update(rules): adding container info to the output of the Lryke detecting kernel module injections from containers

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Di Donato <leodidonato@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Leonardo Di Donato 2021-06-11 13:19:28 +00:00 committed by poiana
parent 78f710c706
commit 8216b435cb

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@ -3003,7 +3003,7 @@
- rule: Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected
desc: Detect kernel module was injected (from container).
condition: spawned_process and container and proc.name=insmod and not proc.args in (white_listed_modules)
output: Linux Kernel Module injection using insmod detected (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid parent_process=%proc.pname module=%proc.args)
output: Linux Kernel Module injection using insmod detected (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid parent_process=%proc.pname module=%proc.args %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
priority: WARNING
tags: [process]
@ -3027,7 +3027,7 @@
# A privilege escalation to root through heap-based buffer overflow
- rule: Sudo Potential Privilege Escalation
desc: Privilege escalation vulnerability affecting sudo (<= 1.9.5p2). Executing sudo using sudoedit -s or sudoedit -i command with command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character from an unprivileged user it's possible to elevate the user privileges to root.
condition: spawned_process and user.uid!= 0 and proc.name=sudoedit and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i) and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \)
condition: spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and proc.name=sudoedit and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i) and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \)
output: "Detect Sudo Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-3156) (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline %container.info)"
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation]