In some cases, dropped events around the time a new container is started can result in missing the exec/clone for a process that does a setns to enter the namespace of a container. Here's an example from an oss capture: ``` 282273 09:01:22.098095673 30 runc:[0:PARENT] (168555) < setns res=0 282283 09:01:22.098138869 30 runc:[0:PARENT] (168555) < setns res=0 282295 09:01:22.098179685 30 runc:[0:PARENT] (168555) < setns res=0 517284 09:01:30.128723777 13 <NA> (168909) < setns res=0 517337 09:01:30.129054963 13 <NA> (168909) < setns res=0 517451 09:01:30.129560037 2 <NA> (168890) < setns res=0 524597 09:01:30.162741004 19 <NA> (168890) < setns res=0 527433 09:01:30.179786170 18 runc:[0:PARENT] (168927) < setns res=0 527448 09:01:30.179852428 18 runc:[0:PARENT] (168927) < setns res=0 535566 09:01:30.232420372 25 nsenter (168938) < setns res=0 537412 09:01:30.246200357 0 nsenter (168941) < setns res=0 554163 09:01:30.347158783 17 nsenter (168950) < setns res=0 659908 09:01:31.064622960 12 runc:[0:PARENT] (169023) < setns res=0 659919 09:01:31.064665759 12 runc:[0:PARENT] (169023) < setns res=0 732062 09:01:31.608297074 4 nsenter (169055) < setns res=0 812985 09:01:32.217527319 6 runc:[0:PARENT] (169077) < setns res=0 812991 09:01:32.217579396 6 runc:[0:PARENT] (169077) < setns res=0 813000 09:01:32.217632211 6 runc:[0:PARENT] (169077) < setns res=0 ``` When this happens, it can cause false positives for the "Change thread namespace" rule as it allows certain process names like "runc", "containerd", etc to perform setns calls. Other rules already use the proc_name_exists macro to require that the process name exists. This change adds proc_name_exists to the Change Thread Namespace rule as well. Signed-off-by: Mark Stemm <mark.stemm@gmail.com> |
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README.md | ||
RELEASE.md |
Cloud Native Runtime Security.
Latest releases
Read the change log.
development | stable | |
---|---|---|
rpm | ||
deb | ||
binary |
The Falco Project, originally created by Sysdig, is an incubating CNCF open source cloud native runtime security tool. Falco makes it easy to consume kernel events, and enrich those events with information from Kubernetes and the rest of the cloud native stack. Falco has a rich rule set of security rules specifically built for Kubernetes, Linux, and cloud-native. If a rule is violated in a system, Falco will send an alert notifying the user of the violation and its severity.
Installing Falco
If you would like to run Falco in production please adhere to the official installation guide.
Kubernetes
Tool | Link | Note |
---|---|---|
Helm | Chart Repository | The Falco community offers regular helm chart releases. |
Minikube | Tutorial | The Falco driver has been baked into minikube for easy deployment. |
Kind | Tutorial | Running Falco with kind requires a driver on the host system. |
GKE | Tutorial | We suggest using the eBPF driver for running Falco on GKE. |
Developing
Falco is designed to be extensible such that it can be built into cloud-native applications and infrastructure.
Falco has a gRPC endpoint and an API defined in protobuf. The Falco Project supports various SDKs for this endpoint.
SDKs
Language | Repository |
---|---|
Go | client-go |
Rust | client-rs |
Python | client-py |
What can Falco detect?
Falco can detect and alert on any behavior that involves making Linux system calls. Falco alerts can be triggered by the use of specific system calls, their arguments, and by properties of the calling process. For example, Falco can easily detect incidents including but not limited to:
- A shell is running inside a container or pod in Kubernetes.
- A container is running in privileged mode, or is mounting a sensitive path, such as
/proc
, from the host. - A server process is spawning a child process of an unexpected type.
- Unexpected read of a sensitive file, such as
/etc/shadow
. - A non-device file is written to
/dev
. - A standard system binary, such as
ls
, is making an outbound network connection.
Documentation
The Official Documentation is the best resource to learn about Falco.
Join the Community
To get involved with The Falco Project please visit the community repository to find more.
Contributing
See the CONTRIBUTING.md.
Security Audit
A third party security audit was performed by Cure53, you can see the full report here.
Reporting security vulnerabilities
Please report security vulnerabilities following the community process documented here.
License Terms
Falco is licensed to you under the Apache 2.0 open source license.