey) error {
+	added, err := s.addKey(privKey.ID(), keyInfo.Role, privKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if added && s.backupStore != nil {
+		err = s.backupStore.AddKey(keyInfo, privKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			defer s.RemoveKey(privKey.ID())
+			return ErrBackupFailed{err: err.Error()}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Only add if we haven't seen the key already.  Return whether the key was
+// added.
+func (s *YubiStore) addKey(keyID string, role data.RoleName, privKey data.PrivateKey) (
+	bool, error) {
+
+	// We only allow adding root keys for now
+	if role != data.CanonicalRootRole {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf(
+			"yubikey only supports storing root keys, got %s for key: %s", role, keyID)
+	}
+
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, s.libLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("No yubikey found, using alternative key storage: %s", err.Error())
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+
+	if k, ok := s.keys[keyID]; ok {
+		if k.role == role {
+			// already have the key and it's associated with the correct role
+			return false, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	slot, err := getNextEmptySlot(ctx, session)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to get an empty yubikey slot: %s", err.Error())
+		return false, err
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("Attempting to store key using yubikey slot %v", slot)
+
+	err = addECDSAKey(
+		ctx, session, privKey, slot, s.passRetriever, role)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.keys[privKey.ID()] = yubiSlot{
+			role:   role,
+			slotID: slot,
+		}
+		return true, nil
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("Failed to add key to yubikey: %v", err)
+
+	return false, err
+}
+
+// GetKey retrieves a key from the Yubikey only (it does not look inside the
+// backup store)
+func (s *YubiStore) GetKey(keyID string) (data.PrivateKey, data.RoleName, error) {
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, s.libLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("No yubikey found, using alternative key storage: %s", err.Error())
+		if _, ok := err.(errHSMNotPresent); ok {
+			err = trustmanager.ErrKeyNotFound{KeyID: keyID}
+		}
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+
+	key, ok := s.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, "", trustmanager.ErrKeyNotFound{KeyID: keyID}
+	}
+
+	pubKey, alias, err := getECDSAKey(ctx, session, key.slotID)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to get key from slot %s: %s", key.slotID, err.Error())
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	// Check to see if we're returning the intended keyID
+	if pubKey.ID() != keyID {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("expected root key: %s, but found: %s", keyID, pubKey.ID())
+	}
+	privKey := NewYubiPrivateKey(key.slotID, *pubKey, s.passRetriever)
+	if privKey == nil {
+		return nil, "", errors.New("could not initialize new YubiPrivateKey")
+	}
+
+	return privKey, alias, err
+}
+
+// RemoveKey deletes a key from the Yubikey only (it does not remove it from the
+// backup store)
+func (s *YubiStore) RemoveKey(keyID string) error {
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, s.libLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("No yubikey found, using alternative key storage: %s", err.Error())
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+
+	key, ok := s.keys[keyID]
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.New("Key not present in yubikey")
+	}
+	err = yubiRemoveKey(ctx, session, key.slotID, s.passRetriever, keyID)
+	if err == nil {
+		delete(s.keys, keyID)
+	} else {
+		logrus.Debugf("Failed to remove from the yubikey KeyID %s: %v", keyID, err)
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// GetKeyInfo is not yet implemented
+func (s *YubiStore) GetKeyInfo(keyID string) (trustmanager.KeyInfo, error) {
+	return trustmanager.KeyInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("Not yet implemented")
+}
+
+func cleanup(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle) {
+	err := ctx.CloseSession(session)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Error closing session: %s", err.Error())
+	}
+	finalizeAndDestroy(ctx)
+}
+
+func finalizeAndDestroy(ctx IPKCS11Ctx) {
+	err := ctx.Finalize()
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("Error finalizing: %s", err.Error())
+	}
+	ctx.Destroy()
+}
+
+// SetupHSMEnv is a method that depends on the existences
+func SetupHSMEnv(libraryPath string, libLoader pkcs11LibLoader) (
+	IPKCS11Ctx, pkcs11.SessionHandle, error) {
+
+	if libraryPath == "" {
+		return nil, 0, errHSMNotPresent{err: "no library found"}
+	}
+	p := libLoader(libraryPath)
+
+	if p == nil {
+		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to load library %s", libraryPath)
+	}
+
+	if err := p.Initialize(); err != nil {
+		defer finalizeAndDestroy(p)
+		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("found library %s, but initialize error %s", libraryPath, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	slots, err := p.GetSlotList(true)
+	if err != nil {
+		defer finalizeAndDestroy(p)
+		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"loaded library %s, but failed to list HSM slots %s", libraryPath, err)
+	}
+	// Check to see if we got any slots from the HSM.
+	if len(slots) < 1 {
+		defer finalizeAndDestroy(p)
+		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"loaded library %s, but no HSM slots found", libraryPath)
+	}
+
+	// CKF_SERIAL_SESSION: TRUE if cryptographic functions are performed in serial with the application; FALSE if the functions may be performed in parallel with the application.
+	// CKF_RW_SESSION: TRUE if the session is read/write; FALSE if the session is read-only
+	session, err := p.OpenSession(slots[0], pkcs11.CKF_SERIAL_SESSION|pkcs11.CKF_RW_SESSION)
+	if err != nil {
+		defer cleanup(p, session)
+		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf(
+			"loaded library %s, but failed to start session with HSM %s",
+			libraryPath, err)
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("Initialized PKCS11 library %s and started HSM session", libraryPath)
+	return p, session, nil
+}
+
+// IsAccessible returns true if a Yubikey can be accessed
+func IsAccessible() bool {
+	if pkcs11Lib == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	ctx, session, err := SetupHSMEnv(pkcs11Lib, defaultLoader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	defer cleanup(ctx, session)
+	return true
+}
+
+func login(ctx IPKCS11Ctx, session pkcs11.SessionHandle, passRetriever notary.PassRetriever, userFlag uint, defaultPassw string) error {
+	// try default password
+	err := ctx.Login(session, userFlag, defaultPassw)
+	if err == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// default failed, ask user for password
+	for attempts := 0; ; attempts++ {
+		var (
+			giveup bool
+			err    error
+			user   string
+		)
+		if userFlag == pkcs11.CKU_SO {
+			user = "SO Pin"
+		} else {
+			user = "User Pin"
+		}
+		passwd, giveup, err := passRetriever(user, "yubikey", false, attempts)
+		// Check if the passphrase retriever got an error or if it is telling us to give up
+		if giveup || err != nil {
+			return trustmanager.ErrPasswordInvalid{}
+		}
+		if attempts > 2 {
+			return trustmanager.ErrAttemptsExceeded{}
+		}
+
+		// attempt to login. Loop if failed
+		err = ctx.Login(session, userFlag, passwd)
+		if err == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func buildKeyMap(keys map[string]yubiSlot) map[string]trustmanager.KeyInfo {
+	res := make(map[string]trustmanager.KeyInfo)
+	for k, v := range keys {
+		res[k] = trustmanager.KeyInfo{Role: v.role, Gun: ""}
+	}
+	return res
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustpinning/certs.go

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+package trustpinning
+
+import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+const wildcard = "*"
+
+// ErrValidationFail is returned when there is no valid trusted certificates
+// being served inside of the roots.json
+type ErrValidationFail struct {
+	Reason string
+}
+
+// ErrValidationFail is returned when there is no valid trusted certificates
+// being served inside of the roots.json
+func (err ErrValidationFail) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("could not validate the path to a trusted root: %s", err.Reason)
+}
+
+// ErrRootRotationFail is returned when we fail to do a full root key rotation
+// by either failing to add the new root certificate, or delete the old ones
+type ErrRootRotationFail struct {
+	Reason string
+}
+
+// ErrRootRotationFail is returned when we fail to do a full root key rotation
+// by either failing to add the new root certificate, or delete the old ones
+func (err ErrRootRotationFail) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("could not rotate trust to a new trusted root: %s", err.Reason)
+}
+
+func prettyFormatCertIDs(certs map[string]*x509.Certificate) string {
+	ids := make([]string, 0, len(certs))
+	for id := range certs {
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	return strings.Join(ids, ", ")
+}
+
+/*
+ValidateRoot receives a new root, validates its correctness and attempts to
+do root key rotation if needed.
+
+First we check if we have any trusted certificates for a particular GUN in
+a previous root, if we have one. If the previous root is not nil and we find
+certificates for this GUN, we've already seen this repository before, and
+have a list of trusted certificates for it. In this case, we use this list of
+certificates to attempt to validate this root file.
+
+If the previous validation succeeds, we check the integrity of the root by
+making sure that it is validated by itself. This means that we will attempt to
+validate the root data with the certificates that are included in the root keys
+themselves.
+
+However, if we do not have any current trusted certificates for this GUN, we
+check if there are any pinned certificates specified in the trust_pinning section
+of the notary client config.  If this section specifies a Certs section with this
+GUN, we attempt to validate that the certificates present in the downloaded root
+file match the pinned ID.
+
+If the Certs section is empty for this GUN, we check if the trust_pinning
+section specifies a CA section specified in the config for this GUN.  If so, we check
+that the specified CA is valid and has signed a certificate included in the downloaded
+root file.  The specified CA can be a prefix for this GUN.
+
+If both the Certs and CA configs do not match this GUN, we fall back to the TOFU
+section in the config: if true, we trust certificates specified in the root for
+this GUN. If later we see a different certificate for that certificate, we return
+an ErrValidationFailed error.
+
+Note that since we only allow trust data to be downloaded over an HTTPS channel
+we are using the current public PKI to validate the first download of the certificate
+adding an extra layer of security over the normal (SSH style) trust model.
+We shall call this: TOFUS.
+
+Validation failure at any step will result in an ErrValidationFailed error.
+*/
+func ValidateRoot(prevRoot *data.SignedRoot, root *data.Signed, gun data.GUN, trustPinning TrustPinConfig) (*data.SignedRoot, error) {
+	logrus.Debugf("entered ValidateRoot with dns: %s", gun)
+	signedRoot, err := data.RootFromSigned(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	rootRole, err := signedRoot.BuildBaseRole(data.CanonicalRootRole)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Retrieve all the leaf and intermediate certificates in root for which the CN matches the GUN
+	allLeafCerts, allIntCerts := parseAllCerts(signedRoot)
+	certsFromRoot, err := validRootLeafCerts(allLeafCerts, gun, true)
+	validIntCerts := validRootIntCerts(allIntCerts)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("error retrieving valid leaf certificates for: %s, %v", gun, err)
+		return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: "unable to retrieve valid leaf certificates"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("found %d leaf certs, of which %d are valid leaf certs for %s", len(allLeafCerts), len(certsFromRoot), gun)
+
+	// If we have a previous root, let's try to use it to validate that this new root is valid.
+	havePrevRoot := prevRoot != nil
+	if havePrevRoot {
+		// Retrieve all the trusted certificates from our previous root
+		// Note that we do not validate expiries here since our originally trusted root might have expired certs
+		allTrustedLeafCerts, allTrustedIntCerts := parseAllCerts(prevRoot)
+		trustedLeafCerts, err := validRootLeafCerts(allTrustedLeafCerts, gun, false)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: "could not retrieve trusted certs from previous root role data"}
+		}
+
+		// Use the certificates we found in the previous root for the GUN to verify its signatures
+		// This could potentially be an empty set, in which case we will fail to verify
+		logrus.Debugf("found %d valid root leaf certificates for %s: %s", len(trustedLeafCerts), gun,
+			prettyFormatCertIDs(trustedLeafCerts))
+
+		// Extract the previous root's threshold for signature verification
+		prevRootRoleData, ok := prevRoot.Signed.Roles[data.CanonicalRootRole]
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: "could not retrieve previous root role data"}
+		}
+		err = signed.VerifySignatures(
+			root, data.BaseRole{Keys: utils.CertsToKeys(trustedLeafCerts, allTrustedIntCerts), Threshold: prevRootRoleData.Threshold})
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to verify TUF data for: %s, %v", gun, err)
+			return nil, &ErrRootRotationFail{Reason: "failed to validate data with current trusted certificates"}
+		}
+		// Clear the IsValid marks we could have received from VerifySignatures
+		for i := range root.Signatures {
+			root.Signatures[i].IsValid = false
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Regardless of having a previous root or not, confirm that the new root validates against the trust pinning
+	logrus.Debugf("checking root against trust_pinning config for %s", gun)
+	trustPinCheckFunc, err := NewTrustPinChecker(trustPinning, gun, !havePrevRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: err.Error()}
+	}
+
+	validPinnedCerts := map[string]*x509.Certificate{}
+	for id, cert := range certsFromRoot {
+		logrus.Debugf("checking trust-pinning for cert: %s", id)
+		if ok := trustPinCheckFunc(cert, validIntCerts[id]); !ok {
+			logrus.Debugf("trust-pinning check failed for cert: %s", id)
+			continue
+		}
+		validPinnedCerts[id] = cert
+	}
+	if len(validPinnedCerts) == 0 {
+		return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: "unable to match any certificates to trust_pinning config"}
+	}
+	certsFromRoot = validPinnedCerts
+
+	// Validate the integrity of the new root (does it have valid signatures)
+	// Note that certsFromRoot is guaranteed to be unchanged only if we had prior cert data for this GUN or enabled TOFUS
+	// If we attempted to pin a certain certificate or CA, certsFromRoot could have been pruned accordingly
+	err = signed.VerifySignatures(root, data.BaseRole{
+		Keys: utils.CertsToKeys(certsFromRoot, validIntCerts), Threshold: rootRole.Threshold})
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed to verify TUF data for: %s, %v", gun, err)
+		return nil, &ErrValidationFail{Reason: "failed to validate integrity of roots"}
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("root validation succeeded for %s", gun)
+	// Call RootFromSigned to make sure we pick up on the IsValid markings from VerifySignatures
+	return data.RootFromSigned(root)
+}
+
+// MatchCNToGun checks that the common name in a cert is valid for the given gun.
+// This allows wildcards as suffixes, e.g. `namespace/*`
+func MatchCNToGun(commonName string, gun data.GUN) bool {
+	if strings.HasSuffix(commonName, wildcard) {
+		prefix := strings.TrimRight(commonName, wildcard)
+		logrus.Debugf("checking gun %s against wildcard prefix %s", gun, prefix)
+		return strings.HasPrefix(gun.String(), prefix)
+	}
+	return commonName == gun.String()
+}
+
+// validRootLeafCerts returns a list of possibly (if checkExpiry is true) non-expired, non-sha1 certificates
+// found in root whose Common-Names match the provided GUN. Note that this
+// "validity" alone does not imply any measure of trust.
+func validRootLeafCerts(allLeafCerts map[string]*x509.Certificate, gun data.GUN, checkExpiry bool) (map[string]*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	validLeafCerts := make(map[string]*x509.Certificate)
+
+	// Go through every leaf certificate and check that the CN matches the gun
+	for id, cert := range allLeafCerts {
+		// Validate that this leaf certificate has a CN that matches the gun
+		if !MatchCNToGun(cert.Subject.CommonName, gun) {
+			logrus.Debugf("error leaf certificate CN: %s doesn't match the given GUN: %s",
+				cert.Subject.CommonName, gun)
+			continue
+		}
+		// Make sure the certificate is not expired if checkExpiry is true
+		// and warn if it hasn't expired yet but is within 6 months of expiry
+		if err := utils.ValidateCertificate(cert, checkExpiry); err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("%s is invalid: %s", id, err.Error())
+			continue
+		}
+
+		validLeafCerts[id] = cert
+	}
+
+	if len(validLeafCerts) < 1 {
+		logrus.Debugf("didn't find any valid leaf certificates for %s", gun)
+		return nil, errors.New("no valid leaf certificates found in any of the root keys")
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("found %d valid leaf certificates for %s: %s", len(validLeafCerts), gun,
+		prettyFormatCertIDs(validLeafCerts))
+	return validLeafCerts, nil
+}
+
+// validRootIntCerts filters the passed in structure of intermediate certificates to only include non-expired, non-sha1 certificates
+// Note that this "validity" alone does not imply any measure of trust.
+func validRootIntCerts(allIntCerts map[string][]*x509.Certificate) map[string][]*x509.Certificate {
+	validIntCerts := make(map[string][]*x509.Certificate)
+
+	// Go through every leaf cert ID, and build its valid intermediate certificate list
+	for leafID, intCertList := range allIntCerts {
+		for _, intCert := range intCertList {
+			if err := utils.ValidateCertificate(intCert, true); err != nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			validIntCerts[leafID] = append(validIntCerts[leafID], intCert)
+		}
+
+	}
+	return validIntCerts
+}
+
+// parseAllCerts returns two maps, one with all of the leafCertificates and one
+// with all the intermediate certificates found in signedRoot
+func parseAllCerts(signedRoot *data.SignedRoot) (map[string]*x509.Certificate, map[string][]*x509.Certificate) {
+	if signedRoot == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	leafCerts := make(map[string]*x509.Certificate)
+	intCerts := make(map[string][]*x509.Certificate)
+
+	// Before we loop through all root keys available, make sure any exist
+	rootRoles, ok := signedRoot.Signed.Roles[data.CanonicalRootRole]
+	if !ok {
+		logrus.Debugf("tried to parse certificates from invalid root signed data")
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("found the following root keys: %v", rootRoles.KeyIDs)
+	// Iterate over every keyID for the root role inside of roots.json
+	for _, keyID := range rootRoles.KeyIDs {
+		// check that the key exists in the signed root keys map
+		key, ok := signedRoot.Signed.Keys[keyID]
+		if !ok {
+			logrus.Debugf("error while getting data for keyID: %s", keyID)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Decode all the x509 certificates that were bundled with this
+		// Specific root key
+		decodedCerts, err := utils.LoadCertBundleFromPEM(key.Public())
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("error while parsing root certificate with keyID: %s, %v", keyID, err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Get all non-CA certificates in the decoded certificates
+		leafCertList := utils.GetLeafCerts(decodedCerts)
+
+		// If we got no leaf certificates or we got more than one, fail
+		if len(leafCertList) != 1 {
+			logrus.Debugf("invalid chain due to leaf certificate missing or too many leaf certificates for keyID: %s", keyID)
+			continue
+		}
+		// If we found a leaf certificate, assert that the cert bundle started with a leaf
+		if decodedCerts[0].IsCA {
+			logrus.Debugf("invalid chain due to leaf certificate not being first certificate for keyID: %s", keyID)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Get the ID of the leaf certificate
+		leafCert := leafCertList[0]
+
+		// Store the leaf cert in the map
+		leafCerts[key.ID()] = leafCert
+
+		// Get all the remainder certificates marked as a CA to be used as intermediates
+		intermediateCerts := utils.GetIntermediateCerts(decodedCerts)
+		intCerts[key.ID()] = intermediateCerts
+	}
+
+	return leafCerts, intCerts
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustpinning/trustpin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+package trustpinning
+
+import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// TrustPinConfig represents the configuration under the trust_pinning section of the config file
+// This struct represents the preferred way to bootstrap trust for this repository
+// This is fully optional. If left at the default, uninitialized value Notary will use TOFU over
+// HTTPS.
+// You can use this to provide certificates or a CA to pin to as a root of trust for a GUN.
+// These are used with the following precedence:
+//
+// 1. Certs
+// 2. CA
+// 3. TOFUS (TOFU over HTTPS)
+//
+// Only one trust pinning option will be used to validate a particular GUN.
+type TrustPinConfig struct {
+	// CA maps a GUN prefix to file paths containing the root CA.
+	// This file can contain multiple root certificates, bundled in separate PEM blocks.
+	CA map[string]string
+	// Certs maps a GUN to a list of certificate IDs
+	Certs map[string][]string
+	// DisableTOFU, when true, disables "Trust On First Use" of new key data
+	// This is false by default, which means new key data will always be trusted the first time it is seen.
+	DisableTOFU bool
+}
+
+type trustPinChecker struct {
+	gun           data.GUN
+	config        TrustPinConfig
+	pinnedCAPool  *x509.CertPool
+	pinnedCertIDs []string
+}
+
+// CertChecker is a function type that will be used to check leaf certs against pinned trust
+type CertChecker func(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool
+
+// NewTrustPinChecker returns a new certChecker function from a TrustPinConfig for a GUN
+func NewTrustPinChecker(trustPinConfig TrustPinConfig, gun data.GUN, firstBootstrap bool) (CertChecker, error) {
+	t := trustPinChecker{gun: gun, config: trustPinConfig}
+	// Determine the mode, and if it's even valid
+	if pinnedCerts, ok := trustPinConfig.Certs[gun.String()]; ok {
+		logrus.Debugf("trust-pinning using Cert IDs")
+		t.pinnedCertIDs = pinnedCerts
+		return t.certsCheck, nil
+	}
+	var ok bool
+	t.pinnedCertIDs, ok = wildcardMatch(gun, trustPinConfig.Certs)
+	if ok {
+		return t.certsCheck, nil
+	}
+
+	if caFilepath, err := getPinnedCAFilepathByPrefix(gun, trustPinConfig); err == nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("trust-pinning using root CA bundle at: %s", caFilepath)
+
+		// Try to add the CA certs from its bundle file to our certificate store,
+		// and use it to validate certs in the root.json later
+		caCerts, err := utils.LoadCertBundleFromFile(caFilepath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not load root cert from CA path")
+		}
+		// Now only consider certificates that are direct children from this CA cert chain
+		caRootPool := x509.NewCertPool()
+		for _, caCert := range caCerts {
+			if err = utils.ValidateCertificate(caCert, true); err != nil {
+				logrus.Debugf("ignoring root CA certificate with CN %s in bundle: %s", caCert.Subject.CommonName, err)
+				continue
+			}
+			caRootPool.AddCert(caCert)
+		}
+		// If we didn't have any valid CA certs, error out
+		if len(caRootPool.Subjects()) == 0 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CA certs provided")
+		}
+		t.pinnedCAPool = caRootPool
+		return t.caCheck, nil
+	}
+
+	// If TOFUs is disabled and we don't have any previous trusted root data for this GUN, we error out
+	if trustPinConfig.DisableTOFU && firstBootstrap {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid trust pinning specified")
+
+	}
+	return t.tofusCheck, nil
+}
+
+func (t trustPinChecker) certsCheck(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool {
+	// reconstruct the leaf + intermediate cert chain, which is bundled as {leaf, intermediates...},
+	// in order to get the matching id in the root file
+	key, err := utils.CertBundleToKey(leafCert, intCerts)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debug("error creating cert bundle: ", err.Error())
+		return false
+	}
+	return utils.StrSliceContains(t.pinnedCertIDs, key.ID())
+}
+
+func (t trustPinChecker) caCheck(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool {
+	// Use intermediate certificates included in the root TUF metadata for our validation
+	caIntPool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	for _, intCert := range intCerts {
+		caIntPool.AddCert(intCert)
+	}
+	// Attempt to find a valid certificate chain from the leaf cert to CA root
+	// Use this certificate if such a valid chain exists (possibly using intermediates)
+	var err error
+	if _, err = leafCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: t.pinnedCAPool, Intermediates: caIntPool}); err == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("unable to find a valid certificate chain from leaf cert to CA root: %s", err)
+	return false
+}
+
+func (t trustPinChecker) tofusCheck(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// Will return the CA filepath corresponding to the most specific (longest) entry in the map that is still a prefix
+// of the provided gun.  Returns an error if no entry matches this GUN as a prefix.
+func getPinnedCAFilepathByPrefix(gun data.GUN, t TrustPinConfig) (string, error) {
+	specificGUN := ""
+	specificCAFilepath := ""
+	foundCA := false
+	for gunPrefix, caFilepath := range t.CA {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(gun.String(), gunPrefix) && len(gunPrefix) >= len(specificGUN) {
+			specificGUN = gunPrefix
+			specificCAFilepath = caFilepath
+			foundCA = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !foundCA {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("could not find pinned CA for GUN: %s", gun)
+	}
+	return specificCAFilepath, nil
+}
+
+// wildcardMatch will attempt to match the most specific (longest prefix) wildcarded
+// trustpinning option for key IDs. Given the simple globbing and the use of maps,
+// it is impossible to have two different prefixes of equal length.
+// This logic also solves the issue of Go's randomization of map iteration.
+func wildcardMatch(gun data.GUN, certs map[string][]string) ([]string, bool) {
+	var (
+		longest = ""
+		ids     []string
+	)
+	for gunPrefix, keyIDs := range certs {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(gunPrefix, "*") {
+			if strings.HasPrefix(gun.String(), gunPrefix[:len(gunPrefix)-1]) && len(gunPrefix) > len(longest) {
+				longest = gunPrefix
+				ids = keyIDs
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return ids, ids != nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+Copyright (c) 2015, Docker Inc.
+Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Prime Directive, Inc.
+
+All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+met:
+
+   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
+in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+distribution.
+   * Neither the name of Prime Directive, Inc. nor the names of its
+contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+## Credits
+
+This implementation was originally forked from [flynn/go-tuf](https://github.com/flynn/go-tuf)
+
+This implementation retains the same 3 Clause BSD license present on 
+the original flynn implementation.

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/builder.go

@@ -0,0 +1,732 @@
+package tuf
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustpinning"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// ErrBuildDone is returned when any functions are called on RepoBuilder, and it
+// is already finished building
+var ErrBuildDone = fmt.Errorf(
+	"the builder has finished building and cannot accept any more input or produce any more output")
+
+// ErrInvalidBuilderInput is returned when RepoBuilder.Load is called
+// with the wrong type of metadata for the state that it's in
+type ErrInvalidBuilderInput struct{ msg string }
+
+func (e ErrInvalidBuilderInput) Error() string {
+	return e.msg
+}
+
+// ConsistentInfo is the consistent name and size of a role, or just the name
+// of the role and a -1 if no file metadata for the role is known
+type ConsistentInfo struct {
+	RoleName data.RoleName
+	fileMeta data.FileMeta
+}
+
+// ChecksumKnown determines whether or not we know enough to provide a size and
+// consistent name
+func (c ConsistentInfo) ChecksumKnown() bool {
+	// empty hash, no size : this is the zero value
+	return len(c.fileMeta.Hashes) > 0 || c.fileMeta.Length != 0
+}
+
+// ConsistentName returns the consistent name (rolename.sha256) for the role
+// given this consistent information
+func (c ConsistentInfo) ConsistentName() string {
+	return utils.ConsistentName(c.RoleName.String(), c.fileMeta.Hashes[notary.SHA256])
+}
+
+// Length returns the expected length of the role as per this consistent
+// information - if no checksum information is known, the size is -1.
+func (c ConsistentInfo) Length() int64 {
+	if c.ChecksumKnown() {
+		return c.fileMeta.Length
+	}
+	return -1
+}
+
+// RepoBuilder is an interface for an object which builds a tuf.Repo
+type RepoBuilder interface {
+	Load(roleName data.RoleName, content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error
+	LoadRootForUpdate(content []byte, minVersion int, isFinal bool) error
+	GenerateSnapshot(prev *data.SignedSnapshot) ([]byte, int, error)
+	GenerateTimestamp(prev *data.SignedTimestamp) ([]byte, int, error)
+	Finish() (*Repo, *Repo, error)
+	BootstrapNewBuilder() RepoBuilder
+	BootstrapNewBuilderWithNewTrustpin(trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig) RepoBuilder
+
+	// informative functions
+	IsLoaded(roleName data.RoleName) bool
+	GetLoadedVersion(roleName data.RoleName) int
+	GetConsistentInfo(roleName data.RoleName) ConsistentInfo
+}
+
+// finishedBuilder refuses any more input or output
+type finishedBuilder struct{}
+
+func (f finishedBuilder) Load(roleName data.RoleName, content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	return ErrBuildDone
+}
+func (f finishedBuilder) LoadRootForUpdate(content []byte, minVersion int, isFinal bool) error {
+	return ErrBuildDone
+}
+func (f finishedBuilder) GenerateSnapshot(prev *data.SignedSnapshot) ([]byte, int, error) {
+	return nil, 0, ErrBuildDone
+}
+func (f finishedBuilder) GenerateTimestamp(prev *data.SignedTimestamp) ([]byte, int, error) {
+	return nil, 0, ErrBuildDone
+}
+func (f finishedBuilder) Finish() (*Repo, *Repo, error)    { return nil, nil, ErrBuildDone }
+func (f finishedBuilder) BootstrapNewBuilder() RepoBuilder { return f }
+func (f finishedBuilder) BootstrapNewBuilderWithNewTrustpin(trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig) RepoBuilder {
+	return f
+}
+func (f finishedBuilder) IsLoaded(roleName data.RoleName) bool        { return false }
+func (f finishedBuilder) GetLoadedVersion(roleName data.RoleName) int { return 0 }
+func (f finishedBuilder) GetConsistentInfo(roleName data.RoleName) ConsistentInfo {
+	return ConsistentInfo{RoleName: roleName}
+}
+
+// NewRepoBuilder is the only way to get a pre-built RepoBuilder
+func NewRepoBuilder(gun data.GUN, cs signed.CryptoService, trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig) RepoBuilder {
+	return NewBuilderFromRepo(gun, NewRepo(cs), trustpin)
+}
+
+// NewBuilderFromRepo allows us to bootstrap a builder given existing repo data.
+// YOU PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE USING THIS OUTSIDE OF TESTING CODE!!!
+func NewBuilderFromRepo(gun data.GUN, repo *Repo, trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig) RepoBuilder {
+	return &repoBuilderWrapper{
+		RepoBuilder: &repoBuilder{
+			repo:                 repo,
+			invalidRoles:         NewRepo(nil),
+			gun:                  gun,
+			trustpin:             trustpin,
+			loadedNotChecksummed: make(map[data.RoleName][]byte),
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// repoBuilderWrapper embeds a repoBuilder, but once Finish is called, swaps
+// the embed out with a finishedBuilder
+type repoBuilderWrapper struct {
+	RepoBuilder
+}
+
+func (rbw *repoBuilderWrapper) Finish() (*Repo, *Repo, error) {
+	switch rbw.RepoBuilder.(type) {
+	case finishedBuilder:
+		return rbw.RepoBuilder.Finish()
+	default:
+		old := rbw.RepoBuilder
+		rbw.RepoBuilder = finishedBuilder{}
+		return old.Finish()
+	}
+}
+
+// repoBuilder actually builds a tuf.Repo
+type repoBuilder struct {
+	repo         *Repo
+	invalidRoles *Repo
+
+	// needed for root trust pininng verification
+	gun      data.GUN
+	trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig
+
+	// in case we load root and/or targets before snapshot and timestamp (
+	// or snapshot and not timestamp), so we know what to verify when the
+	// data with checksums come in
+	loadedNotChecksummed map[data.RoleName][]byte
+
+	// bootstrapped values to validate a new root
+	prevRoot                 *data.SignedRoot
+	bootstrappedRootChecksum *data.FileMeta
+
+	// for bootstrapping the next builder
+	nextRootChecksum *data.FileMeta
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) Finish() (*Repo, *Repo, error) {
+	return rb.repo, rb.invalidRoles, nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) BootstrapNewBuilder() RepoBuilder {
+	return &repoBuilderWrapper{RepoBuilder: &repoBuilder{
+		repo:                 NewRepo(rb.repo.cryptoService),
+		invalidRoles:         NewRepo(nil),
+		gun:                  rb.gun,
+		loadedNotChecksummed: make(map[data.RoleName][]byte),
+		trustpin:             rb.trustpin,
+
+		prevRoot:                 rb.repo.Root,
+		bootstrappedRootChecksum: rb.nextRootChecksum,
+	}}
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) BootstrapNewBuilderWithNewTrustpin(trustpin trustpinning.TrustPinConfig) RepoBuilder {
+	return &repoBuilderWrapper{RepoBuilder: &repoBuilder{
+		repo:                 NewRepo(rb.repo.cryptoService),
+		gun:                  rb.gun,
+		loadedNotChecksummed: make(map[data.RoleName][]byte),
+		trustpin:             trustpin,
+
+		prevRoot:                 rb.repo.Root,
+		bootstrappedRootChecksum: rb.nextRootChecksum,
+	}}
+}
+
+// IsLoaded returns whether a particular role has already been loaded
+func (rb *repoBuilder) IsLoaded(roleName data.RoleName) bool {
+	switch roleName {
+	case data.CanonicalRootRole:
+		return rb.repo.Root != nil
+	case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
+		return rb.repo.Snapshot != nil
+	case data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
+		return rb.repo.Timestamp != nil
+	default:
+		return rb.repo.Targets[roleName] != nil
+	}
+}
+
+// GetLoadedVersion returns the metadata version, if it is loaded, or 1 (the
+// minimum valid version number) otherwise
+func (rb *repoBuilder) GetLoadedVersion(roleName data.RoleName) int {
+	switch {
+	case roleName == data.CanonicalRootRole && rb.repo.Root != nil:
+		return rb.repo.Root.Signed.Version
+	case roleName == data.CanonicalSnapshotRole && rb.repo.Snapshot != nil:
+		return rb.repo.Snapshot.Signed.Version
+	case roleName == data.CanonicalTimestampRole && rb.repo.Timestamp != nil:
+		return rb.repo.Timestamp.Signed.Version
+	default:
+		if tgts, ok := rb.repo.Targets[roleName]; ok {
+			return tgts.Signed.Version
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 1
+}
+
+// GetConsistentInfo returns the consistent name and size of a role, if it is known,
+// otherwise just the rolename and a -1 for size (both of which are inside a
+// ConsistentInfo object)
+func (rb *repoBuilder) GetConsistentInfo(roleName data.RoleName) ConsistentInfo {
+	info := ConsistentInfo{RoleName: roleName} // starts out with unknown filemeta
+	switch roleName {
+	case data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
+		// we do not want to get a consistent timestamp, but we do want to
+		// limit its size
+		info.fileMeta.Length = notary.MaxTimestampSize
+	case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
+		if rb.repo.Timestamp != nil {
+			info.fileMeta = rb.repo.Timestamp.Signed.Meta[roleName.String()]
+		}
+	case data.CanonicalRootRole:
+		switch {
+		case rb.bootstrappedRootChecksum != nil:
+			info.fileMeta = *rb.bootstrappedRootChecksum
+		case rb.repo.Snapshot != nil:
+			info.fileMeta = rb.repo.Snapshot.Signed.Meta[roleName.String()]
+		}
+	default:
+		if rb.repo.Snapshot != nil {
+			info.fileMeta = rb.repo.Snapshot.Signed.Meta[roleName.String()]
+		}
+	}
+	return info
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) Load(roleName data.RoleName, content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	return rb.loadOptions(roleName, content, minVersion, allowExpired, false, false)
+}
+
+// LoadRootForUpdate adds additional flags for updating the root.json file
+func (rb *repoBuilder) LoadRootForUpdate(content []byte, minVersion int, isFinal bool) error {
+	if err := rb.loadOptions(data.CanonicalRootRole, content, minVersion, !isFinal, !isFinal, true); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !isFinal {
+		rb.prevRoot = rb.repo.Root
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// loadOptions adds additional flags that should only be used for updating the root.json
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadOptions(roleName data.RoleName, content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired, skipChecksum, allowLoaded bool) error {
+	if !data.ValidRole(roleName) {
+		return ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s is an invalid role", roleName)}
+	}
+
+	if !allowLoaded && rb.IsLoaded(roleName) {
+		return ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s has already been loaded", roleName)}
+	}
+
+	var err error
+	switch roleName {
+	case data.CanonicalRootRole:
+		break
+	case data.CanonicalTimestampRole, data.CanonicalSnapshotRole, data.CanonicalTargetsRole:
+		err = rb.checkPrereqsLoaded([]data.RoleName{data.CanonicalRootRole})
+	default: // delegations
+		err = rb.checkPrereqsLoaded([]data.RoleName{data.CanonicalRootRole, data.CanonicalTargetsRole})
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	switch roleName {
+	case data.CanonicalRootRole:
+		return rb.loadRoot(content, minVersion, allowExpired, skipChecksum)
+	case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
+		return rb.loadSnapshot(content, minVersion, allowExpired)
+	case data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
+		return rb.loadTimestamp(content, minVersion, allowExpired)
+	case data.CanonicalTargetsRole:
+		return rb.loadTargets(content, minVersion, allowExpired)
+	default:
+		return rb.loadDelegation(roleName, content, minVersion, allowExpired)
+	}
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) checkPrereqsLoaded(prereqRoles []data.RoleName) error {
+	for _, req := range prereqRoles {
+		if !rb.IsLoaded(req) {
+			return ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: fmt.Sprintf("%s must be loaded first", req)}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateSnapshot generates a new snapshot given a previous (optional) snapshot
+// We can't just load the previous snapshot, because it may have been signed by a different
+// snapshot key (maybe from a previous root version).  Note that we need the root role and
+// targets role to be loaded, because we need to generate metadata for both (and we need
+// the root to be loaded so we can get the snapshot role to sign with)
+func (rb *repoBuilder) GenerateSnapshot(prev *data.SignedSnapshot) ([]byte, int, error) {
+	switch {
+	case rb.repo.cryptoService == nil:
+		return nil, 0, ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: "cannot generate snapshot without a cryptoservice"}
+	case rb.IsLoaded(data.CanonicalSnapshotRole):
+		return nil, 0, ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: "snapshot has already been loaded"}
+	case rb.IsLoaded(data.CanonicalTimestampRole):
+		return nil, 0, ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: "cannot generate snapshot if timestamp has already been loaded"}
+	}
+
+	if err := rb.checkPrereqsLoaded([]data.RoleName{data.CanonicalRootRole}); err != nil {
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	// If there is no previous snapshot, we need to generate one, and so the targets must
+	// have already been loaded.  Otherwise, so long as the previous snapshot structure is
+	// valid (it has a targets meta), we're good.
+	switch prev {
+	case nil:
+		if err := rb.checkPrereqsLoaded([]data.RoleName{data.CanonicalTargetsRole}); err != nil {
+			return nil, 0, err
+		}
+
+		if err := rb.repo.InitSnapshot(); err != nil {
+			rb.repo.Snapshot = nil
+			return nil, 0, err
+		}
+	default:
+		if err := data.IsValidSnapshotStructure(prev.Signed); err != nil {
+			return nil, 0, err
+		}
+		rb.repo.Snapshot = prev
+	}
+
+	sgnd, err := rb.repo.SignSnapshot(data.DefaultExpires(data.CanonicalSnapshotRole))
+	if err != nil {
+		rb.repo.Snapshot = nil
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	sgndJSON, err := json.Marshal(sgnd)
+	if err != nil {
+		rb.repo.Snapshot = nil
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	// loadedNotChecksummed should currently contain the root awaiting checksumming,
+	// since it has to have been loaded.  Since the snapshot was generated using
+	// the root and targets data (there may not be any) that that have been loaded,
+	// remove all of them from rb.loadedNotChecksummed
+	for tgtName := range rb.repo.Targets {
+		delete(rb.loadedNotChecksummed, data.RoleName(tgtName))
+	}
+	delete(rb.loadedNotChecksummed, data.CanonicalRootRole)
+
+	// The timestamp can't have been loaded yet, so we want to cache the snapshot
+	// bytes so we can validate the checksum when a timestamp gets generated or
+	// loaded later.
+	rb.loadedNotChecksummed[data.CanonicalSnapshotRole] = sgndJSON
+
+	return sgndJSON, rb.repo.Snapshot.Signed.Version, nil
+}
+
+// GenerateTimestamp generates a new timestamp given a previous (optional) timestamp
+// We can't just load the previous timestamp, because it may have been signed by a different
+// timestamp key (maybe from a previous root version)
+func (rb *repoBuilder) GenerateTimestamp(prev *data.SignedTimestamp) ([]byte, int, error) {
+	switch {
+	case rb.repo.cryptoService == nil:
+		return nil, 0, ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: "cannot generate timestamp without a cryptoservice"}
+	case rb.IsLoaded(data.CanonicalTimestampRole):
+		return nil, 0, ErrInvalidBuilderInput{msg: "timestamp has already been loaded"}
+	}
+
+	// SignTimestamp always serializes the loaded snapshot and signs in the data, so we must always
+	// have the snapshot loaded first
+	if err := rb.checkPrereqsLoaded([]data.RoleName{data.CanonicalRootRole, data.CanonicalSnapshotRole}); err != nil {
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	switch prev {
+	case nil:
+		if err := rb.repo.InitTimestamp(); err != nil {
+			rb.repo.Timestamp = nil
+			return nil, 0, err
+		}
+	default:
+		if err := data.IsValidTimestampStructure(prev.Signed); err != nil {
+			return nil, 0, err
+		}
+		rb.repo.Timestamp = prev
+	}
+
+	sgnd, err := rb.repo.SignTimestamp(data.DefaultExpires(data.CanonicalTimestampRole))
+	if err != nil {
+		rb.repo.Timestamp = nil
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	sgndJSON, err := json.Marshal(sgnd)
+	if err != nil {
+		rb.repo.Timestamp = nil
+		return nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	// The snapshot should have been loaded (and not checksummed, since a timestamp
+	// cannot have been loaded), so it is awaiting checksumming. Since this
+	// timestamp was generated using the snapshot awaiting checksumming, we can
+	// remove it from rb.loadedNotChecksummed. There should be no other items
+	// awaiting checksumming now since loading/generating a snapshot should have
+	// cleared out everything else in `loadNotChecksummed`.
+	delete(rb.loadedNotChecksummed, data.CanonicalSnapshotRole)
+
+	return sgndJSON, rb.repo.Timestamp.Signed.Version, nil
+}
+
+// loadRoot loads a root if one has not been loaded
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadRoot(content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired, skipChecksum bool) error {
+	roleName := data.CanonicalRootRole
+
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSigned(content, data.CanonicalRootRole, skipChecksum)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// ValidateRoot validates against the previous root's role, as well as validates that the root
+	// itself is self-consistent with its own signatures and thresholds.
+	// This assumes that ValidateRoot calls data.RootFromSigned, which validates
+	// the metadata, rather than just unmarshalling signedObject into a SignedRoot object itself.
+	signedRoot, err := trustpinning.ValidateRoot(rb.prevRoot, signedObj, rb.gun, rb.trustpin)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := signed.VerifyVersion(&(signedRoot.Signed.SignedCommon), minVersion); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !allowExpired { // check must go at the end because all other validation should pass
+		if err := signed.VerifyExpiry(&(signedRoot.Signed.SignedCommon), roleName); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	rootRole, err := signedRoot.BuildBaseRole(data.CanonicalRootRole)
+	if err != nil { // this should never happen since the root has been validated
+		return err
+	}
+	rb.repo.Root = signedRoot
+	rb.repo.originalRootRole = rootRole
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadTimestamp(content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	roleName := data.CanonicalTimestampRole
+
+	timestampRole, err := rb.repo.Root.BuildBaseRole(roleName)
+	if err != nil { // this should never happen, since it's already been validated
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSignedAndValidateSigs(timestampRole, content)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedTimestamp, err := data.TimestampFromSigned(signedObj)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := signed.VerifyVersion(&(signedTimestamp.Signed.SignedCommon), minVersion); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !allowExpired { // check must go at the end because all other validation should pass
+		if err := signed.VerifyExpiry(&(signedTimestamp.Signed.SignedCommon), roleName); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err := rb.validateChecksumsFromTimestamp(signedTimestamp); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	rb.repo.Timestamp = signedTimestamp
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadSnapshot(content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	roleName := data.CanonicalSnapshotRole
+
+	snapshotRole, err := rb.repo.Root.BuildBaseRole(roleName)
+	if err != nil { // this should never happen, since it's already been validated
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSignedAndValidateSigs(snapshotRole, content)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedSnapshot, err := data.SnapshotFromSigned(signedObj)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := signed.VerifyVersion(&(signedSnapshot.Signed.SignedCommon), minVersion); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !allowExpired { // check must go at the end because all other validation should pass
+		if err := signed.VerifyExpiry(&(signedSnapshot.Signed.SignedCommon), roleName); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// at this point, the only thing left to validate is existing checksums - we can use
+	// this snapshot to bootstrap the next builder if needed - and we don't need to do
+	// the 2-value assignment since we've already validated the signedSnapshot, which MUST
+	// have root metadata
+	rootMeta := signedSnapshot.Signed.Meta[data.CanonicalRootRole.String()]
+	rb.nextRootChecksum = &rootMeta
+
+	if err := rb.validateChecksumsFromSnapshot(signedSnapshot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	rb.repo.Snapshot = signedSnapshot
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadTargets(content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	roleName := data.CanonicalTargetsRole
+
+	targetsRole, err := rb.repo.Root.BuildBaseRole(roleName)
+	if err != nil { // this should never happen, since it's already been validated
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSignedAndValidateSigs(targetsRole, content)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedTargets, err := data.TargetsFromSigned(signedObj, roleName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := signed.VerifyVersion(&(signedTargets.Signed.SignedCommon), minVersion); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !allowExpired { // check must go at the end because all other validation should pass
+		if err := signed.VerifyExpiry(&(signedTargets.Signed.SignedCommon), roleName); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	signedTargets.Signatures = signedObj.Signatures
+	rb.repo.Targets[roleName] = signedTargets
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) loadDelegation(roleName data.RoleName, content []byte, minVersion int, allowExpired bool) error {
+	delegationRole, err := rb.repo.GetDelegationRole(roleName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// bytesToSigned checks checksum
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSigned(content, roleName, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	signedTargets, err := data.TargetsFromSigned(signedObj, roleName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := signed.VerifyVersion(&(signedTargets.Signed.SignedCommon), minVersion); err != nil {
+		// don't capture in invalidRoles because the role we received is a rollback
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// verify signature
+	if err := signed.VerifySignatures(signedObj, delegationRole.BaseRole); err != nil {
+		rb.invalidRoles.Targets[roleName] = signedTargets
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !allowExpired { // check must go at the end because all other validation should pass
+		if err := signed.VerifyExpiry(&(signedTargets.Signed.SignedCommon), roleName); err != nil {
+			rb.invalidRoles.Targets[roleName] = signedTargets
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	signedTargets.Signatures = signedObj.Signatures
+	rb.repo.Targets[roleName] = signedTargets
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) validateChecksumsFromTimestamp(ts *data.SignedTimestamp) error {
+	sn, ok := rb.loadedNotChecksummed[data.CanonicalSnapshotRole]
+	if ok {
+		// by this point, the SignedTimestamp has been validated so it must have a snapshot hash
+		snMeta := ts.Signed.Meta[data.CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()].Hashes
+		if err := data.CheckHashes(sn, data.CanonicalSnapshotRole.String(), snMeta); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		delete(rb.loadedNotChecksummed, data.CanonicalSnapshotRole)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) validateChecksumsFromSnapshot(sn *data.SignedSnapshot) error {
+	var goodRoles []data.RoleName
+	for roleName, loadedBytes := range rb.loadedNotChecksummed {
+		switch roleName {
+		case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole, data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
+			break
+		default:
+			if err := data.CheckHashes(loadedBytes, roleName.String(), sn.Signed.Meta[roleName.String()].Hashes); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			goodRoles = append(goodRoles, roleName)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, roleName := range goodRoles {
+		delete(rb.loadedNotChecksummed, roleName)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) validateChecksumFor(content []byte, roleName data.RoleName) error {
+	// validate the bootstrap checksum for root, if provided
+	if roleName == data.CanonicalRootRole && rb.bootstrappedRootChecksum != nil {
+		if err := data.CheckHashes(content, roleName.String(), rb.bootstrappedRootChecksum.Hashes); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// but we also want to cache the root content, so that when the snapshot is
+	// loaded it is validated (to make sure everything in the repo is self-consistent)
+	checksums := rb.getChecksumsFor(roleName)
+	if checksums != nil { // as opposed to empty, in which case hash check should fail
+		if err := data.CheckHashes(content, roleName.String(), *checksums); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else if roleName != data.CanonicalTimestampRole {
+		// timestamp is the only role which does not need to be checksummed, but
+		// for everything else, cache the contents in the list of roles that have
+		// not been checksummed by the snapshot/timestamp yet
+		rb.loadedNotChecksummed[roleName] = content
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Checksums the given bytes, and if they validate, convert to a data.Signed object.
+// If a checksums are nil (as opposed to empty), adds the bytes to the list of roles that
+// haven't been checksummed (unless it's a timestamp, which has no checksum reference).
+func (rb *repoBuilder) bytesToSigned(content []byte, roleName data.RoleName, skipChecksum bool) (*data.Signed, error) {
+	if !skipChecksum {
+		if err := rb.validateChecksumFor(content, roleName); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// unmarshal to signed
+	signedObj := &data.Signed{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(content, signedObj); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return signedObj, nil
+}
+
+func (rb *repoBuilder) bytesToSignedAndValidateSigs(role data.BaseRole, content []byte) (*data.Signed, error) {
+
+	signedObj, err := rb.bytesToSigned(content, role.Name, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// verify signature
+	if err := signed.VerifySignatures(signedObj, role); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return signedObj, nil
+}
+
+// If the checksum reference (the loaded timestamp for the snapshot role, and
+// the loaded snapshot for every other role except timestamp and snapshot) is nil,
+// then return nil for the checksums, meaning that the checksum is not yet
+// available.  If the checksum reference *is* loaded, then always returns the
+// Hashes object for the given role - if it doesn't exist, returns an empty Hash
+// object (against which any checksum validation would fail).
+func (rb *repoBuilder) getChecksumsFor(role data.RoleName) *data.Hashes {
+	var hashes data.Hashes
+	switch role {
+	case data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
+		return nil
+	case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
+		if rb.repo.Timestamp == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		hashes = rb.repo.Timestamp.Signed.Meta[data.CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()].Hashes
+	default:
+		if rb.repo.Snapshot == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		hashes = rb.repo.Snapshot.Signed.Meta[role.String()].Hashes
+	}
+	return &hashes
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+package data
+
+import "fmt"
+
+// ErrInvalidMetadata is the error to be returned when metadata is invalid
+type ErrInvalidMetadata struct {
+	role RoleName
+	msg  string
+}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidMetadata) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s type metadata invalid: %s", e.role.String(), e.msg)
+}
+
+// ErrMissingMeta - couldn't find the FileMeta object for the given Role, or
+// the FileMeta object contained no supported checksums
+type ErrMissingMeta struct {
+	Role string
+}
+
+func (e ErrMissingMeta) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("no checksums for supported algorithms were provided for %s", e.Role)
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidChecksum is the error to be returned when checksum is invalid
+type ErrInvalidChecksum struct {
+	alg string
+}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidChecksum) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s checksum invalid", e.alg)
+}
+
+// ErrMismatchedChecksum is the error to be returned when checksum is mismatched
+type ErrMismatchedChecksum struct {
+	alg      string
+	name     string
+	expected string
+}
+
+func (e ErrMismatchedChecksum) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s checksum for %s did not match: expected %s", e.alg, e.name,
+		e.expected)
+}
+
+// ErrCertExpired is the error to be returned when a certificate has expired
+type ErrCertExpired struct {
+	CN string
+}
+
+func (e ErrCertExpired) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("certificate with CN %s is expired", e.CN)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/keys.go

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/agl/ed25519"
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// PublicKey is the necessary interface for public keys
+type PublicKey interface {
+	ID() string
+	Algorithm() string
+	Public() []byte
+}
+
+// PrivateKey adds the ability to access the private key
+type PrivateKey interface {
+	PublicKey
+	Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error)
+	Private() []byte
+	CryptoSigner() crypto.Signer
+	SignatureAlgorithm() SigAlgorithm
+}
+
+// KeyPair holds the public and private key bytes
+type KeyPair struct {
+	Public  []byte `json:"public"`
+	Private []byte `json:"private"`
+}
+
+// Keys represents a map of key ID to PublicKey object. It's necessary
+// to allow us to unmarshal into an interface via the json.Unmarshaller
+// interface
+type Keys map[string]PublicKey
+
+// UnmarshalJSON implements the json.Unmarshaller interface
+func (ks *Keys) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
+	parsed := make(map[string]TUFKey)
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	final := make(map[string]PublicKey)
+	for k, tk := range parsed {
+		final[k] = typedPublicKey(tk)
+	}
+	*ks = final
+	return nil
+}
+
+// KeyList represents a list of keys
+type KeyList []PublicKey
+
+// UnmarshalJSON implements the json.Unmarshaller interface
+func (ks *KeyList) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
+	parsed := make([]TUFKey, 0, 1)
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	final := make([]PublicKey, 0, len(parsed))
+	for _, tk := range parsed {
+		final = append(final, typedPublicKey(tk))
+	}
+	*ks = final
+	return nil
+}
+
+// IDs generates a list of the hex encoded key IDs in the KeyList
+func (ks KeyList) IDs() []string {
+	keyIDs := make([]string, 0, len(ks))
+	for _, k := range ks {
+		keyIDs = append(keyIDs, k.ID())
+	}
+	return keyIDs
+}
+
+func typedPublicKey(tk TUFKey) PublicKey {
+	switch tk.Algorithm() {
+	case ECDSAKey:
+		return &ECDSAPublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+	case ECDSAx509Key:
+		return &ECDSAx509PublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+	case RSAKey:
+		return &RSAPublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+	case RSAx509Key:
+		return &RSAx509PublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+	case ED25519Key:
+		return &ED25519PublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+	}
+	return &UnknownPublicKey{TUFKey: tk}
+}
+
+func typedPrivateKey(tk TUFKey) (PrivateKey, error) {
+	private := tk.Value.Private
+	tk.Value.Private = nil
+	switch tk.Algorithm() {
+	case ECDSAKey:
+		return NewECDSAPrivateKey(
+			&ECDSAPublicKey{
+				TUFKey: tk,
+			},
+			private,
+		)
+	case ECDSAx509Key:
+		return NewECDSAPrivateKey(
+			&ECDSAx509PublicKey{
+				TUFKey: tk,
+			},
+			private,
+		)
+	case RSAKey:
+		return NewRSAPrivateKey(
+			&RSAPublicKey{
+				TUFKey: tk,
+			},
+			private,
+		)
+	case RSAx509Key:
+		return NewRSAPrivateKey(
+			&RSAx509PublicKey{
+				TUFKey: tk,
+			},
+			private,
+		)
+	case ED25519Key:
+		return NewED25519PrivateKey(
+			ED25519PublicKey{
+				TUFKey: tk,
+			},
+			private,
+		)
+	}
+	return &UnknownPrivateKey{
+		TUFKey:     tk,
+		privateKey: privateKey{private: private},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewPublicKey creates a new, correctly typed PublicKey, using the
+// UnknownPublicKey catchall for unsupported ciphers
+func NewPublicKey(alg string, public []byte) PublicKey {
+	tk := TUFKey{
+		Type: alg,
+		Value: KeyPair{
+			Public: public,
+		},
+	}
+	return typedPublicKey(tk)
+}
+
+// NewPrivateKey creates a new, correctly typed PrivateKey, using the
+// UnknownPrivateKey catchall for unsupported ciphers
+func NewPrivateKey(pubKey PublicKey, private []byte) (PrivateKey, error) {
+	tk := TUFKey{
+		Type: pubKey.Algorithm(),
+		Value: KeyPair{
+			Public:  pubKey.Public(),
+			Private: private, // typedPrivateKey moves this value
+		},
+	}
+	return typedPrivateKey(tk)
+}
+
+// UnmarshalPublicKey is used to parse individual public keys in JSON
+func UnmarshalPublicKey(data []byte) (PublicKey, error) {
+	var parsed TUFKey
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return typedPublicKey(parsed), nil
+}
+
+// UnmarshalPrivateKey is used to parse individual private keys in JSON
+func UnmarshalPrivateKey(data []byte) (PrivateKey, error) {
+	var parsed TUFKey
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return typedPrivateKey(parsed)
+}
+
+// TUFKey is the structure used for both public and private keys in TUF.
+// Normally it would make sense to use a different structures for public and
+// private keys, but that would change the key ID algorithm (since the canonical
+// JSON would be different). This structure should normally be accessed through
+// the PublicKey or PrivateKey interfaces.
+type TUFKey struct {
+	id    string
+	Type  string  `json:"keytype"`
+	Value KeyPair `json:"keyval"`
+}
+
+// Algorithm returns the algorithm of the key
+func (k TUFKey) Algorithm() string {
+	return k.Type
+}
+
+// ID efficiently generates if necessary, and caches the ID of the key
+func (k *TUFKey) ID() string {
+	if k.id == "" {
+		pubK := TUFKey{
+			Type: k.Algorithm(),
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  k.Public(),
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		}
+		data, err := json.MarshalCanonical(&pubK)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Error("Error generating key ID:", err)
+		}
+		digest := sha256.Sum256(data)
+		k.id = hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+	}
+	return k.id
+}
+
+// Public returns the public bytes
+func (k TUFKey) Public() []byte {
+	return k.Value.Public
+}
+
+// Public key types
+
+// ECDSAPublicKey represents an ECDSA key using a raw serialization
+// of the public key
+type ECDSAPublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// ECDSAx509PublicKey represents an ECDSA key using an x509 cert
+// as the serialized format of the public key
+type ECDSAx509PublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// RSAPublicKey represents an RSA key using a raw serialization
+// of the public key
+type RSAPublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// RSAx509PublicKey represents an RSA key using an x509 cert
+// as the serialized format of the public key
+type RSAx509PublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// ED25519PublicKey represents an ED25519 key using a raw serialization
+// of the public key
+type ED25519PublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// UnknownPublicKey is a catchall for key types that are not supported
+type UnknownPublicKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+}
+
+// NewECDSAPublicKey initializes a new public key with the ECDSAKey type
+func NewECDSAPublicKey(public []byte) *ECDSAPublicKey {
+	return &ECDSAPublicKey{
+		TUFKey: TUFKey{
+			Type: ECDSAKey,
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  public,
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// NewECDSAx509PublicKey initializes a new public key with the ECDSAx509Key type
+func NewECDSAx509PublicKey(public []byte) *ECDSAx509PublicKey {
+	return &ECDSAx509PublicKey{
+		TUFKey: TUFKey{
+			Type: ECDSAx509Key,
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  public,
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// NewRSAPublicKey initializes a new public key with the RSA type
+func NewRSAPublicKey(public []byte) *RSAPublicKey {
+	return &RSAPublicKey{
+		TUFKey: TUFKey{
+			Type: RSAKey,
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  public,
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// NewRSAx509PublicKey initializes a new public key with the RSAx509Key type
+func NewRSAx509PublicKey(public []byte) *RSAx509PublicKey {
+	return &RSAx509PublicKey{
+		TUFKey: TUFKey{
+			Type: RSAx509Key,
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  public,
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// NewED25519PublicKey initializes a new public key with the ED25519Key type
+func NewED25519PublicKey(public []byte) *ED25519PublicKey {
+	return &ED25519PublicKey{
+		TUFKey: TUFKey{
+			Type: ED25519Key,
+			Value: KeyPair{
+				Public:  public,
+				Private: nil,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// Private key types
+type privateKey struct {
+	private []byte
+}
+
+type signer struct {
+	signer crypto.Signer
+}
+
+// ECDSAPrivateKey represents a private ECDSA key
+type ECDSAPrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	privateKey
+	signer
+}
+
+// RSAPrivateKey represents a private RSA key
+type RSAPrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	privateKey
+	signer
+}
+
+// ED25519PrivateKey represents a private ED25519 key
+type ED25519PrivateKey struct {
+	ED25519PublicKey
+	privateKey
+}
+
+// UnknownPrivateKey is a catchall for unsupported key types
+type UnknownPrivateKey struct {
+	TUFKey
+	privateKey
+}
+
+// NewECDSAPrivateKey initializes a new ECDSA private key
+func NewECDSAPrivateKey(public PublicKey, private []byte) (*ECDSAPrivateKey, error) {
+	switch public.(type) {
+	case *ECDSAPublicKey, *ECDSAx509PublicKey:
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid public key type provided to NewECDSAPrivateKey")
+	}
+	ecdsaPrivKey, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(private)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &ECDSAPrivateKey{
+		PublicKey:  public,
+		privateKey: privateKey{private: private},
+		signer:     signer{signer: ecdsaPrivKey},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewRSAPrivateKey initialized a new RSA private key
+func NewRSAPrivateKey(public PublicKey, private []byte) (*RSAPrivateKey, error) {
+	switch public.(type) {
+	case *RSAPublicKey, *RSAx509PublicKey:
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid public key type provided to NewRSAPrivateKey")
+	}
+	rsaPrivKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(private)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &RSAPrivateKey{
+		PublicKey:  public,
+		privateKey: privateKey{private: private},
+		signer:     signer{signer: rsaPrivKey},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewED25519PrivateKey initialized a new ED25519 private key
+func NewED25519PrivateKey(public ED25519PublicKey, private []byte) (*ED25519PrivateKey, error) {
+	return &ED25519PrivateKey{
+		ED25519PublicKey: public,
+		privateKey:       privateKey{private: private},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Private return the serialized private bytes of the key
+func (k privateKey) Private() []byte {
+	return k.private
+}
+
+// CryptoSigner returns the underlying crypto.Signer for use cases where we need the default
+// signature or public key functionality (like when we generate certificates)
+func (s signer) CryptoSigner() crypto.Signer {
+	return s.signer
+}
+
+// CryptoSigner returns the ED25519PrivateKey which already implements crypto.Signer
+func (k ED25519PrivateKey) CryptoSigner() crypto.Signer {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CryptoSigner returns the UnknownPrivateKey which already implements crypto.Signer
+func (k UnknownPrivateKey) CryptoSigner() crypto.Signer {
+	return nil
+}
+
+type ecdsaSig struct {
+	R *big.Int
+	S *big.Int
+}
+
+// Sign creates an ecdsa signature
+func (k ECDSAPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
+	ecdsaPrivKey, ok := k.CryptoSigner().(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("signer was based on the wrong key type")
+	}
+	hashed := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+	sigASN1, err := ecdsaPrivKey.Sign(rand, hashed[:], opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	sig := ecdsaSig{}
+	_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(sigASN1, &sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	rBytes, sBytes := sig.R.Bytes(), sig.S.Bytes()
+	octetLength := (ecdsaPrivKey.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3
+
+	// MUST include leading zeros in the output
+	rBuf := make([]byte, octetLength-len(rBytes), octetLength)
+	sBuf := make([]byte, octetLength-len(sBytes), octetLength)
+
+	rBuf = append(rBuf, rBytes...)
+	sBuf = append(sBuf, sBytes...)
+	return append(rBuf, sBuf...), nil
+}
+
+// Sign creates an rsa signature
+func (k RSAPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
+	hashed := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+	if opts == nil {
+		opts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
+			SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
+			Hash:       crypto.SHA256,
+		}
+	}
+	return k.CryptoSigner().Sign(rand, hashed[:], opts)
+}
+
+// Sign creates an ed25519 signature
+func (k ED25519PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
+	priv := [ed25519.PrivateKeySize]byte{}
+	copy(priv[:], k.private[ed25519.PublicKeySize:])
+	return ed25519.Sign(&priv, msg)[:], nil
+}
+
+// Sign on an UnknownPrivateKey raises an error because the client does not
+// know how to sign with this key type.
+func (k UnknownPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("unknown key type, cannot sign")
+}
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm returns the SigAlgorithm for a ECDSAPrivateKey
+func (k ECDSAPrivateKey) SignatureAlgorithm() SigAlgorithm {
+	return ECDSASignature
+}
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm returns the SigAlgorithm for a RSAPrivateKey
+func (k RSAPrivateKey) SignatureAlgorithm() SigAlgorithm {
+	return RSAPSSSignature
+}
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm returns the SigAlgorithm for a ED25519PrivateKey
+func (k ED25519PrivateKey) SignatureAlgorithm() SigAlgorithm {
+	return EDDSASignature
+}
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm returns the SigAlgorithm for an UnknownPrivateKey
+func (k UnknownPrivateKey) SignatureAlgorithm() SigAlgorithm {
+	return ""
+}
+
+// PublicKeyFromPrivate returns a new TUFKey based on a private key, with
+// the private key bytes guaranteed to be nil.
+func PublicKeyFromPrivate(pk PrivateKey) PublicKey {
+	return typedPublicKey(TUFKey{
+		Type: pk.Algorithm(),
+		Value: KeyPair{
+			Public:  pk.Public(),
+			Private: nil,
+		},
+	})
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/roles.go

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"path"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// Canonical base role names
+var (
+	CanonicalRootRole      RoleName = "root"
+	CanonicalTargetsRole   RoleName = "targets"
+	CanonicalSnapshotRole  RoleName = "snapshot"
+	CanonicalTimestampRole RoleName = "timestamp"
+)
+
+// BaseRoles is an easy to iterate list of the top level
+// roles.
+var BaseRoles = []RoleName{
+	CanonicalRootRole,
+	CanonicalTargetsRole,
+	CanonicalSnapshotRole,
+	CanonicalTimestampRole,
+}
+
+// Regex for validating delegation names
+var delegationRegexp = regexp.MustCompile("^[-a-z0-9_/]+$")
+
+// ErrNoSuchRole indicates the roles doesn't exist
+type ErrNoSuchRole struct {
+	Role RoleName
+}
+
+func (e ErrNoSuchRole) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("role does not exist: %s", e.Role)
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidRole represents an error regarding a role. Typically
+// something like a role for which sone of the public keys were
+// not found in the TUF repo.
+type ErrInvalidRole struct {
+	Role   RoleName
+	Reason string
+}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidRole) Error() string {
+	if e.Reason != "" {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("tuf: invalid role %s. %s", e.Role, e.Reason)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("tuf: invalid role %s.", e.Role)
+}
+
+// ValidRole only determines the name is semantically
+// correct. For target delegated roles, it does NOT check
+// the the appropriate parent roles exist.
+func ValidRole(name RoleName) bool {
+	if IsDelegation(name) {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	for _, v := range BaseRoles {
+		if name == v {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// IsDelegation checks if the role is a delegation or a root role
+func IsDelegation(role RoleName) bool {
+	strRole := role.String()
+	targetsBase := CanonicalTargetsRole + "/"
+
+	whitelistedChars := delegationRegexp.MatchString(strRole)
+
+	// Limit size of full role string to 255 chars for db column size limit
+	correctLength := len(role) < 256
+
+	// Removes ., .., extra slashes, and trailing slash
+	isClean := path.Clean(strRole) == strRole
+	return strings.HasPrefix(strRole, targetsBase.String()) &&
+		whitelistedChars &&
+		correctLength &&
+		isClean
+}
+
+// IsBaseRole checks if the role is a base role
+func IsBaseRole(role RoleName) bool {
+	for _, baseRole := range BaseRoles {
+		if role == baseRole {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// IsWildDelegation determines if a role represents a valid wildcard delegation
+// path, i.e. targets/*, targets/foo/*.
+// The wildcard may only appear as the final part of the delegation and must
+// be a whole segment, i.e. targets/foo* is not a valid wildcard delegation.
+func IsWildDelegation(role RoleName) bool {
+	if path.Clean(role.String()) != role.String() {
+		return false
+	}
+	base := role.Parent()
+	if !(IsDelegation(base) || base == CanonicalTargetsRole) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return role[len(role)-2:] == "/*"
+}
+
+// BaseRole is an internal representation of a root/targets/snapshot/timestamp role, with its public keys included
+type BaseRole struct {
+	Keys      map[string]PublicKey
+	Name      RoleName
+	Threshold int
+}
+
+// NewBaseRole creates a new BaseRole object with the provided parameters
+func NewBaseRole(name RoleName, threshold int, keys ...PublicKey) BaseRole {
+	r := BaseRole{
+		Name:      name,
+		Threshold: threshold,
+		Keys:      make(map[string]PublicKey),
+	}
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		r.Keys[k.ID()] = k
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+// ListKeys retrieves the public keys valid for this role
+func (b BaseRole) ListKeys() KeyList {
+	return listKeys(b.Keys)
+}
+
+// ListKeyIDs retrieves the list of key IDs valid for this role
+func (b BaseRole) ListKeyIDs() []string {
+	return listKeyIDs(b.Keys)
+}
+
+// Equals returns whether this BaseRole equals another BaseRole
+func (b BaseRole) Equals(o BaseRole) bool {
+	if b.Threshold != o.Threshold || b.Name != o.Name || len(b.Keys) != len(o.Keys) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for keyID, key := range b.Keys {
+		oKey, ok := o.Keys[keyID]
+		if !ok || key.ID() != oKey.ID() {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// DelegationRole is an internal representation of a delegation role, with its public keys included
+type DelegationRole struct {
+	BaseRole
+	Paths []string
+}
+
+func listKeys(keyMap map[string]PublicKey) KeyList {
+	keys := KeyList{}
+	for _, key := range keyMap {
+		keys = append(keys, key)
+	}
+	return keys
+}
+
+func listKeyIDs(keyMap map[string]PublicKey) []string {
+	keyIDs := []string{}
+	for id := range keyMap {
+		keyIDs = append(keyIDs, id)
+	}
+	return keyIDs
+}
+
+// Restrict restricts the paths and path hash prefixes for the passed in delegation role,
+// returning a copy of the role with validated paths as if it was a direct child
+func (d DelegationRole) Restrict(child DelegationRole) (DelegationRole, error) {
+	if !d.IsParentOf(child) {
+		return DelegationRole{}, fmt.Errorf("%s is not a parent of %s", d.Name, child.Name)
+	}
+	return DelegationRole{
+		BaseRole: BaseRole{
+			Keys:      child.Keys,
+			Name:      child.Name,
+			Threshold: child.Threshold,
+		},
+		Paths: RestrictDelegationPathPrefixes(d.Paths, child.Paths),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// IsParentOf returns whether the passed in delegation role is the direct child of this role,
+// determined by delegation name.
+// Ex: targets/a is a direct parent of targets/a/b, but targets/a is not a direct parent of targets/a/b/c
+func (d DelegationRole) IsParentOf(child DelegationRole) bool {
+	return path.Dir(child.Name.String()) == d.Name.String()
+}
+
+// CheckPaths checks if a given path is valid for the role
+func (d DelegationRole) CheckPaths(path string) bool {
+	return checkPaths(path, d.Paths)
+}
+
+func checkPaths(path string, permitted []string) bool {
+	for _, p := range permitted {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(path, p) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// RestrictDelegationPathPrefixes returns the list of valid delegationPaths that are prefixed by parentPaths
+func RestrictDelegationPathPrefixes(parentPaths, delegationPaths []string) []string {
+	validPaths := []string{}
+	if len(delegationPaths) == 0 {
+		return validPaths
+	}
+
+	// Validate each individual delegation path
+	for _, delgPath := range delegationPaths {
+		isPrefixed := false
+		for _, parentPath := range parentPaths {
+			if strings.HasPrefix(delgPath, parentPath) {
+				isPrefixed = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		// If the delegation path did not match prefix against any parent path, it is not valid
+		if isPrefixed {
+			validPaths = append(validPaths, delgPath)
+		}
+	}
+	return validPaths
+}
+
+// RootRole is a cut down role as it appears in the root.json
+// Eventually should only be used for immediately before and after serialization/deserialization
+type RootRole struct {
+	KeyIDs    []string `json:"keyids"`
+	Threshold int      `json:"threshold"`
+}
+
+// Role is a more verbose role as they appear in targets delegations
+// Eventually should only be used for immediately before and after serialization/deserialization
+type Role struct {
+	RootRole
+	Name  RoleName `json:"name"`
+	Paths []string `json:"paths,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// NewRole creates a new Role object from the given parameters
+func NewRole(name RoleName, threshold int, keyIDs, paths []string) (*Role, error) {
+	if IsDelegation(name) {
+		if len(paths) == 0 {
+			logrus.Debugf("role %s with no Paths will never be able to publish content until one or more are added", name)
+		}
+	}
+	if threshold < 1 {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidRole{Role: name}
+	}
+	if !ValidRole(name) {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidRole{Role: name}
+	}
+	return &Role{
+		RootRole: RootRole{
+			KeyIDs:    keyIDs,
+			Threshold: threshold,
+		},
+		Name:  name,
+		Paths: paths,
+	}, nil
+
+}
+
+// CheckPaths checks if a given path is valid for the role
+func (r Role) CheckPaths(path string) bool {
+	return checkPaths(path, r.Paths)
+}
+
+// AddKeys merges the ids into the current list of role key ids
+func (r *Role) AddKeys(ids []string) {
+	r.KeyIDs = mergeStrSlices(r.KeyIDs, ids)
+}
+
+// AddPaths merges the paths into the current list of role paths
+func (r *Role) AddPaths(paths []string) error {
+	if len(paths) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	r.Paths = mergeStrSlices(r.Paths, paths)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RemoveKeys removes the ids from the current list of key ids
+func (r *Role) RemoveKeys(ids []string) {
+	r.KeyIDs = subtractStrSlices(r.KeyIDs, ids)
+}
+
+// RemovePaths removes the paths from the current list of role paths
+func (r *Role) RemovePaths(paths []string) {
+	r.Paths = subtractStrSlices(r.Paths, paths)
+}
+
+func mergeStrSlices(orig, new []string) []string {
+	have := make(map[string]bool)
+	for _, e := range orig {
+		have[e] = true
+	}
+	merged := make([]string, len(orig), len(orig)+len(new))
+	copy(merged, orig)
+	for _, e := range new {
+		if !have[e] {
+			merged = append(merged, e)
+		}
+	}
+	return merged
+}
+
+func subtractStrSlices(orig, remove []string) []string {
+	kill := make(map[string]bool)
+	for _, e := range remove {
+		kill[e] = true
+	}
+	var keep []string
+	for _, e := range orig {
+		if !kill[e] {
+			keep = append(keep, e)
+		}
+	}
+	return keep
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/root.go

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+)
+
+// SignedRoot is a fully unpacked root.json
+type SignedRoot struct {
+	Signatures []Signature
+	Signed     Root
+	Dirty      bool
+}
+
+// Root is the Signed component of a root.json
+type Root struct {
+	SignedCommon
+	Keys               Keys                   `json:"keys"`
+	Roles              map[RoleName]*RootRole `json:"roles"`
+	ConsistentSnapshot bool                   `json:"consistent_snapshot"`
+}
+
+// isValidRootStructure returns an error, or nil, depending on whether the content of the struct
+// is valid for root metadata.  This does not check signatures or expiry, just that
+// the metadata content is valid.
+func isValidRootStructure(r Root) error {
+	expectedType := TUFTypes[CanonicalRootRole]
+	if r.Type != expectedType {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalRootRole, msg: fmt.Sprintf("expected type %s, not %s", expectedType, r.Type)}
+	}
+
+	if r.Version < 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalRootRole, msg: "version cannot be less than 1"}
+	}
+
+	// all the base roles MUST appear in the root.json - other roles are allowed,
+	// but other than the mirror role (not currently supported) are out of spec
+	for _, roleName := range BaseRoles {
+		roleObj, ok := r.Roles[roleName]
+		if !ok || roleObj == nil {
+			return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+				role: CanonicalRootRole, msg: fmt.Sprintf("missing %s role specification", roleName)}
+		}
+		if err := isValidRootRoleStructure(CanonicalRootRole, roleName, *roleObj, r.Keys); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func isValidRootRoleStructure(metaContainingRole, rootRoleName RoleName, r RootRole, validKeys Keys) error {
+	if r.Threshold < 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: metaContainingRole,
+			msg:  fmt.Sprintf("invalid threshold specified for %s: %v ", rootRoleName, r.Threshold),
+		}
+	}
+	for _, keyID := range r.KeyIDs {
+		if _, ok := validKeys[keyID]; !ok {
+			return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+				role: metaContainingRole,
+				msg:  fmt.Sprintf("key ID %s specified in %s without corresponding key", keyID, rootRoleName),
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewRoot initializes a new SignedRoot with a set of keys, roles, and the consistent flag
+func NewRoot(keys map[string]PublicKey, roles map[RoleName]*RootRole, consistent bool) (*SignedRoot, error) {
+	signedRoot := &SignedRoot{
+		Signatures: make([]Signature, 0),
+		Signed: Root{
+			SignedCommon: SignedCommon{
+				Type:    TUFTypes[CanonicalRootRole],
+				Version: 0,
+				Expires: DefaultExpires(CanonicalRootRole),
+			},
+			Keys:               keys,
+			Roles:              roles,
+			ConsistentSnapshot: consistent,
+		},
+		Dirty: true,
+	}
+
+	return signedRoot, nil
+}
+
+// BuildBaseRole returns a copy of a BaseRole using the information in this SignedRoot for the specified role name.
+// Will error for invalid role name or key metadata within this SignedRoot
+func (r SignedRoot) BuildBaseRole(roleName RoleName) (BaseRole, error) {
+	roleData, ok := r.Signed.Roles[roleName]
+	if !ok {
+		return BaseRole{}, ErrInvalidRole{Role: roleName, Reason: "role not found in root file"}
+	}
+	// Get all public keys for the base role from TUF metadata
+	keyIDs := roleData.KeyIDs
+	pubKeys := make(map[string]PublicKey)
+	for _, keyID := range keyIDs {
+		pubKey, ok := r.Signed.Keys[keyID]
+		if !ok {
+			return BaseRole{}, ErrInvalidRole{
+				Role:   roleName,
+				Reason: fmt.Sprintf("key with ID %s was not found in root metadata", keyID),
+			}
+		}
+		pubKeys[keyID] = pubKey
+	}
+
+	return BaseRole{
+		Name:      roleName,
+		Keys:      pubKeys,
+		Threshold: roleData.Threshold,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ToSigned partially serializes a SignedRoot for further signing
+func (r SignedRoot) ToSigned() (*Signed, error) {
+	s, err := defaultSerializer.MarshalCanonical(r.Signed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// cast into a json.RawMessage
+	signed := json.RawMessage{}
+	err = signed.UnmarshalJSON(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(r.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, r.Signatures)
+	return &Signed{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     &signed,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// MarshalJSON returns the serialized form of SignedRoot as bytes
+func (r SignedRoot) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	signed, err := r.ToSigned()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return defaultSerializer.Marshal(signed)
+}
+
+// RootFromSigned fully unpacks a Signed object into a SignedRoot and ensures
+// that it is a valid SignedRoot
+func RootFromSigned(s *Signed) (*SignedRoot, error) {
+	r := Root{}
+	if s.Signed == nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalRootRole,
+			msg:  "root file contained an empty payload",
+		}
+	}
+	if err := defaultSerializer.Unmarshal(*s.Signed, &r); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := isValidRootStructure(r); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(s.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, s.Signatures)
+	return &SignedRoot{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     r,
+	}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/serializer.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package data
+
+import "github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+
+// Serializer is an interface that can marshal and unmarshal TUF data.  This
+// is expected to be a canonical JSON marshaller
+type serializer interface {
+	MarshalCanonical(from interface{}) ([]byte, error)
+	Marshal(from interface{}) ([]byte, error)
+	Unmarshal(from []byte, to interface{}) error
+}
+
+// CanonicalJSON marshals to and from canonical JSON
+type canonicalJSON struct{}
+
+// MarshalCanonical returns the canonical JSON form of a thing
+func (c canonicalJSON) MarshalCanonical(from interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
+	return json.MarshalCanonical(from)
+}
+
+// Marshal returns the regular non-canonical JSON form of a thing
+func (c canonicalJSON) Marshal(from interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
+	return json.Marshal(from)
+}
+
+// Unmarshal unmarshals some JSON bytes
+func (c canonicalJSON) Unmarshal(from []byte, to interface{}) error {
+	return json.Unmarshal(from, to)
+}
+
+// defaultSerializer is a canonical JSON serializer
+var defaultSerializer serializer = canonicalJSON{}
+
+func setDefaultSerializer(s serializer) {
+	defaultSerializer = s
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/snapshot.go

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+)
+
+// SignedSnapshot is a fully unpacked snapshot.json
+type SignedSnapshot struct {
+	Signatures []Signature
+	Signed     Snapshot
+	Dirty      bool
+}
+
+// Snapshot is the Signed component of a snapshot.json
+type Snapshot struct {
+	SignedCommon
+	Meta Files `json:"meta"`
+}
+
+// IsValidSnapshotStructure returns an error, or nil, depending on whether the content of the
+// struct is valid for snapshot metadata.  This does not check signatures or expiry, just that
+// the metadata content is valid.
+func IsValidSnapshotStructure(s Snapshot) error {
+	expectedType := TUFTypes[CanonicalSnapshotRole]
+	if s.Type != expectedType {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalSnapshotRole, msg: fmt.Sprintf("expected type %s, not %s", expectedType, s.Type)}
+	}
+
+	if s.Version < 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalSnapshotRole, msg: "version cannot be less than one"}
+	}
+
+	for _, file := range []RoleName{CanonicalRootRole, CanonicalTargetsRole} {
+		// Meta is a map of FileMeta, so if the role isn't in the map it returns
+		// an empty FileMeta, which has an empty map, and you can check on keys
+		// from an empty map.
+		//
+		// For now sha256 is required and sha512 is not.
+		if _, ok := s.Meta[file.String()].Hashes[notary.SHA256]; !ok {
+			return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+				role: CanonicalSnapshotRole,
+				msg:  fmt.Sprintf("missing %s sha256 checksum information", file.String()),
+			}
+		}
+		if err := CheckValidHashStructures(s.Meta[file.String()].Hashes); err != nil {
+			return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+				role: CanonicalSnapshotRole,
+				msg:  fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s checksum information, %v", file.String(), err),
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewSnapshot initilizes a SignedSnapshot with a given top level root
+// and targets objects
+func NewSnapshot(root *Signed, targets *Signed) (*SignedSnapshot, error) {
+	logrus.Debug("generating new snapshot...")
+	targetsJSON, err := json.Marshal(targets)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debug("Error Marshalling Targets")
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	rootJSON, err := json.Marshal(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debug("Error Marshalling Root")
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	rootMeta, err := NewFileMeta(bytes.NewReader(rootJSON), NotaryDefaultHashes...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	targetsMeta, err := NewFileMeta(bytes.NewReader(targetsJSON), NotaryDefaultHashes...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &SignedSnapshot{
+		Signatures: make([]Signature, 0),
+		Signed: Snapshot{
+			SignedCommon: SignedCommon{
+				Type:    TUFTypes[CanonicalSnapshotRole],
+				Version: 0,
+				Expires: DefaultExpires(CanonicalSnapshotRole),
+			},
+			Meta: Files{
+				CanonicalRootRole.String():    rootMeta,
+				CanonicalTargetsRole.String(): targetsMeta,
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ToSigned partially serializes a SignedSnapshot for further signing
+func (sp *SignedSnapshot) ToSigned() (*Signed, error) {
+	s, err := defaultSerializer.MarshalCanonical(sp.Signed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	signed := json.RawMessage{}
+	err = signed.UnmarshalJSON(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(sp.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, sp.Signatures)
+	return &Signed{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     &signed,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// AddMeta updates a role in the snapshot with new meta
+func (sp *SignedSnapshot) AddMeta(role RoleName, meta FileMeta) {
+	sp.Signed.Meta[role.String()] = meta
+	sp.Dirty = true
+}
+
+// GetMeta gets the metadata for a particular role, returning an error if it's
+// not found
+func (sp *SignedSnapshot) GetMeta(role RoleName) (*FileMeta, error) {
+	if meta, ok := sp.Signed.Meta[role.String()]; ok {
+		if _, ok := meta.Hashes["sha256"]; ok {
+			return &meta, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, ErrMissingMeta{Role: role.String()}
+}
+
+// DeleteMeta removes a role from the snapshot. If the role doesn't
+// exist in the snapshot, it's a noop.
+func (sp *SignedSnapshot) DeleteMeta(role RoleName) {
+	if _, ok := sp.Signed.Meta[role.String()]; ok {
+		delete(sp.Signed.Meta, role.String())
+		sp.Dirty = true
+	}
+}
+
+// MarshalJSON returns the serialized form of SignedSnapshot as bytes
+func (sp *SignedSnapshot) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	signed, err := sp.ToSigned()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return defaultSerializer.Marshal(signed)
+}
+
+// SnapshotFromSigned fully unpacks a Signed object into a SignedSnapshot
+func SnapshotFromSigned(s *Signed) (*SignedSnapshot, error) {
+	sp := Snapshot{}
+	if err := defaultSerializer.Unmarshal(*s.Signed, &sp); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := IsValidSnapshotStructure(sp); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(s.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, s.Signatures)
+	return &SignedSnapshot{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     sp,
+	}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/targets.go

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"path"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+)
+
+// SignedTargets is a fully unpacked targets.json, or target delegation
+// json file
+type SignedTargets struct {
+	Signatures []Signature
+	Signed     Targets
+	Dirty      bool
+}
+
+// Targets is the Signed components of a targets.json or delegation json file
+type Targets struct {
+	SignedCommon
+	Targets     Files       `json:"targets"`
+	Delegations Delegations `json:"delegations,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// isValidTargetsStructure returns an error, or nil, depending on whether the content of the struct
+// is valid for targets metadata.  This does not check signatures or expiry, just that
+// the metadata content is valid.
+func isValidTargetsStructure(t Targets, roleName RoleName) error {
+	if roleName != CanonicalTargetsRole && !IsDelegation(roleName) {
+		return ErrInvalidRole{Role: roleName}
+	}
+
+	// even if it's a delegated role, the metadata type is "Targets"
+	expectedType := TUFTypes[CanonicalTargetsRole]
+	if t.Type != expectedType {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: roleName, msg: fmt.Sprintf("expected type %s, not %s", expectedType, t.Type)}
+	}
+
+	if t.Version < 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{role: roleName, msg: "version cannot be less than one"}
+	}
+
+	for _, roleObj := range t.Delegations.Roles {
+		if !IsDelegation(roleObj.Name) || path.Dir(roleObj.Name.String()) != roleName.String() {
+			return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+				role: roleName, msg: fmt.Sprintf("delegation role %s invalid", roleObj.Name)}
+		}
+		if err := isValidRootRoleStructure(roleName, roleObj.Name, roleObj.RootRole, t.Delegations.Keys); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewTargets intiializes a new empty SignedTargets object
+func NewTargets() *SignedTargets {
+	return &SignedTargets{
+		Signatures: make([]Signature, 0),
+		Signed: Targets{
+			SignedCommon: SignedCommon{
+				Type:    TUFTypes["targets"],
+				Version: 0,
+				Expires: DefaultExpires("targets"),
+			},
+			Targets:     make(Files),
+			Delegations: *NewDelegations(),
+		},
+		Dirty: true,
+	}
+}
+
+// GetMeta attempts to find the targets entry for the path. It
+// will return nil in the case of the target not being found.
+func (t SignedTargets) GetMeta(path string) *FileMeta {
+	for p, meta := range t.Signed.Targets {
+		if p == path {
+			return &meta
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GetValidDelegations filters the delegation roles specified in the signed targets, and
+// only returns roles that are direct children and restricts their paths
+func (t SignedTargets) GetValidDelegations(parent DelegationRole) []DelegationRole {
+	roles := t.buildDelegationRoles()
+	result := []DelegationRole{}
+	for _, r := range roles {
+		validRole, err := parent.Restrict(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		result = append(result, validRole)
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+// BuildDelegationRole returns a copy of a DelegationRole using the information in this SignedTargets for the specified role name.
+// Will error for invalid role name or key metadata within this SignedTargets.  Path data is not validated.
+func (t *SignedTargets) BuildDelegationRole(roleName RoleName) (DelegationRole, error) {
+	for _, role := range t.Signed.Delegations.Roles {
+		if role.Name == roleName {
+			pubKeys := make(map[string]PublicKey)
+			for _, keyID := range role.KeyIDs {
+				pubKey, ok := t.Signed.Delegations.Keys[keyID]
+				if !ok {
+					// Couldn't retrieve all keys, so stop walking and return invalid role
+					return DelegationRole{}, ErrInvalidRole{
+						Role:   roleName,
+						Reason: "role lists unknown key " + keyID + " as a signing key",
+					}
+				}
+				pubKeys[keyID] = pubKey
+			}
+			return DelegationRole{
+				BaseRole: BaseRole{
+					Name:      role.Name,
+					Keys:      pubKeys,
+					Threshold: role.Threshold,
+				},
+				Paths: role.Paths,
+			}, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return DelegationRole{}, ErrNoSuchRole{Role: roleName}
+}
+
+// helper function to create DelegationRole structures from all delegations in a SignedTargets,
+// these delegations are read directly from the SignedTargets and not modified or validated
+func (t SignedTargets) buildDelegationRoles() []DelegationRole {
+	var roles []DelegationRole
+	for _, roleData := range t.Signed.Delegations.Roles {
+		delgRole, err := t.BuildDelegationRole(roleData.Name)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		roles = append(roles, delgRole)
+	}
+	return roles
+}
+
+// AddTarget adds or updates the meta for the given path
+func (t *SignedTargets) AddTarget(path string, meta FileMeta) {
+	t.Signed.Targets[path] = meta
+	t.Dirty = true
+}
+
+// AddDelegation will add a new delegated role with the given keys,
+// ensuring the keys either already exist, or are added to the map
+// of delegation keys
+func (t *SignedTargets) AddDelegation(role *Role, keys []*PublicKey) error {
+	return errors.New("Not Implemented")
+}
+
+// ToSigned partially serializes a SignedTargets for further signing
+func (t *SignedTargets) ToSigned() (*Signed, error) {
+	s, err := defaultSerializer.MarshalCanonical(t.Signed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	signed := json.RawMessage{}
+	err = signed.UnmarshalJSON(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(t.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, t.Signatures)
+	return &Signed{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     &signed,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// MarshalJSON returns the serialized form of SignedTargets as bytes
+func (t *SignedTargets) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	signed, err := t.ToSigned()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return defaultSerializer.Marshal(signed)
+}
+
+// TargetsFromSigned fully unpacks a Signed object into a SignedTargets, given
+// a role name (so it can validate the SignedTargets object)
+func TargetsFromSigned(s *Signed, roleName RoleName) (*SignedTargets, error) {
+	t := Targets{}
+	if err := defaultSerializer.Unmarshal(*s.Signed, &t); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := isValidTargetsStructure(t, roleName); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(s.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, s.Signatures)
+	return &SignedTargets{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     t,
+	}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/timestamp.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+)
+
+// SignedTimestamp is a fully unpacked timestamp.json
+type SignedTimestamp struct {
+	Signatures []Signature
+	Signed     Timestamp
+	Dirty      bool
+}
+
+// Timestamp is the Signed component of a timestamp.json
+type Timestamp struct {
+	SignedCommon
+	Meta Files `json:"meta"`
+}
+
+// IsValidTimestampStructure returns an error, or nil, depending on whether the content of the struct
+// is valid for timestamp metadata.  This does not check signatures or expiry, just that
+// the metadata content is valid.
+func IsValidTimestampStructure(t Timestamp) error {
+	expectedType := TUFTypes[CanonicalTimestampRole]
+	if t.Type != expectedType {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalTimestampRole, msg: fmt.Sprintf("expected type %s, not %s", expectedType, t.Type)}
+	}
+
+	if t.Version < 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalTimestampRole, msg: "version cannot be less than one"}
+	}
+
+	// Meta is a map of FileMeta, so if the role isn't in the map it returns
+	// an empty FileMeta, which has an empty map, and you can check on keys
+	// from an empty map.
+	//
+	// For now sha256 is required and sha512 is not.
+	if _, ok := t.Meta[CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()].Hashes[notary.SHA256]; !ok {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalTimestampRole, msg: "missing snapshot sha256 checksum information"}
+	}
+	if err := CheckValidHashStructures(t.Meta[CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()].Hashes); err != nil {
+		return ErrInvalidMetadata{
+			role: CanonicalTimestampRole, msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid snapshot checksum information, %v", err)}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewTimestamp initializes a timestamp with an existing snapshot
+func NewTimestamp(snapshot *Signed) (*SignedTimestamp, error) {
+	snapshotJSON, err := json.Marshal(snapshot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	snapshotMeta, err := NewFileMeta(bytes.NewReader(snapshotJSON), NotaryDefaultHashes...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &SignedTimestamp{
+		Signatures: make([]Signature, 0),
+		Signed: Timestamp{
+			SignedCommon: SignedCommon{
+				Type:    TUFTypes[CanonicalTimestampRole],
+				Version: 0,
+				Expires: DefaultExpires(CanonicalTimestampRole),
+			},
+			Meta: Files{
+				CanonicalSnapshotRole.String(): snapshotMeta,
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ToSigned partially serializes a SignedTimestamp such that it can
+// be signed
+func (ts *SignedTimestamp) ToSigned() (*Signed, error) {
+	s, err := defaultSerializer.MarshalCanonical(ts.Signed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	signed := json.RawMessage{}
+	err = signed.UnmarshalJSON(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(ts.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, ts.Signatures)
+	return &Signed{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     &signed,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// GetSnapshot gets the expected snapshot metadata hashes in the timestamp metadata,
+// or nil if it doesn't exist
+func (ts *SignedTimestamp) GetSnapshot() (*FileMeta, error) {
+	snapshotExpected, ok := ts.Signed.Meta[CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrMissingMeta{Role: CanonicalSnapshotRole.String()}
+	}
+	return &snapshotExpected, nil
+}
+
+// MarshalJSON returns the serialized form of SignedTimestamp as bytes
+func (ts *SignedTimestamp) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	signed, err := ts.ToSigned()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return defaultSerializer.Marshal(signed)
+}
+
+// TimestampFromSigned parsed a Signed object into a fully unpacked
+// SignedTimestamp
+func TimestampFromSigned(s *Signed) (*SignedTimestamp, error) {
+	ts := Timestamp{}
+	if err := defaultSerializer.Unmarshal(*s.Signed, &ts); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := IsValidTimestampStructure(ts); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	sigs := make([]Signature, len(s.Signatures))
+	copy(sigs, s.Signatures)
+	return &SignedTimestamp{
+		Signatures: sigs,
+		Signed:     ts,
+	}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data/types.go

@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+package data
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"path"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+)
+
+// GUN is a Globally Unique Name. It is used to identify trust collections.
+// An example usage of this is for container image repositories.
+// For example: myregistry.io/myuser/myimage
+type GUN string
+
+func (g GUN) String() string {
+	return string(g)
+}
+
+// RoleName type for specifying role
+type RoleName string
+
+func (r RoleName) String() string {
+	return string(r)
+}
+
+// Parent provides the parent path role from the provided child role
+func (r RoleName) Parent() RoleName {
+	return RoleName(path.Dir(r.String()))
+}
+
+// MetadataRoleMapToStringMap generates a map string of bytes from a map RoleName of bytes
+func MetadataRoleMapToStringMap(roles map[RoleName][]byte) map[string][]byte {
+	metadata := make(map[string][]byte)
+	for k, v := range roles {
+		metadata[k.String()] = v
+	}
+	return metadata
+}
+
+// NewRoleList generates an array of RoleName objects from a slice of strings
+func NewRoleList(roles []string) []RoleName {
+	var roleNames []RoleName
+	for _, role := range roles {
+		roleNames = append(roleNames, RoleName(role))
+	}
+	return roleNames
+}
+
+// RolesListToStringList generates an array of string objects from a slice of roles
+func RolesListToStringList(roles []RoleName) []string {
+	var roleNames []string
+	for _, role := range roles {
+		roleNames = append(roleNames, role.String())
+	}
+	return roleNames
+}
+
+// SigAlgorithm for types of signatures
+type SigAlgorithm string
+
+func (k SigAlgorithm) String() string {
+	return string(k)
+}
+
+const defaultHashAlgorithm = "sha256"
+
+// NotaryDefaultExpiries is the construct used to configure the default expiry times of
+// the various role files.
+var NotaryDefaultExpiries = map[RoleName]time.Duration{
+	CanonicalRootRole:      notary.NotaryRootExpiry,
+	CanonicalTargetsRole:   notary.NotaryTargetsExpiry,
+	CanonicalSnapshotRole:  notary.NotarySnapshotExpiry,
+	CanonicalTimestampRole: notary.NotaryTimestampExpiry,
+}
+
+// Signature types
+const (
+	EDDSASignature       SigAlgorithm = "eddsa"
+	RSAPSSSignature      SigAlgorithm = "rsapss"
+	RSAPKCS1v15Signature SigAlgorithm = "rsapkcs1v15"
+	ECDSASignature       SigAlgorithm = "ecdsa"
+	PyCryptoSignature    SigAlgorithm = "pycrypto-pkcs#1 pss"
+)
+
+// Key types
+const (
+	ED25519Key   = "ed25519"
+	RSAKey       = "rsa"
+	RSAx509Key   = "rsa-x509"
+	ECDSAKey     = "ecdsa"
+	ECDSAx509Key = "ecdsa-x509"
+)
+
+// TUFTypes is the set of metadata types
+var TUFTypes = map[RoleName]string{
+	CanonicalRootRole:      "Root",
+	CanonicalTargetsRole:   "Targets",
+	CanonicalSnapshotRole:  "Snapshot",
+	CanonicalTimestampRole: "Timestamp",
+}
+
+// ValidTUFType checks if the given type is valid for the role
+func ValidTUFType(typ string, role RoleName) bool {
+	if ValidRole(role) {
+		// All targets delegation roles must have
+		// the valid type is for targets.
+		if role == "" {
+			// role is unknown and does not map to
+			// a type
+			return false
+		}
+		if strings.HasPrefix(role.String(), CanonicalTargetsRole.String()+"/") {
+			role = CanonicalTargetsRole
+		}
+	}
+	// most people will just use the defaults so have this optimal check
+	// first. Do comparison just in case there is some unknown vulnerability
+	// if a key and value in the map differ.
+	if v, ok := TUFTypes[role]; ok {
+		return typ == v
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Signed is the high level, partially deserialized metadata object
+// used to verify signatures before fully unpacking, or to add signatures
+// before fully packing
+type Signed struct {
+	Signed     *json.RawMessage `json:"signed"`
+	Signatures []Signature      `json:"signatures"`
+}
+
+// SignedCommon contains the fields common to the Signed component of all
+// TUF metadata files
+type SignedCommon struct {
+	Type    string    `json:"_type"`
+	Expires time.Time `json:"expires"`
+	Version int       `json:"version"`
+}
+
+// SignedMeta is used in server validation where we only need signatures
+// and common fields
+type SignedMeta struct {
+	Signed     SignedCommon `json:"signed"`
+	Signatures []Signature  `json:"signatures"`
+}
+
+// Signature is a signature on a piece of metadata
+type Signature struct {
+	KeyID     string       `json:"keyid"`
+	Method    SigAlgorithm `json:"method"`
+	Signature []byte       `json:"sig"`
+	IsValid   bool         `json:"-"`
+}
+
+// Files is the map of paths to file meta container in targets and delegations
+// metadata files
+type Files map[string]FileMeta
+
+// Hashes is the map of hash type to digest created for each metadata
+// and target file
+type Hashes map[string][]byte
+
+// NotaryDefaultHashes contains the default supported hash algorithms.
+var NotaryDefaultHashes = []string{notary.SHA256, notary.SHA512}
+
+// FileMeta contains the size and hashes for a metadata or target file. Custom
+// data can be optionally added.
+type FileMeta struct {
+	Length int64            `json:"length"`
+	Hashes Hashes           `json:"hashes"`
+	Custom *json.RawMessage `json:"custom,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Equals returns true if the other FileMeta object is equivalent to this one
+func (f FileMeta) Equals(o FileMeta) bool {
+	if o.Length != f.Length || len(f.Hashes) != len(f.Hashes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if f.Custom == nil && o.Custom != nil || f.Custom != nil && o.Custom == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// we don't care if these are valid hashes, just that they are equal
+	for key, val := range f.Hashes {
+		if !bytes.Equal(val, o.Hashes[key]) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	if f.Custom == nil && o.Custom == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	fBytes, err := f.Custom.MarshalJSON()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	oBytes, err := o.Custom.MarshalJSON()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return bytes.Equal(fBytes, oBytes)
+}
+
+// CheckHashes verifies all the checksums specified by the "hashes" of the payload.
+func CheckHashes(payload []byte, name string, hashes Hashes) error {
+	cnt := 0
+
+	// k, v indicate the hash algorithm and the corresponding value
+	for k, v := range hashes {
+		switch k {
+		case notary.SHA256:
+			checksum := sha256.Sum256(payload)
+			if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
+				return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA256, name: name, expected: hex.EncodeToString(v)}
+			}
+			cnt++
+		case notary.SHA512:
+			checksum := sha512.Sum512(payload)
+			if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
+				return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA512, name: name, expected: hex.EncodeToString(v)}
+			}
+			cnt++
+		}
+	}
+
+	if cnt == 0 {
+		return ErrMissingMeta{Role: name}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CompareMultiHashes verifies that the two Hashes passed in can represent the same data.
+// This means that both maps must have at least one key defined for which they map, and no conflicts.
+// Note that we check the intersection of map keys, which adds support for non-default hash algorithms in notary
+func CompareMultiHashes(hashes1, hashes2 Hashes) error {
+	// First check if the two hash structures are valid
+	if err := CheckValidHashStructures(hashes1); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := CheckValidHashStructures(hashes2); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Check if they have at least one matching hash, and no conflicts
+	cnt := 0
+	for hashAlg, hash1 := range hashes1 {
+
+		hash2, ok := hashes2[hashAlg]
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hash1[:], hash2[:]) == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("mismatched %s checksum", hashAlg)
+		}
+		// If we reached here, we had a match
+		cnt++
+	}
+
+	if cnt == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("at least one matching hash needed")
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CheckValidHashStructures returns an error, or nil, depending on whether
+// the content of the hashes is valid or not.
+func CheckValidHashStructures(hashes Hashes) error {
+	cnt := 0
+
+	for k, v := range hashes {
+		switch k {
+		case notary.SHA256:
+			if len(v) != sha256.Size {
+				return ErrInvalidChecksum{alg: notary.SHA256}
+			}
+			cnt++
+		case notary.SHA512:
+			if len(v) != sha512.Size {
+				return ErrInvalidChecksum{alg: notary.SHA512}
+			}
+			cnt++
+		}
+	}
+
+	if cnt == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("at least one supported hash needed")
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewFileMeta generates a FileMeta object from the reader, using the
+// hash algorithms provided
+func NewFileMeta(r io.Reader, hashAlgorithms ...string) (FileMeta, error) {
+	if len(hashAlgorithms) == 0 {
+		hashAlgorithms = []string{defaultHashAlgorithm}
+	}
+	hashes := make(map[string]hash.Hash, len(hashAlgorithms))
+	for _, hashAlgorithm := range hashAlgorithms {
+		var h hash.Hash
+		switch hashAlgorithm {
+		case notary.SHA256:
+			h = sha256.New()
+		case notary.SHA512:
+			h = sha512.New()
+		default:
+			return FileMeta{}, fmt.Errorf("Unknown hash algorithm: %s", hashAlgorithm)
+		}
+		hashes[hashAlgorithm] = h
+		r = io.TeeReader(r, h)
+	}
+	n, err := io.Copy(ioutil.Discard, r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return FileMeta{}, err
+	}
+	m := FileMeta{Length: n, Hashes: make(Hashes, len(hashes))}
+	for hashAlgorithm, h := range hashes {
+		m.Hashes[hashAlgorithm] = h.Sum(nil)
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// Delegations holds a tier of targets delegations
+type Delegations struct {
+	Keys  Keys    `json:"keys"`
+	Roles []*Role `json:"roles"`
+}
+
+// NewDelegations initializes an empty Delegations object
+func NewDelegations() *Delegations {
+	return &Delegations{
+		Keys:  make(map[string]PublicKey),
+		Roles: make([]*Role, 0),
+	}
+}
+
+// These values are recommended TUF expiry times.
+var defaultExpiryTimes = map[RoleName]time.Duration{
+	CanonicalRootRole:      notary.Year,
+	CanonicalTargetsRole:   90 * notary.Day,
+	CanonicalSnapshotRole:  7 * notary.Day,
+	CanonicalTimestampRole: notary.Day,
+}
+
+// SetDefaultExpiryTimes allows one to change the default expiries.
+func SetDefaultExpiryTimes(times map[RoleName]time.Duration) {
+	for key, value := range times {
+		if _, ok := defaultExpiryTimes[key]; !ok {
+			logrus.Errorf("Attempted to set default expiry for an unknown role: %s", key.String())
+			continue
+		}
+		defaultExpiryTimes[key] = value
+	}
+}
+
+// DefaultExpires gets the default expiry time for the given role
+func DefaultExpires(role RoleName) time.Time {
+	if d, ok := defaultExpiryTimes[role]; ok {
+		return time.Now().Add(d)
+	}
+	var t time.Time
+	return t.UTC().Round(time.Second)
+}
+
+type unmarshalledSignature Signature
+
+// UnmarshalJSON does a custom unmarshalling of the signature JSON
+func (s *Signature) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
+	uSignature := unmarshalledSignature{}
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &uSignature)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	uSignature.Method = SigAlgorithm(strings.ToLower(string(uSignature.Method)))
+	*s = Signature(uSignature)
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/ed25519.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+package signed
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+type edCryptoKey struct {
+	role    data.RoleName
+	privKey data.PrivateKey
+}
+
+// Ed25519 implements a simple in memory cryptosystem for ED25519 keys
+type Ed25519 struct {
+	keys map[string]edCryptoKey
+}
+
+// NewEd25519 initializes a new empty Ed25519 CryptoService that operates
+// entirely in memory
+func NewEd25519() *Ed25519 {
+	return &Ed25519{
+		make(map[string]edCryptoKey),
+	}
+}
+
+// AddKey allows you to add a private key
+func (e *Ed25519) AddKey(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, k data.PrivateKey) error {
+	e.addKey(role, k)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// addKey allows you to add a private key
+func (e *Ed25519) addKey(role data.RoleName, k data.PrivateKey) {
+	e.keys[k.ID()] = edCryptoKey{
+		role:    role,
+		privKey: k,
+	}
+}
+
+// RemoveKey deletes a key from the signer
+func (e *Ed25519) RemoveKey(keyID string) error {
+	delete(e.keys, keyID)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ListKeys returns the list of keys IDs for the role
+func (e *Ed25519) ListKeys(role data.RoleName) []string {
+	keyIDs := make([]string, 0, len(e.keys))
+	for id, edCryptoKey := range e.keys {
+		if edCryptoKey.role == role {
+			keyIDs = append(keyIDs, id)
+		}
+	}
+	return keyIDs
+}
+
+// ListAllKeys returns the map of keys IDs to role
+func (e *Ed25519) ListAllKeys() map[string]data.RoleName {
+	keys := make(map[string]data.RoleName)
+	for id, edKey := range e.keys {
+		keys[id] = edKey.role
+	}
+	return keys
+}
+
+// Create generates a new key and returns the public part
+func (e *Ed25519) Create(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, algorithm string) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	if algorithm != data.ED25519Key {
+		return nil, errors.New("only ED25519 supported by this cryptoservice")
+	}
+
+	private, err := utils.GenerateED25519Key(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	e.addKey(role, private)
+	return data.PublicKeyFromPrivate(private), nil
+}
+
+// PublicKeys returns a map of public keys for the ids provided, when those IDs are found
+// in the store.
+func (e *Ed25519) PublicKeys(keyIDs ...string) (map[string]data.PublicKey, error) {
+	k := make(map[string]data.PublicKey)
+	for _, keyID := range keyIDs {
+		if edKey, ok := e.keys[keyID]; ok {
+			k[keyID] = data.PublicKeyFromPrivate(edKey.privKey)
+		}
+	}
+	return k, nil
+}
+
+// GetKey returns a single public key based on the ID
+func (e *Ed25519) GetKey(keyID string) data.PublicKey {
+	if privKey, _, err := e.GetPrivateKey(keyID); err == nil {
+		return data.PublicKeyFromPrivate(privKey)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GetPrivateKey returns a single private key and role if present, based on the ID
+func (e *Ed25519) GetPrivateKey(keyID string) (data.PrivateKey, data.RoleName, error) {
+	if k, ok := e.keys[keyID]; ok {
+		return k.privKey, k.role, nil
+	}
+	return nil, "", trustmanager.ErrKeyNotFound{KeyID: keyID}
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package signed
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// ErrInsufficientSignatures - can not create enough signatures on a piece of
+// metadata
+type ErrInsufficientSignatures struct {
+	FoundKeys     int
+	NeededKeys    int
+	MissingKeyIDs []string
+}
+
+func (e ErrInsufficientSignatures) Error() string {
+	candidates := ""
+	if len(e.MissingKeyIDs) > 0 {
+		candidates = fmt.Sprintf(" (%s)", strings.Join(e.MissingKeyIDs, ", "))
+	}
+
+	if e.FoundKeys == 0 {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("signing keys not available: need %d keys from %d possible keys%s",
+			e.NeededKeys, len(e.MissingKeyIDs), candidates)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("not enough signing keys: found %d of %d needed keys - %d other possible keys%s",
+		e.FoundKeys, e.NeededKeys, len(e.MissingKeyIDs), candidates)
+}
+
+// ErrExpired indicates a piece of metadata has expired
+type ErrExpired struct {
+	Role    data.RoleName
+	Expired string
+}
+
+func (e ErrExpired) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s expired at %v", e.Role.String(), e.Expired)
+}
+
+// ErrLowVersion indicates the piece of metadata has a version number lower than
+// a version number we're already seen for this role
+type ErrLowVersion struct {
+	Actual  int
+	Current int
+}
+
+func (e ErrLowVersion) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("version %d is lower than current version %d", e.Actual, e.Current)
+}
+
+// ErrRoleThreshold indicates we did not validate enough signatures to meet the threshold
+type ErrRoleThreshold struct {
+	Msg string
+}
+
+func (e ErrRoleThreshold) Error() string {
+	if e.Msg == "" {
+		return "valid signatures did not meet threshold"
+	}
+	return e.Msg
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidKeyType indicates the types for the key and signature it's associated with are
+// mismatched. Probably a sign of malicious behaviour
+type ErrInvalidKeyType struct{}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidKeyType) Error() string {
+	return "key type is not valid for signature"
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidKeyID indicates the specified key ID was incorrect for its associated data
+type ErrInvalidKeyID struct{}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidKeyID) Error() string {
+	return "key ID is not valid for key content"
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidKeyLength indicates that while we may support the cipher, the provided
+// key length is not specifically supported, i.e. we support RSA, but not 1024 bit keys
+type ErrInvalidKeyLength struct {
+	msg string
+}
+
+func (e ErrInvalidKeyLength) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("key length is not supported: %s", e.msg)
+}
+
+// ErrNoKeys indicates no signing keys were found when trying to sign
+type ErrNoKeys struct {
+	KeyIDs []string
+}
+
+func (e ErrNoKeys) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("could not find necessary signing keys, at least one of these keys must be available: %s",
+		strings.Join(e.KeyIDs, ", "))
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/interface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package signed
+
+import "github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+
+// KeyService provides management of keys locally. It will never
+// accept or provide private keys. Communication between the KeyService
+// and a SigningService happen behind the Create function.
+type KeyService interface {
+	// Create issues a new key pair and is responsible for loading
+	// the private key into the appropriate signing service.
+	Create(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, algorithm string) (data.PublicKey, error)
+
+	// AddKey adds a private key to the specified role and gun
+	AddKey(role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, key data.PrivateKey) error
+
+	// GetKey retrieves the public key if present, otherwise it returns nil
+	GetKey(keyID string) data.PublicKey
+
+	// GetPrivateKey retrieves the private key and role if present and retrievable,
+	// otherwise it returns nil and an error
+	GetPrivateKey(keyID string) (data.PrivateKey, data.RoleName, error)
+
+	// RemoveKey deletes the specified key, and returns an error only if the key
+	// removal fails. If the key doesn't exist, no error should be returned.
+	RemoveKey(keyID string) error
+
+	// ListKeys returns a list of key IDs for the role, or an empty list or
+	// nil if there are no keys.
+	ListKeys(role data.RoleName) []string
+
+	// ListAllKeys returns a map of all available signing key IDs to role, or
+	// an empty map or nil if there are no keys.
+	ListAllKeys() map[string]data.RoleName
+}
+
+// CryptoService is deprecated and all instances of its use should be
+// replaced with KeyService
+type CryptoService interface {
+	KeyService
+}
+
+// Verifier defines an interface for verfying signatures. An implementer
+// of this interface should verify signatures for one and only one
+// signing scheme.
+type Verifier interface {
+	Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/sign.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+package signed
+
+// The Sign function is a choke point for all code paths that do signing.
+// We use this fact to do key ID translation. There are 2 types of key ID:
+//   - Scoped: the key ID based purely on the data that appears in the TUF
+//             files. This may be wrapped by a certificate that scopes the
+//             key to be used in a specific context.
+//   - Canonical: the key ID based purely on the public key bytes. This is
+//             used by keystores to easily identify keys that may be reused
+//             in many scoped locations.
+// Currently these types only differ in the context of Root Keys in Notary
+// for which the root key is wrapped using an x509 certificate.
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/trustmanager"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// Sign takes a data.Signed and a cryptoservice containing private keys,
+// calculates and adds at least minSignature signatures using signingKeys the
+// data.Signed.  It will also clean up any signatures that are not in produced
+// by either a signingKey or an otherWhitelistedKey.
+// Note that in most cases, otherWhitelistedKeys should probably be null. They
+// are for keys you don't want to sign with, but you also don't want to remove
+// existing signatures by those keys.  For instance, if you want to call Sign
+// multiple times with different sets of signing keys without undoing removing
+// signatures produced by the previous call to Sign.
+func Sign(service CryptoService, s *data.Signed, signingKeys []data.PublicKey,
+	minSignatures int, otherWhitelistedKeys []data.PublicKey) error {
+
+	logrus.Debugf("sign called with %d/%d required keys", minSignatures, len(signingKeys))
+	signatures := make([]data.Signature, 0, len(s.Signatures)+1)
+	signingKeyIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
+	tufIDs := make(map[string]data.PublicKey)
+
+	privKeys := make(map[string]data.PrivateKey)
+
+	// Get all the private key objects related to the public keys
+	missingKeyIDs := []string{}
+	for _, key := range signingKeys {
+		canonicalID, err := utils.CanonicalKeyID(key)
+		tufIDs[key.ID()] = key
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		k, _, err := service.GetPrivateKey(canonicalID)
+		if err != nil {
+			if _, ok := err.(trustmanager.ErrKeyNotFound); ok {
+				missingKeyIDs = append(missingKeyIDs, canonicalID)
+				continue
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		privKeys[key.ID()] = k
+	}
+
+	// include the list of otherWhitelistedKeys
+	for _, key := range otherWhitelistedKeys {
+		if _, ok := tufIDs[key.ID()]; !ok {
+			tufIDs[key.ID()] = key
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check to ensure we have enough signing keys
+	if len(privKeys) < minSignatures {
+		return ErrInsufficientSignatures{FoundKeys: len(privKeys),
+			NeededKeys: minSignatures, MissingKeyIDs: missingKeyIDs}
+	}
+
+	emptyStruct := struct{}{}
+	// Do signing and generate list of signatures
+	for keyID, pk := range privKeys {
+		sig, err := pk.Sign(rand.Reader, *s.Signed, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("Failed to sign with key: %s. Reason: %v", keyID, err)
+			return err
+		}
+		signingKeyIDs[keyID] = emptyStruct
+		signatures = append(signatures, data.Signature{
+			KeyID:     keyID,
+			Method:    pk.SignatureAlgorithm(),
+			Signature: sig[:],
+		})
+	}
+
+	for _, sig := range s.Signatures {
+		if _, ok := signingKeyIDs[sig.KeyID]; ok {
+			// key is in the set of key IDs for which a signature has been created
+			continue
+		}
+		var (
+			k  data.PublicKey
+			ok bool
+		)
+		if k, ok = tufIDs[sig.KeyID]; !ok {
+			// key is no longer a valid signing key
+			continue
+		}
+		if err := VerifySignature(*s.Signed, &sig, k); err != nil {
+			// signature is no longer valid
+			continue
+		}
+		// keep any signatures that still represent valid keys and are
+		// themselves valid
+		signatures = append(signatures, sig)
+	}
+	s.Signatures = signatures
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/verifiers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+package signed
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/agl/ed25519"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+const (
+	minRSAKeySizeBit  = 2048 // 2048 bits = 256 bytes
+	minRSAKeySizeByte = minRSAKeySizeBit / 8
+)
+
+// Verifiers serves as a map of all verifiers available on the system and
+// can be injected into a verificationService. For testing and configuration
+// purposes, it will not be used by default.
+var Verifiers = map[data.SigAlgorithm]Verifier{
+	data.RSAPSSSignature:      RSAPSSVerifier{},
+	data.RSAPKCS1v15Signature: RSAPKCS1v15Verifier{},
+	data.PyCryptoSignature:    RSAPyCryptoVerifier{},
+	data.ECDSASignature:       ECDSAVerifier{},
+	data.EDDSASignature:       Ed25519Verifier{},
+}
+
+// Ed25519Verifier used to verify Ed25519 signatures
+type Ed25519Verifier struct{}
+
+// Verify checks that an ed25519 signature is valid
+func (v Ed25519Verifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
+	if key.Algorithm() != data.ED25519Key {
+		return ErrInvalidKeyType{}
+	}
+	var sigBytes [ed25519.SignatureSize]byte
+	if len(sig) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
+		logrus.Debugf("signature length is incorrect, must be %d, was %d.", ed25519.SignatureSize, len(sig))
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+	copy(sigBytes[:], sig)
+
+	var keyBytes [ed25519.PublicKeySize]byte
+	pub := key.Public()
+	if len(pub) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		logrus.Errorf("public key is incorrect size, must be %d, was %d.", ed25519.PublicKeySize, len(pub))
+		return ErrInvalidKeyLength{msg: fmt.Sprintf("ed25519 public key must be %d bytes.", ed25519.PublicKeySize)}
+	}
+	n := copy(keyBytes[:], key.Public())
+	if n < ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		logrus.Errorf("failed to copy the key, must have %d bytes, copied %d bytes.", ed25519.PublicKeySize, n)
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	if !ed25519.Verify(&keyBytes, msg, &sigBytes) {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed ed25519 verification")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func verifyPSS(key interface{}, digest, sig []byte) error {
+	rsaPub, ok := key.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		logrus.Debugf("value was not an RSA public key")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	if rsaPub.N.BitLen() < minRSAKeySizeBit {
+		logrus.Debugf("RSA keys less than 2048 bits are not acceptable, provided key has length %d.", rsaPub.N.BitLen())
+		return ErrInvalidKeyLength{msg: fmt.Sprintf("RSA key must be at least %d bits.", minRSAKeySizeBit)}
+	}
+
+	if len(sig) < minRSAKeySizeByte {
+		logrus.Debugf("RSA keys less than 2048 bits are not acceptable, provided signature has length %d.", len(sig))
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	opts := rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: sha256.Size, Hash: crypto.SHA256}
+	if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(rsaPub, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], sig, &opts); err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed RSAPSS verification: %s", err)
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func getRSAPubKey(key data.PublicKey) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	algorithm := key.Algorithm()
+	var pubKey crypto.PublicKey
+
+	switch algorithm {
+	case data.RSAx509Key:
+		pemCert, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(key.Public()))
+		if pemCert == nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to decode PEM-encoded x509 certificate")
+			return nil, ErrInvalid
+		}
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pemCert.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to parse x509 certificate: %s\n", err)
+			return nil, ErrInvalid
+		}
+		pubKey = cert.PublicKey
+	case data.RSAKey:
+		var err error
+		pubKey, err = x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(key.Public())
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to parse public key: %s\n", err)
+			return nil, ErrInvalid
+		}
+	default:
+		// only accept RSA keys
+		logrus.Debugf("invalid key type for RSAPSS verifier: %s", algorithm)
+		return nil, ErrInvalidKeyType{}
+	}
+
+	return pubKey, nil
+}
+
+// RSAPSSVerifier checks RSASSA-PSS signatures
+type RSAPSSVerifier struct{}
+
+// Verify does the actual check.
+func (v RSAPSSVerifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
+	// will return err if keytype is not a recognized RSA type
+	pubKey, err := getRSAPubKey(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+
+	return verifyPSS(pubKey, digest[:], sig)
+}
+
+// RSAPKCS1v15Verifier checks RSA PKCS1v15 signatures
+type RSAPKCS1v15Verifier struct{}
+
+// Verify does the actual verification
+func (v RSAPKCS1v15Verifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
+	// will return err if keytype is not a recognized RSA type
+	pubKey, err := getRSAPubKey(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+
+	rsaPub, ok := pubKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		logrus.Debugf("value was not an RSA public key")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	if rsaPub.N.BitLen() < minRSAKeySizeBit {
+		logrus.Debugf("RSA keys less than 2048 bits are not acceptable, provided key has length %d.", rsaPub.N.BitLen())
+		return ErrInvalidKeyLength{msg: fmt.Sprintf("RSA key must be at least %d bits.", minRSAKeySizeBit)}
+	}
+
+	if len(sig) < minRSAKeySizeByte {
+		logrus.Debugf("RSA keys less than 2048 bits are not acceptable, provided signature has length %d.", len(sig))
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPub, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], sig); err != nil {
+		logrus.Errorf("Failed verification: %s", err.Error())
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RSAPyCryptoVerifier checks RSASSA-PSS signatures
+type RSAPyCryptoVerifier struct{}
+
+// Verify does the actual check.
+// N.B. We have not been able to make this work in a way that is compatible
+// with PyCrypto.
+func (v RSAPyCryptoVerifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+	if key.Algorithm() != data.RSAKey {
+		return ErrInvalidKeyType{}
+	}
+
+	k, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(key.Public()))
+	if k == nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed to decode PEM-encoded x509 certificate")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(k.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed to parse public key: %s\n", err)
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	return verifyPSS(pub, digest[:], sig)
+}
+
+// ECDSAVerifier checks ECDSA signatures, decoding the keyType appropriately
+type ECDSAVerifier struct{}
+
+// Verify does the actual check.
+func (v ECDSAVerifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
+	algorithm := key.Algorithm()
+	var pubKey crypto.PublicKey
+
+	switch algorithm {
+	case data.ECDSAx509Key:
+		pemCert, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(key.Public()))
+		if pemCert == nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to decode PEM-encoded x509 certificate for keyID: %s", key.ID())
+			logrus.Debugf("certificate bytes: %s", string(key.Public()))
+			return ErrInvalid
+		}
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pemCert.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("failed to parse x509 certificate: %s\n", err)
+			return ErrInvalid
+		}
+		pubKey = cert.PublicKey
+	case data.ECDSAKey:
+		var err error
+		pubKey, err = x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(key.Public())
+		if err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("Failed to parse private key for keyID: %s, %s\n", key.ID(), err)
+			return ErrInvalid
+		}
+	default:
+		// only accept ECDSA keys.
+		logrus.Debugf("invalid key type for ECDSA verifier: %s", algorithm)
+		return ErrInvalidKeyType{}
+	}
+
+	ecdsaPubKey, ok := pubKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		logrus.Debugf("value isn't an ECDSA public key")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	sigLength := len(sig)
+	expectedOctetLength := 2 * ((ecdsaPubKey.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3)
+	if sigLength != expectedOctetLength {
+		logrus.Debugf("signature had an unexpected length")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	rBytes, sBytes := sig[:sigLength/2], sig[sigLength/2:]
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(rBytes)
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sBytes)
+
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+
+	if !ecdsa.Verify(ecdsaPubKey, digest[:], r, s) {
+		logrus.Debugf("failed ECDSA signature validation")
+		return ErrInvalid
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/signed/verify.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package signed
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/docker/go/canonical/json"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils"
+)
+
+// Various basic signing errors
+var (
+	ErrNoSignatures = errors.New("tuf: data has no signatures")
+	ErrInvalid      = errors.New("tuf: signature verification failed")
+	ErrWrongType    = errors.New("tuf: meta file has wrong type")
+)
+
+// IsExpired checks if the given time passed before the present time
+func IsExpired(t time.Time) bool {
+	return t.Before(time.Now())
+}
+
+// VerifyExpiry returns ErrExpired if the metadata is expired
+func VerifyExpiry(s *data.SignedCommon, role data.RoleName) error {
+	if IsExpired(s.Expires) {
+		logrus.Errorf("Metadata for %s expired", role)
+		return ErrExpired{Role: role, Expired: s.Expires.Format("Mon Jan 2 15:04:05 MST 2006")}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// VerifyVersion returns ErrLowVersion if the metadata version is lower than the min version
+func VerifyVersion(s *data.SignedCommon, minVersion int) error {
+	if s.Version < minVersion {
+		return ErrLowVersion{Actual: s.Version, Current: minVersion}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// VerifySignatures checks the we have sufficient valid signatures for the given role
+func VerifySignatures(s *data.Signed, roleData data.BaseRole) error {
+	if len(s.Signatures) == 0 {
+		return ErrNoSignatures
+	}
+
+	if roleData.Threshold < 1 {
+		return ErrRoleThreshold{}
+	}
+	logrus.Debugf("%s role has key IDs: %s", roleData.Name, strings.Join(roleData.ListKeyIDs(), ","))
+
+	// remarshal the signed part so we can verify the signature, since the signature has
+	// to be of a canonically marshalled signed object
+	var decoded map[string]interface{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(*s.Signed, &decoded); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	msg, err := json.MarshalCanonical(decoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	valid := make(map[string]struct{})
+	for i := range s.Signatures {
+		sig := &(s.Signatures[i])
+		logrus.Debug("verifying signature for key ID: ", sig.KeyID)
+		key, ok := roleData.Keys[sig.KeyID]
+		if !ok {
+			logrus.Debugf("continuing b/c keyid lookup was nil: %s\n", sig.KeyID)
+			continue
+		}
+		// Check that the signature key ID actually matches the content ID of the key
+		if key.ID() != sig.KeyID {
+			return ErrInvalidKeyID{}
+		}
+		if err := VerifySignature(msg, sig, key); err != nil {
+			logrus.Debugf("continuing b/c %s", err.Error())
+			continue
+		}
+		valid[sig.KeyID] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	if len(valid) < roleData.Threshold {
+		return ErrRoleThreshold{
+			Msg: fmt.Sprintf("valid signatures did not meet threshold for %s", roleData.Name),
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// VerifySignature checks a single signature and public key against a payload
+// If the signature is verified, the signature's is valid field will actually
+// be mutated to be equal to the boolean true
+func VerifySignature(msg []byte, sig *data.Signature, pk data.PublicKey) error {
+	// method lookup is consistent due to Unmarshal JSON doing lower case for us.
+	method := sig.Method
+	verifier, ok := Verifiers[method]
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("signing method is not supported: %s", sig.Method)
+	}
+
+	if err := verifier.Verify(pk, sig.Signature, msg); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("signature was invalid")
+	}
+	sig.IsValid = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+// VerifyPublicKeyMatchesPrivateKey checks if the private key and the public keys forms valid key pairs.
+// Supports both x509 certificate PublicKeys and non-certificate PublicKeys
+func VerifyPublicKeyMatchesPrivateKey(privKey data.PrivateKey, pubKey data.PublicKey) error {
+	pubKeyID, err := utils.CanonicalKeyID(pubKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("could not verify key pair: %v", err)
+	}
+	if privKey == nil || pubKeyID != privKey.ID() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("private key is nil or does not match public key")
+	}
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils/pkcs8.go

@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+// Package utils contains tuf related utility functions however this file is hard
+// forked from https://github.com/youmark/pkcs8 package. It has been further modified
+// based on the requirements of Notary. For converting keys into PKCS#8 format,
+// original package expected *crypto.PrivateKey interface, which then type inferred
+// to either *rsa.PrivateKey or *ecdsa.PrivateKey depending on the need and later
+// converted to ASN.1 DER encoded form, this whole process was superfluous here as
+// keys are already being kept in ASN.1 DER format wrapped in data.PrivateKey
+// structure. With these changes, package has became tightly coupled with notary as
+// most of the method signatures have been updated. Moreover support for ED25519
+// keys has been added as well. License for original package is following:
+//
+// The MIT License (MIT)
+//
+// Copyright (c) 2014 youmark
+//
+// Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+// of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+// in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+// to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+// copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+// furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+//
+// The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+// copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+//
+// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+// IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+// FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+// AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+// LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+// OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+// SOFTWARE.
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// Copy from crypto/x509
+var (
+	oidPublicKeyRSA   = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1}
+	oidPublicKeyDSA   = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1}
+	oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1}
+	// crypto/x509 doesn't have support for ED25519
+	// http://www.oid-info.com/get/1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.15.1
+	oidPublicKeyED25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11591, 15, 1}
+)
+
+// Copy from crypto/x509
+var (
+	oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33}
+	oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7}
+	oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34}
+	oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35}
+)
+
+// Copy from crypto/x509
+func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) {
+	switch curve {
+	case elliptic.P224():
+		return oidNamedCurveP224, true
+	case elliptic.P256():
+		return oidNamedCurveP256, true
+	case elliptic.P384():
+		return oidNamedCurveP384, true
+	case elliptic.P521():
+		return oidNamedCurveP521, true
+	}
+
+	return nil, false
+}
+
+// Unecrypted PKCS8
+var (
+	oidPKCS5PBKDF2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5, 12}
+	oidPBES2       = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5, 13}
+	oidAES256CBC   = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 42}
+)
+
+type ecPrivateKey struct {
+	Version       int
+	PrivateKey    []byte
+	NamedCurveOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:0"`
+	PublicKey     asn1.BitString        `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:1"`
+}
+
+type privateKeyInfo struct {
+	Version             int
+	PrivateKeyAlgorithm []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	PrivateKey          []byte
+}
+
+// Encrypted PKCS8
+type pbkdf2Params struct {
+	Salt           []byte
+	IterationCount int
+}
+
+type pbkdf2Algorithms struct {
+	IDPBKDF2     asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	PBKDF2Params pbkdf2Params
+}
+
+type pbkdf2Encs struct {
+	EncryAlgo asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	IV        []byte
+}
+
+type pbes2Params struct {
+	KeyDerivationFunc pbkdf2Algorithms
+	EncryptionScheme  pbkdf2Encs
+}
+
+type pbes2Algorithms struct {
+	IDPBES2     asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	PBES2Params pbes2Params
+}
+
+type encryptedPrivateKeyInfo struct {
+	EncryptionAlgorithm pbes2Algorithms
+	EncryptedData       []byte
+}
+
+// pkcs8 reflects an ASN.1, PKCS#8 PrivateKey.
+// copied from https://github.com/golang/go/blob/964639cc338db650ccadeafb7424bc8ebb2c0f6c/src/crypto/x509/pkcs8.go#L17
+type pkcs8 struct {
+	Version    int
+	Algo       pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
+	PrivateKey []byte
+}
+
+func parsePKCS8ToTufKey(der []byte) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	var key pkcs8
+
+	if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &key); err != nil {
+		if _, ok := err.(asn1.StructuralError); ok {
+			return nil, errors.New("could not decrypt private key")
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if key.Algo.Algorithm.Equal(oidPublicKeyED25519) {
+		tufED25519PrivateKey, err := ED25519ToPrivateKey(key.PrivateKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert ed25519.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufED25519PrivateKey, nil
+	}
+
+	privKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	switch priv := privKey.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		tufRSAPrivateKey, err := RSAToPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert rsa.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufRSAPrivateKey, nil
+	case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		tufECDSAPrivateKey, err := ECDSAToPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert ecdsa.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufECDSAPrivateKey, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("unsupported key type")
+}
+
+// ParsePKCS8ToTufKey requires PKCS#8 key in DER format and returns data.PrivateKey
+// Password should be provided in case of Encrypted PKCS#8 key, else it should be nil.
+func ParsePKCS8ToTufKey(der []byte, password []byte) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if password == nil {
+		return parsePKCS8ToTufKey(der)
+	}
+
+	var privKey encryptedPrivateKeyInfo
+	if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &privKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: only PKCS #5 v2.0 supported")
+	}
+
+	if !privKey.EncryptionAlgorithm.IDPBES2.Equal(oidPBES2) {
+		return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: only PBES2 supported")
+	}
+
+	if !privKey.EncryptionAlgorithm.PBES2Params.KeyDerivationFunc.IDPBKDF2.Equal(oidPKCS5PBKDF2) {
+		return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: only PBKDF2 supported")
+	}
+
+	encParam := privKey.EncryptionAlgorithm.PBES2Params.EncryptionScheme
+	kdfParam := privKey.EncryptionAlgorithm.PBES2Params.KeyDerivationFunc.PBKDF2Params
+
+	switch {
+	case encParam.EncryAlgo.Equal(oidAES256CBC):
+		iv := encParam.IV
+		salt := kdfParam.Salt
+		iter := kdfParam.IterationCount
+
+		encryptedKey := privKey.EncryptedData
+		symkey := pbkdf2.Key(password, salt, iter, 32, sha1.New)
+		block, err := aes.NewCipher(symkey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		mode := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+		mode.CryptBlocks(encryptedKey, encryptedKey)
+
+		// no need to explicitly remove padding, as ASN.1 unmarshalling will automatically discard it
+		key, err := parsePKCS8ToTufKey(encryptedKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: incorrect password")
+		}
+
+		return key, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: only AES-256-CBC supported")
+	}
+
+}
+
+func convertTUFKeyToPKCS8(priv data.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
+	var pkey privateKeyInfo
+
+	switch priv.Algorithm() {
+	case data.RSAKey, data.RSAx509Key:
+		// Per RFC5958, if publicKey is present, then version is set to v2(1) else version is set to v1(0).
+		// But openssl set to v1 even publicKey is present
+		pkey.Version = 0
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, 1)
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm[0] = oidPublicKeyRSA
+		pkey.PrivateKey = priv.Private()
+	case data.ECDSAKey, data.ECDSAx509Key:
+		// To extract Curve value, parsing ECDSA key to *ecdsa.PrivateKey
+		eckey, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(priv.Private())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		oidNamedCurve, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(eckey.Curve)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: unknown elliptic curve")
+		}
+
+		// Per RFC5958, if publicKey is present, then version is set to v2(1) else version is set to v1(0).
+		// But openssl set to v1 even publicKey is present
+		pkey.Version = 1
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, 2)
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm[0] = oidPublicKeyECDSA
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm[1] = oidNamedCurve
+		pkey.PrivateKey = priv.Private()
+	case data.ED25519Key:
+		pkey.Version = 0
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, 1)
+		pkey.PrivateKeyAlgorithm[0] = oidPublicKeyED25519
+		pkey.PrivateKey = priv.Private()
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s not supported", priv.Algorithm())
+	}
+
+	return asn1.Marshal(pkey)
+}
+
+func convertTUFKeyToPKCS8Encrypted(priv data.PrivateKey, password []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	// Convert private key into PKCS8 format
+	pkey, err := convertTUFKeyToPKCS8(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Calculate key from password based on PKCS5 algorithm
+	// Use 8 byte salt, 16 byte IV, and 2048 iteration
+	iter := 2048
+	salt := make([]byte, 8)
+	iv := make([]byte, 16)
+	_, err = rand.Reader.Read(salt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	_, err = rand.Reader.Read(iv)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	key := pbkdf2.Key(password, salt, iter, 32, sha1.New)
+
+	// Use AES256-CBC mode, pad plaintext with PKCS5 padding scheme
+	padding := aes.BlockSize - len(pkey)%aes.BlockSize
+	if padding > 0 {
+		n := len(pkey)
+		pkey = append(pkey, make([]byte, padding)...)
+		for i := 0; i < padding; i++ {
+			pkey[n+i] = byte(padding)
+		}
+	}
+
+	encryptedKey := make([]byte, len(pkey))
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	mode := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+	mode.CryptBlocks(encryptedKey, pkey)
+
+	pbkdf2algo := pbkdf2Algorithms{oidPKCS5PBKDF2, pbkdf2Params{salt, iter}}
+	pbkdf2encs := pbkdf2Encs{oidAES256CBC, iv}
+	pbes2algo := pbes2Algorithms{oidPBES2, pbes2Params{pbkdf2algo, pbkdf2encs}}
+
+	encryptedPkey := encryptedPrivateKeyInfo{pbes2algo, encryptedKey}
+	return asn1.Marshal(encryptedPkey)
+}
+
+// ConvertTUFKeyToPKCS8 converts a private key (data.Private) to PKCS#8 and returns in DER format
+// if password is not nil, it would convert the Private Key to Encrypted PKCS#8.
+func ConvertTUFKeyToPKCS8(priv data.PrivateKey, password []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if password == nil {
+		return convertTUFKeyToPKCS8(priv)
+	}
+	return convertTUFKeyToPKCS8Encrypted(priv, password)
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils/role_sort.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// RoleList is a list of roles
+type RoleList []string
+
+// Len returns the length of the list
+func (r RoleList) Len() int {
+	return len(r)
+}
+
+// Less returns true if the item at i should be sorted
+// before the item at j. It's an unstable partial ordering
+// based on the number of segments, separated by "/", in
+// the role name
+func (r RoleList) Less(i, j int) bool {
+	segsI := strings.Split(r[i], "/")
+	segsJ := strings.Split(r[j], "/")
+	if len(segsI) == len(segsJ) {
+		return r[i] < r[j]
+	}
+	return len(segsI) < len(segsJ)
+}
+
+// Swap the items at 2 locations in the list
+func (r RoleList) Swap(i, j int) {
+	r[i], r[j] = r[j], r[i]
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils/stack.go

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+// ErrEmptyStack is used when an action that requires some
+// content is invoked and the stack is empty
+type ErrEmptyStack struct {
+	action string
+}
+
+func (err ErrEmptyStack) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("attempted to %s with empty stack", err.action)
+}
+
+// ErrBadTypeCast is used by PopX functions when the item
+// cannot be typed to X
+type ErrBadTypeCast struct{}
+
+func (err ErrBadTypeCast) Error() string {
+	return "attempted to do a typed pop and item was not of type"
+}
+
+// Stack is a simple type agnostic stack implementation
+type Stack struct {
+	s []interface{}
+	l sync.Mutex
+}
+
+// NewStack create a new stack
+func NewStack() *Stack {
+	s := &Stack{
+		s: make([]interface{}, 0),
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// Push adds an item to the top of the stack.
+func (s *Stack) Push(item interface{}) {
+	s.l.Lock()
+	defer s.l.Unlock()
+	s.s = append(s.s, item)
+}
+
+// Pop removes and returns the top item on the stack, or returns
+// ErrEmptyStack if the stack has no content
+func (s *Stack) Pop() (interface{}, error) {
+	s.l.Lock()
+	defer s.l.Unlock()
+	l := len(s.s)
+	if l > 0 {
+		item := s.s[l-1]
+		s.s = s.s[:l-1]
+		return item, nil
+	}
+	return nil, ErrEmptyStack{action: "Pop"}
+}
+
+// PopString attempts to cast the top item on the stack to the string type.
+// If this succeeds, it removes and returns the top item. If the item
+// is not of the string type, ErrBadTypeCast is returned. If the stack
+// is empty, ErrEmptyStack is returned
+func (s *Stack) PopString() (string, error) {
+	s.l.Lock()
+	defer s.l.Unlock()
+	l := len(s.s)
+	if l > 0 {
+		item := s.s[l-1]
+		if item, ok := item.(string); ok {
+			s.s = s.s[:l-1]
+			return item, nil
+		}
+		return "", ErrBadTypeCast{}
+	}
+	return "", ErrEmptyStack{action: "PopString"}
+}
+
+// Empty returns true if the stack is empty
+func (s *Stack) Empty() bool {
+	s.l.Lock()
+	defer s.l.Unlock()
+	return len(s.s) == 0
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils/utils.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// StrSliceContains checks if the given string appears in the slice
+func StrSliceContains(ss []string, s string) bool {
+	for _, v := range ss {
+		if v == s {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// RoleNameSliceContains checks if the given string appears in the slice
+func RoleNameSliceContains(ss []data.RoleName, s data.RoleName) bool {
+	for _, v := range ss {
+		if v == s {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// RoleNameSliceRemove removes the the given RoleName from the slice, returning a new slice
+func RoleNameSliceRemove(ss []data.RoleName, s data.RoleName) []data.RoleName {
+	res := []data.RoleName{}
+	for _, v := range ss {
+		if v != s {
+			res = append(res, v)
+		}
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+// NoopCloser is a simple Reader wrapper that does nothing when Close is
+// called
+type NoopCloser struct {
+	io.Reader
+}
+
+// Close does nothing for a NoopCloser
+func (nc *NoopCloser) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DoHash returns the digest of d using the hashing algorithm named
+// in alg
+func DoHash(alg string, d []byte) []byte {
+	switch alg {
+	case "sha256":
+		digest := sha256.Sum256(d)
+		return digest[:]
+	case "sha512":
+		digest := sha512.Sum512(d)
+		return digest[:]
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// UnusedDelegationKeys prunes a list of keys, returning those that are no
+// longer in use for a given targets file
+func UnusedDelegationKeys(t data.SignedTargets) []string {
+	// compare ids to all still active key ids in all active roles
+	// with the targets file
+	found := make(map[string]bool)
+	for _, r := range t.Signed.Delegations.Roles {
+		for _, id := range r.KeyIDs {
+			found[id] = true
+		}
+	}
+	var discard []string
+	for id := range t.Signed.Delegations.Keys {
+		if !found[id] {
+			discard = append(discard, id)
+		}
+	}
+	return discard
+}
+
+// RemoveUnusedKeys determines which keys in the slice of IDs are no longer
+// used in the given targets file and removes them from the delegated keys
+// map
+func RemoveUnusedKeys(t *data.SignedTargets) {
+	unusedIDs := UnusedDelegationKeys(*t)
+	for _, id := range unusedIDs {
+		delete(t.Signed.Delegations.Keys, id)
+	}
+}
+
+// FindRoleIndex returns the index of the role named <name> or -1 if no
+// matching role is found.
+func FindRoleIndex(rs []*data.Role, name data.RoleName) int {
+	for i, r := range rs {
+		if r.Name == name {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
+}
+
+// ConsistentName generates the appropriate HTTP URL path for the role,
+// based on whether the repo is marked as consistent. The RemoteStore
+// is responsible for adding file extensions.
+func ConsistentName(role string, hashSHA256 []byte) string {
+	if len(hashSHA256) > 0 {
+		hash := hex.EncodeToString(hashSHA256)
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", role, hash)
+	}
+	return role
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/utils/x509.go

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"math/big"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/agl/ed25519"
+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary"
+	"github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/data"
+)
+
+// CanonicalKeyID returns the ID of the public bytes version of a TUF key.
+// On regular RSA/ECDSA TUF keys, this is just the key ID.  On X509 RSA/ECDSA
+// TUF keys, this is the key ID of the public key part of the key in the leaf cert
+func CanonicalKeyID(k data.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+	if k == nil {
+		return "", errors.New("public key is nil")
+	}
+	switch k.Algorithm() {
+	case data.ECDSAx509Key, data.RSAx509Key:
+		return X509PublicKeyID(k)
+	default:
+		return k.ID(), nil
+	}
+}
+
+// LoadCertFromPEM returns the first certificate found in a bunch of bytes or error
+// if nothing is found. Taken from https://golang.org/src/crypto/x509/cert_pool.go#L85.
+func LoadCertFromPEM(pemBytes []byte) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	for len(pemBytes) > 0 {
+		var block *pem.Block
+		block, pemBytes = pem.Decode(pemBytes)
+		if block == nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("no certificates found in PEM data")
+		}
+		if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" || len(block.Headers) != 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		return cert, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("no certificates found in PEM data")
+}
+
+// X509PublicKeyID returns a public key ID as a string, given a
+// data.PublicKey that contains an X509 Certificate
+func X509PublicKeyID(certPubKey data.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+	// Note that this only loads the first certificate from the public key
+	cert, err := LoadCertFromPEM(certPubKey.Public())
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	var key data.PublicKey
+	switch certPubKey.Algorithm() {
+	case data.ECDSAx509Key:
+		key = data.NewECDSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
+	case data.RSAx509Key:
+		key = data.NewRSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
+	}
+
+	return key.ID(), nil
+}
+
+func parseLegacyPrivateKey(block *pem.Block, passphrase string) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if notary.FIPSEnabled() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s not supported in FIPS mode", block.Type)
+	}
+
+	var privKeyBytes []byte
+	var err error
+	if x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) {
+		privKeyBytes, err = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, []byte(passphrase))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("could not decrypt private key")
+		}
+	} else {
+		privKeyBytes = block.Bytes
+	}
+
+	switch block.Type {
+	case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
+		rsaPrivKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(privKeyBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse DER encoded key: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		tufRSAPrivateKey, err := RSAToPrivateKey(rsaPrivKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert rsa.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufRSAPrivateKey, nil
+	case "EC PRIVATE KEY":
+		ecdsaPrivKey, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(privKeyBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse DER encoded private key: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		tufECDSAPrivateKey, err := ECDSAToPrivateKey(ecdsaPrivKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert ecdsa.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufECDSAPrivateKey, nil
+	case "ED25519 PRIVATE KEY":
+		// We serialize ED25519 keys by concatenating the private key
+		// to the public key and encoding with PEM. See the
+		// ED25519ToPrivateKey function.
+		tufECDSAPrivateKey, err := ED25519ToPrivateKey(privKeyBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not convert ecdsa.PrivateKey to data.PrivateKey: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		return tufECDSAPrivateKey, nil
+
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type %q", block.Type)
+	}
+}
+
+// ParsePEMPrivateKey returns a data.PrivateKey from a PEM encoded private key. It
+// supports PKCS#8 as well as RSA/ECDSA (PKCS#1) only in non-FIPS mode and
+// attempts to decrypt using the passphrase, if encrypted.
+func ParsePEMPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte, passphrase string) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
+	if block == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("no valid private key found")
+	}
+
+	switch block.Type {
+	case "RSA PRIVATE KEY", "EC PRIVATE KEY", "ED25519 PRIVATE KEY":
+		return parseLegacyPrivateKey(block, passphrase)
+	case "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", "PRIVATE KEY":
+		if passphrase == "" {
+			return ParsePKCS8ToTufKey(block.Bytes, nil)
+		}
+		return ParsePKCS8ToTufKey(block.Bytes, []byte(passphrase))
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type %q", block.Type)
+	}
+}
+
+// CertToPEM is a utility function returns a PEM encoded x509 Certificate
+func CertToPEM(cert *x509.Certificate) []byte {
+	pemCert := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert.Raw})
+
+	return pemCert
+}
+
+// CertChainToPEM is a utility function returns a PEM encoded chain of x509 Certificates, in the order they are passed
+func CertChainToPEM(certChain []*x509.Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
+	var pemBytes bytes.Buffer
+	for _, cert := range certChain {
+		if err := pem.Encode(&pemBytes, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert.Raw}); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return pemBytes.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+// LoadCertFromFile loads the first certificate from the file provided. The
+// data is expected to be PEM Encoded and contain one of more certificates
+// with PEM type "CERTIFICATE"
+func LoadCertFromFile(filename string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	certs, err := LoadCertBundleFromFile(filename)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return certs[0], nil
+}
+
+// LoadCertBundleFromFile loads certificates from the []byte provided. The
+// data is expected to be PEM Encoded and contain one of more certificates
+// with PEM type "CERTIFICATE"
+func LoadCertBundleFromFile(filename string) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	b, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return LoadCertBundleFromPEM(b)
+}
+
+// LoadCertBundleFromPEM loads certificates from the []byte provided. The
+// data is expected to be PEM Encoded and contain one of more certificates
+// with PEM type "CERTIFICATE"
+func LoadCertBundleFromPEM(pemBytes []byte) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	certificates := []*x509.Certificate{}
+	var block *pem.Block
+	block, pemBytes = pem.Decode(pemBytes)
+	for ; block != nil; block, pemBytes = pem.Decode(pemBytes) {
+		if block.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
+			cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			certificates = append(certificates, cert)
+		} else {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid pem block type: %s", block.Type)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(certificates) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid certificates found")
+	}
+
+	return certificates, nil
+}
+
+// GetLeafCerts parses a list of x509 Certificates and returns all of them
+// that aren't CA
+func GetLeafCerts(certs []*x509.Certificate) []*x509.Certificate {
+	var leafCerts []*x509.Certificate
+	for _, cert := range certs {
+		if cert.IsCA {
+			continue
+		}
+		leafCerts = append(leafCerts, cert)
+	}
+	return leafCerts
+}
+
+// GetIntermediateCerts parses a list of x509 Certificates and returns all of the
+// ones marked as a CA, to be used as intermediates
+func GetIntermediateCerts(certs []*x509.Certificate) []*x509.Certificate {
+	var intCerts []*x509.Certificate
+	for _, cert := range certs {
+		if cert.IsCA {
+			intCerts = append(intCerts, cert)
+		}
+	}
+	return intCerts
+}
+
+// ParsePEMPublicKey returns a data.PublicKey from a PEM encoded public key or certificate.
+func ParsePEMPublicKey(pubKeyBytes []byte) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	pemBlock, _ := pem.Decode(pubKeyBytes)
+	if pemBlock == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("no valid public key found")
+	}
+
+	switch pemBlock.Type {
+	case "CERTIFICATE":
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pemBlock.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse provided certificate: %v", err)
+		}
+		err = ValidateCertificate(cert, true)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid certificate: %v", err)
+		}
+		return CertToKey(cert), nil
+	case "PUBLIC KEY":
+		keyType, err := keyTypeForPublicKey(pemBlock.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return data.NewPublicKey(keyType, pemBlock.Bytes), nil
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported PEM block type %q, expected CERTIFICATE or PUBLIC KEY", pemBlock.Type)
+	}
+}
+
+func keyTypeForPublicKey(pubKeyBytes []byte) (string, error) {
+	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("unable to parse pem encoded public key: %v", err)
+	}
+	switch pub.(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		return data.ECDSAKey, nil
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return data.RSAKey, nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("unknown public key format")
+}
+
+// ValidateCertificate returns an error if the certificate is not valid for notary
+// Currently this is only ensuring the public key has a large enough modulus if RSA,
+// using a non SHA1 signature algorithm, and an optional time expiry check
+func ValidateCertificate(c *x509.Certificate, checkExpiry bool) error {
+	if (c.NotBefore).After(c.NotAfter) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("certificate validity window is invalid")
+	}
+	// Can't have SHA1 sig algorithm
+	if c.SignatureAlgorithm == x509.SHA1WithRSA || c.SignatureAlgorithm == x509.DSAWithSHA1 || c.SignatureAlgorithm == x509.ECDSAWithSHA1 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("certificate with CN %s uses invalid SHA1 signature algorithm", c.Subject.CommonName)
+	}
+	// If we have an RSA key, make sure it's long enough
+	if c.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA {
+		rsaKey, ok := c.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse RSA public key")
+		}
+		if rsaKey.N.BitLen() < notary.MinRSABitSize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("RSA bit length is too short")
+		}
+	}
+	if checkExpiry {
+		now := time.Now()
+		tomorrow := now.AddDate(0, 0, 1)
+		// Give one day leeway on creation "before" time, check "after" against today
+		if (tomorrow).Before(c.NotBefore) || now.After(c.NotAfter) {
+			return data.ErrCertExpired{CN: c.Subject.CommonName}
+		}
+		// If this certificate is expiring within 6 months, put out a warning
+		if (c.NotAfter).Before(time.Now().AddDate(0, 6, 0)) {
+			logrus.Warnf("certificate with CN %s is near expiry", c.Subject.CommonName)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKey returns a new private key using the provided algorithm or an
+// error detailing why the key could not be generated
+func GenerateKey(algorithm string) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	switch algorithm {
+	case data.ECDSAKey:
+		return GenerateECDSAKey(rand.Reader)
+	case data.ED25519Key:
+		return GenerateED25519Key(rand.Reader)
+	}
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("private key type not supported for key generation: %s", algorithm)
+}
+
+// RSAToPrivateKey converts an rsa.Private key to a TUF data.PrivateKey type
+func RSAToPrivateKey(rsaPrivKey *rsa.PrivateKey) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	// Get a DER-encoded representation of the PublicKey
+	rsaPubBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(&rsaPrivKey.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Get a DER-encoded representation of the PrivateKey
+	rsaPrivBytes := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(rsaPrivKey)
+
+	pubKey := data.NewRSAPublicKey(rsaPubBytes)
+	return data.NewRSAPrivateKey(pubKey, rsaPrivBytes)
+}
+
+// GenerateECDSAKey generates an ECDSA Private key and returns a TUF PrivateKey
+func GenerateECDSAKey(random io.Reader) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	ecdsaPrivKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), random)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	tufPrivKey, err := ECDSAToPrivateKey(ecdsaPrivKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("generated ECDSA key with keyID: %s", tufPrivKey.ID())
+
+	return tufPrivKey, nil
+}
+
+// GenerateED25519Key generates an ED25519 private key and returns a TUF
+// PrivateKey. The serialization format we use is just the public key bytes
+// followed by the private key bytes
+func GenerateED25519Key(random io.Reader) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(random)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	var serialized [ed25519.PublicKeySize + ed25519.PrivateKeySize]byte
+	copy(serialized[:], pub[:])
+	copy(serialized[ed25519.PublicKeySize:], priv[:])
+
+	tufPrivKey, err := ED25519ToPrivateKey(serialized[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	logrus.Debugf("generated ED25519 key with keyID: %s", tufPrivKey.ID())
+
+	return tufPrivKey, nil
+}
+
+// ECDSAToPrivateKey converts an ecdsa.Private key to a TUF data.PrivateKey type
+func ECDSAToPrivateKey(ecdsaPrivKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	// Get a DER-encoded representation of the PublicKey
+	ecdsaPubBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(&ecdsaPrivKey.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Get a DER-encoded representation of the PrivateKey
+	ecdsaPrivKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(ecdsaPrivKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal private key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	pubKey := data.NewECDSAPublicKey(ecdsaPubBytes)
+	return data.NewECDSAPrivateKey(pubKey, ecdsaPrivKeyBytes)
+}
+
+// ED25519ToPrivateKey converts a serialized ED25519 key to a TUF
+// data.PrivateKey type
+func ED25519ToPrivateKey(privKeyBytes []byte) (data.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if len(privKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize+ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("malformed ed25519 private key")
+	}
+
+	pubKey := data.NewED25519PublicKey(privKeyBytes[:ed25519.PublicKeySize])
+	return data.NewED25519PrivateKey(*pubKey, privKeyBytes)
+}
+
+// ExtractPrivateKeyAttributes extracts role and gun values from private key bytes
+func ExtractPrivateKeyAttributes(pemBytes []byte) (data.RoleName, data.GUN, error) {
+	block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
+	if block == nil {
+		return "", "", errors.New("PEM block is empty")
+	}
+
+	switch block.Type {
+	case "RSA PRIVATE KEY", "EC PRIVATE KEY", "ED25519 PRIVATE KEY":
+		if notary.FIPSEnabled() {
+			return "", "", fmt.Errorf("%s not supported in FIPS mode", block.Type)
+		}
+	case "PRIVATE KEY", "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY":
+		// do nothing for PKCS#8 keys
+	default:
+		return "", "", errors.New("unknown key format")
+	}
+	return data.RoleName(block.Headers["role"]), data.GUN(block.Headers["gun"]), nil
+}
+
+// ConvertPrivateKeyToPKCS8 converts a data.PrivateKey to PKCS#8 Format
+func ConvertPrivateKeyToPKCS8(key data.PrivateKey, role data.RoleName, gun data.GUN, passphrase string) ([]byte, error) {
+	var (
+		err       error
+		der       []byte
+		blockType = "PRIVATE KEY"
+	)
+
+	if passphrase == "" {
+		der, err = ConvertTUFKeyToPKCS8(key, nil)
+	} else {
+		blockType = "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY"
+		der, err = ConvertTUFKeyToPKCS8(key, []byte(passphrase))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to convert to PKCS8 key")
+	}
+
+	headers := make(map[string]string)
+	if role != "" {
+		headers["role"] = role.String()
+	}
+
+	if gun != "" {
+		headers["gun"] = gun.String()
+	}
+
+	return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Bytes: der, Type: blockType, Headers: headers}), nil
+}
+
+// CertToKey transforms a single input certificate into its corresponding
+// PublicKey
+func CertToKey(cert *x509.Certificate) data.PublicKey {
+	block := pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert.Raw}
+	pemdata := pem.EncodeToMemory(&block)
+
+	switch cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
+	case x509.RSA:
+		return data.NewRSAx509PublicKey(pemdata)
+	case x509.ECDSA:
+		return data.NewECDSAx509PublicKey(pemdata)
+	default:
+		logrus.Debugf("Unknown key type parsed from certificate: %v", cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm)
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// CertsToKeys transforms each of the input certificate chains into its corresponding
+// PublicKey
+func CertsToKeys(leafCerts map[string]*x509.Certificate, intCerts map[string][]*x509.Certificate) map[string]data.PublicKey {
+	keys := make(map[string]data.PublicKey)
+	for id, leafCert := range leafCerts {
+		if key, err := CertBundleToKey(leafCert, intCerts[id]); err == nil {
+			keys[key.ID()] = key
+		}
+	}
+	return keys
+}
+
+// CertBundleToKey creates a TUF key from a leaf certs and a list of
+// intermediates
+func CertBundleToKey(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) (data.PublicKey, error) {
+	certBundle := []*x509.Certificate{leafCert}
+	certBundle = append(certBundle, intCerts...)
+	certChainPEM, err := CertChainToPEM(certBundle)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var newKey data.PublicKey
+	// Use the leaf cert's public key algorithm for typing
+	switch leafCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
+	case x509.RSA:
+		newKey = data.NewRSAx509PublicKey(certChainPEM)
+	case x509.ECDSA:
+		newKey = data.NewECDSAx509PublicKey(certChainPEM)
+	default:
+		logrus.Debugf("Unknown key type parsed from certificate: %v", leafCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm)
+		return nil, x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
+	}
+	return newKey, nil
+}
+
+// NewCertificate returns an X509 Certificate following a template, given a Common Name and validity interval.
+func NewCertificate(commonName string, startTime, endTime time.Time) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	serialNumberLimit := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128)
+
+	serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, serialNumberLimit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate new certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber: serialNumber,
+		Subject: pkix.Name{
+			CommonName: commonName,
+		},
+		NotBefore: startTime,
+		NotAfter:  endTime,
+
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
+		ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+	}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/tuf/validation/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package validation
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+// VALIDATION ERRORS
+
+// ErrValidation represents a general validation error
+type ErrValidation struct {
+	Msg string
+}
+
+func (err ErrValidation) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("An error occurred during validation: %s", err.Msg)
+}
+
+// ErrBadHierarchy represents missing metadata.  Currently: a missing snapshot
+// at this current time. When delegations are implemented it will also
+// represent a missing delegation parent
+type ErrBadHierarchy struct {
+	Missing string
+	Msg     string
+}
+
+func (err ErrBadHierarchy) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Metadata hierarchy is incomplete: %s", err.Msg)
+}
+
+// ErrBadRoot represents a failure validating the root
+type ErrBadRoot struct {
+	Msg string
+}
+
+func (err ErrBadRoot) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("The root metadata is invalid: %s", err.Msg)
+}
+
+// ErrBadTargets represents a failure to validate a targets (incl delegations)
+type ErrBadTargets struct {
+	Msg string
+}
+
+func (err ErrBadTargets) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("The targets metadata is invalid: %s", err.Msg)
+}
+
+// ErrBadSnapshot represents a failure to validate the snapshot
+type ErrBadSnapshot struct {
+	Msg string
+}
+
+func (err ErrBadSnapshot) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("The snapshot metadata is invalid: %s", err.Msg)
+}
+
+// END VALIDATION ERRORS
+
+// SerializableError is a struct that can be used to serialize an error as JSON
+type SerializableError struct {
+	Name  string
+	Error error
+}
+
+// UnmarshalJSON attempts to unmarshal the error into the right type
+func (s *SerializableError) UnmarshalJSON(text []byte) (err error) {
+	var x struct{ Name string }
+	err = json.Unmarshal(text, &x)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	var theError error
+	switch x.Name {
+	case "ErrValidation":
+		var e struct{ Error ErrValidation }
+		err = json.Unmarshal(text, &e)
+		theError = e.Error
+	case "ErrBadHierarchy":
+		var e struct{ Error ErrBadHierarchy }
+		err = json.Unmarshal(text, &e)
+		theError = e.Error
+	case "ErrBadRoot":
+		var e struct{ Error ErrBadRoot }
+		err = json.Unmarshal(text, &e)
+		theError = e.Error
+	case "ErrBadTargets":
+		var e struct{ Error ErrBadTargets }
+		err = json.Unmarshal(text, &e)
+		theError = e.Error
+	case "ErrBadSnapshot":
+		var e struct{ Error ErrBadSnapshot }
+		err = json.Unmarshal(text, &e)
+		theError = e.Error
+	default:
+		err = fmt.Errorf("do not know how to unmarshal %s", x.Name)
+		return
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s.Name = x.Name
+	s.Error = theError
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewSerializableError serializes one of the above errors into JSON
+func NewSerializableError(err error) (*SerializableError, error) {
+	// make sure it's one of our errors
+	var name string
+	switch err.(type) {
+	case ErrValidation:
+		name = "ErrValidation"
+	case ErrBadHierarchy:
+		name = "ErrBadHierarchy"
+	case ErrBadRoot:
+		name = "ErrBadRoot"
+	case ErrBadTargets:
+		name = "ErrBadTargets"
+	case ErrBadSnapshot:
+		name = "ErrBadSnapshot"
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("does not support serializing non-validation errors")
+	}
+	return &SerializableError{Name: name, Error: err}, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/theupdateframework/notary/vendor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+github.com/Shopify/logrus-bugsnag   6dbc35f2c30d1e37549f9673dd07912452ab28a5
+github.com/sirupsen/logrus          f006c2ac4710855cf0f916dd6b77acf6b048dc6e  # v1.0.3
+github.com/agl/ed25519              278e1ec8e8a6e017cd07577924d6766039146ced
+github.com/bugsnag/bugsnag-go       13fd6b8acda029830ef9904df6b63be0a83369d0
+github.com/bugsnag/panicwrap	    e2c28503fcd0675329da73bf48b33404db873782
+github.com/bugsnag/osext	    0dd3f918b21bec95ace9dc86c7e70266cfc5c702
+github.com/docker/distribution      edc3ab29cdff8694dd6feb85cfeb4b5f1b38ed9c
+github.com/opencontainers/go-digest a6d0ee40d4207ea02364bd3b9e8e77b9159ba1eb 
+github.com/docker/go-connections    3ede32e2033de7505e6500d6c868c2b9ed9f169d
+github.com/docker/go                d30aec9fd63c35133f8f79c3412ad91a3b08be06
+github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go     6387d3c1f5abd8443b223577d5a7e0f4e0e5731f   # v1.2
+github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql      a0583e0143b1624142adab07e0e97fe106d99561   # v1.3
+github.com/gorilla/mux              e444e69cbd2e2e3e0749a2f3c717cec491552bbf
+github.com/jinzhu/gorm              5409931a1bb87e484d68d649af9367c207713ea2
+github.com/jinzhu/inflection        1c35d901db3da928c72a72d8458480cc9ade058f
+github.com/lib/pq                   0dad96c0b94f8dee039aa40467f767467392a0af
+github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3         b4142c444a8941d0d92b0b7103a24df9cd815e42   # v1.0.0
+github.com/miekg/pkcs11             ba39b9c6300b7e0be41b115330145ef8afdff7d6
+github.com/mitchellh/go-homedir     df55a15e5ce646808815381b3db47a8c66ea62f4
+github.com/prometheus/client_golang 449ccefff16c8e2b7229f6be1921ba22f62461fe
+github.com/prometheus/client_model  fa8ad6fec33561be4280a8f0514318c79d7f6cb6   # model-0.0.2-12-gfa8ad6f
+github.com/prometheus/procfs	    b1afdc266f54247f5dc725544f5d351a8661f502
+github.com/prometheus/common	    4fdc91a58c9d3696b982e8a680f4997403132d44
+github.com/golang/protobuf          c3cefd437628a0b7d31b34fe44b3a7a540e98527
+github.com/spf13/cobra              f368244301305f414206f889b1735a54cfc8bde8
+github.com/spf13/viper              be5ff3e4840cf692388bde7a057595a474ef379e
+golang.org/x/crypto                 76eec36fa14229c4b25bb894c2d0e591527af429
+golang.org/x/net                    6a513affb38dc9788b449d59ffed099b8de18fa0
+golang.org/x/sys                    739734461d1c916b6c72a63d7efda2b27edb369f
+google.golang.org/grpc              708a7f9f3283aa2d4f6132d287d78683babe55c8   # v1.0.5
+github.com/pkg/errors 		    839d9e913e063e28dfd0e6c7b7512793e0a48be9
+
+github.com/spf13/pflag		    cb88ea77998c3f024757528e3305022ab50b43be
+github.com/spf13/cast		    4d07383ffe94b5e5a6fa3af9211374a4507a0184
+gopkg.in/yaml.v2 		    bef53efd0c76e49e6de55ead051f886bea7e9420
+gopkg.in/fatih/pool.v2		    cba550ebf9bce999a02e963296d4bc7a486cb715
+github.com/gorilla/context	    14f550f51af52180c2eefed15e5fd18d63c0a64a
+github.com/spf13/jwalterweatherman  3d60171a64319ef63c78bd45bd60e6eab1e75f8b
+github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure   2caf8efc93669b6c43e0441cdc6aed17546c96f3
+github.com/magiconair/properties    624009598839a9432bd97bb75552389422357723  # v1.5.3
+github.com/kr/text		    6807e777504f54ad073ecef66747de158294b639
+github.com/kr/pretty		    bc9499caa0f45ee5edb2f0209fbd61fbf3d9018f  # go.weekly.2011-12-22-18-gbc9499c
+github.com/hailocab/go-hostpool	    e80d13ce29ede4452c43dea11e79b9bc8a15b478
+github.com/docker/libtrust	    aabc10ec26b754e797f9028f4589c5b7bd90dc20
+github.com/beorn7/perks		    b965b613227fddccbfffe13eae360ed3fa822f8d
+github.com/BurntSushi/toml	    a368813c5e648fee92e5f6c30e3944ff9d5e8895
+
+github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions	d0c3fe89de86839aecf2e0579c40ba3bb336a453
+github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap			76626ae9c91c4f2a10f34cad8ce83ea42c93bb75
+
+gopkg.in/dancannon/gorethink.v3        e324d6ad938205da6c1e8a0179dc97a5b1a92185  https://github.com/docker/gorethink # v3.0.0-logrus
+# dependencies of gorethink.v3
+gopkg.in/gorethink/gorethink.v2        ac5be4ae8538d44ae8843b97fc9f90860cb48a85  https://github.com/docker/gorethink # v2.2.2-logrus
+github.com/cenk/backoff             32cd0c5b3aef12c76ed64aaf678f6c79736be7dc  # v1.0.0
+
+# Testing requirements
+github.com/stretchr/testify                     089c7181b8c728499929ff09b62d3fdd8df8adff
+github.com/cloudflare/cfssl                     7fb22c8cba7ecaf98e4082d22d65800cf45e042a
+github.com/google/certificate-transparency      0f6e3d1d1ba4d03fdaab7cd716f36255c2e48341