The priv container populate the `/mac` key on startup, that the calf can
then read.
Also add more fine-grained control over read/write delete capabilities attached
to the routes, e.g. the calf can read /mac but not write to it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gazagnaire <thomas@gazagnaire.org>
The protocol allows the client to send concurrent RPCs to the server.
The server replies by keeping the client ID, and the client keeps a
dispatch table of queries to route the retries. By doing things like
that, the server has a strong control over resource allocation, so
a bad client cannot exhaust all the server memory.
Also add some simple tests for the serialization + wire protocol which
are all passing. Proper concurrency/resource exhaustion usage will be
added later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gazagnaire <thomas@gazagnaire.org>
Previously, the control plane was using HTTP client/server, that various people
found way too complex to run in a privileged container (for very good reasons).
So switching to a simpler binary protocol, using c-like structures. Will
probably switch to an other serialization protocol later (eg. protobuf
or cap-n-proto).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gazagnaire <thomas@gazagnaire.org>
Today the SDK only contains helper code to create secure Moby services based on
MirageOS. Today the SDK only defines the architecture and the communication
pipes between the privileged service and the calf; the proper communication
API will be specified after we have a few more use-cases.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gazagnaire <thomas@gazagnaire.org>
