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Destroyed Competitive notes (markdown)
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# Commercial
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## Threatstack
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"Continuous security monitoring for your cloud."
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Threatstack provides a host intrusion detection system that is currently focused on servers running in AWS. They deploy an agent that monitors:
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- process events (start, stop, network connections) via `auditd`
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- user events (commands run)
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- file/directory activity via `inotify` and `fanotify`
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Their support docs explicitly state that they do not install a kernel module.
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It is a rule-based system, with rules like:
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- `(command = "scp" or command = "wget") and type = "start" and syscall = "execve"`
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- `type="connect" and connection.addr != null and connection.addr != "127.0.0.1"`
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Rules are configured by the user, with a number of pointers [here](https://threatstack.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/203022169-Defensive-Policy-Creation-Use-Cases-and-What-to-Look-For).
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Based on [this](https://threatstack.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/205992556-Tabbed-Alert-View-A-New-Way-to-Manage-Alerts) it looks like their system can routinely generate _lots_ of alerts.
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Also, based on [this](https://threatstack.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/200635804-How-do-I-Configure-File-Integrity-Monitoring-FIM-Rules-) their FIM feature does not consider which process is accessing/modifying a file.
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## Twistlock
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Hangout on air, Chenxi Wang (Twistlock, https://www.linkedin.com/in/chenxi-wang-5588874) and Kit Merker (Google PM for Kubernetes).
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Pitch: containers were originally developed for resource isolation, not security isolation. We at Twistlock think that with the right tools, containers can actually make your system *more* secure.
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Challenges today:
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- Lack of checking process for vulns when building container images.
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- Lack of visibility and control in runtime
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- Ops often left out of the look because they can't look inside them. Can't run agents inside them, can't run logging scripts in them.
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Twistlock addresses security for the entire container lifecycle: vulnerability management (look at images statically, production containers, scan for vulns), role-based access control layer for docker and k8s, and "smart runtime defense"
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This talk focused on the first piece (vuln management).
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### Vulnerability management and image scanning
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It integrates with a registry: download images form registry, decompose image into its layers, scan each layer from base linux distro to app framework to custom code. Results presented in a dashboard and can be sent out via http.
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We use real-time vuln feeds to drive our service.
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### Runtime defense
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Twistlock runs as a privileged container on each host. "Were able to observer execution of containers and detect anomalies, block certain things, kill anomalous containers". Didn't go into any more detail.
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# Open source
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## Snort
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## Suricata
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## OSSEC
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Reference in New Issue
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