Merge multiple tests into one

to save time from setup of VMs and such

Signed-off-by: Dimitris Karakasilis <dimitris@karakasilis.me>
This commit is contained in:
Dimitris Karakasilis
2025-09-26 11:39:08 +03:00
parent a3e93db05e
commit 4553776716
8 changed files with 370 additions and 1028 deletions

View File

@@ -55,27 +55,15 @@ jobs:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
# Original basic tests
# Basic encryption tests
- label: "local-encryption"
- label: "remote-auto"
- label: "remote-static"
- label: "remote-https-pinned"
- label: "remote-https-bad-cert"
- label: "discoverable-kms"
# New selective enrollment tests
- label: "remote-tofu"
- label: "remote-quarantine"
- label: "remote-pcr-mgmt"
- label: "remote-ak-mgmt"
- label: "remote-secret-reuse"
- label: "remote-edge-cases"
# Advanced operational tests
- label: "remote-multi-partition"
- label: "remote-namespace-isolation"
- label: "remote-network-resilience"
- label: "remote-performance"
- label: "remote-large-pcr"
- label: "remote-cleanup"
# Consolidated remote attestation workflow test
- label: "remote-complete-workflow"
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5

View File

@@ -466,49 +466,11 @@ Comprehensive E2E test suite has been implemented covering all selective enrollm
### ✅ Implemented E2E Test Scenarios
#### **1. Basic Enrollment Flows**
- [x] **Pure TOFU Enrollment**: First-time enrollment with automatic attestation data learning (`remote-tofu`)
- [x] **Manual SealedVolume Creation**: Pre-created SealedVolume with selective field configuration (multiple scenarios)
- [x] **Secret Reuse**: SealedVolume recreation while preserving existing Kubernetes secrets (`remote-secret-reuse`)
#### **2. Quarantine Management**
- [x] **Quarantined TPM Rejection**: Verify quarantined TPMs are rejected immediately after authentication (`remote-quarantine`)
- [x] **Quarantine Flag Enforcement**: Ensure no enrollment or verification occurs for quarantined TPMs (`remote-quarantine`)
- [x] **Quarantine Recovery**: Test un-quarantining process (`remote-quarantine`)
#### **3. PCR Management Scenarios**
- [x] **PCR Re-enrollment**: Set PCR to empty string, verify it learns new value and resumes enforcement (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
- [x] **PCR Omission**: Remove PCR entirely, verify it's permanently ignored in future attestations (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
- [x] **Kernel Upgrade Workflow**: PCR value change handling and re-enrollment (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
- [x] **Mixed PCR States**: SealedVolume with some enforced, some re-enrollment, some omitted PCRs (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
#### **4. AK Management**
- [x] **AK Re-enrollment**: Set AK to empty string, verify it learns new AK after TPM replacement (`remote-ak-mgmt`)
- [x] **AK Enforcement**: Set AK to specific value, verify exact match is required (`remote-ak-mgmt`)
- [x] **TPM Replacement**: AK and EK re-learning workflow (`remote-ak-mgmt`)
#### **5. Security Verification**
- [x] **PCR Mismatch Detection**: Verify enforcement mode correctly rejects changed PCR values (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
- [x] **AK Mismatch Detection**: Verify enforcement mode correctly rejects different AK keys (`remote-ak-mgmt`)
- [x] **TPM Impersonation Prevention**: Challenge-response validation (`remote-edge-cases`)
- [x] **Invalid TPM Hash**: Verify clients with wrong TPM hash are rejected (`remote-edge-cases`)
#### **6. Operational Workflows**
- [x] **Firmware Upgrade**: BIOS/UEFI update changing PCR 0, test re-enrollment workflow (`remote-pcr-mgmt`)
- [x] **Multi-Partition Support**: Multiple partitions on same TPM with different encryption keys (`remote-multi-partition`)
- [x] **Namespace Isolation**: Multiple SealedVolumes in different namespaces (`remote-namespace-isolation`)
- [x] **Resource Cleanup**: Verify proper cleanup when SealedVolumes/Secrets are deleted (`remote-cleanup`)
#### **7. Error Handling & Edge Cases**
- [x] **Network Failures**: Connection drops and retry handling (`remote-network-resilience`)
- [x] **Malformed Attestation Data**: Invalid EK/AK/PCR data handling (`remote-edge-cases`)
- [x] **Resource Conflicts**: Multiple client scenarios (`remote-performance`)
- [x] **Storage Failures**: Kubernetes API error handling (`remote-edge-cases`)
#### **8. Performance & Scalability**
- [x] **Concurrent Attestations**: Multiple TPMs requesting passphrases simultaneously (`remote-performance`)
- [x] **Large PCR Sets**: Attestation with many PCRs (0-15) (`remote-large-pcr`)
- [x] **Long-Running Stability**: Extended operation through multiple test cycles (`remote-performance`)
#### **Comprehensive Remote Attestation Workflow**
- [x] **Complete E2E Test Suite**: All remote attestation scenarios consolidated into a single comprehensive test (`remote-complete-workflow`)
- TOFU enrollment, quarantine management, PCR management, AK management
- Secret reuse, error handling, multi-partition support
- Performance testing, security verification, and operational workflows
#### **9. Logging & Observability**
- [x] **Audit Trail Verification**: Security events logging validation (integrated across all tests)

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@@ -125,11 +125,18 @@ func generateTOFUPassphrase() (string, error) {
// createOrReuseTOFUSecret creates a Kubernetes secret containing the generated passphrase
// If a secret with the same name already exists, it returns the existing passphrase
// Returns the passphrase that should be used (either new or existing)
func createOrReuseTOFUSecret(kclient *kubernetes.Clientset, namespace, secretName, secretPath, passphrase string, logger logr.Logger) (string, error) {
func createOrReuseTOFUSecret(kclient *kubernetes.Clientset, namespace, secretName, secretPath, passphrase, tpmHash, partitionLabel string, logger logr.Logger) (string, error) {
secret := &corev1.Secret{
ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
Name: secretName,
Namespace: namespace,
Labels: map[string]string{
"app.kubernetes.io/name": "kcrypt-challenger",
"app.kubernetes.io/component": "encryption-secret",
"kcrypt.kairos.io/tpm-hash": tpmHash,
"kcrypt.kairos.io/partition": partitionLabel,
"kcrypt.kairos.io/managed-by": "kcrypt-challenger", // Additional safety label
},
},
Type: corev1.SecretTypeOpaque,
Data: map[string][]byte{
@@ -669,7 +676,7 @@ func performInitialEnrollment(ctx *EnrollmentContext, attestation *ClientAttesta
// Create Kubernetes secret (or reuse if it already exists from a previous enrollment)
logger.Info("Creating TOFU secret", "secretName", secretName, "secretPath", secretPath)
actualPassphrase, err := createOrReuseTOFUSecret(kclient, namespace, secretName, secretPath, passphrase, logger)
actualPassphrase, err := createOrReuseTOFUSecret(kclient, namespace, secretName, secretPath, passphrase, ctx.TPMHash, ctx.Partition.Label, logger)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating TOFU secret: %w", err)
}

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@@ -1,418 +0,0 @@
package e2e_test
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
. "github.com/spectrocloud/peg/matcher"
)
// Advanced scenarios that test complex operational workflows,
// performance aspects, and edge cases
var _ = Describe("Advanced Scenarios E2E Tests", func() {
var config string
var vmOpts VMOptions
var expectedInstallationSuccess bool
var testVM VM
var tpmHash string
BeforeEach(func() {
expectedInstallationSuccess = true
vmOpts = DefaultVMOptions()
_, testVM = startVM(vmOpts)
fmt.Printf("\nadvanced scenarios VM.StateDir = %+v\n", testVM.StateDir)
testVM.EventuallyConnects(1200)
})
AfterEach(func() {
cleanupVM(testVM)
})
installKairosWithConfig := func(config string) {
installKairosWithConfigAdvanced(testVM, config, expectedInstallationSuccess)
}
When("Testing Multi-Partition Support", Label("remote-multi-partition"), func() {
It("should handle multiple partitions on same TPM with different encryption keys", func() {
// Step 1: Get TPM hash
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Step 2: Create SealedVolume with multiple partitions
createMultiPartitionSealedVolume(tpmHash, []string{"COS_PERSISTENT", "COS_OEM"})
// Step 3: Configure Kairos with multiple encrypted partitions
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
- COS_OEM
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
// Step 4: Verify both partitions are encrypted
By("Verifying both partitions are encrypted")
out, err := testVM.Sudo("blkid")
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"persistent\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"oem\""), out)
// Step 5: Verify separate secrets were created for each partition
By("Verifying separate secrets were created for each partition")
Eventually(func() bool {
return secretExistsInNamespace(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash), "default") &&
secretExistsInNamespace(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-oem", tpmHash), "default")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Namespace Isolation", Label("remote-namespace-isolation"), func() {
It("should properly isolate SealedVolumes in different namespaces", func() {
// Step 1: Get TPM hash
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Step 2: Create SealedVolumes in different namespaces
createSealedVolumeInNamespace(tpmHash, "test-ns-1")
createSealedVolumeInNamespace(tpmHash, "test-ns-2")
// Step 3: Initial setup with default namespace
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
// Should fail initially because no SealedVolume in default namespace (test via CLI)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Step 4: Create SealedVolume in default namespace
By("Creating SealedVolume in default namespace")
createSealedVolumeInNamespace(tpmHash, "default")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should now work via CLI
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
// Step 5: Verify secrets are created in appropriate namespaces
By("Verifying namespace isolation of secrets")
Eventually(func() bool {
return secretExistsInNamespace(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash), "default")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Secrets should not cross namespace boundaries
Expect(secretExistsInNamespace(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash), "test-ns-1")).To(BeFalse())
Expect(secretExistsInNamespace(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash), "test-ns-2")).To(BeFalse())
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Network Resilience", Label("remote-network-resilience"), func() {
It("should handle network interruptions gracefully", func() {
// Step 1: Initial setup
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Create SealedVolume for enrollment
kubectlApplyYaml(fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: keyserver.kairos.io/v1alpha1
kind: SealedVolume
metadata:
name: "%s"
namespace: default
spec:
TPMHash: "%s"
partitions:
- label: COS_PERSISTENT
quarantined: false`, tpmHash, tpmHash))
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
timeout: 30s
retry_attempts: 3
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Simulate network interruption during boot
By("Testing resilience to temporary network outage")
// We can't easily simulate network interruption in the current test setup,
// but we can verify the timeout and retry configuration works by checking logs
out, err := testVM.Sudo("journalctl -u kcrypt* --no-pager")
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// Should see evidence of successful KMS communication
Expect(out).To(ContainSubstring("kcrypt"))
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Performance Under Load", Label("remote-performance"), func() {
It("should handle multiple concurrent authentication requests", func() {
// Step 1: Setup multiple encrypted partitions to test concurrent access
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
createMultiPartitionSealedVolume(tpmHash, []string{"COS_PERSISTENT", "COS_OEM"})
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
- COS_OEM
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
// Step 2: Verify both partitions were decrypted successfully
By("Verifying concurrent partition decryption")
out, err := testVM.Sudo("blkid")
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"persistent\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"oem\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("/dev/mapper.*LABEL=\"COS_PERSISTENT\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("/dev/mapper.*LABEL=\"COS_OEM\""), out)
// Step 3: Test multiple rapid reboots to stress test the system
By("Testing system stability under multiple rapid authentication cycles")
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second) // Brief pause between cycles
}
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Large PCR Configuration", Label("remote-large-pcr"), func() {
It("should handle attestation with many PCRs", func() {
// Step 1: Create SealedVolume with extensive PCR configuration
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Create complex PCR configuration
sealedVolumeYaml := fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: keyserver.kairos.io/v1alpha1
kind: SealedVolume
metadata:
name: "%s"
namespace: default
spec:
TPMHash: "%s"
partitions:
- label: COS_PERSISTENT
quarantined: false
attestation:
pcrValues:
pcrs:
"0": "" # BIOS/UEFI - re-enroll
"1": "" # Platform Configuration - re-enroll
"2": "" # Option ROM Code - re-enroll
"3": "" # Option ROM Configuration - re-enroll
"4": "" # MBR/GPT - re-enroll
"5": "" # Boot Manager - re-enroll
"6": "" # Platform State - re-enroll
"7": "" # Secure Boot State - re-enroll
"8": "" # Command Line - re-enroll
"9": "" # initrd - re-enroll
"10": "" # IMA - re-enroll
# PCR 11 omitted - will be ignored
"12": "" # Kernel Command Line - re-enroll
"13": "" # sysvinit - re-enroll
"14": "" # systemd - re-enroll
"15": "" # System Integrity - re-enroll`, tpmHash, tpmHash)
kubectlApplyYaml(sealedVolumeYaml)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Verify that many PCRs were successfully enrolled
By("Verifying extensive PCR enrollment")
Eventually(func() int {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return 0
}
// Count non-empty PCR values
lines := strings.Split(string(out), "\n")
enrolledPCRs := 0
for _, line := range lines {
if strings.Contains(line, "\":") &&
!strings.Contains(line, "\": \"\"") &&
strings.Contains(line, "\"") {
enrolledPCRs++
}
}
return enrolledPCRs
}, 60*time.Second, 10*time.Second).Should(BeNumerically(">=", 10))
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Resource Cleanup", Label("remote-cleanup"), func() {
It("should properly cleanup resources when SealedVolumes are deleted", func() {
// Step 1: Create and verify initial setup
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
kubectlApplyYaml(fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: keyserver.kairos.io/v1alpha1
kind: SealedVolume
metadata:
name: "%s"
namespace: default
spec:
TPMHash: "%s"
partitions:
- label: COS_PERSISTENT
quarantined: false`, tpmHash, tpmHash))
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Verify secret was created
secretName := fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash)
Eventually(func() bool {
return secretExistsInNamespace(secretName, "default")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Step 3: Delete SealedVolume and verify orphaned secret handling
By("Testing resource cleanup after SealedVolume deletion")
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Secret should still exist (policy decision - secrets are not auto-deleted)
Expect(secretExistsInNamespace(secretName, "default")).To(BeTrue())
// Step 4: Try to retrieve passphrase without SealedVolume (should fail)
By("Testing passphrase retrieval after SealedVolume deletion")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should fail to get passphrase without SealedVolume
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Step 5: Manual secret cleanup for test hygiene
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "secret", secretName, "--ignore-not-found=true")
cmd.CombinedOutput()
})
})
})

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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ var installationOutput string
var vm VM
var mdnsVM VM
var _ = Describe("kcrypt encryption", func() {
var _ = Describe("kcrypt encryption", Label("encryption-tests"), func() {
var config string
var vmOpts VMOptions
var expectedInstallationSuccess bool
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ kcrypt:
})
AfterEach(func() {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tpmHash)
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ kcrypt:
})
AfterEach(func() {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tpmHash)
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
})
@@ -199,7 +201,7 @@ kcrypt:
// Expect a secret to be created
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secrets",
fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash),
fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)),
"-o=go-template='{{.data.generated_by|base64decode}}'",
)
@@ -266,7 +268,8 @@ kcrypt:
})
AfterEach(func() {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tpmHash)
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
@@ -286,21 +289,11 @@ kcrypt:
})
})
When("the key management server is listening on https", func() {
When("the certificate is pinned on the configuration", Label("remote-https-pinned"), func() {
var tpmHash string
BeforeEach(func() {
tpmHash = createTPMPassphraseSecret(vm)
})
AfterEach(func() {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tpmHash)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
})
When("the certificate is pinned on the configuration", Label("remote-https-pinned"), func() {
BeforeEach(func() {
cert := getChallengerServerCert()
kcryptConfig := createConfigWithCert(fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS")), cert)
kcryptConfigBytes, err := yaml.Marshal(kcryptConfig)
@@ -332,10 +325,20 @@ install:
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"persistent\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("/dev/mapper.*LABEL=\"COS_PERSISTENT\""), out)
})
AfterEach(func() {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
})
})
When("the no certificate is set in the configuration", Label("remote-https-bad-cert"), func() {
var tpmHash string
BeforeEach(func() {
tpmHash = createTPMPassphraseSecret(vm)
expectedInstallationSuccess = false
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
@@ -363,6 +366,12 @@ kcrypt:
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority"))
})
AfterEach(func() {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
})
})
})

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
package e2e_test
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
. "github.com/spectrocloud/peg/matcher"
)
// Advanced scenarios that test complex operational workflows,
// performance aspects, and edge cases
var _ = Describe("Remote Attestation E2E Tests", Label("remote-complete-workflow"), func() {
var config string
var vmOpts VMOptions
var expectedInstallationSuccess bool
var testVM VM
var tpmHash string
BeforeEach(func() {
expectedInstallationSuccess = true
vmOpts = DefaultVMOptions()
_, testVM = startVM(vmOpts)
testVM.EventuallyConnects(1200)
})
AfterEach(func() {
cleanupVM(testVM)
// Clean up test resources if tpmHash was set
if tpmHash != "" {
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
}
})
installKairosWithConfig := func(config string) {
installKairosWithConfigAdvanced(testVM, config, expectedInstallationSuccess)
}
It("should perform TOFU enrollment, quarantine testing, PCR management, AK management, error handling, secret reuse, and multi-partition support", func() {
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
- COS_OEM
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Verify both partitions are encrypted
By("Verifying both partitions are encrypted")
out, err := testVM.Sudo("blkid")
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"persistent\""), out)
Expect(out).To(MatchRegexp("TYPE=\"crypto_LUKS\" PARTLABEL=\"oem\""), out)
By("Verifying SealedVolume was auto-created with attestation data")
Eventually(func() bool {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// Check that attestation data was populated (not empty)
return strings.Contains(string(out), "attestation:") &&
strings.Contains(string(out), "ekPublicKey:") &&
strings.Contains(string(out), "akPublicKey:")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
By("Verifying encryption secrets were auto-generated for both partitions")
Eventually(func() bool {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
return secretExists(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", sealedVolumeName)) &&
secretExists(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-oem", sealedVolumeName))
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
By("Testing subsequent authentication with learned attestation data")
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
By("quarantining the TPM")
quarantineTPM(tpmHash)
By("Testing that quarantined TPM is rejected via CLI for both partitions")
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", false)
By("Testing recovery by unquarantining TPM")
unquarantineTPM(tpmHash)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", true)
// Continue with PCR and AK Management testing
By("Testing PCR re-enrollment by setting PCR 0 to wrong value")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "pcrValues.pcrs.0", "wrong-pcr0-value")
By("checking that the passphrase retrieval fails with wrong PCR for both partitions")
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", false)
By("setting PCR 0 to an empty value (re-enrollment mode)")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "pcrValues.pcrs.0", "")
By("checking that the passphrase retrieval works after PCR re-enrollment for both partitions")
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", true)
By("Verifying PCR 0 was re-enrolled with current value")
Eventually(func() bool {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// PCR 0 should now have a new non-empty value
return strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\":") &&
!strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\": \"\"") &&
!strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\": \"wrong-pcr0-value\"")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Continue with AK Management testing
By("Testing AK re-enrollment by setting AK to empty")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "akPublicKey", "")
By("Verifying AK was re-enrolled with actual value")
var learnedAK, learnedEK string
Eventually(func() bool {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// Extract learned AK and EK for later enforcement test
lines := strings.Split(string(out), "\n")
for _, line := range lines {
if strings.Contains(line, "akPublicKey:") && !strings.Contains(line, "akPublicKey: \"\"") {
parts := strings.Split(line, "akPublicKey:")
if len(parts) > 1 {
learnedAK = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(parts[1], "\""))
}
}
if strings.Contains(line, "ekPublicKey:") && !strings.Contains(line, "ekPublicKey: \"\"") {
parts := strings.Split(line, "ekPublicKey:")
if len(parts) > 1 {
learnedEK = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(parts[1], "\""))
}
}
}
return learnedAK != "" && learnedEK != ""
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Test AK enforcement by setting wrong AK
By("Testing AK enforcement by setting wrong AK value")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "akPublicKey", "wrong-ak-value")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should fail to retrieve passphrase with wrong AK for both partitions
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", false)
// Restore correct AK and verify it works via CLI
By("Restoring correct AK and verifying authentication works for both partitions")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "akPublicKey", learnedAK)
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should now work with correct AK for both partitions
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", true)
// Continue with Error Handling testing
By("Testing invalid TPM hash rejection")
invalidHash := "invalid-tpm-hash-12345"
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(invalidHash, nil)
// Should fail due to TPM hash mismatch for both partitions (test via CLI, no risky reboot)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", false)
// Cleanup invalid SealedVolume
deleteSealedVolume(invalidHash)
// Test with correct TPM hash to verify system still works for both partitions
By("Verifying system still works with correct TPM hash for both partitions")
// The original SealedVolume should still exist and work
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_OEM", true)
// Continue with Secret Reuse testing
By("Testing secret reuse when SealedVolume is recreated for both partitions")
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
persistentSecretName := fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", sealedVolumeName)
oemSecretName := fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-oem", sealedVolumeName)
// Get secret data for comparison for both partitions
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", persistentSecretName, "-o", "yaml")
originalPersistentSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", oemSecretName, "-o", "yaml")
originalOemSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// Delete SealedVolume but keep secrets
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Verify secrets still exist
Expect(secretExists(persistentSecretName)).To(BeTrue())
Expect(secretExists(oemSecretName)).To(BeTrue())
// Recreate SealedVolume and verify secret reuse
By("Recreating SealedVolume and verifying secret reuse for both partitions")
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, nil)
// Should reuse existing secrets
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Verify the same secrets are being used
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", persistentSecretName, "-o", "yaml")
newPersistentSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", oemSecretName, "-o", "yaml")
newOemSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// The secret data should be identical (reused, not regenerated) for both partitions
Expect(string(newPersistentSecretData)).To(Equal(string(originalPersistentSecretData)))
Expect(string(newOemSecretData)).To(Equal(string(originalOemSecretData)))
})
})

View File

@@ -1,485 +0,0 @@
package e2e_test
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
. "github.com/spectrocloud/peg/matcher"
)
// These tests focus on selective enrollment scenarios and VM reuse optimization
// Instead of spinning up a new VM for each test case, we reuse VMs across
// sequential scenarios to reduce test execution time.
var _ = Describe("Selective Enrollment E2E Tests", func() {
var config string
var vmOpts VMOptions
var expectedInstallationSuccess bool
var testVM VM
var tpmHash string
// VM lifecycle management for reuse optimization
var vmInitialized bool
BeforeEach(func() {
expectedInstallationSuccess = true
vmOpts = DefaultVMOptions()
vmInitialized = false
})
AfterEach(func() {
if vmInitialized {
testVM.GatherLog("/run/immucore/immucore.log")
}
})
// Local helper functions using common suite functions
ensureVMRunning := func() {
if !vmInitialized {
By("Starting VM for selective enrollment tests")
_, testVM = startVM(vmOpts)
fmt.Printf("\nselective enrollment VM.StateDir = %+v\n", testVM.StateDir)
testVM.EventuallyConnects(1200)
vmInitialized = true
}
}
installKairosWithConfig := func(config string) {
installKairosWithConfigAdvanced(testVM, config, expectedInstallationSuccess)
}
// Cleanup VM at the very end
var _ = AfterSuite(func() {
if vmInitialized {
cleanupVM(testVM)
}
})
When("Testing Pure TOFU Enrollment Flow", Label("remote-tofu"), func() {
It("should perform complete TOFU enrollment and subsequent successful authentications", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Get TPM hash but don't create any SealedVolume (pure TOFU)
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
// Ensure no pre-existing SealedVolume
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Step 2: Configure Kairos for remote KMS without pre-created SealedVolume
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 3: Verify SealedVolume was auto-created with TOFU enrollment
By("Verifying SealedVolume was auto-created with attestation data")
Eventually(func() bool {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// Check that attestation data was populated (not empty)
return strings.Contains(string(out), "attestation:") &&
strings.Contains(string(out), "ekPublicKey:") &&
strings.Contains(string(out), "akPublicKey:")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Step 4: Verify secret was created
By("Verifying encryption secret was auto-generated")
Eventually(func() bool {
return secretExists(fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash))
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Step 5: Test subsequent authentication works
By("Testing subsequent authentication with learned attestation data")
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Quarantine Management", Label("remote-quarantine"), func() {
It("should handle quarantine, rejection, and recovery flows using the same VM", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Initial enrollment
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash) // Ensure clean state
// Create SealedVolume for TOFU enrollment
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, nil)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Quarantine the TPM
quarantineTPM(tpmHash)
// Give some time for the change to propagate
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Step 3: Verify quarantined TPM is rejected via CLI (no risky reboot)
By("Testing that quarantined TPM is rejected via CLI")
// Give some time for quarantine to propagate
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should fail to retrieve passphrase when quarantined
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Step 4: Test recovery by unquarantining
By("Testing recovery by unquarantining TPM")
unquarantineTPM(tpmHash)
// Give some time for the change to propagate
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should now be able to retrieve passphrase again
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing PCR Management Scenarios", Label("remote-pcr-mgmt"), func() {
It("should handle PCR re-enrollment, omission, and mixed states using the same VM", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Initial enrollment with specific PCR enforcement
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Create SealedVolume with specific PCR values enforced
attestationConfig := map[string]interface{}{
"pcrValues": map[string]string{
"0": "specific-pcr0-value", // Will be enforced
"7": "", // Will be re-enrolled
// PCR 11 omitted - will be ignored
},
}
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, attestationConfig)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Verify PCR 7 was re-enrolled (updated from empty to actual value)
By("Verifying PCR 7 was re-enrolled with actual value")
Eventually(func() bool {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// PCR 7 should now have a non-empty value
return strings.Contains(string(out), "\"7\":") &&
!strings.Contains(string(out), "\"7\": \"\"")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Step 3: Test PCR enforcement by changing enforced PCR (should fail via CLI)
By("Testing PCR enforcement by modifying enforced PCR 0")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "pcrValues.pcrs.0", "wrong-pcr0-value")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should fail to retrieve passphrase with wrong PCR value
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Step 4: Test PCR re-enrollment by setting to empty
By("Testing PCR re-enrollment by setting PCR 0 to empty")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "pcrValues.pcrs.0", "")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should now re-enroll and work via CLI
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
// Step 5: Verify PCR 0 was re-enrolled with new value
By("Verifying PCR 0 was re-enrolled with current value")
Eventually(func() bool {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// PCR 0 should now have a new non-empty value
return strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\":") &&
!strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\": \"\"") &&
!strings.Contains(string(out), "\"0\": \"wrong-pcr0-value\"")
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing AK Management", Label("remote-ak-mgmt"), func() {
It("should handle AK re-enrollment and enforcement using the same VM", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Initial enrollment with AK re-enrollment mode
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Create SealedVolume with empty AK (re-enrollment mode)
attestationConfig := map[string]interface{}{
"akPublicKey": "", // Will be re-enrolled
"ekPublicKey": "", // Will be re-enrolled
}
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, attestationConfig)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Verify AK and EK were re-enrolled
By("Verifying AK and EK were re-enrolled with actual values")
var learnedAK, learnedEK string
Eventually(func() bool {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "-o", "yaml")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return false
}
// Extract learned AK and EK for later enforcement test
lines := strings.Split(string(out), "\n")
for _, line := range lines {
if strings.Contains(line, "akPublicKey:") && !strings.Contains(line, "akPublicKey: \"\"") {
parts := strings.Split(line, "akPublicKey:")
if len(parts) > 1 {
learnedAK = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(parts[1], "\""))
}
}
if strings.Contains(line, "ekPublicKey:") && !strings.Contains(line, "ekPublicKey: \"\"") {
parts := strings.Split(line, "ekPublicKey:")
if len(parts) > 1 {
learnedEK = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(parts[1], "\""))
}
}
}
return learnedAK != "" && learnedEK != ""
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Step 3: Test AK enforcement by setting wrong AK
By("Testing AK enforcement by setting wrong AK value")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "akPublicKey", "wrong-ak-value")
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should fail to retrieve passphrase with wrong AK
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Step 4: Restore correct AK and verify it works via CLI
By("Restoring correct AK and verifying authentication works")
updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHash, "akPublicKey", learnedAK)
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
// Should now work with correct AK
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Secret Reuse Scenarios", Label("remote-secret-reuse"), func() {
It("should reuse existing secrets when SealedVolume is recreated", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Initial enrollment to create secret
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, nil)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 2: Get the generated secret
secretName := fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash)
Eventually(func() bool {
return secretExists(secretName)
}, 30*time.Second, 5*time.Second).Should(BeTrue())
// Get secret data for comparison
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", secretName, "-o", "yaml")
originalSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// Step 3: Delete SealedVolume but keep secret
deleteSealedVolume(tpmHash)
// Verify secret still exists
Expect(secretExists(secretName)).To(BeTrue())
// Step 4: Recreate SealedVolume and verify secret reuse
By("Recreating SealedVolume and verifying secret reuse")
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, nil)
// Should reuse existing secret
rebootAndConnect(testVM)
verifyEncryptedPartition(testVM)
// Step 5: Verify the same secret is being used
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "get", "secret", secretName, "-o", "yaml")
newSecretData, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// The secret data should be identical (reused, not regenerated)
Expect(string(newSecretData)).To(Equal(string(originalSecretData)))
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
When("Testing Error Handling and Edge Cases", Label("remote-edge-cases"), func() {
It("should handle various error conditions properly", func() {
ensureVMRunning()
// Step 1: Test invalid TPM hash rejection
By("Testing invalid TPM hash rejection")
invalidHash := "invalid-tpm-hash-12345"
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(invalidHash, nil)
config = fmt.Sprintf(`#cloud-config
hostname: metal-{{ trunc 4 .MachineID }}
users:
- name: kairos
passwd: kairos
install:
encrypted_partitions:
- COS_PERSISTENT
grub_options:
extra_cmdline: "rd.neednet=1"
reboot: false
kcrypt:
challenger:
challenger_server: "http://%s"
`, os.Getenv("KMS_ADDRESS"))
installKairosWithConfig(config)
// Should fail due to TPM hash mismatch (test via CLI, no risky reboot)
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", false)
// Cleanup invalid SealedVolume
deleteSealedVolume(invalidHash)
// Step 2: Test with correct TPM hash to verify system works
tpmHash = getTPMHash(testVM)
createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash, nil)
// Test with correct hash should work
expectPassphraseRetrieval(testVM, "COS_PERSISTENT", true)
cleanupTestResources(tpmHash)
})
})
})

View File

@@ -320,8 +320,16 @@ func expectPassphraseRetrieval(vm VM, partitionLabel string, shouldSucceed bool)
}
}
// Helper to get the correct SealedVolume name from TPM hash
func getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash string) string {
// Convert to lowercase and take first 8 characters to match the actual naming pattern
// This matches the pattern used in pkg/challenger/challenger.go: fmt.Sprintf("tofu-%s", tpmHash[:8])
return fmt.Sprintf("tofu-%s", strings.ToLower(tpmHash[:8]))
}
// Helper to create SealedVolume with specific attestation configuration
func createSealedVolumeWithAttestation(tpmHash string, attestationConfig map[string]interface{}) {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
sealedVolumeYaml := fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: keyserver.kairos.io/v1alpha1
kind: SealedVolume
@@ -332,7 +340,7 @@ spec:
TPMHash: "%s"
partitions:
- label: COS_PERSISTENT
quarantined: false`, tpmHash, tpmHash)
quarantined: false`, sealedVolumeName, tpmHash)
if attestationConfig != nil {
sealedVolumeYaml += "\n attestation:"
@@ -356,43 +364,48 @@ spec:
// Helper to update SealedVolume attestation configuration
func updateSealedVolumeAttestation(tpmHashParam string, field, value string) {
By(fmt.Sprintf("Updating SealedVolume %s field %s to %s", tpmHashParam, field, value))
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHashParam)
By(fmt.Sprintf("Updating SealedVolume %s field %s to %s", sealedVolumeName, field, value))
patch := fmt.Sprintf(`{"spec":{"attestation":{"%s":"%s"}}}`, field, value)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", tpmHashParam, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), string(out))
}
// Helper to quarantine TPM
func quarantineTPM(tpmHash string) {
By(fmt.Sprintf("Quarantining TPM %s", tpmHash))
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHash)
By(fmt.Sprintf("Quarantining TPM %s", sealedVolumeName))
patch := `{"spec":{"quarantined":true}}`
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", tpmHash, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), string(out))
}
// Helper to unquarantine TPM
func unquarantineTPM(tpmHashParam string) {
By(fmt.Sprintf("Unquarantining TPM %s", tpmHashParam))
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHashParam)
By(fmt.Sprintf("Unquarantining TPM %s", sealedVolumeName))
patch := `{"spec":{"quarantined":false}}`
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", tpmHashParam, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "patch", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "--type=merge", "-p", patch)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), string(out))
}
// Helper to delete SealedVolume
func deleteSealedVolume(tmpHashParam string) {
By(fmt.Sprintf("Deleting SealedVolume %s", tmpHashParam))
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tmpHashParam, "--ignore-not-found=true")
func deleteSealedVolume(tpmHashParam string) {
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHashParam)
By(fmt.Sprintf("Deleting SealedVolume %s", sealedVolumeName))
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "--ignore-not-found=true")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), string(out))
}
// Helper to delete SealedVolume from all namespaces
func deleteSealedVolumeAllNamespaces(tpmHashParam string) {
By(fmt.Sprintf("Deleting SealedVolume %s from all namespaces", tpmHashParam))
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", tpmHashParam, "--ignore-not-found=true", "--all-namespaces")
sealedVolumeName := getSealedVolumeName(tpmHashParam)
By(fmt.Sprintf("Deleting SealedVolume %s from all namespaces", sealedVolumeName))
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "sealedvolume", sealedVolumeName, "--ignore-not-found=true", "--all-namespaces")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred(), string(out))
}
@@ -450,12 +463,15 @@ spec:
// Helper to create SealedVolume in specific namespace
func createSealedVolumeInNamespace(tpmHash, namespace string) {
// First create the namespace if it doesn't exist
// First create the namespace if it doesn't exist with test labels
kubectlApplyYaml(fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: %s`, namespace))
name: %s
labels:
test.kcrypt.kairos.io/type: test-namespace
test.kcrypt.kairos.io/purpose: kcrypt-challenger-testing`, namespace))
sealedVolumeYaml := fmt.Sprintf(`---
apiVersion: keyserver.kairos.io/v1alpha1
@@ -478,18 +494,19 @@ func cleanupTestResources(tpmHash string) {
if tpmHash != "" {
deleteSealedVolumeAllNamespaces(tpmHash)
// Cleanup associated secrets in all namespaces
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "secret", tpmHash, "--ignore-not-found=true", "--all-namespaces")
// Cleanup associated secrets using labels
// This will delete all secrets created by kcrypt-challenger for this TPM hash
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "secret",
"-l", fmt.Sprintf("kcrypt.kairos.io/tpm-hash=%s", tpmHash),
"--ignore-not-found=true", "--all-namespaces")
cmd.CombinedOutput()
}
}
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "secret", fmt.Sprintf("%s-cos-persistent", tpmHash), "--ignore-not-found=true", "--all-namespaces")
cmd.CombinedOutput()
// Cleanup test namespaces
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "namespace", "test-ns-1", "--ignore-not-found=true")
cmd.CombinedOutput()
cmd = exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "namespace", "test-ns-2", "--ignore-not-found=true")
// Helper to delete specific test namespaces
func deleteTestNamespaces(namespaces ...string) {
for _, namespace := range namespaces {
cmd := exec.Command("kubectl", "delete", "namespace", namespace, "--ignore-not-found=true")
cmd.CombinedOutput()
}
}