We have had those tests broken for months. It's time to get rid of
those.
NOTE that we could easily revert this commit and re-add those tests as
soon as we find someone to maintain and be responsible for such
integration.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
This is a bump pre-release, which brings several fixes and some
improvements related to initData, and NVIDIA's remote verifier.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
The test case designed to verify policy failures due to an "unexpected
capability" was misconfigured. It was using "CAP_SYS_CHROOT" as the
unexpected capability to be added.
This configuration was flawed for two main reasons:
1.Incorrect Syntax: Kubernetes Pod specs expect capability names without
the "CAP_" prefix (e.g., "SYS_CHROOT", not "CAP_SYS_CHROOT").
This made the test case's premise incorrect from a K8s API perspective.
2.Part of Default Set: "SYS_CHROOT" is already included in the
`default_caps` list for a standard container. Therefore, adding it would
not trigger a policy violation, defeating the purpose of the
"unexpected capability" test.
Furthermore, a related issue was observed where a malformed capability
like "CAP_CAP_SYS_CHROOT" was being generated, causing parsing failures
in the `oci-spec-rs` library. This was a symptom of incorrect string
manipulation when handling capabilities.
This commit corrects the test by selecting "SYS_NICE" as the unexpected
capability. "SYS_NICE" is a more suitable choice because:
- It is a valid Linux capability.
- It is relatively harmless.
- It is **not** part of the default capability set defined in
`genpolicy-settings.json`.
By using "SYS_NICE", the test now accurately simulates a scenario where
a Pod requests a legitimate but non-default capability, which the policy
(generated from a baseline Pod without this capability) should correctly
reject. This change fixes the test's logic and also resolves the
downstream `oci-spec-rs` parsing error by ensuring only valid capability
names are processed.
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyn <alex.lyn@antgroup.com>
Thankfully there's only one piece that's still SNP specific (for the
supported TEEs). Let's adjust it so we can have an easy and smooth
execution when adding a TDX CI machine.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
There are several changes needed in order to get this test working with
CC, and yet we still are skipping it.
Basically, we need to:
* Pull an authenticated image inside the guest, which requires:
* Using Trustee to release the credential
* We still depend on a PR to be merged on Trustee side
* https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee/pull/1035
* We still depend on a Trustee bump (including the PR above) on our
side
Apart from those changes, I ended up "duplicating" the tests by adding a
"-tee" version of those, which already have:
* The proper kbs annotations set up
* Dropped host mounts
* Increases the memory needed
Last but not least, as "bats" probably means "being a terrible script",
I had to re-arrange a few things otherwise the tests would not even run
due to bats-isms that I am sincerely not able to pin-point.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
We added the tests using virtio-9p as we knew it'd require incremental
changes to be able to use any kind of guest-pull method.
Now, as in the coming commits we'll be actually ensuring that guest-pull
works and is in use, we can enforce the experimental_force_guest_pull
usage for the nvidia cases.
Note: We're using experimental_force_guest_pull instead of
nydus-snapshotter due to stability concerns with the snapshotter.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
It takes either a shim name or "", but we were treating this (thankfully
only in this specific file) as a boolean.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
Adjust output to the setup_file and teardown_file behavior.
With this, we will be able to observe relevant logging rather than
adding to the output variable.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
The new image reference has changed to mcr.microsoft.com/oss/v2/kubernetes/pause:3.6
from mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes/pause:3.6.
The new image uses by default UID=0, GID=0 while the older. The older image had:
UID=65535, GID=65535.
There is a new pause_container_id_policy field in genpolicy-settings.json, informing
genpolicy about the way AdditionalGids gets updated - "v1" for the older behavior
and "v2" for the newer AKS version:
- When using v1, the default value of AdditionalGids is {65535}.
- When using v2, the default value of AdditionalGids is {}.
UID=65535 and GID=65535 are still hard-coded by default in genpolicy-settings.json.
We might be able to remove/ignore these fields in the future, if we'll stop relying
on policy::KataSpec::get_process_fields to use these fields.
A new CI function adapt_common_policy_settings_for_aks() changes the pause container
UID, GID, pause_container_id_policy, and image ref settings values when testing on
AKS Hosts - i.e., when testing coco-dev or mariner Hosts.
The genpolicy workarounds for the unexpected behavior with guest pull enabled have
been improved to use the current container's GID instead of hard-coding GID=0 as the
guest pull default. Also, AdditionalGids gets updated when the current container's GID is
changing, instead of always changing the AdditionalGids at the very end of
policy::AgentPolicy::get_container_process(), when the relevant evolution of the GID
value was no longer available.
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
Same deal as the previous commut, just enabling the tests here, with the
same list of improvements that we will need to go through in order to
get is working in a perfect way.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
While the primary goal of this change is to detect regressions to the
NVIDIA SNP GPU scenario, various improvements to reflect a more
realistic CC setting are planned in subsequent changes, such as:
* moving away from the overlayfs snapshotter
* disabling filesystem sharing
* applying a pod security policy
* activating the GPUs only after attestation
* using a refined approach for GPU cold-plugging without requiring
annotations
* revisiting pod timeout and overhead parameters (the podOverhead value
was increased due to CUDA vectorAdd requiring about 6Gi of
podOverhead, as well as the inference and embedqa requiring at least
12Gi, respectively, 14Gi of podOverhead to run without invoking the
host's oom-killer. We will revisit this aspect after addressing
points 1. and 2.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
Let's add a new NVIDIA machine, which later on will be used for CC
related tests.
For now the current tests are skipped in the CC capable machine.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
Since qemu-coco-dev-runtime-rs and qemu-coco-dev had disabled the
cpu&memory hotplug by enable static_sandbox_resource_mgmt, thus
we should disable the cpu hotplug test for those two runtime.
Signed-off-by: Fupan Li <fupan.lfp@antgroup.com>
Since the qemu, cloud-hypervisor and dragonball had supported the
cpu hotplug on runtime-rs, thus enable the cpu hotplug test in CI.
Signed-off-by: Fupan Li <fupan.lfp@antgroup.com>
It's just a follow-up on the previous commit where we move away from the
runtimeClass creation inside the script, and instead we do it using the
chart itself.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
In order to fix:
```
=== Running govulncheck on containerd-shim-kata-v2 ===
Vulnerabilities found in containerd-shim-kata-v2:
=== Symbol Results ===
Vulnerability #1: GO-2025-4015
Excessive CPU consumption in Reader.ReadResponse in net/textproto
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4015
Standard library
Found in: net/textproto@go1.24.6
Fixed in: net/textproto@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: textproto.Reader.ReadResponse
Vulnerability #2: GO-2025-4014
Unbounded allocation when parsing GNU sparse map in archive/tar
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4014
Standard library
Found in: archive/tar@go1.24.6
Fixed in: archive/tar@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: tar.Reader.Next
Vulnerability #3: GO-2025-4013
Panic when validating certificates with DSA public keys in crypto/x509
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4013
Standard library
Found in: crypto/x509@go1.24.6
Fixed in: crypto/x509@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: x509.Certificate.Verify
#2: x509.Certificate.Verify
Vulnerability #4: GO-2025-4012
Lack of limit when parsing cookies can cause memory exhaustion in net/http
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4012
Standard library
Found in: net/http@go1.24.6
Fixed in: net/http@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: http.Client.Do
#2: http.Client.Get
#3: http.Client.Head
#4: http.Client.Post
#5: http.Client.PostForm
Use '-show traces' to see the other 9 found symbols
Vulnerability #5: GO-2025-4011
Parsing DER payload can cause memory exhaustion in encoding/asn1
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4011
Standard library
Found in: encoding/asn1@go1.24.6
Fixed in: encoding/asn1@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: asn1.Unmarshal
#2: asn1.UnmarshalWithParams
Vulnerability #6: GO-2025-4010
Insufficient validation of bracketed IPv6 hostnames in net/url
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4010
Standard library
Found in: net/url@go1.24.6
Fixed in: net/url@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: url.JoinPath
#2: url.Parse
#3: url.ParseRequestURI
#4: url.URL.Parse
#5: url.URL.UnmarshalBinary
Vulnerability #7: GO-2025-4009
Quadratic complexity when parsing some invalid inputs in encoding/pem
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4009
Standard library
Found in: encoding/pem@go1.24.6
Fixed in: encoding/pem@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: pem.Decode
Vulnerability #8: GO-2025-4008
ALPN negotiation error contains attacker controlled information in
crypto/tls
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4008
Standard library
Found in: crypto/tls@go1.24.6
Fixed in: crypto/tls@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: tls.Conn.Handshake
#2: tls.Conn.HandshakeContext
#3: tls.Conn.Read
#4: tls.Conn.Write
#5: tls.Dial
Use '-show traces' to see the other 4 found symbols
Vulnerability #9: GO-2025-4007
Quadratic complexity when checking name constraints in crypto/x509
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4007
Standard library
Found in: crypto/x509@go1.24.6
Fixed in: crypto/x509@go1.24.9
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: x509.CertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM
#2: x509.Certificate.CheckCRLSignature
#3: x509.Certificate.CheckSignature
#4: x509.Certificate.CheckSignatureFrom
#5: x509.Certificate.CreateCRL
Use '-show traces' to see the other 27 found symbols
Vulnerability #10: GO-2025-4006
Excessive CPU consumption in ParseAddress in net/mail
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4006
Standard library
Found in: net/mail@go1.24.6
Fixed in: net/mail@go1.24.8
Vulnerable symbols found:
#1: mail.AddressParser.Parse
#2: mail.AddressParser.ParseList
#3: mail.Header.AddressList
#4: mail.ParseAddress
#5: mail.ParseAddressList
```
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
not ok 1 Successful replication controller with auto-generated policy in 123335ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected container command in 14601ms
ok 3 Policy failure: unexpected volume mountPath in 14443ms
ok 4 Policy failure: unexpected host device mapping in 14515ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation in 14485ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected capability in 14382ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 1000 in 14578ms
After this change:
not ok 1 Successful replication controller with auto-generated policy in 17108ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected container command in 14427ms
ok 3 Policy failure: unexpected volume mountPath in 14636ms
ok 4 Policy failure: unexpected host device mapping in 14493ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation in 14554ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected capability in 15087ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 1000 in 14371ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
not ok 1 Successful pod with auto-generated policy in 94852ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected device mount in 17807ms
After this change:
not ok 1 Successful pod with auto-generated policy in 35194ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected device mount in 21355ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
not ok 1 Logs empty when ReadStreamRequest is blocked in 102257ms
After this change:
not ok 1 Logs empty when ReadStreamRequest is blocked in 17339ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
not ok 1 Successful job with auto-generated policy in 107111ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected environment variable in 7920ms
ok 3 Policy failure: unexpected command line argument in 7874ms
ok 4 Policy failure: unexpected emptyDir volume in 7823ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected projected volume in 7812ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected readOnlyRootFilesystem in 7903ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 222 in 7720ms
After this change:
not ok 1 Successful job with auto-generated policy in 10271ms
ok 2 Policy failure: unexpected environment variable in 8018ms
ok 3 Policy failure: unexpected command line argument in 7886ms
ok 4 Policy failure: unexpected emptyDir volume in 7621ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected projected volume in 7843ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected readOnlyRootFilesystem in 7632ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 222 in 7619ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
ok 1 Successful sc deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 14769ms
ok 2 Successful sc with fsGroup/supplementalGroup deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 8384ms
not ok 3 Successful sc deployment with security context choosing another valid user in 136149ms
ok 4 Successful layered sc deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 8862ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected GID = 0 for layered securityContext deployment in 7941ms
ok 6 Policy failure: malicious root group added via supplementalGroups deployment in 11612ms
After:
ok 1 Successful sc deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 15230ms
ok 2 Successful sc with fsGroup/supplementalGroup deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 9364ms
not ok 3 Successful sc deployment with security context choosing another valid user in 11060ms
ok 4 Successful layered sc deployment with auto-generated policy and container image volumes in 9124ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected GID = 0 for layered securityContext deployment in 7919ms
ok 6 Policy failure: malicious root group added via supplementalGroups deployment in 11666ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
During the ${wait_time} for an expected condition, if
CreateContainerRequest was NOT expected to fail: detect possible
CreateContainerRequest failures early and abort the wait.
For example, before this change:
not ok 1 Successful pod with auto-generated policy in 110801ms
not ok 2 Able to read env variables sourced from configmap using envFrom in 94104ms
not ok 3 Successful pod with auto-generated policy and runtimeClassName filter in 95838ms
not ok 4 Successful pod with auto-generated policy and custom layers cache path in 110712ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected container image in 8113ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected privileged security context in 7943ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected terminationMessagePath in 11530ms
ok 8 Policy failure: unexpected hostPath volume mount in 7970ms
ok 9 Policy failure: unexpected config map in 7933ms
not ok 10 Policy failure: unexpected lifecycle.postStart.exec.command in 112677ms
ok 11 RuntimeClassName filter: no policy in 2302ms
not ok 12 ExecProcessRequest tests in 93946ms
not ok 13 Successful pod: runAsUser having the same value as the UID from the container image in 94003ms
ok 14 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 0 in 8016ms
ok 15 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 1234 in 7850ms
After:
not ok 1 Successful pod with auto-generated policy in 12182ms
not ok 2 Able to read env variables sourced from configmap using envFrom in 10121ms
not ok 3 Successful pod with auto-generated policy and runtimeClassName filter in 11738ms
not ok 4 Successful pod with auto-generated policy and custom layers cache path in 26592ms
ok 5 Policy failure: unexpected container image in 7742ms
ok 6 Policy failure: unexpected privileged security context in 7949ms
ok 7 Policy failure: unexpected terminationMessagePath in 7789ms
ok 8 Policy failure: unexpected hostPath volume mount in 7887ms
ok 9 Policy failure: unexpected config map in 7818ms
not ok 10 Policy failure: unexpected lifecycle.postStart.exec.command in 9120ms
ok 11 RuntimeClassName filter: no policy in 2081ms
not ok 12 ExecProcessRequest tests in 9883ms
not ok 13 Successful pod: runAsUser having the same value as the UID from the container image in 9870ms
ok 14 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 0 in 11161ms
ok 15 Policy failure: unexpected UID = 1234 in 7814ms
Signed-off-by: Dan Mihai <dmihai@microsoft.com>
We've seen a few cases where we fail the test due to timeout and when we
print the pods we just see that they've been created.
With that in mind, let's just increase the timeout a little bit.
Example:
```
not ok 1 Parallel jobs in 6250ms
(in test file k8s-parallel.bats, line 41)
`kubectl wait --for=condition=Ready --timeout=$timeout pod -l jobgroup=${job_name}' failed
No resources found in kata-containers-k8s-tests namespace.
[bats-exec-test:71] INFO: k8s configured to use runtimeclass
job.batch/process-item-test1 created
job.batch/process-item-test2 created
job.batch/process-item-test3 created
NAME STATUS COMPLETIONS DURATION AGE
process-item-test1 Running 0/1 0s
process-item-test2 Running 0/1 0s
process-item-test3 Running 0/1 0s
error: no matching resources found
No resources found in kata-containers-k8s-tests namespace.
No resources found in kata-containers-k8s-tests namespace.
DEBUG: system logs of node 'aks-nodepool1-25989463-vmss000000' since test start time (2025-11-01 16:39:03)
-- No entries --
job.batch "process-item-test1" deleted
job.batch "process-item-test2" deleted
job.batch "process-item-test3" deleted
```
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
As we're failing on the uninstall, which seems related to a bug on NFD
itself, but I don't have access to a s390x machine to debug, let's skip
the enablement for now and enable it back once we've experimented it
better on s390x.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
As we're failing to install NFD on CBL Mariner, let's skip the
enablement there, and enable it once we've experimented it better there.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
As we have the ability to deploy NFD as a sub-chart of our chart, let's
make sure we test it during our CI.
We had to increase the timeout values, where we had timeouts set, to
deploy / undeploy kata, as now NFD is also deployed / undeployed.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
We have 2 tests running on GitHub provided runners:
* devmapper
* CRI-O
- devmapper situation
For devmapper, we're currently testing devmapper with s390x as part of
one of its jobs.
More than that, this test has been failing here due to a lack of space
in the machine for quite some time, and no-action was taken to bring it
back either via GARM or some other way.
With that said, let's rely on the s390x CI to test devmapper and avoid
one extra failure on our CI by removing this one.
- cri-o situation
CRI-O is being tested with a fixed version of kubernetes that's already
reached its EOL, and a CRI-O version that matches that k8s version.
There has been attempts to raise issues, and also to provide a PR that
does at least part of the work ... leaving the debugging part for the
maintainers of the CI. However, there was no action on those from the
maintainers.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
Change NIM bats file logic to allow skipping test cases which
require multiple GPUs. This can be helpful for test clusters where
there is only one node with a single GPU, or for local test
environments with a single-node cluster with a single GPU.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
If a ConfigMap has more than 8 files it will not be mounted watchable
[1]. However, genpolicy assumes that ConfigMaps are always mounted at a
watchable path, so containers with large ConfigMap mounts fail
verification.
This commit allows mounting ConfigMaps from watchable and non-watchable
directories. ConfigMap mounts can't be meaningfully verified anyway, so
the exact location of the data does not matter, except that we stay in
the sandbox data dirs.
[1]: 0ce3f5fc6f/docs/design/inotify.md (L11-L21)Fixes: #11777
Signed-off-by: Markus Rudy <mr@edgeless.systems>
Every now and then, in case a failure happens, helm leaves the secret
behind without cleaning it up, leading to issues in the consecutive
runs.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
Aurélien has moved to a reliable mirror for our tests, but we missed
that our tools Dockerfiles could benefit from the same change, which is
added now.
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <ffidencio@nvidia.com>
