* Let supervisor write more generally below /etc
* Let perl+plesk scripts run shells/write below etc
* Allow spaces after some cmdlines
* Add additional shell spawner.
* Add addl package mgmt binaries.
* Add addl cases for java + jenkins
Addl jar files to consider.
* Add addl jenkins-related cmdlines
Mostly related to node scripts run by jenkins
* Let python running some mesos tasks spawn shells
In this case marathon run by python
* Let ucf write below etc
Only below /etc/gconf for now.
* Let dpkg-reconfigur indirectly write below /etc
It may run programs that modify files below /etc
* Add files/dirs/prefixes for writes below root
Build a set of acceptable files/dirs/prefixes for writes below
/root. Mostly triggered by apps that run directly as root.
* Add addl shell spawn binaries.
* Also let java + sbt spawn shells in containers
Not seen only at host level
* Make sure the file below etc is /etc/
Make sure the file below /etc is really below the directory etc aka
/etc/xxx. Otherwise it would match a file /etcfoo.
* Let rancher healthcheck spawn shells
The name healthcheck is relatively innocuous so also look at the parent
process.
* Add addl shell container shell spawn binaries
* Add addl x2go binaries
* Let rabbitq write its config files
* Let rook write below /etc
toolbox.sh is fairly generic so add a condition based on the image name.
* Let consul-template spawn shells
* Add rook/toolbox as a trusted container
Their github pages recommend running privileged.
* Add addl mail binary that can setuid
* Let plesk autoinstaller spawn shells
The name autoinstaller is fairly generic so also look at the parent.
* Let php handlers write its config
* Let addl pkg-* binary write to /etc indirectly
* Add additional shell spawning binaries.
* Add ability to specify user trusted containers
New macro user_trusted_containers allows a user-provided set of
containers that are trusted and are allowed to run privileged.
* If npm runs node, let node spawn shells
* Let python run airflow via a shell.
* Add addl passenger commandlines (for shells)
* Add addl ways datadog can be run
* Let find run shells in containers.
* Add rpmq as a rpm binary
* Let httpd write below /etc/httpd/
* Let awstats/sa-update spawn shells
* Add container entrypoint as a shell
Some images have an extra shell level for image entrypoints.
* Add an additional jenkins commandline
* Let mysql write its config
* Let openvpn write its config
* Add addl root dirs/files
Also move /root/.java to be a general prefix.
* Let mysql_upgrade/opkg-cl spawn shells
* Allow login to perform dns lookups
With run with -h <host> to specify a remote host, some versions of login
will do a dns lookup to try to resolve the host.
* Let consul-template write haproxy config.
* Also let mysql indirectly edit its config
It might spawn a program to edit the config in addition to directly.
* Allow certain sed temp files below /etc/
* Allow debian binaries to indirectly write to /etc
They may spawn programs like sed, touch, etc to change files below /etc.
* Add additional root file
* Let rancher healthcheck be run more indirectly
The grandparent as well as parent of healthcheck can be tini.
* Add more cases for haproxy writing config
Allow more files as well as more scripts to update the config.
* Let vmtoolsd spawn shells on the host
* Add an additional innocuous entrypoint shell
* Let peer-finder (mongodb) spawn shells
* Split application rules to separate file.
Move the contents of application rules, which have never been enabled by
default, to a separate file. It's only installed in the mail falco packages.
* Add more build-related command lines
* Let perl running openresty spawn shells
* Let countly write nginx config
* Let confd spawn shells
* Also let aws spawn shells in containers.
The terminal shell in container rule has always been less permissive
than the other shell rules, mostly because we expect terminal-attached
shells to be less common. However, they might run innocuous commands,
especially from scripting languages like python. So allow the innocuous
commands to run.
* Let luajit spawn shells.
* Start support for db mgmt programs
Add support for db management programs that tend to spawn
shells. Starting with two lists
mysql_mgmt_binaries/postgres_mgmt_binaries which are combined into
db_mgmt_binaries. db_mgmt_binaries is added to both shell spawning rules
and the individual programs are removed.
* Let apache beam spawn shells
The program is "python pipeline.py" but it appears to be related to
https://github.com/apache/beam/blob/master/sdks/python/apache_beam/pipeline.py.
* Better support for dovecot
Allow dovecot to setuid by adding to mail_binaries.
Allow the program auth, when run by dovecot, to spawn shells.
* Better support for plesk
Create a list plesk_binaries and allow them to run shells.
Also let them write to files below /etc/sw/keys.
* Let strongswan spawn shells.
Specifically the program starter. Using the full command line to be more
specific.
* Let proftpd modify files below /etc.
* Let chef binaries write below /etc
* Let mandb read sensitive files
* Let specific phusion passenger binaries run shells
The program is "my_init", which is fairly generic, so capture it by the
full command line.
* Make git-remote-http more permissive.
* Let networkmanager modify /etc/resolv.conf
specifically nm-dispatcher
* Let hostid open network connections
It might perform dns lookups as a part of resolving ip addresses.
* Let uwsgi spawn shells
* Add docker-runc-cur as a docker binary.
truncated version of docker-runc-current.
* Add rule for allowed containers
New rule Launch Disallowed Container triggers when a container is
started that does not match the macro allowed_containers. In the main
falco rules file, this macro never matches, so it never
triggers. However, in a second rules file the macro allowed_containers
could be filled in with the specific images that match.
* Also let foreman spawn shells
Used by Red Hat Sattelite.
* Let confluence run shells.
Appears as java program, so look for the classpath.
* Make allowed_containers macro more foolproof.
In some cases, the container image might not be known/is NULL, so the
comparison aganst "dummy-not-allowed-container-image" doesn't work.
Replace this with proc.vpid=1, which is in the main rule Launch
Disallowed Continer. Ensures it will only trigger when the
allowed_containers macro is overridden.
* Let tomcat spawn shells.
It's java so you need to look at the classpath.
* Let pip install software.
* Add another yarn command line.
* Let add-shell write to /etc/shells.tmp
* Let more plesk binaries setuid.
* Add imap-login as a mail binary.
* Fix plesk writing keys macro
Should be testing proc.name, not proc.cmdline.
* Let screen read sensitive files.
* Add more shell spawners.
S99qualys-cloud is the init script, cfn-signal is cloudformation.
* Exclude nologin from user mgmt programs.
* Let programs run by locales.postins write to /etc
It can run scripts like sed to modify files before writing the final
file.
* Let install4j java progs spawn shells.
Again, searching by classpath.
* Let some shell cmds be spawned outside containers
We had a list known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines that contained
innocuous commandlines, but it only worked for containers.
Split this list into container-specific and general commandlines, and
add an exception for the general commandlines for the Run Shell
Untrusted rule.
* Add addl ruby-based passenger spawners
Add a different way to identify ruby run by phusion passenger.
* Allow bundle ruby cmds to be identififed by name
In some cases, bundle runs ruby scripts by direct script
name (foo.rb). Also allow that to spawn shells.
* Let nginx spawn shells.
* Skip setuid rules for containers.
For now, entirely skip the setuid rule for containers. Will add back
once I can find a way to check for unknown users.
* Let PassengerWatchd run shells
* Add additional foreman shells
Let the direct parent also be scl when the ancestor is tfm-rake,tfm-ruby.
* Add additional innocuous command lines.
* Also let cron spawn shells in containers
Seen when using things like phusion passenger.
* Also let run-parts run cmp/cp for sensitive files
Might be a case of a missing process but might also be legitimate.
* Let erlexec spawn shells.
* Add additional innocuous shell cmdlines.
* Add suexec as a userexec binary.
* Add imap/mailmng-core as mail binaries.
Also split list across multiple lines.
* Let perl spawn shells when run by cpanm
* Let apache_control_ spawn shells
* Let ics_start/stop running java spawn shells
java is the direct parent, ics_start/stop are ancestors.
* Let PassengerAgent setuid.
It setuids to nobody.
* Let multilog write below /etc if run by supervise
* Let bwrap setuid
A container setup utility.
* Detect writes below /, /root
New rule Write below root detects writes either directly below / or
anywhere below /root.
* Don't let shells directly open network connections
In addition to system binaries, don't let shells directly open network
connections. Bash has /dev/{tcp,udp} which allows direct connections.
* Add additional sensitive mounts.
Add additional sensitive mounts, including the docker socket, /,
anywhere below /root, or anywhere below /etc.
* Let pki-realm write below /etc/pki/realms
Appears to be an ansible script.
* Let sgdisk write below dev
* Let debconf-show read sensitive files.
* Additional case for build-related scripts.
* Add additional mail binaries.
* Let ruby running discourse spawn shells.
* Let beam.smp and paster run shells
* Temporarily undo shells opening net conns update
At some customers, at container create time events are being lost, and
for that reason programs spawned by the shell that perform network
connections are being misattributed to the shell.
* Make the actual sensitive files a list.
Make the actual sensitive files used by the sensitive files macro a list
so it can be easily extended.
* Print mounts in Launch Sensitive Mount Container
Add the full list of mounts to the output of Launch Sensitive Mount
Container, so it's easy to see which sensitive mount was used.
* Add container.image to container-related rules.
Helps in diagnosis.
* Add sw-engine-kv as a plesk binary.
* Allow sa-update to read sensitive files
SpamAssassin updater.
* Add additional shell spawners.
* Allow sumologic secureFiles to run user mgmt progs
See https://help.sumologic.com/Send-Data/Installed-Collectors/05Reference-Information-for-Collector-Installation/08Enhanced-File-System-Security-for-Installed-Collectors.
* Only consider full mounts of /etc as sensitive
A legitimate case is k8s mounting /etc/kubernetes/ssl, which was
matching /etc*. The glob matcher we have isn't a full regex so you can't
exclude strings, only characters.
* Let htpasswd write below /etc
Part of nginx
* Let pam-auth-update read sensitive files
* Let hawkular-metric spawn shells.
* Generalize jenkins scripts spawning shells
Generalize jenkins_script_sh to jenkins_scripts and add additional
cases.
* Let php run by assemble spawn shells
Better than globally letting php spawn shells.
* Add additional setuid binaries.
* Add additional package mgmt prog
rhsmcertd-worke(r), red hat subscription manager
* Add additional yarn cmdlines.
* Let dmeventd write below etc.
device mapper event daemon.
* Let rhsmcertd-worke(r) spawn shells.
* Let node spawn bitnami-related shells.
* Add user allowed sensitive mounts
New macro user_sensitive_mount_containers allows a second rules file to
specify containers/images that can perform sensitive mounts.
* Add start-stop-daemon as setuid program
It has -g/-u args to change gid/uid.
Also move some other single setuid programs to the list
known_setuid_binaries.
* Add additional shell spawners/cmdlines.
* Let python running localstack spawn shells.
* Add additional chef binaries.
* Let fluentd spawn shells.
* Don't consider unix_chkpwd to be a user mgmt prog
It only checks passwords.
* Get setuid for NULL user in container working
Reorganize the unknown_user_in_container macro to get it working again
in containers. Previously, it was being skipped entirely due to a
problem with handling of unknown users, which get returned as NULL.
The new macro is known_user_in_container, which tests the user.name
against "N/A". It happens that if user.name is NULL, the comparison
fails, so it has the same effect as if the string "N/A" were being
returned. Any valid user name won't match the string "N/A", so known
users will cause the macro to return true.
The setuid rule needs an additional check for not container, so add that.
* Add exceptions for Write below root
Add lists of files/directories that are acceptable to write.
@ret2libc reported that osx builds were failing with the current version
of libcurl. Update to the latest version and add the necessary configure
arguments.
Also use https links for all dependencies downloads.
The rules CMakeLists.txt, which controls the installation of the falco
rules files, was in the engine CMakeLists.txt, which meant that programs
that included the engine would also include rules files.
This may not always be desired, so move the rules CMakeLists.txt to the
main falco CMakeLists.txt instead.
// Given an event, check it against the set of rules in the
// engine and if a matching rule is found, return details on
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