update(rules): adding container info to the output of the Lryke detecting kernel module injections from containers

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Di Donato <leodidonato@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Leonardo Di Donato 2021-06-11 13:19:28 +00:00 committed by poiana
parent 78f710c706
commit 8216b435cb

View File

@ -1753,13 +1753,13 @@
- macro: allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks
condition: >
(container.image.repository startswith "602401143452.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "877085696533.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "800184023465.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "602401143452.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "877085696533.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "800184023465.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "602401143452.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "918309763551.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "961992271922.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "961992271922.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "590381155156.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "558608220178.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "558608220178.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "151742754352.dkr.ecr" or
container.image.repository startswith "013241004608.dkr.ecr")
@ -3003,7 +3003,7 @@
- rule: Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected
desc: Detect kernel module was injected (from container).
condition: spawned_process and container and proc.name=insmod and not proc.args in (white_listed_modules)
output: Linux Kernel Module injection using insmod detected (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid parent_process=%proc.pname module=%proc.args)
output: Linux Kernel Module injection using insmod detected (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid parent_process=%proc.pname module=%proc.args %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: WARNING
tags: [process]
@ -3027,7 +3027,7 @@
# A privilege escalation to root through heap-based buffer overflow
- rule: Sudo Potential Privilege Escalation
desc: Privilege escalation vulnerability affecting sudo (<= 1.9.5p2). Executing sudo using sudoedit -s or sudoedit -i command with command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character from an unprivileged user it's possible to elevate the user privileges to root.
condition: spawned_process and user.uid!= 0 and proc.name=sudoedit and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i) and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \)
condition: spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and proc.name=sudoedit and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i) and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \)
output: "Detect Sudo Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-3156) (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline %container.info)"
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation]