fix(deps): update module github.com/containers/image/v5 to v5.32.2

Signed-off-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

go.mod

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ go 1.21.0
 require (
 	github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3 v3.2.1
 	github.com/containers/common v0.60.1
-	github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1
+	github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2
 	github.com/containers/ocicrypt v1.2.0
 	github.com/containers/storage v1.55.0
 	github.com/docker/distribution v2.8.3+incompatible

go.sum

@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ github.com/containerd/stargz-snapshotter/estargz v0.15.1 h1:eXJjw9RbkLFgioVaTG+G
 github.com/containerd/stargz-snapshotter/estargz v0.15.1/go.mod h1:gr2RNwukQ/S9Nv33Lt6UC7xEx58C+LHRdoqbEKjz1Kk=
 github.com/containers/common v0.60.1 h1:hMJNKfDxfXY91zD7mr4t/Ybe8JbAsTq5nkrUaCqTKsA=
 github.com/containers/common v0.60.1/go.mod h1:tB0DRxznmHviECVHnqgWbl+8AVCSMZLA8qe7+U7KD6k=
-github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1 h1:fVa7GxRC4BCPGsfSRs4JY12WyeY26SUYQ0NuANaCFrI=
+github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2 h1:SzNE2Y6sf9b1GJoC8qjCuMBXwQrACFp4p0RK15+4gmQ=
-github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1/go.mod h1:v1l73VeMugfj/QtKI+jhYbwnwFCFnNGckvbST3rQ5Hk=
+github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2/go.mod h1:v1l73VeMugfj/QtKI+jhYbwnwFCFnNGckvbST3rQ5Hk=
 github.com/containers/libtrust v0.0.0-20230121012942-c1716e8a8d01 h1:Qzk5C6cYglewc+UyGf6lc8Mj2UaPTHy/iF2De0/77CA=
 github.com/containers/libtrust v0.0.0-20230121012942-c1716e8a8d01/go.mod h1:9rfv8iPl1ZP7aqh9YA68wnZv2NUDbXdcdPHVz0pFbPY=
 github.com/containers/ocicrypt v1.2.0 h1:X14EgRK3xNFvJEfI5O4Qn4T3E25ANudSOZz/sirVuPM=

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/fulcio_cert.go

@@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ func (f *fulcioTrustRoot) verifyFulcioCertificateAtTime(relevantTime time.Time,
 	return untrustedCertificate.PublicKey, nil
 }
 
-func verifyRekorFulcio(rekorPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, fulcioTrustRoot *fulcioTrustRoot, untrustedRekorSET []byte,
+func verifyRekorFulcio(rekorPublicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey, fulcioTrustRoot *fulcioTrustRoot, untrustedRekorSET []byte,
 	untrustedCertificateBytes []byte, untrustedIntermediateChainBytes []byte, untrustedBase64Signature string,
 	untrustedPayloadBytes []byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	rekorSETTime, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(rekorPublicKey, untrustedRekorSET, untrustedCertificateBytes,
+	rekorSETTime, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(rekorPublicKeys, untrustedRekorSET, untrustedCertificateBytes,
 		untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayloadBytes)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/rekor_set.go

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (p UntrustedRekorPayload) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 
 // VerifyRekorSET verifies that unverifiedRekorSET is correctly signed by publicKey and matches the rest of the data.
 // Returns bundle upload time on success.
-func VerifyRekorSET(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unverifiedKeyOrCertBytes []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, unverifiedPayloadBytes []byte) (time.Time, error) {
+func VerifyRekorSET(publicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unverifiedKeyOrCertBytes []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, unverifiedPayloadBytes []byte) (time.Time, error) {
 	// FIXME: Should the publicKey parameter hard-code ecdsa?
 
 	// == Parse SET bytes
@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ func VerifyRekorSET(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, unverifiedRekorSET []byte, unver
 		return time.Time{}, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("canonicalizing Rekor SET JSON: %v", err))
 	}
 	untrustedSETPayloadHash := sha256.Sum256(untrustedSETPayloadCanonicalBytes)
-	if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(publicKey, untrustedSETPayloadHash[:], untrustedSET.UntrustedSignedEntryTimestamp) {
+	publicKeymatched := false
+	for _, pk := range publicKeys {
+		if ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pk, untrustedSETPayloadHash[:], untrustedSET.UntrustedSignedEntryTimestamp) {
+			publicKeymatched = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !publicKeymatched {
 		return time.Time{}, NewInvalidSignatureError("cryptographic signature verification of Rekor SET failed")
 	}
 

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal/sigstore_payload.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/containers/image/v5/version"
@@ -171,24 +172,62 @@ type SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules struct {
 	ValidateSignedDockerManifestDigest func(digest.Digest) error
 }
 
-// VerifySigstorePayload verifies unverifiedBase64Signature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created by publicKey, and that its principal components
+// verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature verifies unverifiedSignature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created
+// by any of the public keys in publicKeys.
+//
+// This is an internal implementation detail of VerifySigstorePayload and should have no other callers.
+// It is INSUFFICIENT alone to consider the signature acceptable.
+func verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature(publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload, unverifiedSignature []byte) error {
+	if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("Need at least one public key to verify the sigstore payload, but got 0")
+	}
+
+	verifiers := make([]sigstoreSignature.Verifier, 0, len(publicKeys))
+	for _, key := range publicKeys {
+		// Failing to load a verifier indicates that something is really, really
+		// invalid about the public key; prefer to fail even if the signature might be
+		// valid with other keys, so that users fix their fallback keys before they need them.
+		// For that reason, we even initialize all verifiers before trying to validate the signature
+		// with any key.
+		verifier, err := sigstoreSignature.LoadVerifier(key, sigstoreHarcodedHashAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		verifiers = append(verifiers, verifier)
+	}
+
+	var failures []string
+	for _, verifier := range verifiers {
+		// github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign.verifyOCISignature uses signatureoptions.WithContext(),
+		// which seems to be not used by anything. So we don’t bother.
+		err := verifier.VerifySignature(bytes.NewReader(unverifiedSignature), bytes.NewReader(unverifiedPayload))
+		if err == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		failures = append(failures, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	if len(failures) == 0 {
+		// Coverage: We have checked there is at least one public key, any success causes an early return,
+		// and any failure adds an entry to failures => there must be at least one error.
+		return fmt.Errorf("Internal error: signature verification failed but no errors have been recorded")
+	}
+	return NewInvalidSignatureError("cryptographic signature verification failed: " + strings.Join(failures, ", "))
+}
+
+// VerifySigstorePayload verifies unverifiedBase64Signature of unverifiedPayload was correctly created by any of the public keys in publicKeys, and that its principal components
 // match expected values, both as specified by rules, and returns it.
 // We return an *UntrustedSigstorePayload, although nothing actually uses it,
 // just to double-check against stupid typos.
-func VerifySigstorePayload(publicKey crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, rules SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules) (*UntrustedSigstorePayload, error) {
+func VerifySigstorePayload(publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey, unverifiedPayload []byte, unverifiedBase64Signature string, rules SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules) (*UntrustedSigstorePayload, error) {
-	verifier, err := sigstoreSignature.LoadVerifier(publicKey, sigstoreHarcodedHashAlgorithm)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating verifier: %w", err)
-	}
-
 	unverifiedSignature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(unverifiedBase64Signature)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("base64 decoding: %v", err))
 	}
-	// github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign.verifyOCISignature uses signatureoptions.WithContext(),
+
-	// which seems to be not used by anything. So we don’t bother.
+	if err := verifySigstorePayloadBlobSignature(publicKeys, unverifiedPayload, unverifiedSignature); err != nil {
-	if err := verifier.VerifySignature(bytes.NewReader(unverifiedSignature), bytes.NewReader(unverifiedPayload)); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
-		return nil, NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("cryptographic signature verification failed: %v", err))
 	}
 
 	var unmatchedPayload UntrustedSigstorePayload

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_config_sigstore.go

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package signature
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 
 	"github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/internal"
@@ -15,29 +14,57 @@ type PRSigstoreSignedOption func(*prSigstoreSigned) error
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPath(keyPath string) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.KeyPath != "" {
-			return errors.New(`"keyPath" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPath" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.KeyPath = keyPath
 		return nil
 	}
 }
 
+// PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths specifies a value for the "keyPaths" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
+func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths(keyPaths []string) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
+	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
+		if pr.KeyPaths != nil {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPaths" already specified`)
+		}
+		if len(keyPaths) == 0 {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyPaths" contains no entries`)
+		}
+		pr.KeyPaths = keyPaths
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
 // PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData specifies a value for the "keyData" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData(keyData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.KeyData != nil {
-			return errors.New(`"keyData" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyData" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.KeyData = keyData
 		return nil
 	}
 }
 
+// PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas specifies a value for the "keyDatas" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
+func PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas(keyDatas [][]byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
+	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
+		if pr.KeyDatas != nil {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyDatas" already specified`)
+		}
+		if len(keyDatas) == 0 {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"keyDatas" contains no entries`)
+		}
+		pr.KeyDatas = keyDatas
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
 // PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio specifies a value for the "fulcio" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.Fulcio != nil {
-			return errors.New(`"fulcio" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"fulcio" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.Fulcio = fulcio
 		return nil
@@ -48,29 +75,57 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio) PRSigstoreSignedO
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPath(rekorPublicKeyPath string) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" {
-			return errors.New(`"rekorPublicKeyPath" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublicKeyPath" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.RekorPublicKeyPath = rekorPublicKeyPath
 		return nil
 	}
 }
 
+// PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths specifies a value for the rRekorPublickeyPaths" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
+func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths(rekorPublickeyPaths []string) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
+	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
+		if pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths != nil {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyPaths" already specified`)
+		}
+		if len(rekorPublickeyPaths) == 0 {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyPaths" contains no entries`)
+		}
+		pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths = rekorPublickeyPaths
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
 // PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData specifies a value for the "rekorPublicKeyData" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData(rekorPublicKeyData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.RekorPublicKeyData != nil {
-			return errors.New(`"rekorPublicKeyData" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublicKeyData" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.RekorPublicKeyData = rekorPublicKeyData
 		return nil
 	}
 }
 
+// PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas specifies a value for the "rekorPublickeyDatas" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
+func PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas(rekorPublickeyDatas [][]byte) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
+	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
+		if pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas != nil {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyDatas" already specified`)
+		}
+		if len(rekorPublickeyDatas) == 0 {
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"rekorPublickeyDatas" contains no entries`)
+		}
+		pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas = rekorPublickeyDatas
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
 // PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity specifies a value for the "signedIdentity" field when calling NewPRSigstoreSigned.
 func PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity(signedIdentity PolicyReferenceMatch) PRSigstoreSignedOption {
 	return func(pr *prSigstoreSigned) error {
 		if pr.SignedIdentity != nil {
-			return errors.New(`"signedIdentity" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"signedIdentity" already specified`)
 		}
 		pr.SignedIdentity = signedIdentity
 		return nil
@@ -92,21 +147,40 @@ func newPRSigstoreSigned(options ...PRSigstoreSignedOption) (*prSigstoreSigned,
 	if res.KeyPath != "" {
 		keySources++
 	}
+	if res.KeyPaths != nil {
+		keySources++
+	}
 	if res.KeyData != nil {
 		keySources++
 	}
+	if res.KeyDatas != nil {
+		keySources++
+	}
 	if res.Fulcio != nil {
 		keySources++
 	}
 	if keySources != 1 {
-		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("exactly one of keyPath, keyData and fulcio must be specified")
+		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("exactly one of keyPath, keyPaths, keyData, keyDatas and fulcio must be specified")
 	}
 
-	if res.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" && res.RekorPublicKeyData != nil {
+	rekorSources := 0
-		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("rekorPublickeyType and rekorPublickeyData cannot be used simultaneously")
+	if res.RekorPublicKeyPath != "" {
+		rekorSources++
 	}
-	if res.Fulcio != nil && res.RekorPublicKeyPath == "" && res.RekorPublicKeyData == nil {
+	if res.RekorPublicKeyPaths != nil {
-		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("At least one of RekorPublickeyPath and RekorPublickeyData must be specified if fulcio is used")
+		rekorSources++
+	}
+	if res.RekorPublicKeyData != nil {
+		rekorSources++
+	}
+	if res.RekorPublicKeyDatas != nil {
+		rekorSources++
+	}
+	if rekorSources > 1 {
+		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("at most one of rekorPublickeyPath, rekorPublicKeyPaths, rekorPublickeyData and rekorPublicKeyDatas can be used simultaneously")
+	}
+	if res.Fulcio != nil && rekorSources == 0 {
+		return nil, InvalidPolicyFormatError("At least one of rekorPublickeyPath, rekorPublicKeyPaths, rekorPublickeyData and rekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified if fulcio is used")
 	}
 
 	if res.SignedIdentity == nil {
@@ -144,7 +218,8 @@ var _ json.Unmarshaler = (*prSigstoreSigned)(nil)
 func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 	*pr = prSigstoreSigned{}
 	var tmp prSigstoreSigned
-	var gotKeyPath, gotKeyData, gotFulcio, gotRekorPublicKeyPath, gotRekorPublicKeyData bool
+	var gotKeyPath, gotKeyPaths, gotKeyData, gotKeyDatas, gotFulcio bool
+	var gotRekorPublicKeyPath, gotRekorPublicKeyPaths, gotRekorPublicKeyData, gotRekorPublicKeyDatas bool
 	var fulcio prSigstoreSignedFulcio
 	var signedIdentity json.RawMessage
 	if err := internal.ParanoidUnmarshalJSONObject(data, func(key string) any {
@@ -154,18 +229,30 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 		case "keyPath":
 			gotKeyPath = true
 			return &tmp.KeyPath
+		case "keyPaths":
+			gotKeyPaths = true
+			return &tmp.KeyPaths
 		case "keyData":
 			gotKeyData = true
 			return &tmp.KeyData
+		case "keyDatas":
+			gotKeyDatas = true
+			return &tmp.KeyDatas
 		case "fulcio":
 			gotFulcio = true
 			return &fulcio
 		case "rekorPublicKeyPath":
 			gotRekorPublicKeyPath = true
 			return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyPath
+		case "rekorPublicKeyPaths":
+			gotRekorPublicKeyPaths = true
+			return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyPaths
 		case "rekorPublicKeyData":
 			gotRekorPublicKeyData = true
 			return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyData
+		case "rekorPublicKeyDatas":
+			gotRekorPublicKeyDatas = true
+			return &tmp.RekorPublicKeyDatas
 		case "signedIdentity":
 			return &signedIdentity
 		default:
@@ -192,18 +279,30 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 	if gotKeyPath {
 		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPath(tmp.KeyPath))
 	}
+	if gotKeyPaths {
+		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyPaths(tmp.KeyPaths))
+	}
 	if gotKeyData {
 		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyData(tmp.KeyData))
 	}
+	if gotKeyDatas {
+		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithKeyDatas(tmp.KeyDatas))
+	}
 	if gotFulcio {
 		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithFulcio(&fulcio))
 	}
 	if gotRekorPublicKeyPath {
 		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPath(tmp.RekorPublicKeyPath))
 	}
+	if gotRekorPublicKeyPaths {
+		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyPaths(tmp.RekorPublicKeyPaths))
+	}
 	if gotRekorPublicKeyData {
 		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyData(tmp.RekorPublicKeyData))
 	}
+	if gotRekorPublicKeyDatas {
+		opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithRekorPublicKeyDatas(tmp.RekorPublicKeyDatas))
+	}
 	opts = append(opts, PRSigstoreSignedWithSignedIdentity(tmp.SignedIdentity))
 
 	res, err := newPRSigstoreSigned(opts...)
@@ -221,7 +320,7 @@ type PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption func(*prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error
 func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAPath(caPath string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption {
 	return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error {
 		if f.CAPath != "" {
-			return errors.New(`"caPath" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"caPath" already specified`)
 		}
 		f.CAPath = caPath
 		return nil
@@ -232,7 +331,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAPath(caPath string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOptio
 func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAData(caData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption {
 	return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error {
 		if f.CAData != nil {
-			return errors.New(`"caData" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"caData" already specified`)
 		}
 		f.CAData = caData
 		return nil
@@ -243,7 +342,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithCAData(caData []byte) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOptio
 func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithOIDCIssuer(oidcIssuer string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption {
 	return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error {
 		if f.OIDCIssuer != "" {
-			return errors.New(`"oidcIssuer" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"oidcIssuer" already specified`)
 		}
 		f.OIDCIssuer = oidcIssuer
 		return nil
@@ -254,7 +353,7 @@ func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithOIDCIssuer(oidcIssuer string) PRSigstoreSignedFul
 func PRSigstoreSignedFulcioWithSubjectEmail(subjectEmail string) PRSigstoreSignedFulcioOption {
 	return func(f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) error {
 		if f.SubjectEmail != "" {
-			return errors.New(`"subjectEmail" already specified`)
+			return InvalidPolicyFormatError(`"subjectEmail" already specified`)
 		}
 		f.SubjectEmail = subjectEmail
 		return nil

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_signedby.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"os"
 	"slices"
 
 	"github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/multierr"
@@ -27,33 +26,18 @@ func (pr *prSignedBy) isSignatureAuthorAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva
 	}
 
 	// FIXME: move this to per-context initialization
-	var data [][]byte
+	const notOneSourceErrorText = `Internal inconsistency: not exactly one of "keyPath", "keyPaths" and "keyData" specified`
-	keySources := 0
+	data, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{
-	if pr.KeyPath != "" {
+		inconsistencyErrorMessage: notOneSourceErrorText,
-		keySources++
+		path:                      pr.KeyPath,
-		d, err := os.ReadFile(pr.KeyPath)
+		paths:                     pr.KeyPaths,
+		data:                      pr.KeyData,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return sarRejected, nil, err
 	}
-		data = [][]byte{d}
+	if data == nil {
-	}
+		return sarRejected, nil, errors.New(notOneSourceErrorText)
-	if pr.KeyPaths != nil {
-		keySources++
-		data = [][]byte{}
-		for _, path := range pr.KeyPaths {
-			d, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-			if err != nil {
-				return sarRejected, nil, err
-			}
-			data = append(data, d)
-		}
-	}
-	if pr.KeyData != nil {
-		keySources++
-		data = [][]byte{pr.KeyData}
-	}
-	if keySources != 1 {
-		return sarRejected, nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: not exactly one of "keyPath", "keyPaths" and "keyData" specified`)
 	}
 
 	// FIXME: move this to per-context initialization

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_eval_sigstore.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/multierr"
 	"github.com/containers/image/v5/internal/private"
@@ -20,37 +21,69 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore/pkg/cryptoutils"
 )
 
-// loadBytesFromDataOrPath ensures there is at most one of ${prefix}Data and ${prefix}Path set,
+// configBytesSources contains configuration fields which may result in one or more []byte values
+type configBytesSources struct {
+	inconsistencyErrorMessage string   // Error to return if more than one source is set
+	path                      string   // …Path: a path to a file containing the data, or ""
+	paths                     []string // …Paths: paths to files containing the data, or nil
+	data                      []byte   // …Data: a single instance ofhe raw data, or nil
+	datas                     [][]byte // …Datas: the raw data, or nil // codespell:ignore datas
+}
+
+// loadBytesFromConfigSources ensures at most one of the sources in src is set,
 // and returns the referenced data, or nil if neither is set.
-func loadBytesFromDataOrPath(prefix string, data []byte, path string) ([]byte, error) {
+func loadBytesFromConfigSources(src configBytesSources) ([][]byte, error) {
-	switch {
+	sources := 0
-	case data != nil && path != "":
+	var data [][]byte // = nil
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf(`Internal inconsistency: both "%sPath" and "%sData" specified`, prefix, prefix)
+	if src.path != "" {
-	case path != "":
+		sources++
+		d, err := os.ReadFile(src.path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		data = [][]byte{d}
+	}
+	if src.paths != nil {
+		sources++
+		data = [][]byte{}
+		for _, path := range src.paths {
 			d, err := os.ReadFile(path)
 			if err != nil {
 				return nil, err
 			}
-		return d, nil
+			data = append(data, d)
-	case data != nil:
-		return data, nil
-	default: // Nothing
-		return nil, nil
 		}
+	}
+	if src.data != nil {
+		sources++
+		data = [][]byte{src.data}
+	}
+	if src.datas != nil { // codespell:ignore datas
+		sources++
+		data = src.datas // codespell:ignore datas
+	}
+	if sources > 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New(src.inconsistencyErrorMessage)
+	}
+	return data, nil
 }
 
 // prepareTrustRoot creates a fulcioTrustRoot from the input data.
 // (This also prevents external implementations of this interface, ensuring that prSigstoreSignedFulcio is the only one.)
 func (f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) prepareTrustRoot() (*fulcioTrustRoot, error) {
-	caCertBytes, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("fulcioCA", f.CAData, f.CAPath)
+	caCertPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{
+		inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: both "caPath" and "caData" specified`,
+		path:                      f.CAPath,
+		data:                      f.CAData,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if caCertBytes == nil {
+	if len(caCertPEMs) != 1 {
-		return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Fulcio specified with neither "caPath" nor "caData"`)
+		return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Fulcio specified with not exactly one of "caPath" nor "caData"`)
 	}
 	certs := x509.NewCertPool()
-	if ok := certs.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCertBytes); !ok {
+	if ok := certs.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCertPEMs[0]); !ok {
 		return nil, errors.New("error loading Fulcio CA certificates")
 	}
 	fulcio := fulcioTrustRoot{
@@ -66,24 +99,35 @@ func (f *prSigstoreSignedFulcio) prepareTrustRoot() (*fulcioTrustRoot, error) {
 
 // sigstoreSignedTrustRoot contains an already parsed version of the prSigstoreSigned policy
 type sigstoreSignedTrustRoot struct {
-	publicKey      crypto.PublicKey
+	publicKeys      []crypto.PublicKey
 	fulcio          *fulcioTrustRoot
-	rekorPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
+	rekorPublicKeys []*ecdsa.PublicKey
 }
 
 func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) prepareTrustRoot() (*sigstoreSignedTrustRoot, error) {
 	res := sigstoreSignedTrustRoot{}
 
-	publicKeyPEM, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("key", pr.KeyData, pr.KeyPath)
+	publicKeyPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{
+		inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: more than one of "keyPath", "keyPaths", "keyData", "keyDatas" specified`,
+		path:                      pr.KeyPath,
+		paths:                     pr.KeyPaths,
+		data:                      pr.KeyData,
+		datas:                     pr.KeyDatas, // codespell:ignore datas
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if publicKeyPEM != nil {
+	if publicKeyPEMs != nil {
-		pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(publicKeyPEM)
+		for index, keyData := range publicKeyPEMs {
+			pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(keyData)
 			if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing public key: %w", err)
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing public key %d: %w", index+1, err)
+			}
+			res.publicKeys = append(res.publicKeys, pk)
+		}
+		if len(res.publicKeys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: "keyPath", "keyPaths", "keyData" and "keyDatas" produced no public keys`)
 		}
-		res.publicKey = pk
 	}
 
 	if pr.Fulcio != nil {
@@ -94,21 +138,32 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) prepareTrustRoot() (*sigstoreSignedTrustRoot, error)
 		res.fulcio = f
 	}
 
-	rekorPublicKeyPEM, err := loadBytesFromDataOrPath("rekorPublicKey", pr.RekorPublicKeyData, pr.RekorPublicKeyPath)
+	rekorPublicKeyPEMs, err := loadBytesFromConfigSources(configBytesSources{
+		inconsistencyErrorMessage: `Internal inconsistency: both "rekorPublicKeyPath" and "rekorPublicKeyData" specified`,
+		path:                      pr.RekorPublicKeyPath,
+		paths:                     pr.RekorPublicKeyPaths,
+		data:                      pr.RekorPublicKeyData,
+		datas:                     pr.RekorPublicKeyDatas, // codespell:ignore datas
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if rekorPublicKeyPEM != nil {
+	if rekorPublicKeyPEMs != nil {
-		pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(rekorPublicKeyPEM)
+		for index, pem := range rekorPublicKeyPEMs {
+			pk, err := cryptoutils.UnmarshalPEMToPublicKey(pem)
 			if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing Rekor public key: %w", err)
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing Rekor public key %d: %w", index+1, err)
 			}
 			pkECDSA, ok := pk.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
 			if !ok {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("Rekor public key is not using ECDSA")
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("Rekor public key %d is not using ECDSA", index+1)
 
 			}
-		res.rekorPublicKey = pkECDSA
+			res.rekorPublicKeys = append(res.rekorPublicKeys, pkECDSA)
+		}
+		if len(res.rekorPublicKeys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: "rekorPublicKeyPath", "rekorPublicKeyPaths", "rekorPublicKeyData" and "rekorPublicKeyDatas" produced no public keys`)
+		}
 	}
 
 	return &res, nil
@@ -134,37 +189,51 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) isSignatureAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva
 	}
 	untrustedPayload := sig.UntrustedPayload()
 
-	var publicKey crypto.PublicKey
+	var publicKeys []crypto.PublicKey
 	switch {
-	case trustRoot.publicKey != nil && trustRoot.fulcio != nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
+	case trustRoot.publicKeys != nil && trustRoot.fulcio != nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
 		return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Both a public key and Fulcio CA specified")
-	case trustRoot.publicKey == nil && trustRoot.fulcio == nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
+	case trustRoot.publicKeys == nil && trustRoot.fulcio == nil: // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
 		return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Neither a public key nor a Fulcio CA specified")
 
-	case trustRoot.publicKey != nil:
+	case trustRoot.publicKeys != nil:
-		if trustRoot.rekorPublicKey != nil {
+		if trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys != nil {
 			untrustedSET, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey]
 			if !ok { // For user convenience; passing an empty []byte to VerifyRekorSet should work.
 				return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("missing %s annotation", signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey)
 			}
+
+			var rekorFailures []string
+			for _, candidatePublicKey := range trustRoot.publicKeys {
 				// We could use publicKeyPEM directly, but let’s re-marshal to avoid inconsistencies.
 				// FIXME: We could just generate DER instead of the full PEM text
-			recreatedPublicKeyPEM, err := cryptoutils.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(trustRoot.publicKey)
+				recreatedPublicKeyPEM, err := cryptoutils.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(candidatePublicKey)
 				if err != nil {
 					// Coverage: The key was loaded from a PEM format, so it’s unclear how this could fail.
 					// (PEM is not essential, MarshalPublicKeyToPEM can only fail if marshaling to ASN1.DER fails.)
 					return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("re-marshaling public key to PEM: %w", err)
-
 				}
 				// We don’t care about the Rekor timestamp, just about log presence.
-			if _, err := internal.VerifyRekorSET(trustRoot.rekorPublicKey, []byte(untrustedSET), recreatedPublicKeyPEM, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload); err != nil {
+				_, err = internal.VerifyRekorSET(trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys, []byte(untrustedSET), recreatedPublicKeyPEM, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload)
-				return sarRejected, err
+				if err == nil {
+					publicKeys = append(publicKeys, candidatePublicKey)
+					break // The SET can only accept one public key entry, so if we found one, the rest either doesn’t match or is a duplicate
 				}
+				rekorFailures = append(rekorFailures, err.Error())
+			}
+			if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
+				if len(rekorFailures) == 0 {
+					// Coverage: We have ensured that len(trustRoot.publicKeys) != 0, when nothing succeeds, there must be at least one failure.
+					return sarRejected, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: Rekor SET did not match any key but we have no failures.`)
+				}
+				return sarRejected, internal.NewInvalidSignatureError(fmt.Sprintf("No public key verified against the RekorSET: %s", strings.Join(rekorFailures, ", ")))
+			}
+		} else {
+			publicKeys = trustRoot.publicKeys
 		}
-		publicKey = trustRoot.publicKey
 
 	case trustRoot.fulcio != nil:
-		if trustRoot.rekorPublicKey == nil { // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
+		if trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys == nil { // newPRSigstoreSigned rejects such combinations.
 			return sarRejected, errors.New("Internal inconsistency: Fulcio CA specified without a Rekor public key")
 		}
 		untrustedSET, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreSETAnnotationKey]
@@ -179,19 +248,20 @@ func (pr *prSigstoreSigned) isSignatureAccepted(ctx context.Context, image priva
 		if untrustedIntermediateChain, ok := untrustedAnnotations[signature.SigstoreIntermediateCertificateChainAnnotationKey]; ok {
 			untrustedIntermediateChainBytes = []byte(untrustedIntermediateChain)
 		}
-		pk, err := verifyRekorFulcio(trustRoot.rekorPublicKey, trustRoot.fulcio,
+		pk, err := verifyRekorFulcio(trustRoot.rekorPublicKeys, trustRoot.fulcio,
 			[]byte(untrustedSET), []byte(untrustedCert), untrustedIntermediateChainBytes, untrustedBase64Signature, untrustedPayload)
 		if err != nil {
 			return sarRejected, err
 		}
-		publicKey = pk
+		publicKeys = []crypto.PublicKey{pk}
 	}
 
-	if publicKey == nil {
+	if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
-		// Coverage: This should never happen, we have already excluded the possibility in the switch above.
+		// Coverage: This should never happen, we ensured that trustRoot.publicKeys is non-empty if set,
+		// and we have already excluded the possibility in the switch above.
 		return sarRejected, fmt.Errorf("Internal inconsistency: publicKey not set before verifying sigstore payload")
 	}
-	signature, err := internal.VerifySigstorePayload(publicKey, untrustedPayload, untrustedBase64Signature, internal.SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules{
+	signature, err := internal.VerifySigstorePayload(publicKeys, untrustedPayload, untrustedBase64Signature, internal.SigstorePayloadAcceptanceRules{
 		ValidateSignedDockerReference: func(ref string) error {
 			if !pr.SignedIdentity.matchesDockerReference(image, ref) {
 				return PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("Signature for identity %q is not accepted", ref))

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/signature/policy_types.go

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ type prSignedBy struct {
 
 	// KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified.
 	KeyPath string `json:"keyPath,omitempty"`
-	// KeyPaths if a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified.
+	// KeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified.
 	KeyPaths []string `json:"keyPaths,omitempty"`
 	// KeyData contains the trusted key(s), base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths and KeyData must be specified.
 	KeyData []byte `json:"keyData,omitempty"`
@@ -111,24 +111,35 @@ type prSignedBaseLayer struct {
 type prSigstoreSigned struct {
 	prCommon
 
-	// KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified.
+	// KeyPath is a pathname to a local file containing the trusted key. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified.
 	KeyPath string `json:"keyPath,omitempty"`
-	// KeyData contains the trusted key, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified.
+	// KeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files containing the trusted key(s). Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified.
+	KeyPaths []string `json:"keyPaths,omitempty"`
+	// KeyData contains the trusted key, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified.
 	KeyData []byte `json:"keyData,omitempty"`
-	// FIXME: Multiple public keys?
+	// KeyDatas is a set of trusted keys, base64-encoded. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified.
+	KeyDatas [][]byte `json:"keyDatas,omitempty"`
 
-	// Fulcio specifies which Fulcio-generated certificates are accepted. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyData, Fulcio must be specified.
+	// Fulcio specifies which Fulcio-generated certificates are accepted. Exactly one of KeyPath, KeyPaths, KeyData, KeyDatas and Fulcio must be specified.
 	// If Fulcio is specified, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well.
 	Fulcio PRSigstoreSignedFulcio `json:"fulcio,omitempty"`
 
 	// RekorPublicKeyPath is a pathname to local file containing a public key of a Rekor server which must record acceptable signatures.
-	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well; otherwise it is optional
+	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well;
-	// (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
+	// otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
 	RekorPublicKeyPath string `json:"rekorPublicKeyPath,omitempty"`
+	// RekorPublicKeyPaths is a set of pathnames to local files, each containing a public key of a Rekor server. One of the keys must record acceptable signatures.
+	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well;
+	// otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
+	RekorPublicKeyPaths []string `json:"rekorPublicKeyPaths,omitempty"`
 	// RekorPublicKeyPath contain a base64-encoded public key of a Rekor server which must record acceptable signatures.
-	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath or RekorPublicKeyData must be specified as well; otherwise it is optional
+	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well;
-	// (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
+	// otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
 	RekorPublicKeyData []byte `json:"rekorPublicKeyData,omitempty"`
+	// RekorPublicKeyDatas each contain a base64-encoded public key of a Rekor server. One of the keys must record acceptable signatures.
+	// If Fulcio is used, one of RekorPublicKeyPath, RekorPublicKeyPaths, RekorPublicKeyData and RekorPublicKeyDatas must be specified as well;
+	// otherwise it is optional (and Rekor inclusion is not required if a Rekor public key is not specified).
+	RekorPublicKeyDatas [][]byte `json:"rekorPublicKeyDatas,omitempty"`
 
 	// SignedIdentity specifies what image identity the signature must be claiming about the image.
 	// Defaults to "matchRepoDigestOrExact" if not specified.

vendor/github.com/containers/image/v5/version/version.go

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ const (
 	// VersionMajor is for an API incompatible changes
 	VersionMajor = 5
 	// VersionMinor is for functionality in a backwards-compatible manner
-	VersionMinor = 33
+	VersionMinor = 32
 	// VersionPatch is for backwards-compatible bug fixes
-	VersionPatch = 1
+	VersionPatch = 2
 
 	// VersionDev indicates development branch. Releases will be empty string.
 	VersionDev = ""

vendor/modules.txt

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ github.com/containers/common/pkg/password
 github.com/containers/common/pkg/report
 github.com/containers/common/pkg/report/camelcase
 github.com/containers/common/pkg/retry
-# github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.1
+# github.com/containers/image/v5 v5.32.2
 ## explicit; go 1.21.0
 github.com/containers/image/v5/copy
 github.com/containers/image/v5/directory