sig-security: add meeting notes for 2017-06-21

Signed-off-by: Riyaz Faizullabhoy <riyaz.faizullabhoy@docker.com>

reports/sig-security/2017-06-21.md

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ Meeting location: https://docker.zoom.us/j/779801882
 
 Announcement: [Moby project forum post](https://forums.mobyproject.org/t/2017-06-21-linuxkit-security-sig-meeting/74)
 
+Video recording: coming soon!
+
 Previous meeting notes: [2017-06-07](2017-06-07.md)
 
 ## Agenda
@@ -23,3 +25,57 @@ Previous meeting notes: [2017-06-07](2017-06-07.md)
   - we can propose additional deep dives and discussion topics!
 
 ## Meeting Notes
+Scribe: @mgoelzer
+
+- Next meeting July 5
+
+- Recap of Moby Summit
+  - slides for [linuxkit update](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Y4ZI2r-O8NNp3geq0Q_Ud07YnhTX6G7Q2T_iaeWnAME/edit#slide=id.g1e55e362fb_0_0) and [linuxkit security](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1ld5nUgPKMEwaiR7EgGPJeJU29YZkww8e_9Aa1ONSXvs/edit), videos coming soon
+  - Lots of bare metal linuxkit interest
+  - auditd requested
+  - Another Summit at Open Source Summit in LA
+
+- Package Signing
+  - Based on Notary (based on The Update Framework) - implemented in Docker Content Trust in Docker CLI
+  - all `linuxkit/` images on Docker Hub are signed by maintainers
+  - Guarantees:
+    - authenticity
+    - integrity
+    - freshness
+    - survivability after key compromise
+  - Linuxkit yaml files container `trust:` block - tells moby builder that you want to verify all images in a given organization or per image control
+  - Moby builder will first check the signatures for all images and validate expiration dates before pulling images
+  - Future directions:
+    - key pinning for signed packages
+    - enforce multi-sig thresholds
+    actively remove sigs for old packages (or let them expire)
+    - private notary servers
+
+- Landlock LSM (presentation by @l0kod)
+  - [Presentation slides here](https://landlock-lsm.github.io/talks/2017-06-21_landlock-linuxkit-sig.pdf)
+  - Threat:  compromised processes (like browsers) -> privilege escalations -> access data on the system
+  - Today we have:
+    - access control through SELinux (fine grained)
+    - seccomp-bpf (not an AC mechanism)
+    - namespaces
+  - Landlock is trying to do three things:
+    - fine grained control
+    - unprivileged
+    - embedded in applications
+  - Landlock = programmatic access control
+  - Landlock rules:
+    - written in C
+    - compiled down to eBPF bytecode
+    - embedded in application
+    - application executes
+    - Landlock rule loaded into running kernel
+  - Example:  rule that says application cannot write to files but can write to FIFOs
+- Key data structure:  `struct landlock_context`
+- Overview of eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filtering)
+  - In-kernel bytecode
+  - For network filtering, tracing
+- Landlock Roadmap:
+  - MVP
+  - cgroups
+  - new eBPF maps for fs checks
+  - unprivileged mode