c5523d89a7
* Add alternatives as a binary dir writer
It can set symlinks below binary dirs.
* Let userhelper read sens.files/write below /etc
Part of usermode package, can be used by oVirt.
* Let package mgmt progs urlgrabber pki files
Some package management programs run urlgrabber-ext-{down} to update pki
files.
* Add additional root directory
for Jupyter-notebook
* Let brandbot write to /etc/os-release
Used on centos
* Add an additional veritas conf directory.
Also /etc/opt/VRTS...
* Let appdynamics spawn shells
Java, so we look at parent cmdline.
* Add more ancestors to output
In an attempt to track down the source of some additional shell
spawners, add additional parents.
* Let chef write below bin dirs/rpm database
Rename an existing macro chef_running_yum_dump to python_running_chef
and add additional variants.
Also add chef-client as a package management binary.
* Remove dangling macro.
No longer in use.
* Add additional volume mgmt progs
Add pvscan as a volume management program and add an additional
directory below /etc. Also rename the macro to make it more generic.
* Let openldap write below /etc/openldap
Only program is run-openldap.sh for now.
* Add additional veritas directory
Also /etc/vom.
* Let sed write /etc/sedXXXXX files
These are often seen in install scrips for rpm/deb packages. The test
only checks for /etc/sed, as we don't have anything like a regex match
or glob operator.
* Let dse (DataStax Search) write to /root
Only file is /root/tmp__.
* Add additional mysql programs and directories
Add run-mysqld and /etc/my.cnf.d directory.
* Let redis write its config below /etc.
* Let id program open network connections
Seen using port 111 (sun-rpc, but really user lookups).
* Opt-in rule for protecting tomcat shell spawns
Some users want to consider any shell spawned by tomcat suspect for
example, protecting against the famous apache struts attack
CVE-2017-5638, while others do not.
Split the difference by adding a macro
possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat, but disabling it by default.
* added ossec-syscheckd to read_sensitive_file_binaries
* Add "Write below monitored directory"
Take the technique used by "Write below binary dir", and make it more
general, expanding to a list of "monitored directories". This contains
common directories like /boot, /lib, etc.
It has a small workaround to look for home ssh directories without using
the glob operator, which has a pending fix in
https://github.com/draios/sysdig/pull/1153.
* Fix FPs
Move monitored_dir to after evt type checks and allow mkinitramfs to
write below /boot
* Addl boot writers.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| cla | ||
| cpack/debian | ||
| docker | ||
| examples | ||
| rules | ||
| scripts | ||
| test | ||
| userspace | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .travis.yml | ||
| CHANGELOG.md | ||
| CMakeCPackOptions.cmake | ||
| CMakeLists.txt | ||
| COPYING | ||
| falco.yaml | ||
| README.md | ||
Sysdig Falco
Latest release
v0.10.0 Read the change log
Dev Branch: 
Master Branch: 
Overview
Sysdig Falco is a behavioral activity monitor designed to detect anomalous activity in your applications. Powered by sysdig’s system call capture infrastructure, falco lets you continuously monitor and detect container, application, host, and network activity... all in one place, from one source of data, with one set of rules.
What kind of behaviors can Falco detect?
Falco can detect and alert on any behavior that involves making Linux system calls. Thanks to Sysdig's core decoding and state tracking functionality, falco alerts can be triggered by the use of specific system calls, their arguments, and by properties of the calling process. For example, you can easily detect things like:
- A shell is run inside a container
- A container is running in privileged mode, or is mounting a sensitive path like
/procfrom the host. - A server process spawns a child process of an unexpected type
- Unexpected read of a sensitive file (like
/etc/shadow) - A non-device file is written to
/dev - A standard system binary (like
ls) makes an outbound network connection
How Falco Compares to Other Security Tools like SELinux, Auditd, etc.
One of the questions we often get when we talk about Sysdig Falco is “How does it compare to other tools like SELinux, AppArmor, Auditd, etc. that also have security policies?”. We wrote a blog post comparing Falco to other tools.
Documentation
Visit the wiki for full documentation on falco.
Join the Community
- Follow us on Twitter for general falco and sysdig news.
- This is our blog, where you can find the latest falco posts.
- Join our Public Slack channel for sysdig and falco announcements and discussions.
License Terms
Falco is licensed to you under the GPL 2.0 open source license.
In addition, as a special exception, the copyright holders give permission to link the code of portions of this program with the OpenSSL library under certain conditions as described in each individual source file, and distribute linked combinations including the two.
You must obey the GNU General Public License in all respects for all of the code used other than OpenSSL. If you modify file(s) with this exception, you may extend this exception to your version of the file(s), but you are not obligated to do so. If you do not wish to do so, delete this exception statement from your version.
Contributor License Agreements
Background
As we did for sysdig, we are formalizing the way that we accept contributions of code from the contributing community. We must now ask that contributions to falco be provided subject to the terms and conditions of a Contributor License Agreement (CLA). The CLA comes in two forms, applicable to contributions by individuals, or by legal entities such as corporations and their employees. We recognize that entering into a CLA with us involves real consideration on your part, and we’ve tried to make this process as clear and simple as possible.
We’ve modeled our CLA off of industry standards, such as the CLA used by Kubernetes. Note that this agreement is not a transfer of copyright ownership, this simply is a license agreement for contributions, intended to clarify the intellectual property license granted with contributions from any person or entity. It is for your protection as a contributor as well as the protection of falco; it does not change your rights to use your own contributions for any other purpose.
For some background on why contributor license agreements are necessary, you can read FAQs from many other open source projects:
- Django’s excellent CLA FAQ
- A well-written chapter from Karl Fogel’s Producing Open Source Software on CLAs
- The Wikipedia article on CLAs
As always, we are grateful for your past and present contributions to falco.
What do I need to do in order to contribute code?
Individual contributions: Individuals who wish to make contributions must review the Individual Contributor License Agreement and indicate agreement by adding the following line to every GIT commit message:
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
Use your real name; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
Corporate contributions: Employees of corporations, members of LLCs or LLPs, or others acting on behalf of a contributing entity, must review the Corporate Contributor License Agreement, must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.
Government contributions: Employees or officers of the United States Government, must review the Government Contributor License Agreement, must be an authorized representative of the contributing entity, and indicate agreement to it on behalf of the contributing entity by adding the following lines to every GIT commit message:
falco-CLA-1.0-contributing-govt-entity: Full Legal Name of Entity
falco-CLA-1.0-signed-off-by: Joe Smith <joe.smith@email.com>
This file is a work of authorship of an employee or officer of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright in the United States under 17 USC 105.
Use a real name of a natural person who is an authorized representative of the contributing entity; pseudonyms or anonymous contributions are not allowed.