release: add release notes for v0.14.0

This is a big release

Signed-off-by: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>

.lycheeignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+https://sigs.centos.org/virt/tdx/
+https://www.intel.com/

ADOPTERS.md

@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
 # Confidential Containers Adopters
 
-This page contains a list of organizations/companies and projects/products who use confidential containers as adopters in different usage levels (development, beta, production, GA etc...) 
+This page contains a list of organizations/companies and projects/products who use confidential containers as adopters in different usage levels (development, beta, production, GA etc...)
 
-**NOTE:** For adding your organization/company and project/product to this table (alphabetical order) fork the repository and open a PR with the required change. 
+**NOTE:** For adding your organization/company and project/product to this table (alphabetical order) fork the repository and open a PR with the required change.
 See list of adopter types at the bottom of this page.
 
 ## Adopters
 
 | Organization/Company                                              | Project/Product                                               | Usage level              | Adopter type                     | Details                                                                   |
 |-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|[Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun)](https://www.alibabacloud.com/)| [Elastic Algorithm Service](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/pai/user-guide/eas-model-serving/?spm=a2c63.p38356.0.0.2b2b6679Pjozxy) and [Elastic GPU Service](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/egs/) | Beta | Service Provider | Both services use sub-projects of confidential containers to protect the user data and AI model from being exposed to CSP (For details mading.ma@alibaba-inc.com) |
 | [Edgeless Systems](https://www.edgeless.systems/)                 | [Contrast](https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast)           | Beta                     | Service Provider / Consultancy   | Contrast runs confidential container deployments on Kubernetes at scale.                                |
 | [IBM](https://www.ibm.com/z)                                    | [IBM LinuxONE](https://www.ibm.com/linuxone)                  | Beta                     | Service Provider                 | Confidential Containers with Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform and IBM® Secure Execution for Linux (see [details](https://www.ibm.com/blog/confidential-containers-with-red-hat-openshift-container-platform-and-ibm-secure-execution-for-linux/))  |
 |NanhuLab|Trusted Big Data Sharing System |Beta |Service Provider |The system uses confidential containers to ensure that data users can utilize the data without being able to view the raw data.(No official website yet. For details: yzc@nanhulab.ac.cn) |
+| [KubeArmor](https://www.kubearmor.io/) | Runtime Security | Beta | Another project | An open source project that leverages CoCo as part of their solution, integrates with for compatibility and interoperability, or is used in the supply chain of another project [(5GSEC)](https://github.com/5GSEC/nimbus/blob/main/examples/clusterscoped/coco-workload-si-sib.yaml). |
+| [Red Hat](https://www.redhat.com/en) | [OpenShift confidential containers](https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/learn-about-confidential-containers) | Beta | Service Provider | Confidential Containers are available from [OpenShift sandboxed containers release version 1.7.0](https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_sandboxed_containers/1.7/) as a tech preview on Azure cloud for both Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP. The tech preview also includes support for confidential containers on IBM Z and LinuxONE using Secure Execution for Linux (IBM SEL).|
+| [ByteDance](https://www.bytedance.com/) | Jeddak Sandbox | Beta | End-User / Service Provider | Jeddak Sandbox leverages CoCo to protect the data privacy in the process of the company's business  (for details chendian.imtyrant@bytedance.com) |
+| [Intel](https://www.intel.com/) | [Enterprise-RAG](https://github.com/opea-project/Enterprise-RAG/blob/main/docs/tdx.md)<br>[OPEA](https://github.com/opea-project/GenAIInfra/tree/main/helm-charts/TDX.md) | Beta | End-User / Service Provider | Intel runs confidential container deployments on Kubernetes with Intel TDX |
+| [Switchboard](https://www.switchboard.xyz/) | [Decentralized Crypto Oracle](https://docs.switchboard.xyz/switchboard-protocol/running-a-switchboard-oracle) | Production | Service Provider | Running our Decentralized Oracles code in CoCo on AMD SEV SNP bare metal machines |
 |TBD| | | | |
 |TBD| | | | |
 
-## Adopter types 
+## Adopter types
 
 See CNCF [definition of an adopter](https://github.com/cncf/toc/blob/main/FAQ.md#what-is-the-definition-of-an-adopter) <br>
 

MAINTAINERS

@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
 # CoCo Steering Committee / Maintainers
 #
-# Github ID, Name, Email Address
-
-ariel-adam, Ariel Adam, aadam@redhat.com
-bpradipt, Pradipta Banerjee, prbanerj@redhat.com
-dcmiddle, Dan Middleton, dan.middleton@intel.com
-fitzthum, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum, tobin@ibm.com
-jiazhang0, Zhang Jia, zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com
-Jiang Liu, jiangliu, gerry@linux.alibaba.com
-larrydewey, Larry Dewey, Larry.Dewey@amd.com
-magowan, James Magowan, magowan@uk.ibm.com
-peterzcst, Peter Zhu, peter.j.zhu@intel.com
-sameo, Samuel Ortiz, samuel.e.ortiz@protonmail.com
+# Github ID, Name, Affiliation
 
+ariel-adam, Ariel Adam, Redhat
+bpradipt, Pradipta Banerjee, Redhat
+peterzcst, Peter Zhu, Intel
+mythi, Mikko Ylinen, Intel
+magowan, James Magowan, IBM
+fitzthum, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum, IBM
+jiazhang0, Zhang Jia, Alibaba
+jiangliu, Jiang Liu, Alibaba
+larrydewey, Larry Dewey, AMD
+ryansavino, Ryan Savino, AMD
+sameo, Samuel Ortiz, Rivos
+zvonkok, Zvonko Kaiser, NVIDIA
+vbatts, Vincent Batts, Microsoft
+danmihai1, Dan Mihai, Microsoft

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 # Confidential Containers
 
-[![CII Best Practices](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/5719/badge)](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/5719)
+[![CII Best Practices](https://bestpractices.dev/projects/5719/badge)](https://bestpractices.dev/projects/5719)
 
 ## Welcome to confidential-containers
 
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ delivering Confidential Computing for guest applications or data inside the TEE
 
 ### Get started quickly... 
 - [Kubernetes Operator for Confidential
-  Computing](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers-operator) : An
+  Computing](https://github.com/confidential-containers/operator) : An
   operator to deploy confidential containers runtime (and required configs) on a Kubernetes cluster
 
 
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ delivering Confidential Computing for guest applications or data inside the TEE
 - [Project Overview](./overview.md)
 - [Project Architecture](./architecture.md)
 - [Our Roadmap](./roadmap.md)
+- [Our Release Content Planning](https://github.com/orgs/confidential-containers/projects/6)
 - [Alignment with other Projects](alignment.md)
 
 

governance.md

@@ -40,15 +40,25 @@ Project maintainers are first and foremost active *Contributors* to the project
 * Creating and assigning project issues.
 * Enforcing the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).
 
-The list of maintainers for a project is defined by the project `CODEOWNERS` file placed at the top-level of each project's repository.
+Project maintainers are managed via GitHub teams. The maintainer team for a project is referenced in the `CODEOWNERS` file
+at the top level of each project repository.
 
 ### Becoming a project maintainer
 
 Existing maintainers may decide to elevate a *Contributor* to the *Maintainer* role based on the contributor established trust and contributions relevance.
 This decision process is not formally defined and is based on lazy consensus from the existing maintainers.
 
-Any contributor may request for becoming a project maintainer by opening a pull request (PR) against the `CODEOWNERS` file, and adding *all* current maintainers as reviewer of the PR.
-Maintainers may also pro-actively promote contributors based on their contributions and leadership track record.
+A contributor can propose themself or someone else as a maintainer by opening an issue in the repository for the project in question.
+
+### Removing project maintainers
+
+Inactive maintainers can be removed by the Steering Committee.
+Maintainers are considered inactive if they have made no GitHub contributions relating to the project they maintain
+for more than six months.
+Before removing a maintainer, the Steering Commitee should notify the maintainer of their status.
+
+Not all inactive maintainers must be removed.
+This process should mainly be used to remove maintainers that have permanently moved on from the project.
 
 ## Steering Committee Member
 

guides/coco-dev.md

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+# Running a workload
+
+## Creating a sample CoCo workload
+
+Once you've used the operator to install Confidential Containers, you can run a pod with CoCo by simply adding a runtime class.
+First, we will use the `kata-qemu-coco-dev` runtime class which uses CoCo without hardware support.
+Initially we will try this with an unencrypted container image.
+
+In this example, we will be using the bitnami/nginx image as described in the following yaml:
+```yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    run: nginx
+  name: nginx
+  annotations:
+    io.containerd.cri.runtime-handler: kata-qemu-coco-dev
+spec:
+  containers:
+  - image: bitnami/nginx:1.22.0
+    name: nginx
+  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
+  runtimeClassName: kata-qemu-coco-dev
+```
+
+Setting the `runtimeClassName` is usually the only change needed to the pod yaml, but some platforms
+support additional annotations for configuring the enclave. See the [guides](../guides) for
+more details.
+
+With Confidential Containers, the workload container images are never downloaded on the host.
+For verifying that the container image doesn’t exist on the host, you should log into the k8s node and ensure the following command returns an empty result:
+```shell
+root@cluster01-master-0:/home/ubuntu# crictl -r unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock image ls | grep bitnami/nginx
+```
+You will run this command again after the container has started.
+
+Create a pod YAML file as previously described (we named it `nginx.yaml`) .
+
+Create the workload:
+```shell
+kubectl apply -f nginx.yaml
+```
+
+Output:
+```shell
+pod/nginx created
+```
+
+Ensure the pod was created successfully (in running state):
+```shell
+kubectl get pods
+```
+
+Output:
+```shell
+NAME    READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
+nginx   1/1     Running   0          3m50s
+```
+
+Now go back to the k8s node and ensure that you don’t have any bitnami/nginx images on it:
+```shell
+root@cluster01-master-0:/home/ubuntu# crictl  -r  unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock image ls | grep bitnami/nginx
+```
+
+## Encrypted and/or signed images with attestation
+
+The previous example does not involve any attestation because the workload container isn't signed or encrypted,
+and the workload itself does not require any secrets.
+
+This is not the case for most real workloads. It is recommended to use CoCo with signed and/or encrypted images.
+The workload itself can also request secrets from the attestation agent in the guest.
+
+Secrets are provisioned to the guest in conjunction with an attestation, which is based on hardware evidence.
+The rest of this guide focuses on setting up more substantial encrypted/signed workloads using attestation
+and confidential hardware.
+
+CoCo has a modular attestation interface and there are a few options for attestation.
+CoCo provides a generic Key Broker Service (KBS) that the rest of this guide will be focused on.
+
+### Select Runtime Class
+
+To use CoCo with confidential hardware, first switch to the appropriate runtime class.
+TDX has one runtime class, `kata-qemu-tdx`. 
+
+For SNP, use the `kata-qemu-snp` runtime class and follow the [SNP guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/examples/snp-container-launch/).
+
+For `enclave-cc` follow the [enclave-cc guide](../guides/enclave-cc.md).
+
+### Deploy and Configure tenant-side CoCo Key Broker System cluster
+
+The following describes how to run and provision the generic KBS.
+The KBS should be run in a trusted environment. The KBS is not just one service,
+but a combination of several.
+
+A tenant-side CoCo Key Broker System cluster includes:
+- Key Broker Service (KBS): Brokering service for confidential resources.
+- Attestation Service (AS): Verifier for remote attestation.
+- Reference Value Provider Service (RVPS): Provides reference values for AS.
+- CoCo Keyprovider: Component to encrypt the images following ocicrypt spec.
+
+To quick start the KBS cluster, a `docker compose` yaml is provided to launch.
+
+```shell
+# Clone KBS git repository
+git clone https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee.git
+cd trustee/kbs
+export KBS_DIR_PATH=$(pwd)
+
+# Generate a user auth key pair
+openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 > config/private.key
+openssl pkey -in config/private.key -pubout -out config/public.pub
+
+cd ..
+
+# Start KBS cluster
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+If configuration of KBS cluster is required, edit the following config files and restart the KBS cluster with `docker compose`:
+
+- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/kbs-config.toml`: configuration for Key Broker Service.
+- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/as-config.json`: configuration for Attestation Service.
+- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/sgx_default_qcnl.conf`: configuration for Intel TDX/SGX verification. See [details](https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee/blob/main/attestation-service/docs/grpc-as.md#quick-start).
+
+When KBS cluster is running, you can modify the policy file used by AS policy engine ([OPA](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/)) at any time:
+
+- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/data/attestation-service/opa/default.rego`: Policy file for evidence verification of AS, refer to [AS Policy Engine](https://github.com/confidential-containers/attestation-service#policy-engine) for more infomation.
+
+### Encrypting an Image
+
+[skopeo](https://github.com/containers/skopeo) is required to encrypt the container image.
+Follow the [instructions](https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/main/install.md) to install `skopeo`.
+If building with Ubuntu 22.04, make sure to follow the instructions to build skopeo from source, otherwise 
+there will be errors regarding version incompatibility between ocicrypt and skopeo. Make sure the downloaded
+skopeo version is at least 1.16.0. Ubuntu 22.04 builds skopeo with an outdated ocicrypt version, which does
+not support the keyprovider protocol we depend on. 
+
+Use `skopeo` to encrypt an image on the same node of the KBS cluster (use busybox:latest for example):
+
+```shell
+# edit ocicrypt.conf
+tee > ocicrypt.conf <<EOF
+{
+    "key-providers": {
+        "attestation-agent": {
+            "grpc": "127.0.0.1:50000"
+        }
+    }
+}
+EOF
+
+# encrypt the image
+OCICRYPT_KEYPROVIDER_CONFIG=ocicrypt.conf skopeo copy --insecure-policy --encryption-key provider:attestation-agent docker://library/busybox oci:busybox:encrypted
+```
+
+The image will be encrypted, and things happens in the KBS cluster background include:
+
+- CoCo Keyprovider generates a random key and a key-id. Then encrypts the image using the key.
+- CoCo Keyprovider registers the key with key-id into KBS.
+
+Then push the image to a registry:
+
+```shell
+skopeo copy oci:busybox:encrypted [SCHEME]://[REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
+```
+Be sure to replace `[SCHEME]` with registry scheme type like `docker`, replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL like `docker.io/encrypt_test/busybox`.
+
+### Signing an Image
+
+[cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is required to sign the container image. Follow the instructions here to install `cosign`:
+
+To install cosign, find and unpackage the corresponding package to the machine being used from their [release page](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases).
+
+Generate a cosign key pair and register the public key to KBS storage:
+
+```shell
+cosign generate-key-pair
+mkdir -p $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/cosign-key && cp cosign.pub $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/cosign-key/1
+```
+
+Sign the encrypted image with cosign private key:
+
+```shell
+cosign sign --key cosign.key [REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
+```
+
+Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image generated in previous steps.
+
+Then edit an image pulling validation policy file.
+Here is a sample policy file `security-policy.json`:
+
+```json
+{
+    "default": [{"type": "reject"}],
+    "transports": {
+        "docker": {
+            "[REGISTRY_URL]": [
+                {
+                    "type": "sigstoreSigned",
+                    "keyPath": "kbs:///default/cosign-key/1"
+                }
+            ]
+        }
+    }
+}
+```
+
+Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image.
+
+Register the image pulling validation policy file to KBS storage:
+
+```shell
+mkdir -p $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/security-policy
+cp security-policy.json $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/security-policy/test
+```
+
+### Deploy an Encrypted Image as a CoCo workload on CC HW
+
+Here is a sample yaml for encrypted image deploying:
+
+```shell
+cat << EOT | tee encrypted-image-test-busybox.yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    run: encrypted-image-test-busybox
+  name: encrypted-image-test-busybox
+  annotations:
+    io.containerd.cri.runtime-handler: [RUNTIME_CLASS]
+spec:
+  containers:
+  - image: [REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
+    name: busybox
+  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
+  runtimeClassName: [RUNTIME_CLASS]
+EOT
+```
+
+Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image generated in previous step, replace `[RUNTIME_CLASS]` with kata runtime class for CC HW.
+
+Then configure `/opt/confidential-containers/share/defaults/kata-containers/configuration-<RUNTIME_CLASS_SUFFIX>.toml` to add `agent.aa_kbc_params=cc_kbc::<KBS_URI>` to kernel parameters. Here `RUNTIME_CLASS_SUFFIX` is something like `qemu-coco-dev`, `KBS_URI` is the address of Key Broker Service in KBS cluster like `http://123.123.123.123:8080`.
+
+Deploy encrypted image as a workload:
+
+```shell
+kubectl apply -f encrypted-image-test-busybox.yaml
+``` 

guides/eaa_verdictd.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# EAA Verdictd Guide
-
-**EAA/Verdictd support has been deprecated in Confidential Containers**
-
-EAA is used to perform attestation at runtime and provide guest with confidential resources such as keys.
-It is based on [rats-tls](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/rats-tls).
-
-[Verdictd](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/verdictd) is the Key Broker Service and Attestation Service of EAA.
-The EAA KBC is an optional module in the attestation-agent at compile time,
-which can be used to communicate with Verdictd.
-The communication is established on the encrypted channel provided by rats-tls.
-
-EAA can now be used on Intel TDX and Intel SGX platforms.
-
-## Create encrypted image
-
-Before build encrypted image, you need to make sure Skopeo and Verdictd(EAA KBS) have been installed:
-- [Skopeo](https://github.com/containers/skopeo): the command line utility to perform encryption operations.
-- [Verdictd](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/verdictd): EAA Key Broker Service and Attestation Service.
-
-1. Pull unencrypted image.
-
-Here use `alpine:latest` for example:
-
-```sh
-${SKOPEO_HOME}/bin/skopeo copy --insecure-policy　docker://docker.io/library/alpine:latest oci:busybox
-```
-
-2. Follow the [Verdictd README #Generate encrypted container image](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/verdictd#generate-encrypted-container-image) to encrypt the image.
-
-3. Publish the encrypted image to your registry.
-
-## Deploy encrypted image
-
-1. Build rootfs with EAA component:
-
-Specify `AA_KBC=eaa_kbc` parameters when using kata-containers `rootfs.sh` scripts to create rootfs.
-
-2. Launch Verdictd
-
-Verdictd performs remote attestation at runtime and provides the key needed to decrypt the image.
-It is actually both Key Broker Service and Attestation Service of EAA.
-So when deploy the encrypted image, Verdictd is needed to be launched:
-
-```sh
-verdictd --listen <$ip>:<$port> --mutual
-```
-
-> **Note** The communication between Verdictd and EAA KBC is based on rats-tls,
-so you need to confirm that [rats-tls](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/rats-tls) has been correctly installed in your running environment.
-
-3. Agent Configuration
-
-Add configuration `aa_kbc_params= 'eaa_kbc::<$IP>:<$PORT>'` to agent config file, the IP and PORT should be consistent with verdictd.

guides/enclave-cc.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives) running on every SG
 ## Configuring enclave-cc custom resource to use a different KBC
 
 **Note** Before configuring KBC, please refer to the
-[guide](../quickstart.md#deploy-and-configure-tenant-side-coco-key-broker-system-cluster) to deploy KBS cluster.
+[guide](coco-dev.md#deploy-and-configure-tenant-side-coco-key-broker-system-cluster) to deploy KBS cluster.
 
 **Note** The KBC configuration changes to the enclave-cc custom resource yaml 
 must be made **before** deploying it. 

guides/sev.md

@@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
-# SEV-ES Guide
-
-Confidential Containers supports SEV(-ES) with pre-attestation using
-[simple-kbs](https://github.com/confidential-containers/simple-kbs).
-
-This guide covers platform-specific setup for SEV(-ES) and walks through
-complete flows for attestation and encrypted images.
-
-## Creating a CoCo workload using a pre-existing encrypted image on SEV
-
-### Platform Setup
-
-To enable SEV on the host platform, first ensure that it is supported. Then follow these instructions to enable SEV:
-
-[AMD SEV - Prepare Host OS](https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV#prepare-host-os)
-
-### Install sevctl and Export SEV Certificate Chain
-
-[sevctl](https://github.com/virtee/sevctl) is the SEV command line utility and is needed to export the SEV certificate chain.
-
-Follow these steps to install `sevctl`:
-
-* Debian / Ubuntu:
-
-  ```
-  # Rust must be installed to build
-  curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
-  source $HOME/.cargo/env
-  sudo apt install -y musl-dev musl-tools
-
-  # Additional packages are required to build
-  sudo apt install -y pkg-config libssl-dev asciidoctor
-
-  # Clone the repository
-  git clone https://github.com/virtee/sevctl.git
-
-  # Build
-  (cd sevctl && cargo build)
-  ```
-
-* CentOS / Fedora / RHEL:
-
-  ```
-  sudo dnf install sevctl
-  ```
-
-> **Note** Due to [this bug](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2037963) on sevctl for RHEL and Fedora you might need to build the tool from sources to pick the fix up.
-
-If using the SEV kata configuration template file, the SEV certificate chain must be placed in `/opt/sev`. Export the SEV certificate chain using the following commands:
-
-```
-sudo mkdir -p /opt/sev
-sudo ./sevctl/target/debug/sevctl export --full /opt/sev/cert_chain.cert
-```
-
-### Setup and Run the simple-kbs
-
-
-By default, the `kata-qemu-sev` runtime class uses pre-attestation with the
-`online-sev-kbc` and [simple-kbs](https://github.com/confidential-containers/simple-kbs) to attest the guest and provision secrets.
-`simple-kbs` is a basic prototype key broker which can validate a guest measurement according to a specified policy and conditionally release secrets.
-To use encrypted images, signed images, or authenticated registries with SEV, you should setup `simple-kbs`.
-If you simply want to run an unencrypted container image, you can disable pre-attestation by adding the following annotation
-`io.katacontainers.config.pre_attestation.enabled: "false"` to your pod.
-
-If you are using pre-attestation, you will need to add an annotation to your pod configuration which contains the URI of a `simple-kbs` instance.
-This annotation should be of the form `io.katacontainers.config.pre_attestation.uri: "<KBS IP>:44444"`.
-Port 44444 is the default port per the directions below, but it may be configured to use another port.
-The KBS IP must be accessible from inside the guest.
-Usually it should be the public IP of the node where `simple-kbs` runs.
-
-The SEV policy can also be set by adding `io.katacontainers.config.sev.policy: "<SEV POLICY>"` to your pod configuration. The default policy for SEV and SEV-ES are, respectively, "3" and "7", where the following bits are enabled:
-
-| Bit| Name| Description |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-|0|NODBG| Debugging of the guest is disallowed |
-|1|NOKS| Sharing keys with other guests is disallowed |
-|2|ES| SEV-ES is required |
-
-For more information about SEV policy, see chapter 3 of the [Secure Encrypted Virtualization API](https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf) (PDF).
-
->Note: the SEV policy is not the same as the policies that drive `simple-kbs`.
-
-The CoCo project has created a sample encrypted container image ([ghcr.io/confidential-containers/test-container:encrypted](https://github.com/orgs/confidential-containers/packages/container/test-container/82546314?tag=encrypted)). This image is encrypted using a key that comes already provisioned inside the `simple-kbs` for ease of testing. No `simple-kbs` policy is required to get things running.
-
-The image encryption key and key for SSH access have been attached to the CoCo sample encrypted container image as docker labels. This image is meant for TEST purposes only as these keys are published publicly. In a production use case, these keys would be generated by the workload administrator and kept secret. For further details, see the section how to [Create an Encrypted Image](#create-an-encrypted-image).
-
-To learn more about creating custom policies, see the section on [Creating a simple-kbs Policy to Verify the SEV Firmware Measurement](#creating-a-simple-kbs-policy-to-verify-the-sev-firmware-measurement).
-
-`docker compose` is required to run the `simple-kbs` and its database in docker containers. Installation instructions are available on [Docker's website](https://docs.docker.com/compose/install/linux/).
-
-Clone the repository for specified tag:
-```
-simple_kbs_tag="0.1.1"
-git clone https://github.com/confidential-containers/simple-kbs.git
-(cd simple-kbs && git checkout -b "branch_${simple_kbs_tag}" "${simple_kbs_tag}")
-```
-
-Run the service with `docker compose`:
-
-```
-(cd simple-kbs && sudo docker compose up -d)
-```
-
-### Launch the Pod and Verify SEV Encryption
-
-Here is a sample kubernetes service yaml for an encrypted image:
-
-```
-kind: Service
-apiVersion: v1
-metadata:
-  name: encrypted-image-tests
-spec:
-  selector:
-    app: encrypted-image-tests
-  ports:
-  - port: 22
----
-kind: Deployment
-apiVersion: apps/v1
-metadata:
-  name: encrypted-image-tests
-spec:
-  selector:
-    matchLabels:
-      app: encrypted-image-tests
-  template:
-    metadata:
-      labels:
-        app: encrypted-image-tests
-      annotations:
-        io.containerd.cri.runtime-handler: kata-qemu-sev
-    spec:
-      runtimeClassName: kata-qemu-sev
-      containers:
-      - name: encrypted-image-tests
-        image: ghcr.io/fitzthum/encrypted-image-tests:encrypted
-        imagePullPolicy: Always
-```
-
-Save this service yaml to a file named `encrypted-image-tests.yaml`. Notice the image URL specified points to the previously described CoCo sample encrypted container image. `kata-qemu-sev` must also be specified as the `runtimeClassName`.
-
-Start the service:
-
-```
-kubectl apply -f encrypted-image-tests.yaml
-```
-
-Check for pod errors:
-
-```
-pod_name=$(kubectl get pod -o wide | grep encrypted-image-tests | awk '{print $1;}')
-kubectl describe pod ${pod_name}
-```
-
-If there are no errors, a CoCo encrypted container with SEV has been successfully launched!
-
-### Verify SEV Memory Encryption
-
-The container `dmesg` report can be parsed to verify SEV memory encryption.
-
-Get pod IP:
-
-```
-pod_ip=$(kubectl get pod -o wide | grep encrypted-image-tests | awk '{print $6;}')
-```
-
-Get the CoCo sample encrypted container image SSH access key from docker image label and save it to a file.
-Currently the docker client cannot pull encrypted images. We can inspect the unencrypted image instead,
-which has the same labels. You could also use `skopeo inspect` to get the labels from the encrypted image.
-
-```
-docker pull ghcr.io/fitzthum/encrypted-image-tests:unencrypted
-docker inspect ghcr.io/fitzthum/encrypted-image-tests:unencrypted | \
-  jq -r '.[0].Config.Labels.ssh_key' \
-  | sed "s|\(-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\)|\1\n|g" \
-  | sed "s|\(-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\)|\n\1|g" \
-  > encrypted-image-tests
-```
-
-Set permissions on the SSH private key file:
-
-```
-chmod 600 encrypted-image-tests
-```
-
-Run a SSH command to parse the container `dmesg` output for SEV enabled messages:
-
-```
-ssh -i encrypted-image-tests \
-  -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" \
-  -t root@${pod_ip} \
-  'dmesg | grep SEV'
-```
-
-The output should look something like this:
-```
-[    0.150045] Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SEV
-```
-
-## Create an Encrypted Image
-
-If SSH access to the container is desired, create a keypair:
-
-```
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f encrypted-image-tests -P "" -C "" <<< y
-```
-
-The above command will save the keypair in a file named `encrypted-image-tests`.
-
-Here is a sample Dockerfile to create a docker image:
-
-```
-FROM alpine:3.16
-
-# Update and install openssh-server
-RUN apk update && apk upgrade && apk add openssh-server
-
-# Generate container ssh key
-RUN ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -P ""
-
-# A password needs to be set for login to work. An empty password is
-# unproblematic as password-based login to root is not allowed.
-RUN passwd -d root
-
-# Copy the remote generated public key to the container authorized_keys
-# Generate with 'ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f encrypted-image-tests -P "" -C ""'
-COPY encrypted-image-tests.pub /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
-
-# Entry point - run sshd
-ENTRYPOINT /usr/sbin/sshd -D
-```
-
-Store this `Dockerfile` in the same directory as the `encrypted-image-tests` ssh keypair.
-
-Build image:
-
-```
-docker build -t encrypted-image-tests .
-```
-
-Tag and upload this unencrypted docker image to a registry:
-
-```
-docker tag encrypted-image-tests:latest [REGISTRY_URL]:unencrypted
-docker push [REGISTRY_URL]:unencrypted
-```
-
-Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL.
-
-[skopeo](https://github.com/containers/skopeo) is required to encrypt the container image. Follow the instructions here to install `skopeo`:
-
-[skopeo Installation](https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/main/install.md)
-
-The Attestation Agent hosts a grpc service to support encrypting the image. Clone the repository:
-
-```
-attestation_agent_tag="v0.1.0"
-git clone https://github.com/confidential-containers/attestation-agent.git
-(cd attestation-agent && git checkout -b "branch_${attestation_agent_tag}" "${attestation_agent_tag}")
-```
-
-Run the offline_fs_kbs:
-
-```
-(cd attestation-agent/sample_keyprovider/src/enc_mods/offline_fs_kbs \
-&& cargo run --release --features offline_fs_kbs -- --keyprovider_sock 127.0.0.1:50001 &)
-```
-
-Create the Attestation Agent keyprovider:
-
-```
-cat > attestation-agent/sample_keyprovider/src/enc_mods/offline_fs_kbs/ocicrypt.conf <<EOF
-{
-  "key-providers": {
-    "attestation-agent": {
-      "grpc": "127.0.0.1:50001"
-}}}
-EOF
-```
-
-Set a desired value for the encryption key that should be a 32-bytes and base64 encoded value:
-
-```
-enc_key="RcHGava52DPvj1uoIk/NVDYlwxi0A6yyIZ8ilhEX3X4="
-```
-
-Create a Key file:
-
-```
-cat > keys.json <<EOF
-{
-    "key_id1":"${enc_key}"
-}
-EOF
-```
-
-Run skopeo to encrypt the image created in the previous section:
-
-```
-sudo OCICRYPT_KEYPROVIDER_CONFIG=$(pwd)/attestation-agent/sample_keyprovider/src/enc_mods/offline_fs_kbs/ocicrypt.conf \
-skopeo copy --insecure-policy \
-docker:[REGISTRY_URL]:unencrypted \
-docker:[REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted \
---encryption-key provider:attestation-agent:$(pwd)/keys.json:key_id1
-```
-
-Again, be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL.
-`--insecure-policy` flag is used to connect to the attestation agent and will not impact the security of the project.
-
-Make sure to use the `docker` prefix in the source and destination URL when running the `skopeo copy` command as demonstrated above.
-Utilizing images via the local `docker-daemon` is known to have issues, and the `skopeo copy` command does not return an adequate error
-response. A remote registry known to support encrypted images like GitHub Container Registry (GHCR) is required.
-
-At this point it is a good idea to inspect the image was really encrypted as skopeo can silently leave it unencrypted. Use
-`skopeo inspect` as shown below to check that the layers MIME types are **application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip+encrypted**:
-
-```
-skopeo inspect docker-daemon:[REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
-```
-
-Push the encrypted image to the registry:
-
-```
-docker push [REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
-```
-
-`mysql-client` is required to insert the key into the `simple-kbs` database. `jq` is required to json parse responses on the command line.
-
-* Debian / Ubuntu:
-
-  ```
-  sudo apt install mysql-client jq
-  ```
-
-* CentOS / Fedora / RHEL:
-
-  ```
-  sudo dnf install [ mysql | mariadb | community-mysql ] jq
-  ```
-
-The `mysql-client` package name may differ depending on OS flavor and version.
-
-The `simple-kbs` uses default settings and credentials for the MySQL database. These settings can be changed by the `simple-kbs` administrator and saved into a credential file. For the purposes of this quick start, set them in the environment for use with the MySQL client command line:
-
-```
-KBS_DB_USER="kbsuser"
-KBS_DB_PW="kbspassword"
-KBS_DB="simple_kbs"
-KBS_DB_TYPE="mysql"
-```
-
-Retrieve the host address of the MySQL database container:
-
-```
-KBS_DB_HOST=$(docker network inspect simple-kbs_default \
-  | jq -r '.[].Containers[] | select(.Name | test("simple-kbs[_-]db.*")).IPv4Address' \
-  | sed "s|/.*$||g")
-```
-
-Add the key to the `simple-kbs` database without any verification policy:
-
-```
-mysql -u${KBS_DB_USER} -p${KBS_DB_PW} -h ${KBS_DB_HOST} -D ${KBS_DB} <<EOF
-  REPLACE INTO secrets VALUES (10, 'key_id1', '${enc_key}', NULL);
-  REPLACE INTO keysets VALUES (10, 'KEYSET-1', '["key_id1"]', NULL);
-EOF
-```
-
-The second value in the keysets table (`KEYSET-1`) must match the `guest_pre_attestation_keyset` value specified in the SEV kata configuration file located here:
-
-`/opt/confidential-containers/share/defaults/kata-containers/configuration-qemu-sev.toml`
-
-Return to step [Launch the Pod and Verify SEV Encryption](#launch-the-pod-and-verify-sev-encryption) and finish the remaining process. Make sure to change the `encrypted-image-tests.yaml` to reflect the new `[REGISTRY_URL]`.
-
-To learn more about creating custom policies, see the section on [Creating a simple-kbs Policy to Verify the SEV Firmware Measurement](#creating-a-simple-kbs-policy-to-verify-the-sev-guest-firmware-measurement).
-
-
-## Creating a simple-kbs Policy to Verify the SEV Guest Firmware Measurement
-
-The `simple-kbs` can be configured with a policy that requires the kata shim to provide a matching SEV guest firmware measurement to release the key for decrypting the image. At launch time, the kata shim will collect the SEV guest firmware measurement and forward it in a key request to the `simple-kbs`.
-
-These steps will use the CoCo sample encrypted container image, but the image URL can be replaced with a user created image registry URL.
-
-To create the policy, the value of the SEV guest firmware measurement must be calculated.
-
-`pip` is required to install the `sev-snp-measure` utility.
-
-* Debian / Ubuntu:
-
-  ```
-  sudo apt install python3-pip
-  ```
-
-* CentOS / Fedora / RHEL:
-
-  ```
-  sudo dnf install python3
-  ```
-
-[sev-snp-measure](https://github.com/IBM/sev-snp-measure) is a utility used to calculate the SEV guest firmware measurement with provided ovmf, initrd, kernel and kernel append input parameters. Install it using the following command:
-
-```
-sudo pip install sev-snp-measure
-```
-
-The path to the guest binaries required for measurement is specified in the kata configuration. Set them:
-
-```
-ovmf_path="/opt/confidential-containers/share/ovmf/OVMF.fd"
-kernel_path="/opt/confidential-containers/share/kata-containers/vmlinuz-sev.container"
-initrd_path="/opt/confidential-containers/share/kata-containers/kata-containers-initrd.img"
-```
-
-The kernel append line parameters are included in the SEV guest firmware measurement. A placeholder will be initially set, and the actual value will be retrieved later from the qemu command line:
-
-```
-append="PLACEHOLDER"
-```
-
-Use the `sev-snp-measure` utility to calculate the SEV guest firmware measurement using the binary variables previously set:
-
-```
-measurement=$(sev-snp-measure --mode=sev --output-format=base64 \
-  --ovmf="${ovmf_path}" \
-  --kernel="${kernel_path}" \
-  --initrd="${initrd_path}" \
-  --append="${append}" \
-)
-```
-
-If the container image is not already present, pull it:
-
-```
-encrypted_image_url="ghcr.io/fitzthum/encrypted-image-tests:unencrypted"
-docker pull "${encrypted_image_url}"
-```
-
-Retrieve the encryption key from docker image label:
-
-```
-enc_key=$(docker inspect ${encrypted_image_url} \
-  | jq -r '.[0].Config.Labels.enc_key')
-```
-
-Add the key, keyset and policy with measurement to the `simple-kbs` database:
-
-```
-mysql -u${KBS_DB_USER} -p${KBS_DB_PW} -h ${KBS_DB_HOST} -D ${KBS_DB} <<EOF
-  REPLACE INTO secrets VALUES (10, 'key_id1', '${enc_key}', 10);
-  REPLACE INTO keysets VALUES (10, 'KEYSET-1', '["key_id1"]', 10);
-  REPLACE INTO policy VALUES (10, '["${measurement}"]', '[]', 0, 0, '[]', now(), NULL, 1);
-EOF
-```
-
-Using the same service yaml from the section on [Launch the Pod and Verify SEV Encryption](#launch-the-pod-and-verify-sev-encryption), launch the service:
-
-```
-kubectl apply -f encrypted-image-tests.yaml
-```
-
-Check for pod errors:
-
-```
-pod_name=$(kubectl get pod -o wide | grep encrypted-image-tests | awk '{print $1;}')
-kubectl describe pod ${pod_name}
-```
-
-The pod will error out on the key retrieval request to the `simple-kbs` because the policy verification failed due to a mismatch in the SEV guest firmware measurement. This is the error message that should display:
-
-```
-Policy validation failed: fw digest not valid
-```
-
-The `PLACEHOLDER` value that was set for the kernel append line when the SEV guest firmware measurement was calculated does not match what was measured by the kata shim. The kernel append line parameters can be retrieved from the qemu command line using the following scripting commands, as long as kubernetes is still trying to launch the pod:
-
-```
-duration=$((SECONDS+30))
-set append
-
-while [ $SECONDS -lt $duration ]; do
-  qemu_process=$(ps aux | grep qemu | grep append || true)
-  if [ -n "${qemu_process}" ]; then
-    append=$(echo ${qemu_process} \
-      | sed "s|.*-append \(.*$\)|\1|g" \
-      | sed "s| -.*$||")
-    break
-  fi
-  sleep 1
-done
-
-echo "${append}"
-```
-
-The above check will only work if the `encrypted-image-tests` guest launch is the only consuming qemu process running.
-
-Now, recalculate the SEV guest firmware measurement and store the `simple-kbs` policy in the database:
-
-```
-measurement=$(sev-snp-measure --mode=sev --output-format=base64 \
-  --ovmf="${ovmf_path}" \
-  --kernel="${kernel_path}" \
-  --initrd="${initrd_path}" \
-  --append="${append}" \
-)
-
-mysql -u${KBS_DB_USER} -p${KBS_DB_PW} -h ${KBS_DB_HOST} -D ${KBS_DB} <<EOF
-  REPLACE INTO secrets VALUES (10, 'key_id1', '${enc_key}', 10);
-  REPLACE INTO keysets VALUES (10, 'KEYSET-1', '["key_id1"]', 10);
-  REPLACE INTO policy VALUES (10, '["${measurement}"]', '[]', 0, 0, '[]', now(), NULL, 1);
-EOF
-```
-
-The pod should now show a successful launch:
-
-```
-kubectl describe pod ${pod_name}
-```
-
-If the service is hung up, delete the pod and try to launch again:
-
-```
-# Delete
-kubectl delete -f encrypted-image-tests.yaml
-
-# Verify pod cleaned up
-kubectl describe pod ${pod_name}
-
-# Relaunch
-kubectl apply -f encrypted-image-tests.yaml
-```
-
-Testing the SEV encrypted container launch can be completed by returning to the section on how to [Verify SEV Memory Encryption](#verify-sev-memory-encryption).

overview.md

@@ -31,9 +31,8 @@ Cloud Computing adoption continues to accelerate whether it be Public, Private o
 common a Hybrid approach and with it the trust boundaries change. Consideration of insider threats
 needs to now consider the cloud provider, infrastructure provider, and managed service provider.
 
-Certain industries are heavily focused on compliance to standards. Governments, too, are concerned
-both [collectively](https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cybersecurity) and
-[individually](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/).
+Certain industries are heavily focused on compliance to standards. Governments are also
+[interested](https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cybersecurity).
 The standards expected to protect software solutions continue to evolve towards a concept of
 Confidential Computing.
 

quickstart.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ hardware support and limitations.
 You can enable Confidential Containers in an existing Kubernetes cluster using the Confidential Containers Operator.
 When installation is finished, your cluster will have new runtime classes for different hardware platforms,
 including a generic runtime for testing CoCo without confidential hardware support, a runtime using a remote hypervisor
-that allows for cloud integration, a runtime for process-based isolation using SGX, as well as runtimes for TDX and SEV.
+that allows for cloud integration, a runtime for process-based isolation using SGX, as well as runtimes for TDX and SNP.
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ To run the operator you must have an existing Kubernetes cluster that meets the
 - Ensure a minimum of 8GB RAM and 4 vCPU for the Kubernetes cluster node
 - Only containerd runtime based Kubernetes clusters are supported with the current CoCo release
 - The minimum Kubernetes version should be 1.24
-- Ensure at least one Kubernetes node in the cluster is having the label `node.kubernetes.io/worker=`
+- Ensure at least one Kubernetes node in the cluster has the labels `node-role.kubernetes.io/worker=` or `node.kubernetes.io/worker=`. This will assign the worker role to a node in your cluster, making it responsible for running your applications and services
 - Ensure SELinux is disabled or not enforced (https://github.com/confidential-containers/operator/issues/115)
 
 For more details on the operator, including the custom resources managed by the operator, refer to the operator [docs](https://github.com/confidential-containers/operator).
@@ -59,18 +59,18 @@ on the worker nodes is **not** on an overlayfs mount but the path is a `hostPath
 Deploy the operator by running the following command  where `<RELEASE_VERSION>` needs to be substituted
 with the desired [release tag](https://github.com/confidential-containers/operator/tags).
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/release?ref=<RELEASE_VERSION>
 ```
 
-For example, to deploy the `v0.8.0` release run:
-```
-kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/release?ref=v0.8.0
+For example, to deploy the `v0.10.0` release run:
+```shell
+kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/release?ref=v0.10.0
 ```
 
 Wait until each pod has the STATUS of Running.
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl get pods -n confidential-containers-system --watch
 ```
 
@@ -81,25 +81,25 @@ kubectl get pods -n confidential-containers-system --watch
 Creating a custom resource installs the required CC runtime pieces into the cluster node and creates
 the `RuntimeClasses`
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/ccruntime/<CCRUNTIME_OVERLAY>?ref=<RELEASE_VERSION>
 ```
 
 The current present overlays are: `default` and `s390x`
 
-For example, to deploy the `v0.8.0` release for `x86_64`, run:
-```
-kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/ccruntime/default?ref=v0.8.0
+For example, to deploy the `v0.10.0` release for `x86_64`, run:
+```shell
+kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/ccruntime/default?ref=v0.10.0
 ```
 
-And to deploy `v0.8.0` release for `s390x`, run:
-```
-kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/ccruntime/s390x?ref=v0.8.0
+And to deploy `v0.10.0` release for `s390x`, run:
+```shell
+kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/ccruntime/s390x?ref=v0.10.0
 ```
 
 Wait until each pod has the STATUS of Running.
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl get pods -n confidential-containers-system --watch
 ```
 
@@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ Please see the [enclave-cc guide](./guides/enclave-cc.md) for more information.
 
 `enclave-cc` is a form of Confidential Containers that uses process-based isolation.
 `enclave-cc` can be installed with the following custom resources.
-```
+```shell
 kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/enclave-cc/sim?ref=<RELEASE_VERSION>
 ```
 or
-```
+```shell
 kubectl apply -k github.com/confidential-containers/operator/config/samples/enclave-cc/hw?ref=<RELEASE_VERSION>
 ```
 for the **simulated** SGX mode build or **hardware** SGX mode build, respectively.
@@ -127,287 +127,82 @@ for the **simulated** SGX mode build or **hardware** SGX mode build, respectivel
 
 Check the `RuntimeClasses` that got created.
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl get runtimeclass
 ```
 Output:
-```
-NAME            HANDLER         AGE
-kata            kata            9m55s
-kata-clh        kata-clh        9m55s
-kata-clh-tdx    kata-clh-tdx    9m55s
-kata-qemu       kata-qemu       9m55s
-kata-qemu-tdx   kata-qemu-tdx   9m55s
-kata-qemu-sev   kata-qemu-sev   9m55s
+```shell
+NAME                 HANDLER              AGE
+kata                 kata-qemu            8d
+kata-clh             kata-clh             8d
+kata-qemu            kata-qemu            8d
+kata-qemu-coco-dev   kata-qemu-coco-dev   8d
+kata-qemu-sev        kata-qemu-sev        8d
+kata-qemu-snp        kata-qemu-snp        8d
+kata-qemu-tdx        kata-qemu-tdx        8d
 ```
 
 Details on each of the runtime classes:
 
-- *kata* - standard kata runtime using the QEMU hypervisor including all CoCo building blocks for a non CC HW
-- *kata-clh* - standard kata runtime using the cloud hypervisor including all CoCo building blocks for a non CC HW
-- *kata-clh-tdx* - using the Cloud Hypervisor, with TD-Shim, and support for Intel TDX CC HW
+- *kata* - Convenience runtime that uses the handler of the default runtime
+- *kata-clh* - standard kata runtime using the cloud hypervisor 
 - *kata-qemu* - same as kata
-- *kata-qemu-tdx* - using QEMU, with TDVF, and support for Intel TDX CC HW, prepared for using Verdictd and EAA KBC.
-- *kata-qemu-sev* - using QEMU, and support for AMD SEV HW
+- *kata-qemu-coco-dev* - standard kata runtime using the QEMU hypervisor including all CoCo building blocks for a non CC HW
+- *kata-qemu-snp* - using QEMU, and support for AMD SNP HW
+- *kata-qemu-tdx* -using QEMU, and support Intel TDX HW based on what's provided by [Ubuntu](https://github.com/canonical/tdx) and [CentOS 9 Stream](https://sigs.centos.org/virt/tdx/).
+
+
+
 
 If you are using `enclave-cc` you should see the following runtime classes.
 
-```
+```shell
 kubectl get runtimeclass
 ```
 Output:
-```
+```shell
 NAME            HANDLER         AGE
 enclave-cc      enclave-cc      9m55s
 ```
 
+The CoCo operator environment has been setup and deployed!
+
 ### Platform Setup
 
 While the operator deploys all the required binaries and artifacts and sets up runtime classes that use them,
-certain platforms may require additional configuration to enable confidential computing. For example, the host
-kernel and firmware might need to be configured.
-See the [guides](./guides) for more information.
+certain platforms may require additional configuration to enable confidential computing. For example, a specific 
+host kernel or firmware may be required. See the [guides](./guides/) for more information.
 
-# Running a workload
+## Using CoCo
 
-## Creating a sample CoCo workload
+Below is a brief summary and description of some of the CoCo use cases and features:
 
-Once you've used the operator to install Confidential Containers, you can run a pod with CoCo by simply adding a runtime class.
-First, we will use the `kata` runtime class which uses CoCo without hardware support.
-Initially we will try this with an unencrypted container image.
+- **Container Launch with Only Memory Encryption (No Attestation)** - Launch a container with memory encryption 
+- **Container Launch with Encrypted Image** - Launch an encrypted container by proving the workload is running 
+  in a TEE in order to retrieve the decryption key
+- **Container Launch with Image Signature Verification** - Launch a container and verify the authenticity and 
+  integrity of an image by proving the workload is running in a TEE
+- **Sealed secret** - Implement wrapped kubernetes secrets that are confidential to the workload owner and are
+  automatically decrypted by proving the workload is running in a TEE
+- **Ephemeral Storage** - Temporary storage that is used during the lifecycle of the container but is cleared out 
+  when a pod is restarted or finishes its task. At the moment, only ephemeral storage of the container itself is 
+  supported and it has to be explicityly configured.
+- **Authenticated Registries** - Create secure container registries that require authentication to access and manage container 
+  images that ensures that only trusted images are deployed in the Confidential Container. The host must have access 
+  to the registry credentials.
+- **Secure Storage** - Mechanisms and technologies used to protect data at rest, ensuring that sensitive information 
+  remains confidential and tamper-proof.
+- **Peer Pods** - Enable the creation of VMs on any environment without requiring bare metal servers or nested 
+  virtualization support. More information about this feature can be found [here](https://github.com/confidential-containers/cloud-api-adaptor/tree/main).
+  
+## Platforms
 
-In our example we will be using the bitnami/nginx image as described in the following yaml:
-```
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Pod
-metadata:
-  labels:
-    run: nginx
-  name: nginx
-  annotations:
-    io.containerd.cri.runtime-handler: kata
-spec:
-  containers:
-  - image: bitnami/nginx:1.22.0
-    name: nginx
-  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
-  runtimeClassName: kata
-```
+With some TEEs, the CoCo use cases and/or configurations are implemented differently. Those are described in each corresponding 
+[guide](./guides) section. To get started using CoCo without TEE hardware, follow the CoCo-dev guide below:
 
-Setting the runtimeClassName is usually the only change needed to the pod yaml, but some platforms
-support additional annotations for configuring the enclave. See the [guides](./guides) for
-more details.
-
-With Confidential Containers, the workload container images are never downloaded on the host.
-For verifying that the container image doesn’t exist on the host you should log into the k8s node and ensure the following command returns an empty result:
-```
-root@cluster01-master-0:/home/ubuntu# crictl  -r  unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock image ls | grep bitnami/nginx
-```
-You will run this command again after the container has started.
-
-Create a pod YAML file as previously described (we named it `nginx.yaml`) .
-
-Create the workload:
-```
-kubectl apply -f nginx.yaml
-```
-Output:
-```
-pod/nginx created
-```
-
-Ensure the pod was created successfully (in running state):
-```
-kubectl get pods
-```
-Output:
-```
-NAME    READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
-nginx   1/1     Running   0          3m50s
-```
-
-Now go back to the k8s node and ensure that you still don’t have any bitnami/nginx images on it:
-```
-root@cluster01-master-0:/home/ubuntu# crictl  -r  unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock image ls | grep bitnami/nginx
-```
-
-## Encrypted and/or signed images with attestation
-
-The previous example does not involve any attestation because the workload container isn't signed or encrypted
-and the workload itself does not require any secrets.
-
-This is not the case for most real workloads. It is recommended to use CoCo with signed and/or encrypted images.
-The workload itself can also request secrets from the attestation agent in the guest.
-
-Secrets are provisioned to the guest in conjunction with an attestation, which is based on hardware evidence.
-The rest of this guide focuses on setting up more substantial encrypted/signed workloads using attestation
-and confidential hardware.
-
-CoCo has a modular attestation interface and there are a few options for attestation.
-CoCo provides a generic Key Broker Service (KBS) that the rest of this guide will be focused on.
-The SEV runtime class uses `simple-kbs`, which is described in the [SEV guide](./guides/sev.md).
-There is also `eaa_kbc`/`verdictd` which is described [here](./guides/eaa_verdictd.md).
-
-### Select Runtime Class
-
-To use CoCo with confidential hardware, first switch to the appropriate runtime class.
-TDX has two runtime classes, `kata-qemu-tdx` and `kata-clh-tdx`. One uses QEMU as VMM and TDVF as firmware. The other uses Cloud Hypervisor as VMM and TD-Shim as firmware.
-
-For SEV(-ES) use the `kata-qemu-sev` runtime class and follow the [SEV guide](./guides/sev.md).
-
-For `enclave-cc` follow the [enclave-cc guide](./guides/enclave-cc.md).
-
-### Deploy and Configure tenant-side CoCo Key Broker System cluster
-
-The following describes how to run and provision the generic KBS.
-The KBS should be run in a trusted environment. The KBS is not just one service,
-but a combination of several.
-
-A tenant-side CoCo Key Broker System cluster includes:
-- Key Broker Service (KBS): Brokering service for confidential resources.
-- Attestation Service (AS): Verifier for remote attestation.
-- Reference Value Provicer Service (RVPS): Provides reference values for AS.
-- CoCo Keyprovider: Component to encrypt the images following ocicrypt spec.
-
-To quick start the KBS cluster, a `docker compose` yaml is provided to launch.
-
-```shell
-# Clone KBS git repository
-git clone https://github.com/confidential-containers/kbs.git
-cd kbs/kbs
-export KBS_DIR_PATH=$(pwd)
-
-# Generate a user auth key pair
-openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 > config/private.key
-openssl pkey -in config/private.key -pubout -out config/public.pub
-
-# Start KBS cluster
-docker compose up -d
-```
-
-If configuration of KBS cluster is required, edit the following config files and restart the KBS cluster with `docker compose`:
-
-- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/kbs-config.json`: configuration for Key Broker Service.
-- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/as-config.json`: configuration for Attestation Service.
-- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/config/sgx_default_qcnl.conf`: configuration for Intel TDX/SGX verification.
-
-When KBS cluster is running, you can modify the policy file used by AS policy engine ([OPA](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/)) at any time:
-
-- `$KBS_DIR_PATH/data/attestation-service/opa/policy.rego`: Policy file for evidence verification of AS, refer to [AS Policy Engine](https://github.com/confidential-containers/attestation-service#policy-engine) for more infomation.
-
-### Encrypting an Image
-
-[skopeo](https://github.com/containers/skopeo) is required to encrypt the container image.
-Follow the [instructions](https://github.com/containers/skopeo/blob/main/install.md) to install `skopeo`.
-
-Use `skopeo` to encrypt an image on the same node of the KBS cluster (use busybox:latest for example):
-
-```shell
-# edit ocicrypt.conf
-tee > ocicrypt.conf <<EOF
-{
-    "key-providers": {
-        "attestation-agent": {
-            "grpc": "127.0.0.1:50000"
-        }
-    }
-}
-EOF
-
-# encrypt the image
-OCICRYPT_KEYPROVIDER_CONFIG=ocicrypt.conf skopeo copy --insecure-policy --encryption-key provider:attestation-agent docker://library/busybox oci:busybox:encrypted
-```
-
-The image will be encrypted, and things happens in the KBS cluster background include:
-
-- CoCo Keyprovider generates a random key and a key-id. Then encrypts the image using the key.
-- CoCo Keyprovider registers the key with key-id into KBS.
-
-Then push the image to registry:
-
-```shell
-skopeo copy oci:busybox:encrypted [SCHEME]://[REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
-```
-Be sure to replace `[SCHEME]` with registry scheme type like `docker`, replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL like `docker.io/encrypt_test/busybox`.
-
-### Signing an Image
-
-[cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is required to sign the container image. Follow the instructions here to install `cosign`:
-
-[cosign installation](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/system_config/installation/)
-
-Generate a cosign key pair and register the public key to KBS storage:
-
-```shell
-cosign generate-key-pair
-mkdir -p $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/cosign-key && cp cosign.pub $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/cosign-key/1
-```
-
-Sign the encrypted image with cosign private key:
-
-```shell
-cosign sign --key cosign.key [REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
-```
-
-Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image generated in previous steps.
-
-Then edit an image pulling validation policy file.
-Here is a sample policy file `security-policy.json`:
-
-```json
-{
-    "default": [{"type": "reject"}],
-    "transports": {
-        "docker": {
-            "[REGISTRY_URL]": [
-                {
-                    "type": "sigstoreSigned",
-                    "keyPath": "kbs:///default/cosign-key/1"
-                }
-            ]
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image.
-
-Register the image pulling validation policy file to KBS storage:
-
-```shell
-mkdir -p $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/security-policy
-cp security-policy.json $KBS_DIR_PATH/data/kbs-storage/default/security-policy/test
-```
-
-### Deploy encrypted image as a CoCo workload on CC HW
-
-Here is a sample yaml for encrypted image deploying:
-
-```shell
-cat << EOT | tee encrypted-image-test-busybox.yaml
-apiVersion: v1
-kind: Pod
-metadata:
-  labels:
-    run: encrypted-image-test-busybox
-  name: encrypted-image-test-busybox
-  annotations:
-    io.containerd.cri.runtime-handler: [RUNTIME_CLASS]
-spec:
-  containers:
-  - image: [REGISTRY_URL]:encrypted
-    name: busybox
-  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
-  runtimeClassName: [RUNTIME_CLASS]
-EOT
-```
-
-Be sure to replace `[REGISTRY_URL]` with the desired registry URL of the encrypted image generated in previous step, replace `[RUNTIME_CLASS]` with kata runtime class for CC HW.
-
-Then configure `/opt/confidential-containers/share/defaults/kata-containers/configuration-<RUNTIME_CLASS_SUFFIX>.toml` to add `agent.aa_kbc_params=cc_kbc::<KBS_URI>` to kernel parameters. Here `RUNTIME_CLASS_SUFFIX` is something like `qemu-tdx`, `KBS_URI` is the address of Key Broker Service in KBS cluster like `http://123.123.123.123:8080`.
-
-Deploy encrypted image as a workload:
-
-```shell
-kubectl apply -f encrypted-image-test-busybox.yaml
-```
+- [CoCo-dev](./guides/coco-dev.md)
+- [SNP](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/prerequisites/hardware/snp/)
+- TDX: No additional steps required.
+- [SGX](./guides/enclave-cc.md)
+- [IBM Secure Execution](./guides/ibm-se.md)
+- ...

releases/v0.10.0.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
 * Platform support is rapidly changing
 * SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
 * Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
 * The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which remained at 75% at the time of this release.

releases/v0.11.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Release Notes for v0.11.0
+
+Release Date: November 25th, 2024
+
+This release is based on [3.11.0](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.11.0) of Kata Containers
+and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
+
+Please see the [quickstart guide](../quickstart.md) for details on how to try out Confidential
+Containers.
+
+Please refer to our [Acronyms](https://github.com/confidential-containers/documentation/wiki/Acronyms)
+and [Glossary](https://github.com/confidential-containers/documentation/wiki/Glossary) pages for
+definitions of the acronyms used in this document.
+
+## What's new
+
+* Sealed secrets can be exposed as volumes
+* TDX guests support measured rootfs with dm-verity
+* Policy generation improvements
+* Test coverage improved for s390x
+* Community reached 100% ("passing") on OpenSSF best practices badge
+
+
+## Hardware Support
+
+Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
+Not all feature have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
+are expected to work on the platforms above.
+
+Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
+provisioned by coco.
+
+This release has been tested on the following stacks:
+
+### AMD SEV-SNP
+
+* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-rc5-next-20240221-snp-host-cc2568386](https://github.com/confidential-containers/linux/tree/amd-snp-host-202402240000)
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.1 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v4.5.4
+
+### Intel TDX
+
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-1004-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
+* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
+
+### Secure Execution on IBM zSystems (s390x) running LinuxONE
+
+* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
+* Kernel: 5.15.0-113-generic
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
+* k8s: v1.28.4 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.3.0
+
+## Limitations
+
+The following are known limitations of this release:
+
+* SEV(-ES) does not support attestation.
+* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
+* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
+* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
+  * Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
+  * Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
+  * Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
+* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
+* `crio` support is still evolving.
+* Platform support is rapidly changing
+* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
+* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
+  * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
+* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
+* Container metadata such as environment variables are not measured.
+* The Kata Agent allows the host to call several dangerous endpoints
+    * Kata Agent does not validate mount requests. A malicious host might be able to mount a shared filesystem into the PodVM.
+    * Policy can be used to block endpoints, but it is not yet tied to the hardware evidence.
+
+## CVE Fixes
+
+None

releases/v0.12.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# Release Notes for v0.12.0
+
+Release Date: January 24th, 2025
+
+This release is based on [3.13.0](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.13.0) of Kata Containers
+and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
+
+Please see the [quickstart guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/) for details on how to try out Confidential
+Containers.
+
+Note that there have been a few breaking changes in the configuration for Trustee.
+If you have been using a custom configuration based on a previous release,
+you may need to update it.
+
+Please refer to our [Acronyms](https://github.com/confidential-containers/documentation/wiki/Acronyms)
+and [Glossary](https://github.com/confidential-containers/documentation/wiki/Glossary) pages for
+definitions of the acronyms used in this document.
+
+## What's new
+
+* Trustee can produce EAR attestation tokens.
+* Plugin architecture added to Trustee including a PKCS11 plugin
+* Trustee can automatically pull VCEK from KDS when validating AMD SNP evidence.
+* Trustee ITA config allows users to select which policies are evaluated and will now always return a token by default.
+* Sealed secrets can be exposed as volumes more flexibly.
+* Confidential Containers documentation has moved to [website](https://confidentialcontainers.org).
+* The confidential guest kernel was updated to Linux 6.12 LTS adding efistub TDX RTMR measurements of the kernel command line and initrd.
+* For peer pods, fedora-based podvm images build with mkosi are now tested and published
+* CRI-O container runtime is tested for peer pods
+
+
+## Hardware Support
+
+Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
+Not all feature have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
+are expected to work on the platforms above.
+
+Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
+provisioned by coco.
+
+This release has been tested on the following stacks:
+
+### AMD SEV-SNP
+
+* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-rc5-next-20240221-snp-host-cc2568386](https://github.com/confidential-containers/linux/tree/amd-snp-host-202402240000)
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.1 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v4.5.4
+
+### Intel TDX
+
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-1004-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
+* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
+
+### Secure Execution on IBM zSystems (s390x) running LinuxONE
+
+* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
+* Kernel: 5.15.0-113-generic
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
+* k8s: v1.28.4 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.3.0
+
+## Limitations
+
+The following are limitations and known issues with this release.
+
+* SEV(-ES) does not support attestation.
+* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
+* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
+* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
+  * Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
+  * Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
+  * Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
+* Image-rs fails to observe container whiteout files in some cases. [Issue](https://github.com/confidential-containers/guest-components/issues/876)
+* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
+* `crio` support is still evolving.
+* Platform support is rapidly changing
+* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
+* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
+  * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
+* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
+* Container metadata such as environment variables are not measured.
+* The Kata Agent allows the host to call several dangerous endpoints
+    * Kata Agent does not validate mount requests. A malicious host might be able to mount a shared filesystem into the PodVM.
+    * Policy can be used to block endpoints, but it is not yet tied to the hardware evidence.
+* Container logs may be visible to the host and blocking the logs agent endpoint can lead to container deadlocks. [Issue](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/issues/10680)
+
+## CVE Fixes
+
+None

releases/v0.13.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# Release Notes for v0.13.0
+
+Release Date: March 24th, 2025
+
+This release is based on [3.15.0](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.13.0) of Kata Containers
+and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
+
+Kata and the CoCo components share an MSRV of 1.80.0.
+
+Please see the [quickstart guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/) or [project documentation](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs) for more information.
+
+## What's new
+
+* AMD SEV(-ES) support has been deprecated and will be removed in the next release.
+* AMD SEV-SNP deployments are compatible with upstream (6.11+) host kernels.
+* Trustee uses ECDH keys by default for KBS protocol.
+* Reliabilty of image pulling has been improved (bug fixes below).
+* The repository field of the resource URI is no longer optional.
+* TDX Attestation uses configfs-tsm based reports only and disables the libtdx-attest fallback.
+* Trustee documentation added to project website.
+* Trustee attestation policy improved for TDX.
+* Blocking logs endpoint with policy can no longer cause deadlocks.
+
+## Bug Fixes
+* Fixed an issue where pulling images with many layers failed due to exceeding the 4KB length limit on mount parameters.
+* Fixed an issue where image whiteout files appeared in the unpacked container filesystem due to the guest's tmpfs not supporting xattr.
+* Fixed an issue where the RCAR handshake in the KBS protocol did not treat JWE protected header as AEAD.
+
+## Hardware Support
+
+Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
+Not all features have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
+are expected to work on the platforms above.
+
+Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
+provisioned by CoCo.
+
+This release has been tested on the following stacks:
+
+### AMD SEV-SNP
+
+* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
+* Kernel: 6.12.0-snp-host-adc218676 (upstream 6.11+) 
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.1 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v4.5.4
+
+### Intel TDX
+
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-1004-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
+* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
+
+### Secure Execution on IBM zSystems (s390x) running LinuxONE
+
+* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
+* Kernel: 5.15.0-113-generic
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
+* k8s: v1.28.4 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.3.0
+
+## Limitations
+
+The following are limitations and known issues with this release.
+
+* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
+* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
+* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
+  * Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
+  * Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
+  * Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
+* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
+* `crio` support is still evolving.
+* Platform support is rapidly changing
+* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
+* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
+  * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
+* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
+* Container metadata such as environment variables are not measured.
+* The Kata Agent allows the host to call several dangerous endpoints
+    * Kata Agent does not validate mount requests. A malicious host might be able to mount a shared filesystem into the PodVM.
+    * Policy can be used to block endpoints, but it is not yet tied to the hardware evidence.
+
+## CVE Fixes
+
+None

releases/v0.14.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Release Notes for v0.14.0
+
+Release Date: May 23rd, 2025
+
+This release is based on [3.17.0](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.17.0) of Kata Containers
+and [v0.11.0](https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/releases/tag/v0.11.0) of enclave-cc.
+
+Kata and the CoCo components share an MSRV of 1.80.0.
+
+Please see the [quickstart guide](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs/getting-started/) or [project documentation](https://confidentialcontainers.org/docs) for more information.
+
+## What's new
+
+* Init-data is supported on bare metal Confidential Containers (see limitations below)
+* [Peer Pods](https://github.com/confidential-containers/cloud-api-adaptor) is now supported by [Alibaba Cloud](https://github.com/confidential-containers/cloud-api-adaptor/tree/main/src/cloud-api-adaptor/alibabacloud).
+* Image-rs supports registry configuration file for fine-grained proxying and remapping of container registries.
+* KBS Client can be used to set reference values for Trustee.
+* KBS Client has a few simple resource policies built-in.
+* Trustee supports native verification of CCA guests in addition to verification via veraison.
+* Trustee artifacts are built and tested for ARM.
+* Trustee can extract reference values from TCG RIMs.
+* Trustee can be configured to support a larger payload size to accomodate guests with large evidence.
+* The confidential guest kernel configuration disables virtio MMIO transport and rng to reduce host attack surface.
+
+## Bug Fixes
+* CDH configuration file no longer requires `coco_as` and `kbs_token` fields to be set when not in use.
+* Trustee with docker compose can attest TDX evidence without any changes to QCNL configuration.
+* Trustee no longer errors when parsing the CCEl of a guest booted with grub. 
+* Trustee default policy matches parsed claims generated by SNP verifier.
+* Trustee k8s deployment and Kata tests updated for new AKS interfaces
+
+## Hardware Support
+
+Attestation is supported and tested on three platforms: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and IBM SE.
+Not all features have been tested on every platform, but those based on attestation
+are expected to work on the platforms above.
+
+Make sure your host platform is compatible with the hypervisor and guest kernel
+provisioned by CoCo.
+
+This release has been tested on the following stacks:
+
+### AMD SEV-SNP
+
+* Processor: AMD EPYC 7413
+* Kernel: 6.12.0-snp-host-adc218676 (upstream 6.11+) 
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.1 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v4.5.4
+
+### Intel TDX
+
+* Kernel: [6.8.0-1022-intel](https://git.launchpad.net/~kobuk-team/ubuntu/+source/linux-intel/tree/?h=noble-main-next)
+* OS: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
+* k8s: v1.30.2 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.0.4-0.20230601165947-6ce0bf390ce3
+
+### Secure Execution on IBM zSystems (s390x) running LinuxONE
+
+* Hardware: IBM Z16 LPAR
+* Kernel: 5.15.0-113-generic
+* OS: Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
+* k8s: v1.28.4 (Kubeadm)
+* Kustomize: v5.3.0
+
+## Limitations
+
+The following are limitations and known issues with this release.
+
+* Bare metal initdata is only tested on TDX and non-tee.
+* Plaintext initdata is not forwarded to Trustee.
+* Credentials for authenticated registries are exposed to the host.
+* Not all features are tested on all platforms.
+* Nydus snapshotter support is not mature.
+  * Nydus snapshotter sometimes fails to pull an image.
+  * Host pulling with Nydus snapshotter is not yet enabled.
+  * Nydus snapshotter is not supported with enclave-cc.
+* Pulling container images inside guest may have negative performance implications including greater resource usage and slower startup.
+* `crio` support is still evolving.
+* Platform support is rapidly changing
+* SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
+* Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
+  * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
+* The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
+
+## CVE Fixes
+
+None

releases/v0.2.0.md

@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is not supported
 - CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
   * OpenShift is a non-starter at the moment due to its dependency on [CRI-O](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o)
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
   * Container image sharing is not possible in this release
   * Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
-  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased to 46% at the time of this release.
   * The main gaps are in test coverage, both general and security tests.

releases/v0.3.0.md

@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is not supported
 - CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
   * OpenShift is a non-starter at the moment due to its dependency on [CRI-O](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o)
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
   * Container image sharing is not possible in this release
   * Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
-  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased to 49% at the time of this release.
   * The main gaps are in test coverage, both general and security tests.

releases/v0.4.0.md

@@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is not supported
 - CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
   * OpenShift is a non-starter at the moment due to its dependency on [CRI-O](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o)
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
   * Container image sharing is not possible in this release
   * Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
-  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased to 49% at the time of this release.
   * The main gaps are in test coverage, both general and security tests.

releases/v0.5.0.md

@@ -65,11 +65,11 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is not supported
 - CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
   * Container image sharing is not possible in this release
   * Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
-  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased from 49% to 64% at the time of this release.
   * All CoCo repos now have automated tests, including linting, incorporated into CI.

releases/v0.6.0.md

@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is only supported with `cloud-api-adaptor`.
 - Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress. 
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
-  * Container images must be downloaded separately (inside guest) for each pod. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * Container images must be downloaded separately (inside guest) for each pod. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which remained at 64% at the time of this release.
   * Vulnerability reporting mechanisms still need to be created. Public github issues are still appropriate for this release until private reporting is established.

releases/v0.7.0.md

@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * `crio` is only supported with `cloud-api-adaptor`.
 - Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress. 
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
-  * Container images must be downloaded separately (inside guest) for each pod. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
+  * Container images must be downloaded separately (inside guest) for each pod. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/66)
 - The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which remained at 64% at the time of this release.
   * Vulnerability reporting mechanisms still need to be created. Public github issues are still appropriate for this release until private reporting is established.

releases/v0.8.0.md

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * Not all image repositories support encrypted container images.
  Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
 * The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which improved to 69% at the time of this release.

releases/v0.9.0-alpha0.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
   * Not all image repositories support encrypted container images.
 * Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
 * The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which improved to 75% at the time of this release.

releases/v0.9.0-alpha1.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
 * SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
 * Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
   * OpenShift support is not yet complete.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
 * The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which remained at 75% at the time of this release.

releases/v0.9.0.md

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ The following are known limitations of this release:
 * Platform support is rapidly changing
 * SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
 * Complete integration with Kubernetes is still in progress.
-  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
+  * Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/confidential-containers/issues/53)
   * Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
 * The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
   * We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which remained at 75% at the time of this release.

roadmap.md

@@ -1,87 +1,29 @@
 # Confidential Containers Roadmap
-When looking at the project's roadmap we distinguish between the short-term roadmap (2-4 months) vs. 
-the mid/long-term roadmap (4-12 months):
-- The **short-term roadmap** is focused on achieving an end-to-end, easy to deploy confidential 
-  containers solution using at least one HW encryption solution and integrated to k8s (with forked
-  versions if needed)
-- The **mid/long-term solutions** focuses on maturing the components of the short-term solution 
-  and adding a number of enhancements both to the solution and the project (such as CI,
-  interoperability with other projects etc.)
 
-# Short-Term Roadmap
-The short-term roadmap aims to achieve the following:
-- MVP stack for running confidential containers
-- Based on and compatible with Kata Containers 2
-- Based on at least one confidential computing implementation (SEV, TDX, SE, etc)
-- Integration with Kubernetes: kubectl apply -f confidential-pod.yaml
+When looking at the project's roadmap we distinguish between the short-term roadmap (2-6 months) vs. the mid/long-term roadmap (6-18 months):
+- The [short term roadmap](#short-term-roadmap) is focused on achieving an end-to-end, easy to deploy and stable confidential containers solution. We track this work on a number of github boards.
+- The [mid and long term roadmap](#mid-and-long-term-roadmap) focuses on use case driven development.
 
-The work is targeted to be completed by end of November 2021 and includes 3 milestones:
-![September 2021](./images/RoadmapSept2021.jpg)
-- **September 2021**
-  - Unencrypted image pulled inside the guest, kept in tmpfs
-  - Pod/Container runs from pulled image
-  - Agent API is restricted
-  - crictl only
-  
-![October 2021](./images/RoadmapOct2021.jpg)
-- **October 2021**
-  - Encrypted image pulled inside the guest, kept in tmpfs
-  - Image is decrypted with a pre-provisioned key (No attestation)
-  
-![November 2021](./images/RoadmapNov2021.jpg)
-- **November 2021**
-  - Image is optionally stored on an encrypted, ephemeral block device
-  - Image is decrypted with a key obtained from a key brokering service (KBS)
-  - Integration with kubelet
+# Short Term Roadmap
+The short-term roadmap is based on our github boards and delivered through our on-going releases
 
-For additional details on each milestone see [Confidential Containers v0](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1SIqLogbauLf6lG53cIBPMOFadRT23aXuTGC8q-Ernfw/edit#slide=id.p).
+- [Confidential containers github board](https://github.com/orgs/confidential-containers/projects/6/views/22)
+- [Trustee github board](https://github.com/orgs/confidential-containers/projects/10/views/1)
 
-Tasks are tracked on a weekly basis through a dedicated spreadsheet. 
-For more information see [Confidential Containers V0 Plan](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M_MijAutym4hMg8KtIye1jIDAUMUWsFCri9nq4dqGvA/edit#gid=0&fvid=1397558749).
+# Mid and Long Term Roadmap
 
+In CoCo use case driven development we identify the main functional requirements the community requires by focusing on key use cases.
 
-# Mid-Term Roadmap
+This helps the community deliver releases which address real use cases customers require and focusing on the right priorities. The use case driven development approach also includes developing the relevant CI/CDs to ensure end-to-end use cases the community delivers work over time.
 
-Continue our journey using knowledge and support of Subject Matter Experts (SME's) in other 
-projects to form stronger opinions on what is needed from components which can be integrated to
-deliver the confidential containers objectives.
+We target the following use cases:
 
-- Harden the code used for the demos
-- Improve CI/CD pipeline
-- Clarify the release process
-- Establish processes and tools to support planning, prioritisation, and work in progress
-- Simple process to get up and running regardless of underlying Trusted Execution Environment
-  technology
-- Develop a small, simple, secure, lightweight and high performance OCI container image 
-  management library [image-rs](https://github.com/confidential-containers/image-rs) for 
-  confidential containers.
-- Develop small, simple shim firmware ([td-shim](https://github.com/confidential-containers/td-shim))
-  in support of trusted execution environment for use with cloud native confidential containers.
-- Document threat model and trust model, what are we protecting, how are we achieving it.
-- Identify technical convergence points with other confidential computing projects both inside 
-  and outside CNCF.
+- Confidential Federated Learning
+- Multi-party Computing (data clean room, confidential spaces etc)
+- Trusted Pipeline (Supply Chain)
+- Confidential RAG LLMs
 
-# Longer-Term Roadmap
+These use cases are outlined within [Confidential Computing Use Case Slides](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1YSybvMRku1eoFjAmign9DzKGRpKW4REPYpJCNT0sxmc) created by a dedicated working group.
 
-Focused meetings will be set up to discuss architecture and the priority of longer-term objectives 
-in the process of being set up.
-
-Each meeting will have an agreed focus with people sharing material/thoughts ahead of time.
-
-Topics under consideration:
-- CI/CD + repositories
-- Community structure and expectations
-- 2 on Mid-Term Architecture
-	- Attestation
-	- Images
-	- Runtimes
-
-Proposed Topics to influence long-term direction/architecture:
-- Baremetal / Peer Pod
-- Composability of alternative technologies to deliver confidential containers
-- Performance
-- Identity / Service Mesh
-- Reproducible builds/demos
-- Edge Computing
-- Reduce footprint of image pull
+For additional details we recommend reviewing the working group's notes: [Confidential containers use cases driven development](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1LnGNeyUyPM61Iv4kBKFbfgmBr3RmxHYZ7Ev88obN0_E/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.b0rnn2bw76n)
 

trust_model.md

@@ -69,7 +69,25 @@ This means our trust and threat modelling should
 - Consider existing Cloud Native technologies and the role they can play for confidential containers.
 - Consider additional technologies to fulfil a role in Cloud Native exploitation of TEEs.
 
-### Out of Scope
+## Illustration
+
+The following diagram shows which components in a Confidential Containers setup
+are part of the TEE (green boxes labeled TEE). The hardware and guest work in
+tandem to establish a TEE for the pod, which provides the isolation and
+integrity protection for data in use.
+
+![Threat model](./images/coco-threat-model.png)
+
+Not depicted: Process-based isolation from the enclave-cc runtime class. That isolation model further removes the guest operating system from the trust boundary. See the enclave-cc sub-project for more details:
+https://github.com/confidential-containers/enclave-cc/
+
+Untrusted components include:
+1. The host operating system, including its hypervisor, KVM
+2. Other Cloud Provider host software beyond the host OS and hypervisor
+3. Other virtual machines (and their processes) resident on the same host
+4. Any other processes on the host machine (including the kubernetes control plane).
+
+## Out of Scope
 
 The following items are considered out-of-scope for the trust/threat modelling within confidential
 containers :
@@ -82,7 +100,7 @@ containers :
   and will only highlight them where they become relevant to the trust model or threats we
   consider.
 
-### Summary
+## Summary
 
 In practice, those deploying workloads into TEE environments may have varying levels of trust
 in the personas who have privileges regarding orchestration or hosting the workload. This trust