* Let kubelet running loopback spawn shells
Seen by @JPLachance, thanks for the heads up!
* Let docker's "exe" broadly write to files.
As a part of some docker commands like "docker save", etc, the program
exe can write from files on the host filesystem /var/lib/docker/... to a
variety of files within the container.
Allow this via a macro exe_running_docker_save that checks the
commandline as well as the parent and use it as an exclusion for the
write below binary dir/root/etc rules.
* Let chef perform more tasks
- Let chef-client generally read sensitive files and write below /etc.
- Let python running a chef script yum-dump.py write the rpm database.
Rename user_known_container_shell_spawn_binaries to
user_known_shell_spawn_binaries (the container distinction doesn't exist
any longer) and add it as an exception for run shell untrusted.
That way others can easily exclude shell spawning programs in a second
rules file.
* Refactor shell rules to avoid FPs.
Refactoring the shell related rules to avoid FPs. Instead of considering
all shells suspicious and trying to carve out exceptions for the
legitimate uses of shells, only consider shells spawned below certain
processes suspicious.
The set of processes is a collection of commonly used web servers,
databases, nosql document stores, mail programs, message queues, process
monitors, application servers, etc.
Also, runsv is also considered a top level process that denotes a
service. This allows a way for more flexible servers like ad-hoc nodejs
express apps, etc to denote themselves as a full server process.
* Update event generator to reflect new shell rules
spawn_shell is now a silent action. its replacement is
spawn_shell_under_httpd, which respawns itself as httpd and then runs a
shell.
db_program_spawn_binaries now runs ls instead of a shell so it only
matches db_program_spawn_process.
* Comment out old shell related rules
* Modify nodejs example to work w/ new shell rules
Start the express server using runit's runsv, which allows falco to
consider any shells run by it as suspicious.
* Use the updated argument for mkdir
In https://github.com/draios/sysdig/pull/757 the path argument for mkdir
moved to the second argument. This only became visible in the unit tests
once the trace files were updated to reflect the other shell rule
changes--the trace files had the old format.
* Update unit tests for shell rules changes
Shell in container doesn't exist any longer and its functionality has
been subsumed by run shell untrusted.
* Allow git binaries to run shells
In some cases, these are run below a service runsv so we still need
exceptions for them.
* Let consul agent spawn curl for health checks
* Don't protect tomcat
There's enough evidence of people spawning general commands that we
can't protect it.
* Reorder exceptions, add rabbitmq exception
Move the nginx exception to the main rule instead of the
protected_shell_spawner macro. Also add erl_child_setup (related to
rabbitmq) as an allowed shell spawner.
* Add additional spawn binaries
All off these are either below nginx, httpd, or runsv but should still
be allowed to spawn shells.
* Exclude shells when ancestor is a pkg mgmt binary
Skip shells when any process ancestor (parent, gparent, etc) is a
package management binary. This includes the program needrestart. This
is a deep search but should prevent a lot of other more detailed
exceptions trying to find the specific scripts run as a part of
installations.
* Skip shells related to serf
Serf is a service discovery tool and can in some cases be spawned by
apache/nginx. Also allow shells that are just checking the status of
pids via kill -0.
* Add several exclusions back
Add several exclusions back from the shell in container rule. These are
all allowed shell spawns that happen to be below
nginx/fluentd/apache/etc.
* Remove commented-out rules
This saves space as well as cleanup. I haven't yet removed the
macros/lists used by these rules and not used anywhere else. I'll do
that cleanup in a separate step.
* Also exclude based on command lines
Add back the exclusions based on command lines, using the existing set
of command lines.
* Add addl exclusions for shells
Of note is runsv, which means it can directly run shells (the ./run and
./finish scripts), but the things it runs can not.
* Don't trigger on shells spawning shells
We'll detect the first shell and not any other shells it spawns.
* Allow "runc:" parents to count as a cont entrypnt
In some cases, the initial process for a container can have a parent
"runc:[0:PARENT]", so also allow those cases to count as a container
entrypoint.
* Use container_entrypoint macro
Use the container_entrypoint macro to denote entering a container and
also allow exe to be one of the processes that's the parent of an
entrypoint.
* Let supervisor write more generally below /etc
* Let perl+plesk scripts run shells/write below etc
* Allow spaces after some cmdlines
* Add additional shell spawner.
* Add addl package mgmt binaries.
* Add addl cases for java + jenkins
Addl jar files to consider.
* Add addl jenkins-related cmdlines
Mostly related to node scripts run by jenkins
* Let python running some mesos tasks spawn shells
In this case marathon run by python
* Let ucf write below etc
Only below /etc/gconf for now.
* Let dpkg-reconfigur indirectly write below /etc
It may run programs that modify files below /etc
* Add files/dirs/prefixes for writes below root
Build a set of acceptable files/dirs/prefixes for writes below
/root. Mostly triggered by apps that run directly as root.
* Add addl shell spawn binaries.
* Also let java + sbt spawn shells in containers
Not seen only at host level
* Make sure the file below etc is /etc/
Make sure the file below /etc is really below the directory etc aka
/etc/xxx. Otherwise it would match a file /etcfoo.
* Let rancher healthcheck spawn shells
The name healthcheck is relatively innocuous so also look at the parent
process.
* Add addl shell container shell spawn binaries
* Add addl x2go binaries
* Let rabbitq write its config files
* Let rook write below /etc
toolbox.sh is fairly generic so add a condition based on the image name.
* Let consul-template spawn shells
* Add rook/toolbox as a trusted container
Their github pages recommend running privileged.
* Add addl mail binary that can setuid
* Let plesk autoinstaller spawn shells
The name autoinstaller is fairly generic so also look at the parent.
* Let php handlers write its config
* Let addl pkg-* binary write to /etc indirectly
* Add additional shell spawning binaries.
* Add ability to specify user trusted containers
New macro user_trusted_containers allows a user-provided set of
containers that are trusted and are allowed to run privileged.
* If npm runs node, let node spawn shells
* Let python run airflow via a shell.
* Add addl passenger commandlines (for shells)
* Add addl ways datadog can be run
* Let find run shells in containers.
* Add rpmq as a rpm binary
* Let httpd write below /etc/httpd/
* Let awstats/sa-update spawn shells
* Add container entrypoint as a shell
Some images have an extra shell level for image entrypoints.
* Add an additional jenkins commandline
* Let mysql write its config
* Let openvpn write its config
* Add addl root dirs/files
Also move /root/.java to be a general prefix.
* Let mysql_upgrade/opkg-cl spawn shells
* Allow login to perform dns lookups
With run with -h <host> to specify a remote host, some versions of login
will do a dns lookup to try to resolve the host.
* Let consul-template write haproxy config.
* Also let mysql indirectly edit its config
It might spawn a program to edit the config in addition to directly.
* Allow certain sed temp files below /etc/
* Allow debian binaries to indirectly write to /etc
They may spawn programs like sed, touch, etc to change files below /etc.
* Add additional root file
* Let rancher healthcheck be run more indirectly
The grandparent as well as parent of healthcheck can be tini.
* Add more cases for haproxy writing config
Allow more files as well as more scripts to update the config.
* Let vmtoolsd spawn shells on the host
* Add an additional innocuous entrypoint shell
* Let peer-finder (mongodb) spawn shells
* Split application rules to separate file.
Move the contents of application rules, which have never been enabled by
default, to a separate file. It's only installed in the mail falco packages.
* Add more build-related command lines
* Let perl running openresty spawn shells
* Let countly write nginx config
* Let confd spawn shells
* Also let aws spawn shells in containers.
The terminal shell in container rule has always been less permissive
than the other shell rules, mostly because we expect terminal-attached
shells to be less common. However, they might run innocuous commands,
especially from scripting languages like python. So allow the innocuous
commands to run.
* Let luajit spawn shells.
* Start support for db mgmt programs
Add support for db management programs that tend to spawn
shells. Starting with two lists
mysql_mgmt_binaries/postgres_mgmt_binaries which are combined into
db_mgmt_binaries. db_mgmt_binaries is added to both shell spawning rules
and the individual programs are removed.
* Let apache beam spawn shells
The program is "python pipeline.py" but it appears to be related to
https://github.com/apache/beam/blob/master/sdks/python/apache_beam/pipeline.py.
* Better support for dovecot
Allow dovecot to setuid by adding to mail_binaries.
Allow the program auth, when run by dovecot, to spawn shells.
* Better support for plesk
Create a list plesk_binaries and allow them to run shells.
Also let them write to files below /etc/sw/keys.
* Let strongswan spawn shells.
Specifically the program starter. Using the full command line to be more
specific.
* Let proftpd modify files below /etc.
* Let chef binaries write below /etc
* Let mandb read sensitive files
* Let specific phusion passenger binaries run shells
The program is "my_init", which is fairly generic, so capture it by the
full command line.
* Make git-remote-http more permissive.
* Let networkmanager modify /etc/resolv.conf
specifically nm-dispatcher
* Let hostid open network connections
It might perform dns lookups as a part of resolving ip addresses.
* Let uwsgi spawn shells
* Add docker-runc-cur as a docker binary.
truncated version of docker-runc-current.
* Add rule for allowed containers
New rule Launch Disallowed Container triggers when a container is
started that does not match the macro allowed_containers. In the main
falco rules file, this macro never matches, so it never
triggers. However, in a second rules file the macro allowed_containers
could be filled in with the specific images that match.
* Also let foreman spawn shells
Used by Red Hat Sattelite.
* Let confluence run shells.
Appears as java program, so look for the classpath.
* Make allowed_containers macro more foolproof.
In some cases, the container image might not be known/is NULL, so the
comparison aganst "dummy-not-allowed-container-image" doesn't work.
Replace this with proc.vpid=1, which is in the main rule Launch
Disallowed Continer. Ensures it will only trigger when the
allowed_containers macro is overridden.
* Let tomcat spawn shells.
It's java so you need to look at the classpath.
* Let pip install software.
* Add another yarn command line.
* Let add-shell write to /etc/shells.tmp
* Let more plesk binaries setuid.
* Add imap-login as a mail binary.
* Fix plesk writing keys macro
Should be testing proc.name, not proc.cmdline.
* Let screen read sensitive files.
* Add more shell spawners.
S99qualys-cloud is the init script, cfn-signal is cloudformation.
* Exclude nologin from user mgmt programs.
* Let programs run by locales.postins write to /etc
It can run scripts like sed to modify files before writing the final
file.
* Let install4j java progs spawn shells.
Again, searching by classpath.
* Let some shell cmds be spawned outside containers
We had a list known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines that contained
innocuous commandlines, but it only worked for containers.
Split this list into container-specific and general commandlines, and
add an exception for the general commandlines for the Run Shell
Untrusted rule.
* Add addl ruby-based passenger spawners
Add a different way to identify ruby run by phusion passenger.
* Allow bundle ruby cmds to be identififed by name
In some cases, bundle runs ruby scripts by direct script
name (foo.rb). Also allow that to spawn shells.
* Let nginx spawn shells.
* Skip setuid rules for containers.
For now, entirely skip the setuid rule for containers. Will add back
once I can find a way to check for unknown users.
* Let PassengerWatchd run shells
* Add additional foreman shells
Let the direct parent also be scl when the ancestor is tfm-rake,tfm-ruby.
* Add additional innocuous command lines.
* Also let cron spawn shells in containers
Seen when using things like phusion passenger.
* Also let run-parts run cmp/cp for sensitive files
Might be a case of a missing process but might also be legitimate.
* Let erlexec spawn shells.
* Add additional innocuous shell cmdlines.
* Add suexec as a userexec binary.
* Add imap/mailmng-core as mail binaries.
Also split list across multiple lines.
* Let perl spawn shells when run by cpanm
* Let apache_control_ spawn shells
* Let ics_start/stop running java spawn shells
java is the direct parent, ics_start/stop are ancestors.
* Let PassengerAgent setuid.
It setuids to nobody.
* Let multilog write below /etc if run by supervise
* Let bwrap setuid
A container setup utility.
* Detect writes below /, /root
New rule Write below root detects writes either directly below / or
anywhere below /root.
* Don't let shells directly open network connections
In addition to system binaries, don't let shells directly open network
connections. Bash has /dev/{tcp,udp} which allows direct connections.
* Add additional sensitive mounts.
Add additional sensitive mounts, including the docker socket, /,
anywhere below /root, or anywhere below /etc.
* Let pki-realm write below /etc/pki/realms
Appears to be an ansible script.
* Let sgdisk write below dev
* Let debconf-show read sensitive files.
* Additional case for build-related scripts.
* Add additional mail binaries.
* Let ruby running discourse spawn shells.
* Let beam.smp and paster run shells
* Temporarily undo shells opening net conns update
At some customers, at container create time events are being lost, and
for that reason programs spawned by the shell that perform network
connections are being misattributed to the shell.
* Make the actual sensitive files a list.
Make the actual sensitive files used by the sensitive files macro a list
so it can be easily extended.
* Print mounts in Launch Sensitive Mount Container
Add the full list of mounts to the output of Launch Sensitive Mount
Container, so it's easy to see which sensitive mount was used.
* Add container.image to container-related rules.
Helps in diagnosis.
* Add sw-engine-kv as a plesk binary.
* Allow sa-update to read sensitive files
SpamAssassin updater.
* Add additional shell spawners.
* Allow sumologic secureFiles to run user mgmt progs
See https://help.sumologic.com/Send-Data/Installed-Collectors/05Reference-Information-for-Collector-Installation/08Enhanced-File-System-Security-for-Installed-Collectors.
* Only consider full mounts of /etc as sensitive
A legitimate case is k8s mounting /etc/kubernetes/ssl, which was
matching /etc*. The glob matcher we have isn't a full regex so you can't
exclude strings, only characters.
* Let htpasswd write below /etc
Part of nginx
* Let pam-auth-update read sensitive files
* Let hawkular-metric spawn shells.
* Generalize jenkins scripts spawning shells
Generalize jenkins_script_sh to jenkins_scripts and add additional
cases.
* Let php run by assemble spawn shells
Better than globally letting php spawn shells.
* Add additional setuid binaries.
* Add additional package mgmt prog
rhsmcertd-worke(r), red hat subscription manager
* Add additional yarn cmdlines.
* Let dmeventd write below etc.
device mapper event daemon.
* Let rhsmcertd-worke(r) spawn shells.
* Let node spawn bitnami-related shells.
* Add user allowed sensitive mounts
New macro user_sensitive_mount_containers allows a second rules file to
specify containers/images that can perform sensitive mounts.
* Add start-stop-daemon as setuid program
It has -g/-u args to change gid/uid.
Also move some other single setuid programs to the list
known_setuid_binaries.
* Add additional shell spawners/cmdlines.
* Let python running localstack spawn shells.
* Add additional chef binaries.
* Let fluentd spawn shells.
* Don't consider unix_chkpwd to be a user mgmt prog
It only checks passwords.
* Get setuid for NULL user in container working
Reorganize the unknown_user_in_container macro to get it working again
in containers. Previously, it was being skipped entirely due to a
problem with handling of unknown users, which get returned as NULL.
The new macro is known_user_in_container, which tests the user.name
against "N/A". It happens that if user.name is NULL, the comparison
fails, so it has the same effect as if the string "N/A" were being
returned. Any valid user name won't match the string "N/A", so known
users will cause the macro to return true.
The setuid rule needs an additional check for not container, so add that.
* Add exceptions for Write below root
Add lists of files/directories that are acceptable to write.
@ret2libc reported that osx builds were failing with the current version
of libcurl. Update to the latest version and add the necessary configure
arguments.
Also use https links for all dependencies downloads.
The rules CMakeLists.txt, which controls the installation of the falco
rules files, was in the engine CMakeLists.txt, which meant that programs
that included the engine would also include rules files.
This may not always be desired, so move the rules CMakeLists.txt to the
main falco CMakeLists.txt instead.
Work around https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/954, which relates
to not always knowing the proper user name in containers, by not running
the rule when in a container and the user name is "<NA>". This won't
address cases where the uid from inside the container maps to a user
name outside the container that is different than the user inside the
container, but it will help a bit.
Add crlutil as a program that can modify below etc.
Let centrify programs modify below etc.
Add more info for writes below etc to track etc writers through scripts.
Increase the level of debugging for shells.
Add more run_by_xxx macros for h2o/phusion passenger. Handles cases
where the ancestor has a name, but the direct parent is a general
scripting language like ruby/perl/etc.
New macro run_by_chef is similar to run_by_qualys in that it looks in
various places in the process heirarchy. Use that macro to allow writes
below etc. Will probably add in more places soon.
Qualys seems to run a variety of shell subprocesses, at various
levels. Add a macro run_by_qualys that checks at a few levels without
the cost of a full proc.aname, which traverses the full parent
heirarchy.
Add a macro user_shell_container_exclusions that allows a second rules
file to easily extend the shelll in container rule without overriding
the entire rule.
Also add an exclusion node_running_edi_dynamodb which can be used for
that macro.
Add more specific controls of files below /etc, allowing specific
combinations of programs and files:
- start-fluentd can write to /etc/fluent/fluent.conf
- locales.postins can write to /etc/locale.gen
Use pmatch, which compares a file against a set of prefix paths, instead
of fd.directory. This allows the directories in safe_etc_dirs to be a
prefix of a file instead of just the directory containing a file.
Move entrypoint detection to its own macro. Also consider something the
entrypoint if its parent is runc:[0:PARENT]. There's a race where
runc:[0:PARENT] exits in parallel with the root program being execd, so
the parent might not exist or might have this name.
Combine parent_php_running_builds and parent_ruby_running_gcc into a
single parent_scripting_running_builds which handles the general case of
some script running some make/compilation related program. Also add some
build-related command line prefixes.
Allow supervisor-related programs to spawn shells and access sensitive
files.
Allow sendmail config binaries to write below etc directly (their
children already could).
Add some directories related to phusion (system-as-a-container).
For a few rules add parent programs in the output so it's easier to
diagnose the context for an event.
Let varnishd spawn shells.
- Move qualys-cloud-ag to the monitoring_binaries list
- Add a new list sendmail_config_binaries containing programs that can
modify files.
- Make parent_php_running_git a bit more generic for
parent_php_running_builds and add some additional sub-commands.
- Allow several combinations of scripting programs (ruby, python, etc.)
to run other build-ish commands.
- Let mysql_install_d(b) spawn shells and access sensitive files.
- Let qualys-cloud-ag(ent) spawn shells
- Add a few additional innocuous commandlines
- Let postfix setuid to itself
A new (empty) list user_known_container_shell_spawn_binaries allows
additional files to add additional programs that are allowed to spawn
shells in containers.
Add additional shell spawning command lines.
Allow package management binaries in containers--lots of people seem to
do it. Also allow pycompile/py3compile.
I need to refactor the shell spawners to more clearly isolate shell
spawners that we don't want to occur in a container from ones that can
run both inside and outside of a container.
A new falco.yaml option buffered_outputs, also controlled by
-U/--unbuffered, sets unbuffered outputs for the output methods. This is
especially useful with keep_alive files/programs where you want the
output right away.
Also add cleanup methods for the output channels that ensure output to
the file/program is flushed and closed.
Add the ability to keep file/program outputs open (i.e. writing to the
same open file/program for multiple notifications). A new option to the
file/program output "keep_alive", if true, keeps the file/program pipe
open across events.
This makes the need for unbuffered output aka
https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/211 more pressing. Will add that next.
When json output is set, add a sub-object called output_fields to the
json output that contains the individual templated fields from the
output string. Makes it easier to parse those fields.
This fixes https://github.com/draios/falco/issues/261.
These changes allow for a local rules file that will be preserved across
upgrades and allows the main rules file to be overwritten across upgrades.
- Move all config/rules files below /etc/falco/
- Add a "local rules" file /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml. The intent
is that it contains modifications/deltas to the main rules file
/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml. The main falco_rules.yaml should be
treated as immutable.
- All config files are flagged so they are not overwritten on upgrade.
- Change the handling of the config item "rules_file" in falco.yaml to
allow a list of files. By default, this list contains:
[/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml, /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml].
Also change rpm/debian packaging to ensure that the above files are
preserved across upgrades:
- Use relative paths for share/bin dirs. This ensures that when packaged
as rpms they won't be flagged as config files.
- Add CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX to FALCO_ENGINE_LUA_DIR now that it's relative.
- In debian packaging, flag
/etc/falco/{falco.yaml,falco_rules.yaml,falco_rules.local.yaml} as
conffiles. That way they are preserved across upgrades if modified.
- In rpm packaging when using cmake, any files installed with an
absolute path are automatically flagged as %config. The only files
directly installed are now the config files, so that addresses the problem.
Add CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX to lua dir.
Clean up the handling of priority levels within rules. It used to be a
mix of strings handled in various places. Now, in falco_common.h there's
a consistent type for priority-as-number as well as a list of
priority-as-string values. Priorities are passed around as numbers
instead of strings. It's still permissive about capitalization.
Also add the ability to load rules by severity. New falco
config option "priority=<val>"/-o priority=<val> specifies the minimum
priority level of rules that will be loaded.
Add unit tests for same. The test suppresses INFO notifications for a
rule/trace file combination that would otherwise generate them.
Add the ability to append to rules/macros, like we already do with
lists. For rules/macros, if the object has an append: true key, the
condition value is appended to the condition of an existing rule/macro
with the same name.
Like lists, it's an error to specify append: true without there being an
existing rule/macro.
Also add tests that test the same kind of things we did for lists:
- That append: true really does append
- That append: false overwrites the rule/macro
- That it's an error to append with a prior rule/macro existing.
This file documents all notable changes to Falco. The release numbering uses [semantic versioning](http://semver.org).
## v0.8.1
Released 2017-10-10
### Bug Fixes
* Fix packaging to specify correct built-in config file [[#288](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/288)]
## v0.8.0
Released 2017-10-10
**Important**: the location for falco's configuration file has moved from `/etc/falco.yaml` to `/etc/falco/falco.yaml`. The default rules file has moved from `/etc/falco_rules.yaml` to `/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml`. In addition, 0.8.0 has added a _local_ ruls file to `/etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml`. See [the documentation](https://github.com/draios/falco/wiki/Falco-Default-and-Local-Rules-Files) for more details.
### Major Changes
* Add the ability to append one list to another list by setting an `append: true` attribute. [[#264](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/264)]
* Add the ability to append one macro/rule to another list by setting an `append: true` attribute. [[#277](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/277)]
* Ensure that falco rules/config files are preserved across package upgrades/removes if modified. [[#278](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/278)]
* Add the notion of a "local" rules file that should contain modifications to the default falco rules file. [[#278](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/278)]
* When using json output, separately include the individual templated fields in the json object. [[#282](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/282)]
* Add the ability to keep a file/program pipe handle open across rule notifications. [[#283](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/283)]
* New argument `-V` validates rules file and immediately exits. [[#286](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/286)]
### Minor Changes
* Minor updates to falco example programs [[#248](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/248)] [[#275](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/275)]
* Also validate macros at rule parse time. [[#257](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/257)]
* Minor README typo fixes [[#276](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/276)]
* Add a government CLA (contributor license agreement). [[#263](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/263)]
* Add ability to only run rules with a priority >= some threshold [[#281](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/281)]
* Add ability to make output channels unbuffered [[#285](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/285)]
### Bug Fixes
* Fix installation of falco on OSX [[#252](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/252)]
* Fix a bug that caused the trailing whitespace of a quoted string to be accidentally removed [[#254](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/254)]
* When multiple sets of kernel headers are installed, find the one for the running kernel [[#260](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/260)]
* Allow pathnames in rule/macro conditions to contain '.' characters [[#262](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/262)]
* Fix a bug where a list named "foo" would be substituted even if it were a substring of a longer word like "my_foo" [[#258](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/258)]
* Remove extra trailing newlines from rule output strings [[#265](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/265)]
* Improve build pathnames to avoid relative paths when possible [[#284](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/284)]
### Rule Changes
* Significant changes to default ruleset to address FPs. These changes resulted from hundreds of hours of use in actual customer environments. [[#247](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/247)] [[#259](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/259)]
* Add official gitlab EE docker image to list of known shell spawning images. Thanks @dkerwin! [[#270](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/270)]
* Add keepalived to list of shell spawning binaries. Thanks @dkerwin! [[#269](https://github.com/draios/falco/pull/269)]
Read the [change log](https://github.com/draios/falco/blob/dev/CHANGELOG.md)
Dev Branch: [](https://travis-ci.org/draios/falco)<br />
@@ -33,10 +33,9 @@ Documentation
Join the Community
---
* Contact the [official mailing list](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/falco) for support and to talk with other users.
* Follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/sysdig) for general falco and sysdig news.
* This is our [blog](https://sysdig.com/blog/), where you can find the latest [falco](https://sysdig.com/blog/tag/falco/) posts.
* Join our [Public Slack](https://sysdig.slack.com) channel for sysdig and falco announcements and discussions.
* Join our [Public Slack](https://slack.sysdig.com) channel for sysdig and falco announcements and discussions.
License Terms
---
@@ -61,15 +60,27 @@ As always, we are grateful for your past and present contributions to falco.
**Individual contributions**: Individuals who wish to make contributions must review the [Individual Contributor License Agreement](./cla/falco_contributor_agreement.txt) and indicate agreement by adding the following line to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
```
Use your real name; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
**Corporate contributions**: Employees of corporations, members of LLCs or LLPs, or others acting on behalf of a contributing entity, must review the [Corporate Contributor License Agreement](./cla/falco_corp_contributor_agreement.txt), must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
```
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
**Government contributions**: Employees or officers of the United States Government, must review the [Government Contributor License Agreement](https://github.com/draios/falco/blob/dev/cla/falco_govt_contributor_agreement.txt), must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-govt-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
This file is a work of authorship of an employee or officer of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States under 17 USC 105.
```
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
DRAIOS, INC. <20> OPEN SOURCE CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES (<28>Agreement<6E>)
Draios, Inc. (<28>Draios<6F> or <20>Sysdig<69>) welcomes the work of others on our open source software projects. To contribute code back to our repositories, we require a contributing entity that is a United States Government agency to complete, and agree to, the Government Contributor Agreement (GCA) set forth here, by and through a designated authorized representative. This agreement clarifies the ability for us to use and incorporate the contributions of a government contributing entity in our projects and products. After agreeing to these terms, a contributing entity may contribute to our projects. To indicate the agreement of the contributing entity, an authorized representative shall follow the procedure set forth below under TO AGREE, after reading this Agreement. A <20>contributing entity<74> means any agency or unit of the United States government. We provide a separate CLA for individual contributors.
You accept and agree to the following terms and conditions for Your present and future Contributions that are submitted to Draios/Sysdig.
1. Definitions. "You" (or "Your") shall mean the contributing entity that has authored or otherwise has the right to contribute the Contribution, and that is making this Agreement with Draios/Sysdig. "Contribution" shall mean any original work of authorship, including any modifications or additions to an existing work, that is intentionally submitted by You to Draios/Sysdig for inclusion in, or documentation of, any of the products owned or managed by Draios/Sysdig (the "Work"). For the purposes of this definition, "submitted" means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent to Draios/Sysdig or its representatives, including but not limited to communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems, and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, Draios/Sysdig for the purpose of discussing and improving the Work, but excluding communication that is conspicuously marked or otherwise designated in writing by You as "Not a Contribution."
2. Contributions Not Subject to Copyright. Each Contribution is a work authored by the United States Government or an employee or officer thereof and is not subject to copyright under 17 U.S.C. 105.
3. Grant of Patent License. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, You hereby grant to Draios/Sysdig and to recipients of software distributed by Draios/Sysdig a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work, where such license applies only to those patent claims that You have the right to license and that are necessarily infringed by Your Contribution(s) alone or by combination of Your Contribution(s) with the Work to which such Contribution(s) was submitted. If any entity other than Draios/Sysdig institutes patent litigation against You or any other entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that your Contribution, or the Work to which you have contributed, constitutes direct or contributory patent infringement, then any patent licenses granted to that entity under this Agreement for that Contribution or Work shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed.
4. You represent to Draios/Sysdig that You own or have the right to contribute Your Contributions to Draios/Sysdig, and that You are legally entitled to grant the license set forth above.
5. You represent that each of Your Contributions is Your original creation (see section 7 for submissions on behalf of others). You represent that Your Contribution submissions include complete details of any third-party license or other restriction (including, but not limited to, related patents and trademarks) of which You are personally aware and which are associated with any part of Your Contributions. You represent that Your sign-off indicating assent to this Agreement includes the real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of You, and not a pseudonym, and that You are not attempting or making an anonymous Contribution.
6. You are not expected to provide support for Your Contributions, except to the extent You desire to provide support. You may provide support for free, for a fee, or not at all. Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, You provide Your Contributions to Draios/Sysdig on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions of TITLE, NON- INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
7. If You wish to submit work that is not Your original creation, You may submit it to Draios/Sysdig separately from any Contribution, identifying the complete details of its source and of any license or other restriction (including, but not limited to, related patents, trademarks, and license agreements) of which You are aware, and conspicuously marking the work as "Submitted on behalf of a third-party: [named here]".
8. You agree to notify Draios/Sysdig of any facts or circumstances of which you become aware that would make these representations inaccurate in any respect.
9. You understand and agree that this project and Your Contribution are public and that a record of the contribution, including all personal information that You submit with it, including the sign-off of Your authorized representative, may be stored by Draios/Sysdig indefinitely and may be redistributed to others. You understand and agree that Draios/Sysdig has no obligation to use any Contribution in any Draios/Sysdig project or product, and Draios/Sysdig may decline to accept Your Contributions or Draios/Sysdig may remove Your Contributions from Draios/Sysdig projects or products at any time without notice. You understand and agree that Draios/Sysdig is not and will not pay You any form of compensation, in currency, equity or otherwise, in exchange for Your Contributions or for Your assent to this Agreement. You understand and agree that You are independent of Draios/Sysdig and You are not, by entering into this Agreement or providing Your Contributions, becoming employed, hired as an independent contractor, or forming any other relationship with Draios/Sysdig relating to employment, compensation or ownership or involving any fiduciary obligation.
TO AGREE:
Add the following lines to every GIT commit message:
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-govt-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith joe.smith@email.com
This file is a work of authorship of an employee or officer of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States under 17 USC 105.
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.