Use a wider range of priorities in rules.

Review the priorities used by each rule and try to use a consistent set
that uses more of the possible priorities. The general guidelines I used
were:

 - If a rule is related to a write of state (i.e. filesystem, etc.),
   its priority is ERROR.
 - If a rule is related to an unauthorized read of state (i.e. reading
   sensitive filees, etc.), its priority is WARNING.
 - If a rule is related to unexpected behavior (spawning an unexpected
   shell in a container, opening an unexpected network connection, etc.), its priority
   is NOTICE.
 - If a rule is related to behaving against good practices (unexpected
   privileged containers, containers with sensitive mounts, running
   interactive commands as root), its priority is INFO.

One exception is that the most FP-prone rule (Run shell untrusted) has a
priority of DEBUG.
This commit is contained in:
Mark Stemm
2017-05-24 18:54:14 -07:00
parent f426c4292d
commit edce729bd9

View File

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write and not package_mgmt_procs
output: "File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- macro: write_etc_common
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, not in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and not proc.sname=fbash
output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Within a fbash session, the severity is lowered to INFO
@@ -313,28 +313,28 @@
desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
condition: fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write and not proc.name in (dnf,rpm,rpmkey,yum) and not ansible_running_python
output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt]
- rule: DB program spawned process
desc: a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself. This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
condition: proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and spawned_process and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
output: "Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process, database]
- rule: Modify binary dirs
desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
condition: bin_dir_rename and modify and not package_mgmt_procs
output: "File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
output: "Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# Don't load shared objects coming from unexpected places
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
output: "Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname %container.info)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- list: known_shell_spawn_binaries
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
and not parent_python_running_denyhosts
and not parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
output: "Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)"
priority: WARNING
priority: DEBUG
tags: [host, shell]
- macro: trusted_containers
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@
desc: Any open by a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: (open_read or open_write) and container and container.privileged=true and not trusted_containers
output: File opened for read/write by privileged container (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info file=%fd.name)
priority: WARNING
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
- macro: sensitive_mount
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@
desc: Any open by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory (i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: (open_read or open_write) and container and sensitive_mount and not trusted_containers
output: File opened for read/write by container mounting sensitive directory (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info file=%fd.name)
priority: WARNING
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
# Anything run interactively by root
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@
desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive
output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
priority: INFO
tags: [users]
- rule: Terminal shell in container
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
output: "A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
- rule: Run shell in container
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl, awk, falco, cron, erl_child_setup)
and not trusted_containers
output: "Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name %container.info shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@
desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
condition: (fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs) and (inbound or outbound)
output: "Known system binary sent/received network traffic (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco
@@ -475,14 +475,14 @@
desc: an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. user "root" is also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> and not user.name=root and not proc.name in (userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-)
output: "Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [users]
- rule: User mgmt binaries
desc: activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded. Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top of a base linux distribution at startup.
condition: spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and not proc.name in (su, sudo) and not container and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, run-parts)
output: "User management binary command run outside of container (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [host, users]
- list: allowed_dev_files
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
# fbash is a small shell script that runs bash, and is suitable for use in curl <curl> | fbash installers.
@@ -506,21 +506,21 @@
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start listening for network connections
condition: evt.type=listen and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected listen call by a process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
- rule: Installer bash starts session
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to start a new session
condition: evt.type=setsid and proc.sname=fbash
output: "Unexpected setsid call by a process in fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
- rule: Installer bash non https connection
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to make an outgoing connection on a non-http(s) port
condition: proc.sname=fbash and outbound and not fd.sport in (80, 443, 53)
output: "Outbound connection on non-http(s) port by a process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
# It'd be nice if we could warn when processes in a fbash session try