Compare commits

..

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Stemm
809d20c294 Merge pull request #246 from draios/dev
Merging for 0.7.0
2017-05-30 13:30:39 -07:00
Mark Stemm
b0ae29c23a Merge branch 'dev' 2017-05-15 11:12:11 -07:00
Mark Stemm
d1b6b2be87 Merge pull request #229 from draios/dev
Merging for 0.6.0
2017-03-29 16:00:06 -07:00
Mark Stemm
e00181d553 Merge pull request #174 from draios/dev
Merging for 0.5.0
2016-12-22 13:25:32 -08:00
33 changed files with 118 additions and 739 deletions

3
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
/build*
*~
*.pyc
test/falco_test.pyc
test/falco_tests.yaml
test/traces-negative
test/traces-positive

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ install:
- sudo python setup.py install
- cd ../falco
before_script:
- export KERNELDIR=/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build
- export KERNELDIR=/lib/modules/$(ls /lib/modules | sort | head -1)/build
script:
- set -e
- export CC="gcc-4.8"

View File

@@ -43,9 +43,7 @@ set(PACKAGE_NAME "falco")
set(PROBE_VERSION "${FALCO_VERSION}")
set(PROBE_NAME "falco-probe")
set(PROBE_DEVICE_NAME "falco")
if (CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX_INITIALIZED_TO_DEFAULT)
set(CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX /usr CACHE PATH "Default install path" FORCE)
endif()
set(CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX /usr)
set(CMD_MAKE make)
@@ -303,7 +301,6 @@ if(NOT USE_BUNDLED_LPEG)
else()
set(LPEG_SRC "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lpeg-prefix/src/lpeg")
set(LPEG_LIB "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lpeg-prefix/src/lpeg/build/lpeg.a")
message(STATUS "Using bundled lpeg in '${LPEG_SRC}'")
set(LPEG_DEPENDENCIES "")
if(USE_BUNDLED_LUAJIT)
list(APPEND LPEG_DEPENDENCIES "luajit")
@@ -343,7 +340,6 @@ else()
set(LIBYAML_SRC "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/libyaml-prefix/src/libyaml/src")
set(LIBYAML_LIB "${LIBYAML_SRC}/.libs/libyaml.a")
message(STATUS "Using bundled libyaml in '${LIBYAML_SRC}'")
ExternalProject_Add(libyaml
URL "http://download.draios.com/dependencies/libyaml-0.1.4.tar.gz"
URL_MD5 "4a4bced818da0b9ae7fc8ebc690792a7"
@@ -371,7 +367,6 @@ if(NOT USE_BUNDLED_LYAML)
else()
set(LYAML_SRC "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lyaml-prefix/src/lyaml/ext/yaml")
set(LYAML_LIB "${LYAML_SRC}/.libs/yaml.a")
message(STATUS "Using bundled lyaml in '${LYAML_SRC}'")
set(LYAML_DEPENDENCIES "")
if(USE_BUNDLED_LUAJIT)
list(APPEND LYAML_DEPENDENCIES "luajit")
@@ -398,10 +393,9 @@ endif()
add_subdirectory("${SYSDIG_DIR}/userspace/libscap" "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/userspace/libscap")
add_subdirectory("${SYSDIG_DIR}/userspace/libsinsp" "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/userspace/libsinsp")
add_subdirectory(scripts)
set(FALCO_SINSP_LIBRARY sinsp)
set(FALCO_SHARE_DIR ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/share/falco)
set(FALCO_BIN_DIR ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin)
add_subdirectory(scripts)
add_subdirectory(userspace/engine)
add_subdirectory(userspace/falco)

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Join the Community
* Contact the [official mailing list](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/falco) for support and to talk with other users.
* Follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/sysdig) for general falco and sysdig news.
* This is our [blog](https://sysdig.com/blog/), where you can find the latest [falco](https://sysdig.com/blog/tag/falco/) posts.
* Join our [Public Slack](https://slack.sysdig.com) channel for sysdig and falco announcements and discussions.
* Join our [Public Slack](https://sysdig.slack.com) channel for sysdig and falco announcements and discussions.
License Terms
---
@@ -61,27 +61,15 @@ As always, we are grateful for your past and present contributions to falco.
**Individual contributions**: Individuals who wish to make contributions must review the [Individual Contributor License Agreement](./cla/falco_contributor_agreement.txt) and indicate agreement by adding the following line to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
```
Use your real name; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
**Corporate contributions**: Employees of corporations, members of LLCs or LLPs, or others acting on behalf of a contributing entity, must review the [Corporate Contributor License Agreement](./cla/falco_corp_contributor_agreement.txt), must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
```
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
**Government contributions**: Employees or officers of the United States Government, must review the [Government Contributor License Agreement](https://github.com/draios/falco/blob/dev/cla/falco_govt_contributor_agreement.txt), must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
```
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-govt-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
This file is a work of authorship of an employee or officer of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States under 17 USC 105.
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
```
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
DRAIOS, INC. <20> OPEN SOURCE CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES (<28>Agreement<6E>)
Draios, Inc. (<28>Draios<6F> or <20>Sysdig<69>) welcomes the work of others on our open source software projects. To contribute code back to our repositories, we require a contributing entity that is a United States Government agency to complete, and agree to, the Government Contributor Agreement (GCA) set forth here, by and through a designated authorized representative. This agreement clarifies the ability for us to use and incorporate the contributions of a government contributing entity in our projects and products. After agreeing to these terms, a contributing entity may contribute to our projects. To indicate the agreement of the contributing entity, an authorized representative shall follow the procedure set forth below under TO AGREE, after reading this Agreement. A <20>contributing entity<74> means any agency or unit of the United States government. We provide a separate CLA for individual contributors.
You accept and agree to the following terms and conditions for Your present and future Contributions that are submitted to Draios/Sysdig.
1. Definitions. "You" (or "Your") shall mean the contributing entity that has authored or otherwise has the right to contribute the Contribution, and that is making this Agreement with Draios/Sysdig. "Contribution" shall mean any original work of authorship, including any modifications or additions to an existing work, that is intentionally submitted by You to Draios/Sysdig for inclusion in, or documentation of, any of the products owned or managed by Draios/Sysdig (the "Work"). For the purposes of this definition, "submitted" means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent to Draios/Sysdig or its representatives, including but not limited to communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems, and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, Draios/Sysdig for the purpose of discussing and improving the Work, but excluding communication that is conspicuously marked or otherwise designated in writing by You as "Not a Contribution."
2. Contributions Not Subject to Copyright. Each Contribution is a work authored by the United States Government or an employee or officer thereof and is not subject to copyright under 17 U.S.C. 105.
3. Grant of Patent License. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, You hereby grant to Draios/Sysdig and to recipients of software distributed by Draios/Sysdig a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work, where such license applies only to those patent claims that You have the right to license and that are necessarily infringed by Your Contribution(s) alone or by combination of Your Contribution(s) with the Work to which such Contribution(s) was submitted. If any entity other than Draios/Sysdig institutes patent litigation against You or any other entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that your Contribution, or the Work to which you have contributed, constitutes direct or contributory patent infringement, then any patent licenses granted to that entity under this Agreement for that Contribution or Work shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed.
4. You represent to Draios/Sysdig that You own or have the right to contribute Your Contributions to Draios/Sysdig, and that You are legally entitled to grant the license set forth above.
5. You represent that each of Your Contributions is Your original creation (see section 7 for submissions on behalf of others). You represent that Your Contribution submissions include complete details of any third-party license or other restriction (including, but not limited to, related patents and trademarks) of which You are personally aware and which are associated with any part of Your Contributions. You represent that Your sign-off indicating assent to this Agreement includes the real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of You, and not a pseudonym, and that You are not attempting or making an anonymous Contribution.
6. You are not expected to provide support for Your Contributions, except to the extent You desire to provide support. You may provide support for free, for a fee, or not at all. Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, You provide Your Contributions to Draios/Sysdig on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions of TITLE, NON- INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
7. If You wish to submit work that is not Your original creation, You may submit it to Draios/Sysdig separately from any Contribution, identifying the complete details of its source and of any license or other restriction (including, but not limited to, related patents, trademarks, and license agreements) of which You are aware, and conspicuously marking the work as "Submitted on behalf of a third-party: [named here]".
8. You agree to notify Draios/Sysdig of any facts or circumstances of which you become aware that would make these representations inaccurate in any respect.
9. You understand and agree that this project and Your Contribution are public and that a record of the contribution, including all personal information that You submit with it, including the sign-off of Your authorized representative, may be stored by Draios/Sysdig indefinitely and may be redistributed to others. You understand and agree that Draios/Sysdig has no obligation to use any Contribution in any Draios/Sysdig project or product, and Draios/Sysdig may decline to accept Your Contributions or Draios/Sysdig may remove Your Contributions from Draios/Sysdig projects or products at any time without notice. You understand and agree that Draios/Sysdig is not and will not pay You any form of compensation, in currency, equity or otherwise, in exchange for Your Contributions or for Your assent to this Agreement. You understand and agree that You are independent of Draios/Sysdig and You are not, by entering into this Agreement or providing Your Contributions, becoming employed, hired as an independent contractor, or forming any other relationship with Draios/Sysdig relating to employment, compensation or ownership or involving any fiduciary obligation.
TO AGREE:
Add the following lines to every GIT commit message:
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-govt-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith joe.smith@email.com
This file is a work of authorship of an employee or officer of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States under 17 USC 105.
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ express_server:
working_dir: /usr/src/app
command: bash -c "npm install && node server.js"
ports:
- "8181:8181"
- "8080:8080"
volumes:
- ${PWD}:/usr/src/app

View File

@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@ var express = require('express'); // call express
var app = express(); // define our app using express
var child_process = require('child_process');
var port = process.env.PORT || 8181; // set our port
var port = process.env.PORT || 8080; // set our port
// ROUTES FOR OUR API
// =============================================================================
var router = express.Router(); // get an instance of the express Router
// test route to make sure everything is working (accessed at GET http://localhost:8181/api)
// test route to make sure everything is working (accessed at GET http://localhost:8080/api)
router.get('/', function(req, res) {
res.json({ message: 'API available'});
});
router.get('/exec/:cmd', function(req, res) {
var ret = child_process.spawnSync(req.params.cmd, { shell: true});
var ret = child_process.spawnSync(req.params.cmd);
res.send(ret.stdout);
});

View File

@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@
# condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory))
- macro: open_write
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f'
- macro: open_read
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0
condition: (evt.type=open or evt.type=openat) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f'
- macro: rename
condition: evt.type = rename
@@ -40,34 +40,17 @@
condition: fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)
- macro: bin_dir_mkdir
condition: >
evt.arg[0] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/sbin/
condition: evt.arg[0] startswith /bin/ or evt.arg[0] startswith /sbin/ or evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/bin/ or evt.arg[0] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: bin_dir_rename
condition: >
evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or
evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/
condition: evt.arg[1] startswith /bin/ or evt.arg[1] startswith /sbin/ or evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/bin/ or evt.arg[1] startswith /usr/sbin/
- macro: etc_dir
condition: fd.name startswith /etc
- macro: ubuntu_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib/sudo
condition: fd.name startswith /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or fd.name startswith /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu or fd.name startswith /usr/lib/sudo
- macro: centos_so_dirs
condition: >
fd.name startswith /lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/lib64 or
fd.name startswith /usr/libexec
condition: fd.name startswith /lib64 or fd.name startswith /usr/lib64 or fd.name startswith /usr/libexec
- macro: linux_so_dirs
condition: ubuntu_so_dirs or centos_so_dirs or fd.name=/etc/ld.so.cache
@@ -93,10 +76,7 @@
# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: login_binaries
items: [
login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su,
nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg
]
items: [login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su, nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg]
# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: passwd_binaries
@@ -107,8 +87,7 @@
gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr
]
# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' |
# awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: shadowutils_binaries
items: [
chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd,
@@ -120,7 +99,7 @@
items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks]
- list: docker_binaries
items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi]
items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose]
- list: k8s_binaries
items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz]
@@ -128,11 +107,6 @@
- list: lxd_binaries
items: [lxd, lxcfs]
# Utility/etc programs known to run on mesos slaves. Truncation
# intentional.
- list: mesos_slave_binaries
items: [mesos-health-ch, mesos-docker-ex, mesos-agent, mesos-logrotate, mesos-fetcher]
- list: http_server_binaries
items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd]
@@ -140,29 +114,19 @@
items: [mysqld]
- list: gitlab_binaries
items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git]
items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, git]
- macro: server_procs
condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)
# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being
# interpreted by the filter expression.
- list: rpm_binaries
items: [dnf, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"']
- macro: rpm_procs
condition: proc.name in (rpm_binaries)
- list: deb_binaries
items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr
]
# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are
# truncated at the sysdig level.
- list: package_mgmt_binaries
items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat]
items: [
dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dnf, rpm, rpmkey, yum, frontend,
apt, apt-get, aptitude, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
preinst, update-alternat, unattended-upgr
]
- macro: package_mgmt_procs
condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)
@@ -182,7 +146,7 @@
items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries]
- list: dev_creation_binaries
items: [blkid, rename_device]
items: [blkid]
- list: aide_wrapper_binaries
items: [aide.wrapper, update-aide.con]
@@ -202,17 +166,8 @@
- list: mail_binaries
items: [sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4, pickup, showq]
- list: make_binaries
items: [make, gmake, cmake]
- list: keepalived_binaries
items: [keepalived]
- macro: sensitive_files
condition: >
fd.name startswith /etc and
(fd.name in (/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf)
or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))
condition: fd.name startswith /etc and (fd.name in (/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf) or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))
# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time
# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds.
@@ -223,8 +178,7 @@
- macro: inbound
condition: ((evt.type=listen and evt.dir=>) or (evt.type=accept and evt.dir=<))
# Currently sendto is an ignored syscall, otherwise this could also
# check for (evt.type=sendto and evt.dir=>)
# Currently sendto is an ignored syscall, otherwise this could also check for (evt.type=sendto and evt.dir=>)
- macro: outbound
condition: evt.type=connect and evt.dir=< and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6)
@@ -233,10 +187,7 @@
# Ssh
- macro: ssh_error_message
condition: >
(evt.arg.data contains "Invalid user" or
evt.arg.data contains "preauth" or
evt.arg.data contains "Failed password")
condition: (evt.arg.data contains "Invalid user" or evt.arg.data contains "preauth" or evt.arg.data contains "Failed password")
# System
- macro: modules
@@ -252,17 +203,12 @@
# the command line.
- macro: container
condition: container.id != host
- macro: interactive
condition: >
((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or
proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
condition: ((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)
- macro: syslog
condition: fd.name in (/dev/log, /run/systemd/journal/syslog)
- list: cron_binaries
items: [anacron, cron, crond]
items: [cron, crond]
# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own
# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here.
@@ -282,30 +228,14 @@
condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy) and proc.cmdline contains ansible)
- macro: python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.name=python and
(proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
condition: (proc.name=python and (proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_denyhosts
condition: >
(proc.pname=python and
(proc.pcmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
proc.pcmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_python_running_sdchecks
condition: >
(proc.name in (python, python2.7) and
(proc.cmdline contains /opt/draios/bin/sdchecks))
condition: (proc.pname=python and (proc.pcmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or proc.pcmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))
- macro: parent_bro_running_python
condition: (proc.pname=python and proc.cmdline contains /usr/share/broctl)
- macro: parent_java_running_jenkins
condition: >
(proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains jenkins.war
or proc.pcmdline contains /tmp/slave.jar)
# As a part of kernel upgrades, dpkg will spawn a perl script with the
# name linux-image-N.N. This macro matches that.
- macro: parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
@@ -321,9 +251,7 @@
- rule: Write below binary dir
desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
condition: bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
output: "File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
@@ -332,11 +260,9 @@
etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries,
dev_creation_binaries,
ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv,
apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst,
systemd-machine, debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv,
gen_resolvconf.)
systemd-machine, debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv)
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not fd.directory in (/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java)
and not ansible_running_python
@@ -353,9 +279,7 @@
- rule: Write below etc in installer
desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc, in a pipe installer session
condition: write_etc_common and proc.sname=fbash
output: >
File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
file=%fd.name) within pipe installer session
output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name) within pipe installer session"
priority: INFO
tags: [filesystem]
@@ -363,14 +287,9 @@
condition: proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname=passwd
- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files
at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
desc: an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.
condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
output: "Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
@@ -378,56 +297,43 @@
items: [iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd, vsftpd, systemd]
- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted
desc: >
an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
desc: an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
condition: >
sensitive_files and open_read
and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries)
and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries)
and not cmp_cp_by_passwd
and not ansible_running_python
and not proc.cmdline contains /usr/bin/mandb
output: >
Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name name=%proc.name
command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
output: "Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name name=%proc.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: WARNING
tags: [filesystem]
# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
- rule: Write below rpm database
desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
condition: fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write and not rpm_procs and not ansible_running_python
condition: fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write and not proc.name in (dnf,rpm,rpmkey,yum) and not ansible_running_python
output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt]
- rule: DB program spawned process
desc: >
a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself.
This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
desc: a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself. This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.
condition: proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and spawned_process and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
output: >
Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name
program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
output: "Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process, database]
- rule: Modify binary dirs
desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
condition: bin_dir_rename and modify and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)
output: "File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
output: >
Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name
command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)
output: "Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)"
priority: ERROR
tags: [filesystem]
@@ -442,28 +348,20 @@
# Temporarily disabling this rule as it's tripping over https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/598
# - rule: Syscall returns eaccess
# desc: >
# any system call that returns EACCESS. This is not always a strong
# indication of a problem, hence the INFO priority.
# desc: any system call that returns EACCESS. This is not always a strong indication of a problem, hence the INFO priority.
# condition: evt.res = EACCESS
# output: >
# System call returned EACCESS (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
# syscall=%evt.type args=%evt.args)
# output: "System call returned EACCESS (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline syscall=%evt.type args=%evt.args)"
# priority: INFO
- rule: Change thread namespace
desc: >
an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.
desc: an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.
condition: >
evt.type = setns
and not proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, nsenter)
and not proc.name startswith "runc:"
and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries)
and not java_running_sdjagent
output: >
Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
parent=%proc.pname %container.info)
output: "Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname %container.info)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [process]
@@ -471,12 +369,11 @@
items: [
sshd, sudo, su, tmux, screen, emacs, systemd, login, flock, fbash,
nginx, monit, supervisord, dragent, aws, initdb, docker-compose,
configure, awk, falco, fail2ban-server, fleetctl,
make, configure, awk, falco, fail2ban-server, fleetctl,
logrotate, ansible, less, adduser, pycompile, py3compile,
pyclean, py3clean, pip, pip2, ansible-playboo, man-db,
init, pluto, mkinitramfs, unattended-upgr, watch, sysdig,
landscape-sysin, nessusd, PM2, syslog-summary, erl_child_setup,
npm, cloud-init, toybox, ceph
landscape-sysin, nessusd, PM2, syslog-summary, erl_child_setup
]
- rule: Run shell untrusted
@@ -485,18 +382,14 @@
spawned_process and not container
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, shell_binaries, make_binaries, known_shell_spawn_binaries, docker_binaries,
and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, shell_binaries, known_shell_spawn_binaries, docker_binaries,
k8s_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries, keepalived_binaries)
monitoring_binaries)
and not parent_ansible_running_python
and not parent_bro_running_python
and not parent_python_running_denyhosts
and not parent_python_running_sdchecks
and not parent_linux_image_upgrade_script
and not parent_java_running_jenkins
output: >
Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)
output: "Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)"
priority: DEBUG
tags: [host, shell]
@@ -504,36 +397,25 @@
condition: (container.image startswith sysdig/agent or
(container.image startswith sysdig/falco and
not container.image startswith sysdig/falco-event-generator) or
container.image startswith quay.io/sysdig or
container.image startswith sysdig/sysdig or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube or
container.image startswith quay.io/coreos/flannel or
container.image startswith gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy)
# These containers are ones that are known to spawn lots of
# shells. Generally, they are for systems where the container is used
# as a packaging mechanism more than for a dedicated microservice.
- macro: shell_spawning_containers
condition: (container.image startswith jenkins or
container.image startswith gitlab/gitlab-ce or
container.image startswith gitlab/gitlab-ee)
- rule: Launch Privileged Container
desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and container.privileged=true and not trusted_containers
output: Privileged container started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
- rule: File Open by Privileged Container
desc: Any open by a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: (open_read or open_write) and container and container.privileged=true and not trusted_containers
output: File opened for read/write by privileged container (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info file=%fd.name)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
- macro: sensitive_mount
condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A")
- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
desc: >
Detect the initial process started by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory
(i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: evt.type=execve and proc.vpid=1 and container and sensitive_mount and not trusted_containers
output: Container with sensitive mount started (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
- rule: Sensitive Mount by Container
desc: Any open by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory (i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
condition: (open_read or open_write) and container and sensitive_mount and not trusted_containers
output: File opened for read/write by container mounting sensitive directory (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info file=%fd.name)
priority: INFO
tags: [container, cis]
@@ -554,56 +436,28 @@
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
output: >
A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)
output: "A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to
# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't
# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we
# fall back to allowing certain command lines.
- list: known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines
items: [
'"bash -c curl -f localhost:$API_PORT/admin/healthcheck"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null"',
'"sh -c curl http://localhost:6060/debug/vars>/dev/null "',
'"sh -c pgrep java && exit 0 || exit 1 "',
'"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"',
'"sh -c echo healthy "',
'"sh -c echo alive "'
]
- rule: Run shell in container
desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints are excluded.
condition: >
spawned_process and container
and shell_procs
and proc.pname exists
and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, make_binaries, docker_binaries, k8s_binaries,
lxd_binaries, mesos_slave_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl, awk, falco, cron,
erl_child_setup, ceph, PM2)
and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, aide_wrapper_binaries, nids_binaries,
monitoring_binaries, gitlab_binaries, initdb, pg_ctl, awk, falco, cron, erl_child_setup)
and not trusted_containers
and not shell_spawning_containers
and not proc.cmdline in (known_container_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
output: >
Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name %container.info
shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)
output: "Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name %container.info shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [container, shell]
# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand
- rule: System procs network activity
desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
condition: (fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs) and (inbound or outbound) and not proc.name=systemd
output: >
Known system binary sent/received network traffic
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
condition: (fd.sockfamily = ip and system_procs) and (inbound or outbound)
output: "Known system binary sent/received network traffic (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
@@ -616,49 +470,25 @@
# output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)"
# priority: WARNING
- macro: somebody_becoming_themself
condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or
(user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data))
# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs
- rule: Non sudo setuid
desc: >
an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. users "root" and "nobody"
suing to itself are also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: >
evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> and
not user.name=root and not somebody_becoming_themself
and not proc.name in (userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries,
sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-)
output: >
Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname
command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)
desc: an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. user "root" is also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.
condition: evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> and not user.name=root and not proc.name in (userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-)
output: "Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [users]
- rule: User mgmt binaries
desc: >
activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded.
Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top
of a base linux distribution at startup.
condition: >
spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and
not proc.name in (su, sudo) and not container and
not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, run-parts)
output: >
User management binary command run outside of container
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
desc: activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded. Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top of a base linux distribution at startup.
condition: spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and not proc.name in (su, sudo) and not container and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, run-parts)
output: "User management binary command run outside of container (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [host, users]
- list: allowed_dev_files
items: [
/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr,
/dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg
]
items: [/dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr, /dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console]
# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see:
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
- rule: Create files below dev
desc: creating any files below /dev other than known programs that manage devices. Some rootkits hide files in /dev.
condition: >
@@ -689,9 +519,7 @@
- rule: Installer bash non https connection
desc: an attempt by a program in a pipe installer session to make an outgoing connection on a non-http(s) port
condition: proc.sname=fbash and outbound and not fd.sport in (80, 443, 53)
output: >
Outbound connection on non-http(s) port by a process in a fbash session
(command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
output: "Outbound connection on non-http(s) port by a process in a fbash session (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)"
priority: NOTICE
tags: [network]
@@ -785,10 +613,7 @@
- macro: cassandra_jmx_port
condition: fd.sport=7199
- macro: cassandra_port
condition: >
cassandra_thrift_client_port or
cassandra_cql_port or cassandra_cluster_port or
cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_jmx_port
condition: cassandra_thrift_client_port or cassandra_cql_port or cassandra_cluster_port or cassandra_ssl_cluster_port or cassandra_jmx_port
# - rule: Cassandra unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to cassandra on a port other than the standard ports
@@ -874,9 +699,7 @@
# - rule: Mongodb unexpected network inbound traffic
# desc: inbound network traffic to mongodb on a port other than the standard ports
# condition: >
# user.name = mongodb and inbound and not (mongodb_server_port or
# mongodb_shardserver_port or mongodb_configserver_port or mongodb_webserver_port)
# condition: user.name = mongodb and inbound and not (mongodb_server_port or mongodb_shardserver_port or mongodb_configserver_port or mongodb_webserver_port)
# output: "Inbound network traffic to MongoDB on unexpected port (connection=%fd.name)"
# priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ file(COPY "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/debian/falco"
file(COPY "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/rpm/falco"
DESTINATION "${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/scripts/rpm")
if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME MATCHES "Linux")
install(PROGRAMS ${SYSDIG_DIR}/scripts/sysdig-probe-loader
DESTINATION ${FALCO_BIN_DIR}
RENAME falco-probe-loader)
endif()
install(PROGRAMS ${SYSDIG_DIR}/scripts/sysdig-probe-loader
DESTINATION bin
RENAME falco-probe-loader)

View File

@@ -157,68 +157,6 @@ trace_files: !mux
- rules/override_nested_list.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_substring:
detect: False
rules_file:
- rules/list_substring.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_sub_front:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_sub_front.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_sub_mid:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_sub_mid.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_sub_end:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_sub_end.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_sub_bare:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_sub_bare.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_sub_whitespace:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_sub_whitespace.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_order:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_order.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
macro_order:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/macro_order.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
rule_order:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/rule_order.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
invalid_rule_output:
exit_status: 1
stderr_contains: "Runtime error: Error loading rules:.* Invalid output format 'An open was seen %not_a_real_field': 'invalid formatting token not_a_real_field'. Exiting."
@@ -579,64 +517,3 @@ trace_files: !mux
- open_11: 1
- open_12: 0
- open_13: 0
list_append_failure:
exit_status: 1
stderr_contains: "List my_list has 'append' key but no list by that name already exists. Exiting"
rules_file:
- rules/list_append_failure.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_append:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/list_append.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
list_append_false:
detect: False
rules_file:
- rules/list_append_false.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
macro_append_failure:
exit_status: 1
stderr_contains: "Macro my_macro has 'append' key but no macro by that name already exists. Exiting"
rules_file:
- rules/macro_append_failure.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
macro_append:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/macro_append.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
macro_append_false:
detect: False
rules_file:
- rules/macro_append_false.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
rule_append_failure:
exit_status: 1
stderr_contains: "Rule my_rule has 'append' key but no rule by that name already exists. Exiting"
rules_file:
- rules/rule_append_failure.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
rule_append:
detect: True
detect_level: WARNING
rules_file:
- rules/rule_append.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap
rule_append_false:
detect: False
rules_file:
- rules/rule_append_false.yaml
trace_file: trace_files/cat_write.scap

View File

@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ traces: !mux
detect: True
detect_level: INFO
detect_counts:
- "Launch Privileged Container": 1
- "File Open by Privileged Container": 19
container-sensitive-mount:
trace_file: traces-positive/container-sensitive-mount.scap
detect: True
detect_level: INFO
detect_counts:
- "Launch Sensitive Mount Container": 1
- "Sensitive Mount by Container": 19
create-files-below-dev:
trace_file: traces-positive/create-files-below-dev.scap

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
- list: my_list
items: [not-cat]
- list: my_list
append: true
items: [cat]
- rule: Open From Cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and proc.name in (my_list)
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
- list: my_list
items: [not-cat]
append: true

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
- list: my_list
items: [cat]
- list: my_list
append: false
items: [not-cat]
- rule: Open From Cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and proc.name in (my_list)
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [not_cat]
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (cat_binaries)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name=cat_binaries
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (ls, cat_binaries)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (cat_binaries, ps)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (ls, cat_binaries, ps)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name= cat_binaries or proc.name=nopey
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
- list: my_list
items: ['"one string"']
- rule: my_rule
desc: my description
condition: evt.type=open and fd.name in (file_my_list)
output: my output
priority: INFO

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
- macro: my_macro
condition: proc.name=not-cat
- macro: my_macro
append: true
condition: or proc.name=cat
- rule: Open From Cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and my_macro
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
- macro: my_macro
condition: proc.name=not-cat
append: true

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
- macro: my_macro
condition: proc.name=cat
- macro: my_macro
append: false
condition: proc.name=not-cat
- rule: Open From Cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and my_macro
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (not_cat)
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (cat_binaries)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
- rule: my_rule
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and fd.name=not-a-real-file
output: "An open of /dev/null was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
- rule: my_rule
append: true
condition: or fd.name=/dev/null

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
- rule: my_rule
condition: evt.type=open
append: true

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
- rule: my_rule
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and fd.name=/dev/null
output: "An open of /dev/null was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
- rule: my_rule
append: true
condition: and fd.name=not-a-real-file

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
- list: cat_binaries
items: [cat]
- macro: is_cat
condition: proc.name in (cat_binaries)
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and proc.name=not_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING
- rule: open_from_cat
desc: A process named cat does an open
condition: evt.type=open and is_cat
output: "An open was seen (command=%proc.cmdline)"
priority: WARNING

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ local compiler = {}
compiler.verbose = false
compiler.all_events = false
compiler.trim = parser.trim
function compiler.set_verbose(verbose)
compiler.verbose = verbose
@@ -59,16 +58,15 @@ end
definition uses another macro).
--]]
function copy_ast_obj(obj)
if type(obj) ~= 'table' then return obj end
local res = {}
for k, v in pairs(obj) do res[copy_ast_obj(k)] = copy_ast_obj(v) end
return res
end
function expand_macros(ast, defs, changed)
function copy(obj)
if type(obj) ~= 'table' then return obj end
local res = {}
for k, v in pairs(obj) do res[copy(k)] = copy(v) end
return res
end
if (ast.type == "Rule") then
return expand_macros(ast.filter, defs, changed)
elseif ast.type == "Filter" then
@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ function expand_macros(ast, defs, changed)
if (defs[ast.value.value] == nil) then
error("Undefined macro '".. ast.value.value .. "' used in filter.")
end
ast.value = copy_ast_obj(defs[ast.value.value])
ast.value = copy(defs[ast.value.value])
changed = true
return changed
end
@@ -88,7 +86,7 @@ function expand_macros(ast, defs, changed)
if (defs[ast.left.value] == nil) then
error("Undefined macro '".. ast.left.value .. "' used in filter.")
end
ast.left = copy_ast_obj(defs[ast.left.value])
ast.left = copy(defs[ast.left.value])
changed = true
end
@@ -96,7 +94,7 @@ function expand_macros(ast, defs, changed)
if (defs[ast.right.value] == nil) then
error("Undefined macro ".. ast.right.value .. " used in filter.")
end
ast.right = copy_ast_obj(defs[ast.right.value])
ast.right = copy(defs[ast.right.value])
changed = true
end
@@ -109,7 +107,7 @@ function expand_macros(ast, defs, changed)
if (defs[ast.argument.value] == nil) then
error("Undefined macro ".. ast.argument.value .. " used in filter.")
end
ast.argument = copy_ast_obj(defs[ast.argument.value])
ast.argument = copy(defs[ast.argument.value])
changed = true
end
return expand_macros(ast.argument, defs, changed)
@@ -283,7 +281,7 @@ function get_evttypes(name, ast, source)
return evttypes
end
function compiler.compile_macro(line, macro_defs, list_defs)
function compiler.compile_macro(line, list_defs)
for name, items in pairs(list_defs) do
line = string.gsub(line, name, table.concat(items, ", "))
@@ -302,21 +300,6 @@ function compiler.compile_macro(line, macro_defs, list_defs)
check_for_ignored_syscalls_events(ast, 'macro', line)
end
-- Simply as a validation step, try to expand all macros in this
-- macro's condition. This changes the ast, so we make a copy
-- first.
local ast_copy = copy_ast_obj(ast)
if (ast.type == "Rule") then
-- Line is a filter, so expand macro references
repeat
expanded = expand_macros(ast_copy, macro_defs, false)
until expanded == false
else
error("Unexpected top-level AST type: "..ast.type)
end
return ast
end
@@ -326,12 +309,7 @@ end
function compiler.compile_filter(name, source, macro_defs, list_defs)
for name, items in pairs(list_defs) do
local begin_name_pat = "^("..name..")([%s(),=])"
local mid_name_pat = "([%s(),=])("..name..")([%s(),=])"
local end_name_pat = "([%s(),=])("..name..")$"
source = string.gsub(source, begin_name_pat, table.concat(items, ", ").."%2")
source = string.gsub(source, mid_name_pat, "%1"..table.concat(items, ", ").."%3")
source = string.gsub(source, end_name_pat, "%1"..table.concat(items, ", "))
source = string.gsub(source, name, table.concat(items, ", "))
end
local ast, error_msg = parser.parse_filter(source)

View File

@@ -127,11 +127,10 @@ function trim(s)
if (type(s) ~= "string") then return s end
return (s:gsub("^%s*(.-)%s*$", "%1"))
end
parser.trim = trim
local function terminal (tag)
-- Rather than trim the whitespace in this way, it would be nicer to exclude it from the capture...
return token(V(tag), tag) / function (tok) val = tok; if tag ~= "String" then val = trim(tok) end; return { type = tag, value = val} end
return token(V(tag), tag) / function (tok) return { type = tag, value = trim(tok)} end
end
local function unaryboolop (op, e)
@@ -238,7 +237,7 @@ local G = {
Identifier = V"idStart" * V"idRest"^0;
Macro = V"idStart" * V"idRest"^0 * -P".";
Int = digit^1;
PathString = (alnum + S'.-_/*?')^1;
PathString = (alnum + S'-_/*?')^1;
Index = V"Int" + V"PathString";
FieldName = V"Identifier" * (P"." + V"Identifier")^1 * (P"[" * V"Index" * P"]")^-1;
Name = C(V"Identifier") * -V"idRest";

View File

@@ -208,23 +208,7 @@ function load_rules(rules_content, rules_mgr, verbose, all_events, extra, replac
end
end
-- Possibly append to the condition field of an existing macro
append = false
if v['append'] then
append = v['append']
end
if append then
if state.macros_by_name[v['macro']] == nil then
error ("Macro " ..v['macro'].. " has 'append' key but no macro by that name already exists")
end
state.macros_by_name[v['macro']]['condition'] = state.macros_by_name[v['macro']]['condition'] .. " " .. v['condition']
else
state.macros_by_name[v['macro']] = v
end
state.macros_by_name[v['macro']] = v
elseif (v['list']) then
@@ -238,24 +222,7 @@ function load_rules(rules_content, rules_mgr, verbose, all_events, extra, replac
end
end
-- Possibly append to an existing list
append = false
if v['append'] then
append = v['append']
end
if append then
if state.lists_by_name[v['list']] == nil then
error ("List " ..v['list'].. " has 'append' key but no list by that name already exists")
end
for i, elem in ipairs(v['items']) do
table.insert(state.lists_by_name[v['list']]['items'], elem)
end
else
state.lists_by_name[v['list']] = v
end
state.lists_by_name[v['list']] = v
elseif (v['rule']) then
@@ -263,49 +230,21 @@ function load_rules(rules_content, rules_mgr, verbose, all_events, extra, replac
error ("Missing name in rule")
end
-- Possibly append to the condition field of an existing rule
append = false
if v['append'] then
append = v['append']
for i, field in ipairs({'condition', 'output', 'desc', 'priority'}) do
if (v[field] == nil) then
error ("Missing "..field.." in rule with name "..v['rule'])
end
end
if append then
-- For append rules, all you need is the condition
for i, field in ipairs({'condition'}) do
if (v[field] == nil) then
error ("Missing "..field.." in rule with name "..v['rule'])
end
end
if state.rules_by_name[v['rule']] == nil then
error ("Rule " ..v['rule'].. " has 'append' key but no rule by that name already exists")
end
state.rules_by_name[v['rule']]['condition'] = state.rules_by_name[v['rule']]['condition'] .. " " .. v['condition']
else
for i, field in ipairs({'condition', 'output', 'desc', 'priority'}) do
if (v[field] == nil) then
error ("Missing "..field.." in rule with name "..v['rule'])
end
end
-- Note that we can overwrite rules, but the rules are still
-- loaded in the order in which they first appeared,
-- potentially across multiple files.
if state.rules_by_name[v['rule']] == nil then
state.ordered_rule_names[#state.ordered_rule_names+1] = v['rule']
end
-- The output field might be a folded-style, which adds a
-- newline to the end. Remove any trailing newlines.
v['output'] = compiler.trim(v['output'])
state.rules_by_name[v['rule']] = v
-- Note that we can overwrite rules, but the rules are still
-- loaded in the order in which they first appeared,
-- potentially across multiple files.
if state.rules_by_name[v['rule']] == nil then
state.ordered_rule_names[#state.ordered_rule_names+1] = v['rule']
end
state.rules_by_name[v['rule']] = v
else
error ("Unknown rule object: "..table.tostring(v))
end
@@ -344,7 +283,7 @@ function load_rules(rules_content, rules_mgr, verbose, all_events, extra, replac
local v = state.macros_by_name[name]
local ast = compiler.compile_macro(v['condition'], state.macros, state.lists)
local ast = compiler.compile_macro(v['condition'], state.lists)
state.macros[v['macro']] = ast.filter.value
end

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ target_link_libraries(falco
configure_file(config_falco.h.in config_falco.h)
install(TARGETS falco DESTINATION ${FALCO_BIN_DIR})
install(TARGETS falco DESTINATION bin)
install(DIRECTORY lua
DESTINATION ${FALCO_SHARE_DIR}
DESTINATION share/falco
FILES_MATCHING PATTERN *.lua)