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67 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Release Notes for v0.4.0
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Release Date: 2023-03-03
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Please see the [quickstart guide](../quickstart.md) for details on how to try out Confidential Containers
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## What's new
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- Skopeo and umoci dependencies are removed with our image-rs component fully integrated
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- //add more new stuff here
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## Hardware Support
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Confidential Containers is tested with attestation on the following platforms:
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- Intel TDX
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- AMD SEV
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The following platforms are untested or partially supported:
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- Intel SGX
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- AMD SEV-ES
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- IBM Secure Execution (SE) on IBM zSystems & LinuxONE
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The following platforms are in development:
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- AMD SEV-SNP
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## Limitations
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The following are known limitations of this release:
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- Platform support is currently limited, and rapidly changing
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* AMD SEV-ES is not tested in the CI.
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* Image signature validation has not been tested with AMD SEV.
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* s390x does not support cosign signature validation
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- SELinux is not supported on the host and must be set to permissive if in use.
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- Attestation and key brokering support is still under development
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* The disk-based key broker client (KBC) is used for non-tee testing, but is not suitable for production, except with encrypted VM images.
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* Currently, there are two KBS that can be used:
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- simple-kbs: simple key broker service (KBS) for SEV(-ES).
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- [Verdictd](https://github.com/inclavare-containers/verdictd): An external project with which Attestation Agent can conduct remote attestation communication and key acquisition via EAA KBC
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* The full-featured generic KBS and the corresponding KBC are still in the development stage.
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* For developers, other KBCs can be experimented with.
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- The format of encrypted container images is still subject to change
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* The oci-crypt container image format itself may still change
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* The tools to generate images are not in their final form
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* The image format itself is subject to change in upcoming releases
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* Image repository support for encrypted images is unequal
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- CoCo currently requires a custom build of `containerd`
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* The CoCo operator will deploy the correct version of `containerd` for you
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* Changes are required to delegate `PullImage` to the agent in the virtual machine
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* The required changes are not part of the vanilla `containerd`
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* The final form of the required changes in `containerd` is expected to be different
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* `crio` is not supported
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- CoCo is not fully integrated with the orchestration ecosystem (Kubernetes, OpenShift)
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* OpenShift is a non-starter at the moment due to its dependency on [CRI-O](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o)
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* Existing APIs do not fully support the CoCo security and threat model. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/53)
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* Some commands accessing confidential data, such as `kubectl exec`, may either fail to work, or incorrectly expose information to the host
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* Container image sharing is not possible in this release
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* Container images are downloaded by the guest (with encryption), not by the host
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* As a result, the same image will be downloaded separately by every pod using it, not shared between pods on the same host. [More info](https://github.com/confidential-containers/community/issues/66)
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- The CoCo community aspires to adopting open source security best practices, but not all practices are adopted yet.
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* We track our status with the OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, which increased to 49% at the time of this release.
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* The main gaps are in test coverage, both general and security tests.
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* Vulnerability reporting mechanisms also need to be created. Public github issues are still appropriate for this release until private reporting is established.
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## CVE Fixes
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None
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