Service storage implements transactions. It creates an IPAddress object first and then creates
the Service object, and if the Service object already exists the complete transaction is
reverted. There can be race conditions when the repair loop picks up the new IPAddress object
for reconciliation before the transaction is reverted. This leads to spurious
IPAddressWrongReference warnings, to suppress these warnings we delay the processing of the new
IPAddress object by 5 seconds. The service allocation creates the IPAddress object before creating
the Service object, we easily identify this scenario when the IPAddress object creation timestamp
is after the Service creation timestamp. We do this only when the IPAddress object is created
recently in order to avoid indefinitely requeue/delay in IPAddress cleanup if for some reason
the service transaction revert fails.
Signed-off-by: Daman Arora <aroradaman@gmail.com>
The private constructor for the repair loop now consumes clock.Clock interface allowing
predictable unit testing.
Signed-off-by: Daman Arora <aroradaman@gmail.com>
This change modifies the validation logic for ServiceCIDR updates
(`ValidateServiceCIDRUpdate`) to specifically permit upgrading a
single-stack ServiceCIDR (either IPv4 or IPv6) to a dual-stack
configuration.
This reconfiguration path is considered safe because it only involves adding
a new CIDR range without altering the existing primary CIDR. This
ensures that existing Service IP allocations are not disrupted.
Other modifications, such as:
- Downgrading from dual-stack to single-stack
- Reordering CIDRs in a dual-stack configuration
- Changing the primary CIDR during a single-to-dual-stack
reconfiguration
remain disallowed by the validation. These operations carry a higher
risk of breaking existing Services or cluster networking
configurations. Preventing these updates automatically encourages
administrators to perform such changes manually after carefully
assessing the potential impact on their specific cluster environment.
The validation errors and controller logs provide guidance when such
disallowed changes are attempted.
Change-Id: I41dc09dfddb05f277925da2262f8114d6accbd1d
This adds the "DeviceTaint" top-level type to v1alpha3 and related fields to
ResourceSlice and ResourceClaim. It's complete enough bring up an API server
and generate files.
This is needed to make declaratve validation clean. Past me thought
this was clever (pointer versioned, non-pointer internal) but it is just
confusing.
Introduce a test suite that ensures declarative test cases
are fully tested and that validation errors are compared
with handwritten validation to ensure consistency.
Co-authored-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Prindle <aprindle@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Yongrui Lin <yongrlin@google.com>
After declarative validation is enabled in the ReplicationController
strategy in this way, the generated declarative validation code
in pkg/apis/core/v1/zz.generated.validations.go will be run
when the strategy validates ReplicationController.
Co-authored-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Prindle <aprindle@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Yongrui Lin <yongrlin@google.com>
Co-authored-by: David Eads <deads@redhat.com>
Ignore pre-existing bad IP/CIDR values in:
- pod.spec.podIP(s)
- pod.spec.hostIP(s)
- service.spec.externalIPs
- service.spec.clusterIP(s)
- service.spec.loadBalancerSourceRanges (and corresponding annotation)
- service.status.loadBalancer.ingress[].ip
- endpoints.subsets
- endpointslice.endpoints
- networkpolicy.spec.{ingress[].from[],egress[].to[]}.ipBlock
- ingress.status.loadBalancer.ingress[].ip
In the Endpoints and EndpointSlice case, if *any* endpoint IP is
changed, then the entire object must be valid; invalid IPs are only
allowed to remain in place for updates that don't change any IPs.
(e.g., changing the labels or annotations).
In most of the other cases, when the invalid IP is part of an array,
it can be moved around within the array without triggering
revalidation.
