Move entrypoint detection to its own macro. Also consider something the
entrypoint if its parent is runc:[0:PARENT]. There's a race where
runc:[0:PARENT] exits in parallel with the root program being execd, so
the parent might not exist or might have this name.
Combine parent_php_running_builds and parent_ruby_running_gcc into a
single parent_scripting_running_builds which handles the general case of
some script running some make/compilation related program. Also add some
build-related command line prefixes.
Allow supervisor-related programs to spawn shells and access sensitive
files.
Allow sendmail config binaries to write below etc directly (their
children already could).
Add some directories related to phusion (system-as-a-container).
For a few rules add parent programs in the output so it's easier to
diagnose the context for an event.
Let varnishd spawn shells.
- Move qualys-cloud-ag to the monitoring_binaries list
- Add a new list sendmail_config_binaries containing programs that can
modify files.
- Make parent_php_running_git a bit more generic for
parent_php_running_builds and add some additional sub-commands.
- Allow several combinations of scripting programs (ruby, python, etc.)
to run other build-ish commands.
- Let mysql_install_d(b) spawn shells and access sensitive files.
- Let qualys-cloud-ag(ent) spawn shells
- Add a few additional innocuous commandlines
- Let postfix setuid to itself
A new (empty) list user_known_container_shell_spawn_binaries allows
additional files to add additional programs that are allowed to spawn
shells in containers.
Add additional shell spawning command lines.
Allow package management binaries in containers--lots of people seem to
do it. Also allow pycompile/py3compile.
I need to refactor the shell spawners to more clearly isolate shell
spawners that we don't want to occur in a container from ones that can
run both inside and outside of a container.
These changes allow for a local rules file that will be preserved across
upgrades and allows the main rules file to be overwritten across upgrades.
- Move all config/rules files below /etc/falco/
- Add a "local rules" file /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml. The intent
is that it contains modifications/deltas to the main rules file
/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml. The main falco_rules.yaml should be
treated as immutable.
- All config files are flagged so they are not overwritten on upgrade.
- Change the handling of the config item "rules_file" in falco.yaml to
allow a list of files. By default, this list contains:
[/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml, /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml].
Also change rpm/debian packaging to ensure that the above files are
preserved across upgrades:
- Use relative paths for share/bin dirs. This ensures that when packaged
as rpms they won't be flagged as config files.
- Add CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX to FALCO_ENGINE_LUA_DIR now that it's relative.
- In debian packaging, flag
/etc/falco/{falco.yaml,falco_rules.yaml,falco_rules.local.yaml} as
conffiles. That way they are preserved across upgrades if modified.
- In rpm packaging when using cmake, any files installed with an
absolute path are automatically flagged as %config. The only files
directly installed are now the config files, so that addresses the problem.
Add CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX to lua dir.
* Updates from beta customers.
- add anacron as a cron program
* Reorganize package management binaries
Split package_management_binaries into two separate lists rpm_binaries
and deb_binaries. unattended-upgr is common to both worlds so it's still
in package_management_binaries.
Also change Write below rpm database to use rpm_binaries instead of its
own list.
Also add 75-system-updat (truncated) as a shell spawner.
* Add rules for jenkins
Add rules that allow jenkins to spawn shells, both in containers and
directly on the host.
Also handle jenkins slaves that run /tmp/slave.jar.
* Allow npm to run shells.
Not yet allowing node to run shells itself, although we want to add
something to reduce node-related FPs.
* Allow urlgrabber/git-remote to access /etc
urlgrabber and git-remote both try to access the RHEL nss database,
containing shared certificates. I may change this in a more general way
by changing open_read/open_write to only look for successful opens.
* Only look for successful open_read/open_writes
Change the macros open_read/open_write to only trigger on successful
opens (when fd.num > 0). This is a pretty big change to behavior, but
is more intuitive.
This required a small update to the open counts for a couple of unit
tests, but otherwise they still all passed with this change.
* Allow rename_device to write below /dev
Part of udev.
* Allow cloud-init to spawn shells.
Part of https://cloud-init.io/
* Allow python to run a shell that runs sdchecks
sdchecks is a part of the sysdig monitor agent.
* Allow dev creation binaries to write below etc.
Specifically this includes blkid and /etc/blkid/blkid.tab.
* Allow git binaries to spawn shells.
They were already allowed to run shells in a container.
* Add /dev/kmsg as an allowed /dev file
Allows userspace programs to write to kernel log.
* Allow other make programs to spawn shells.
Also allow gmake/cmake to spawn shells and put them in their own list
make_binaries.
* Add better mesos support.
Mesos slaves appear to be in a container due to their cgroup and can run
programs mesos-health-check/mesos-docker-exec to monitor the containers
on the slave, so allow them to run shells.
Add mesos-agent, mesos-logrotate, mesos-fetch as shell spawners both in
and out of containers.
Add gen_resolvconf. (short for gen_resolvconf.py) as a program that can
write to /etc.
Add toybox (used by mesos, part of http://landley.net/toybox/about.html)
as a shell spawner.
* systemd can listen on network ports.
Systemd can listen on network ports to launch daemons on demand, so
allow it to perform network activity.
* Let docker binaries setuid.
Let docker binaries setuid and add docker-entrypoi (truncation
intentional) to the set of docker binaries.
* Change cis-related rules to be less noisy
Change the two cis-related falco rules "File Open by Privileged
Container" and "Sensitive Mount by Container" to be less noisy. We found
in practice that tracking every open still results in too many falco
notifications.
For now, change the rules to only track the initial process start in the
container by looking for vpid=1. This should result in only triggering
when a privileged/sensitive mount container is started. This is slightly
less coverage but is far less noisy.
* Add quay.io/sysdig as trusted containers
These are used for sysdig cloud onpremise deployments.
* Add gitlab-runner-b(uild) as a gitlab binary.
Add gitlab-runner-b (truncated gitlab-runner-build) as a gitlab binary.
* Add ceph as a shell spawner.
Also allow ceph to spawn shells in a container.
* Allow some shells by command line.
For some mesos containers, where the container doesn't have an image and
is just a tarball in a cgroup/namespace, we don't have any image to work
with. In those cases, allow specific command lines.
* Allow user 'nobody' to setuid.
Allow the user nobody to setuid. This depends on the user nobody being
set up in the first place to have no access, but that should be an ok
assumption.
* Additional allowed shell commandlines
* Add additional shells.
* Allow multiple users to become themself.
Add rule somebody_becoming_themself that handles cases of nobody and
www-data trying to setuid to themself. The sysdig filter language
doesn't support template/variable values to allow "user.name=X and
evt.arg.uid=X for a given X", so we have to enumerate the users.
* More known spawn command lines
* Let make binaries be run in containers.
Some CI/CD pipelines build in containers.
* Add additional shell spawning command lines
* Add additional apt program apt-listchanges.
* Add gitlab-ce as shell spawning container.
* Allow PM2 to spawn shells in containers.
Was already in the general list, seen in some customers, so adding to
the in containers list.
* Clean up pass to fix long lines.
Take a pass through the rules making sure each line is < 120 characters.
* Change tests for privileged container rules.
Change unit tests to reflect the new privileged/sensitive mount
container rules that only detect container launch.
Review the priorities used by each rule and try to use a consistent set
that uses more of the possible priorities. The general guidelines I used
were:
- If a rule is related to a write of state (i.e. filesystem, etc.),
its priority is ERROR.
- If a rule is related to an unauthorized read of state (i.e. reading
sensitive filees, etc.), its priority is WARNING.
- If a rule is related to unexpected behavior (spawning an unexpected
shell in a container, opening an unexpected network connection, etc.), its priority
is NOTICE.
- If a rule is related to behaving against good practices (unexpected
privileged containers, containers with sensitive mounts, running
interactive commands as root), its priority is INFO.
One exception is that the most FP-prone rule (Run shell untrusted) has a
priority of DEBUG.
Allow the sysdig cloud agent to call setns to collect java process
metrics.
We've also seen cases where some of the intermediate processes created
below runc appear to call setns. It appears that this only should happen
if some events (like the execve that spawns the intermediate processes)
are lost, but just to be safe allow processes starting with "runc:" to
call setns.