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fix(deps): update module github.com/containers/image/v5 to v5.33.0

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Signed-off-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
renovate[bot]
2024-11-12 18:34:08 +00:00
committed by Miloslav Trmač
parent 15f69ac611
commit fa1762f52b
546 changed files with 26538 additions and 10856 deletions
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14
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/open_linux.go generated vendored
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@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to OpenInRoot, except that the root is provided
// using an *os.File handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to [OpenInRoot], except that the root is provided
// using an *[os.File] handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
handle, err := completeLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
if err != nil {
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
// handle, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
//
// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and OpenFile, it is
// can modify the filesystem tree between [SecureJoin] and [os.OpenFile], it is
// possible for the returned file to be outside of the root.
//
// Note that the returned handle is an O_PATH handle, meaning that only a very
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
// accidentally opening an untrusted file that could cause issues (such as a
// disconnected TTY that could cause a DoS, or some other issue). In order to
// use the returned handle, you can "upgrade" it to a proper handle using
// Reopen.
// [Reopen].
func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
return OpenatInRoot(rootDir, unsafePath)
}
// Reopen takes an *os.File handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
// Reopen takes an *[os.File] handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
// Reopen(file, flags) is effectively equivalent to
//
// fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", file.Fd())
@@ -59,7 +59,9 @@ func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
// maliciously-configured /proc mount. While this attack scenario is not
// common, in container runtimes it is possible for higher-level runtimes to be
// tricked into configuring an unsafe /proc that can be used to attack file
// operations. See CVE-2019-19921 for more details.
// operations. See [CVE-2019-19921] for more details.
//
// [CVE-2019-19921]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw
func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
if err != nil {