APIC-access page which write into VMCS should be hpa
Signed-off-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
virtual-ACPI page which write into VMCS should be hpa
Signed-off-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Guest write tsc: cache the offset into run_context.tsc_offset;
Guest read tsc : use run_context.tsc_offset to calculate guest_tsc.
Signed-off-by: Qi Yadong <yadong.qi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Before this patch, guest temporary page tables were generated by hardcode
at compile time, HV will copy this page tables to guest before guest
launch.
This patch creates temporary page tables at runtime for the range of 0~4G,
and create page tables to cover new range(511G~511G+16M) with trusty
requirement.
Signed-off-by: Mingqiang Chi <mingqiang.chi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Currently acrn partitions cpus between SOS and UOS, so the default
policy is to allow guest managing CPU px state. However we would
not blindly passthrough perf_ctrl MSR to guest. Instead guest access
is always trapped and validated by acrn hypervisor before forwarding
to pcpu. Doing so leaves room for future power budget control in
hypervisor, e.g. limiting turbo percentage that a cpu can enter.
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
We can use this interface for VHM to pass per-cpu power state data
to guest per its request.
For now the vcpu power state is per-vm, this could be changed if
per-cpu power state support is required in the future.
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
The vm px info would be used for guest Pstate control.
Currently it is copied from host boot cpu.
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
This patch added API destroy_secure_world, which will do:
-- clear trusty memory space
-- restore memory to SOS ept mapping
It will be called when VM is destroyed, furthermore, ept of
Secure world will be destroyed as well.
Signed-off-by: Mingqiang Chi <mingqiang.chi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Xu <anthony.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
1.it doesn't support VMX for guest OS
2.for MSR out of control, inject GP to guest OS.
Signed-off-by: Minggui Cao <minggui.cao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
enable TSC offset in VMX, so if TSC MSR is changed by guest OS,
write a caculated value into TSC-offset, then host TSC will not be changed.
Signed-off-by: Minggui Cao <minggui.cao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Yakui <yakui.zhao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: He, Min <min.he@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
UOS_Loader will trigger boot of Trusty-OS by HC_INITIALIZE_TRUSTY.
UOS_Loader will load trusty image and alloc runtime memory for
trusty. UOS_Loader will transfer these information include
trusty runtime memory base address, entry address and memory
size to hypervisor by trusty_boot_param structure.
In hypervisor, once HC_INITIALIZE_TRUSTY received, it will create
EPT for Secure World, save Normal World vCPU context, init
Secure World vCPU context and switch World state to Secure World.
Signed-off-by: Qi Yadong <yadong.qi@intel.com>
For ARM, The SMC instruction is used to generate a synchronous
exception that is handled by Secure Monitor code running in EL3.
In the ARM architecture, synchronous control is transferred between
the normal Non-secure state and the Secure state through Secure
Monitor Call exceptions. SMC exceptions are generated by the SMC
instruction, and handled by the Secure Monitor.The operation of
the Secure Monitor is determined by the parameters that are passed
in through registers.
For ACRN, Hypervisor will simulate SMC by hypercall to switch vCPU
State between Normal World and Secure World.
There are 4 registers(RDI, RSI, RDX, RBX) reserved for paramters
passing between Normal World and Secure World.
Signed-off-by: Qi Yadong <yadong.qi@intel.com>
this patch is a preparation for changing ptdev remapping entry from
virtual to physical based, it changes the ptdev_lock from per-vm to
global, as entries based on physical mode are global resource.
Signed-off-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Generate all common virtual cpuid entries for flexible support of
guest VCPUID emulation, by decoupling from PCPUID.
Signed-off-by: Li, Fei1 <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Xu, Anthony <anthony.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Chen, Jason CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
microcode update from UOS is disabled.
microcode version checking is available for both SOS and UOS.
There are two TODOs of this patch:
1. This patch only update the uCode on pCPUs SOS owned. For the
pCPUs not owned by SOS, the uCode is not updated. To handle
this gap, we will have SOS own all pCPUs at boot time. So
all pCPUs could have uCode updated. This will be handled
in the patch to enable SOS own all pCPUs at boot time.
2. gva2gpa now doesn't check possible page table walk failure.
Will add the failure check in gva2gpa in different patch.
Signed-off-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Xu (anthony.xu@intel.com)
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tian, Kevin <kevin.tian@intel.com>
this patch is to detect and enable only APICv features which
are actually supported by the processor, instead fo tuning on
all features by default.
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
-If "virtual-interrupt delivery" VM-execution control is 0,
Processor will causes an APIC-write VM exit if page offset
is 0xB0 (EOI), SDM Vol3, Chapter 29.4.3
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
this patch save native lapic configuration and restore it to vm0's vlapic
before its running, then doing hpet timer interrupt injection through vlapic
interface -- this will not mess up vlapic and we can see hpet
timer interrupt coming continuously.
Signed-off-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
According to the explaination for pref_address
in Documentation/x86/boot.txt, a relocating bootloader
should attempt to load kernel at pref_address if possible.
But due to a non-relocatable kernel will unconditionally
move itself and to run at perf address, no need to copy
kernel to perf_address by bootloader.
Signed-off-by: Zheng, Gen <gen.zheng@intel.com>
1. refine multiboot related code, move to /boot.
2. firmware files and ramdisk can be stitched in iasImage;
and they will be loaded as multiboot modules.
Signed-off-by: Minggui Cao <minggui.cao@intel.com>
add key info structure
add sworld_eptp in vm structure, and rename ept->nworld_eptp
add secure world control structure
Change-Id:
Tracked-On:220921
Signed-off-by: Mingqiang Chi <mingqiang.chi@intel.com>
