fix(openai): sanitize urls when counting tokens in images (#35143)

libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_ssrf_protection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+"""SSRF Protection for validating URLs against Server-Side Request Forgery attacks.
+
+This module provides utilities to validate user-provided URLs and prevent SSRF attacks
+by blocking requests to:
+- Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)
+- Cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure, etc.)
+- Localhost addresses
+- Invalid URL schemes
+
+Usage:
+    from lc_security.ssrf_protection import validate_safe_url, is_safe_url
+
+    # Validate a URL (raises ValueError if unsafe)
+    safe_url = validate_safe_url("https://example.com/webhook")
+
+    # Check if URL is safe (returns bool)
+    if is_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1"):
+        # URL is safe
+        pass
+
+    # Allow private IPs for development/testing (still blocks cloud metadata)
+    safe_url = validate_safe_url("http://localhost:8080", allow_private=True)
+"""
+
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import socket
+from typing import Annotated, Any
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from pydantic import (
+    AnyHttpUrl,
+    BeforeValidator,
+    HttpUrl,
+)
+
+# Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, RFC 4193, RFC 3927, loopback)
+PRIVATE_IP_RANGES = [
+    ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),  # Private Class A
+    ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),  # Private Class B
+    ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),  # Private Class C
+    ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),  # Loopback
+    ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),  # Link-local (includes cloud metadata)
+    ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"),  # Current network
+    ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),  # IPv6 loopback
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),  # IPv6 unique local
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),  # IPv6 link-local
+    ipaddress.ip_network("ff00::/8"),  # IPv6 multicast
+]
+
+# Cloud provider metadata endpoints
+CLOUD_METADATA_IPS = [
+    "169.254.169.254",  # AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, Oracle Cloud
+    "169.254.170.2",  # AWS ECS task metadata
+    "100.100.100.200",  # Alibaba Cloud metadata
+]
+
+CLOUD_METADATA_HOSTNAMES = [
+    "metadata.google.internal",  # GCP
+    "metadata",  # Generic
+    "instance-data",  # AWS EC2
+]
+
+# Localhost variations
+LOCALHOST_NAMES = [
+    "localhost",
+    "localhost.localdomain",
+]
+
+
+def is_private_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if an IP address is in a private range.
+
+    Args:
+        ip_str: IP address as a string (e.g., "192.168.1.1")
+
+    Returns:
+        True if IP is in a private range, False otherwise
+    """
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
+        return any(ip in range_ for range_ in PRIVATE_IP_RANGES)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def is_cloud_metadata(hostname: str, ip_str: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Check if hostname or IP is a cloud metadata endpoint.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to check
+        ip_str: Optional IP address to check
+
+    Returns:
+        True if hostname or IP is a known cloud metadata endpoint
+    """
+    # Check hostname
+    if hostname.lower() in CLOUD_METADATA_HOSTNAMES:
+        return True
+
+    # Check IP
+    if ip_str and ip_str in CLOUD_METADATA_IPS:  # noqa: SIM103
+        return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def is_localhost(hostname: str, ip_str: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Check if hostname or IP is localhost.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to check
+        ip_str: Optional IP address to check
+
+    Returns:
+        True if hostname or IP is localhost
+    """
+    # Check hostname
+    if hostname.lower() in LOCALHOST_NAMES:
+        return True
+
+    # Check IP
+    if ip_str:
+        try:
+            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
+            # Check if loopback
+            if ip.is_loopback:
+                return True
+            # Also check common localhost IPs
+            if ip_str in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0"):  # noqa: S104
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_safe_url(
+    url: str | AnyHttpUrl,
+    *,
+    allow_private: bool = False,
+    allow_http: bool = True,
+) -> str:
+    """Validate a URL for SSRF protection.
+
+    This function validates URLs to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks
+    by blocking requests to private networks and cloud metadata endpoints.
+
+    Args:
+        url: The URL to validate (string or Pydantic HttpUrl)
+        allow_private: If True, allows private IPs and localhost (for development).
+                      Cloud metadata endpoints are ALWAYS blocked.
+        allow_http: If True, allows both HTTP and HTTPS. If False, only HTTPS.
+
+    Returns:
+        The validated URL as a string
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If URL is invalid or potentially dangerous
+
+    Examples:
+        >>> validate_safe_url("https://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx")
+        'https://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx'
+
+        >>> validate_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1:8080")
+        ValueError: Localhost URLs are not allowed
+
+        >>> validate_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1")
+        ValueError: URL resolves to private IP: 192.168.1.1
+
+        >>> validate_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
+        ValueError: URL resolves to cloud metadata IP: 169.254.169.254
+
+        >>> validate_safe_url("http://localhost:8080", allow_private=True)
+        'http://localhost:8080'
+    """
+    url_str = str(url)
+    parsed = urlparse(url_str)
+
+    # Validate URL scheme
+    if not allow_http and parsed.scheme != "https":
+        msg = "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+        msg = f"Only HTTP/HTTPS URLs are allowed, got scheme: {parsed.scheme}"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    # Extract hostname
+    hostname = parsed.hostname
+    if not hostname:
+        msg = "URL must have a valid hostname"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    # Special handling for test environments - allow test server hostnames
+    # testserver is used by FastAPI/Starlette test clients and doesn't resolve via DNS
+    # Only enabled when LANGCHAIN_ENV=local_test (set in conftest.py)
+    if (
+        os.environ.get("LANGCHAIN_ENV") == "local_test"
+        and hostname.startswith("test")
+        and "server" in hostname
+    ):
+        return url_str
+
+    # ALWAYS block cloud metadata endpoints (even with allow_private=True)
+    if is_cloud_metadata(hostname):
+        msg = f"Cloud metadata endpoints are not allowed: {hostname}"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    # Check for localhost
+    if is_localhost(hostname) and not allow_private:
+        msg = f"Localhost URLs are not allowed: {hostname}"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    # Resolve hostname to IP addresses and validate each one.
+    # Note: DNS resolution results are cached by the OS, so repeated calls are fast.
+    try:
+        # Get all IP addresses for this hostname
+        addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(
+            hostname,
+            parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80),
+            socket.AF_UNSPEC,  # Allow both IPv4 and IPv6
+            socket.SOCK_STREAM,
+        )
+
+        for result in addr_info:
+            ip_str: str = result[4][0]  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+            # ALWAYS block cloud metadata IPs
+            if is_cloud_metadata(hostname, ip_str):
+                msg = f"URL resolves to cloud metadata IP: {ip_str}"
+                raise ValueError(msg)
+
+            # Check for localhost IPs
+            if is_localhost(hostname, ip_str) and not allow_private:
+                msg = f"URL resolves to localhost IP: {ip_str}"
+                raise ValueError(msg)
+
+            # Check for private IPs
+            if not allow_private and is_private_ip(ip_str):
+                msg = f"URL resolves to private IP address: {ip_str}"
+                raise ValueError(msg)
+
+    except socket.gaierror as e:
+        # DNS resolution failed - fail closed for security
+        msg = f"Failed to resolve hostname '{hostname}': {e}"
+        raise ValueError(msg) from e
+    except OSError as e:
+        # Other network errors - fail closed
+        msg = f"Network error while validating URL: {e}"
+        raise ValueError(msg) from e
+
+    return url_str
+
+
+def is_safe_url(
+    url: str | AnyHttpUrl,
+    *,
+    allow_private: bool = False,
+    allow_http: bool = True,
+) -> bool:
+    """Check if a URL is safe (non-throwing version of validate_safe_url).
+
+    Args:
+        url: The URL to check
+        allow_private: If True, allows private IPs and localhost
+        allow_http: If True, allows both HTTP and HTTPS
+
+    Returns:
+        True if URL is safe, False otherwise
+
+    Examples:
+        >>> is_safe_url("https://example.com")
+        True
+
+        >>> is_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1:8080")
+        False
+
+        >>> is_safe_url("http://localhost:8080", allow_private=True)
+        True
+    """
+    try:
+        validate_safe_url(url, allow_private=allow_private, allow_http=allow_http)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    else:
+        return True
+
+
+def _validate_url_ssrf_strict(v: Any) -> Any:
+    """Validate URL for SSRF protection (strict mode)."""
+    if isinstance(v, str):
+        validate_safe_url(v, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)
+    return v
+
+
+def _validate_url_ssrf_https_only(v: Any) -> Any:
+    """Validate URL for SSRF protection (HTTPS only, strict mode)."""
+    if isinstance(v, str):
+        validate_safe_url(v, allow_private=False, allow_http=False)
+    return v
+
+
+def _validate_url_ssrf_relaxed(v: Any) -> Any:
+    """Validate URL for SSRF protection (relaxed mode - allows private IPs)."""
+    if isinstance(v, str):
+        validate_safe_url(v, allow_private=True, allow_http=True)
+    return v
+
+
+# Annotated types with SSRF protection
+SSRFProtectedUrl = Annotated[HttpUrl, BeforeValidator(_validate_url_ssrf_strict)]
+"""A Pydantic HttpUrl type with built-in SSRF protection.
+
+This blocks private IPs, localhost, and cloud metadata endpoints.
+
+Example:
+    class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+        url: SSRFProtectedUrl  # Automatically validated for SSRF
+        headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
+"""
+
+SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed = Annotated[
+    HttpUrl, BeforeValidator(_validate_url_ssrf_relaxed)
+]
+"""A Pydantic HttpUrl with relaxed SSRF protection (allows private IPs).
+
+Use this for development/testing webhooks where localhost/private IPs are needed.
+Cloud metadata endpoints are still blocked.
+
+Example:
+    class DevWebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+        url: SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed  # Allows localhost, blocks cloud metadata
+"""
+
+SSRFProtectedHttpsUrl = Annotated[
+    HttpUrl, BeforeValidator(_validate_url_ssrf_https_only)
+]
+"""A Pydantic HttpUrl with SSRF protection that only allows HTTPS.
+
+This blocks private IPs, localhost, cloud metadata endpoints, and HTTP URLs.
+
+Example:
+    class SecureWebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+        url: SSRFProtectedHttpsUrl  # Only HTTPS, blocks private IPs
+"""
+
+SSRFProtectedHttpsUrlStr = Annotated[
+    str, BeforeValidator(_validate_url_ssrf_https_only)
+]
+"""A string type with SSRF protection that only allows HTTPS URLs.
+
+Same as SSRFProtectedHttpsUrl but returns a string instead of HttpUrl.
+Useful for FastAPI query parameters where you need a string URL.
+
+Example:
+    @router.get("/proxy")
+    async def proxy_get(url: SSRFProtectedHttpsUrlStr):
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
+            resp = await client.get(url)
+"""

libs/core/tests/unit_tests/test_ssrf_protection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+"""Tests for SSRF protection utilities."""
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError
+
+from langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection import (
+    SSRFProtectedUrl,
+    SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed,
+    is_cloud_metadata,
+    is_localhost,
+    is_private_ip,
+    is_safe_url,
+    validate_safe_url,
+)
+
+
+class TestIPValidation:
+    """Tests for IP address validation functions."""
+
+    def test_is_private_ip_ipv4(self) -> None:
+        """Test private IPv4 address detection."""
+        assert is_private_ip("10.0.0.1") is True
+        assert is_private_ip("172.16.0.1") is True
+        assert is_private_ip("192.168.1.1") is True
+        assert is_private_ip("127.0.0.1") is True
+        assert is_private_ip("169.254.169.254") is True
+        assert is_private_ip("0.0.0.1") is True
+
+    def test_is_private_ip_ipv6(self) -> None:
+        """Test private IPv6 address detection."""
+        assert is_private_ip("::1") is True  # Loopback
+        assert is_private_ip("fc00::1") is True  # Unique local
+        assert is_private_ip("fe80::1") is True  # Link-local
+        assert is_private_ip("ff00::1") is True  # Multicast
+
+    def test_is_private_ip_public(self) -> None:
+        """Test that public IPs are not flagged as private."""
+        assert is_private_ip("8.8.8.8") is False
+        assert is_private_ip("1.1.1.1") is False
+        assert is_private_ip("151.101.1.140") is False
+
+    def test_is_private_ip_invalid(self) -> None:
+        """Test handling of invalid IP addresses."""
+        assert is_private_ip("not-an-ip") is False
+        assert is_private_ip("999.999.999.999") is False
+
+    def test_is_cloud_metadata_ips(self) -> None:
+        """Test cloud metadata IP detection."""
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("example.com", "169.254.169.254") is True
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("example.com", "169.254.170.2") is True
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("example.com", "100.100.100.200") is True
+
+    def test_is_cloud_metadata_hostnames(self) -> None:
+        """Test cloud metadata hostname detection."""
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("metadata.google.internal") is True
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("metadata") is True
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("instance-data") is True
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("METADATA.GOOGLE.INTERNAL") is True  # Case insensitive
+
+    def test_is_cloud_metadata_safe(self) -> None:
+        """Test that normal URLs are not flagged as cloud metadata."""
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("example.com", "8.8.8.8") is False
+        assert is_cloud_metadata("google.com") is False
+
+    def test_is_localhost_hostnames(self) -> None:
+        """Test localhost hostname detection."""
+        assert is_localhost("localhost") is True
+        assert is_localhost("LOCALHOST") is True
+        assert is_localhost("localhost.localdomain") is True
+
+    def test_is_localhost_ips(self) -> None:
+        """Test localhost IP detection."""
+        assert is_localhost("example.com", "127.0.0.1") is True
+        assert is_localhost("example.com", "::1") is True
+        assert is_localhost("example.com", "0.0.0.0") is True
+
+    def test_is_localhost_safe(self) -> None:
+        """Test that normal hosts are not flagged as localhost."""
+        assert is_localhost("example.com", "8.8.8.8") is False
+        assert is_localhost("google.com") is False
+
+
+class TestValidateSafeUrl:
+    """Tests for validate_safe_url function."""
+
+    def test_valid_public_https_url(self) -> None:
+        """Test that valid public HTTPS URLs are accepted."""
+        url = "https://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url)
+        assert result == url
+
+    def test_valid_public_http_url(self) -> None:
+        """Test that valid public HTTP URLs are accepted."""
+        url = "http://example.com/webhook"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url)
+        assert result == url
+
+    def test_localhost_blocked_by_default(self) -> None:
+        """Test that localhost URLs are blocked by default."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Localhost"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://localhost:8080/webhook")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="localhost"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1:8080/webhook")
+
+    def test_localhost_allowed_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        """Test that localhost is allowed with allow_private=True."""
+        url = "http://localhost:8080/webhook"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url, allow_private=True)
+        assert result == url
+
+        url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080/webhook"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url, allow_private=True)
+        assert result == url
+
+    def test_private_ip_blocked_by_default(self) -> None:
+        """Test that private IPs are blocked by default."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private IP"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1/webhook")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private IP"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://10.0.0.1/webhook")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private IP"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://172.16.0.1/webhook")
+
+    def test_private_ip_allowed_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        """Test that private IPs are allowed with allow_private=True."""
+        # Note: These will fail DNS resolution in tests, so we skip actual validation
+        # In production, they would be validated properly
+
+    def test_cloud_metadata_always_blocked(self) -> None:
+        """Test that cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="metadata"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
+
+        # Even with allow_private=True
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="metadata"):
+            validate_safe_url(
+                "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+                allow_private=True,
+            )
+
+    def test_invalid_scheme_blocked(self) -> None:
+        """Test that non-HTTP(S) schemes are blocked."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="scheme"):
+            validate_safe_url("ftp://example.com/file")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="scheme"):
+            validate_safe_url("file:///etc/passwd")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="scheme"):
+            validate_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)")
+
+    def test_https_only_mode(self) -> None:
+        """Test that HTTP is blocked when allow_http=False."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTTPS"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://example.com/webhook", allow_http=False)
+
+        # HTTPS should still work
+        url = "https://example.com/webhook"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url, allow_http=False)
+        assert result == url
+
+    def test_url_without_hostname(self) -> None:
+        """Test that URLs without hostname are rejected."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="hostname"):
+            validate_safe_url("http:///path")
+
+    def test_dns_resolution_failure(self) -> None:
+        """Test handling of DNS resolution failures."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="resolve"):
+            validate_safe_url("http://this-domain-definitely-does-not-exist-12345.com")
+
+    def test_testserver_allowed(self, monkeypatch: Any) -> None:
+        """Test that testserver hostname is allowed for test environments."""
+        # testserver is used by FastAPI/Starlette test clients
+        monkeypatch.setenv("LANGCHAIN_ENV", "local_test")
+        url = "http://testserver/webhook"
+        result = validate_safe_url(url)
+        assert result == url
+
+
+class TestIsSafeUrl:
+    """Tests for is_safe_url function (non-throwing version)."""
+
+    def test_safe_url_returns_true(self) -> None:
+        """Test that safe URLs return True."""
+        assert is_safe_url("https://example.com/webhook") is True
+        assert is_safe_url("http://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx") is True
+
+    def test_unsafe_url_returns_false(self) -> None:
+        """Test that unsafe URLs return False."""
+        assert is_safe_url("http://localhost:8080") is False
+        assert is_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1:8080") is False
+        assert is_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1") is False
+        assert is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254") is False
+
+    def test_unsafe_url_safe_with_allow_private(self) -> None:
+        """Test that private URLs are safe with allow_private=True."""
+        assert is_safe_url("http://localhost:8080", allow_private=True) is True
+        assert is_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1:8080", allow_private=True) is True
+
+    def test_cloud_metadata_always_unsafe(self) -> None:
+        """Test that cloud metadata is always unsafe."""
+        assert is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254") is False
+        assert is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254", allow_private=True) is False
+
+
+class TestSSRFProtectedUrlType:
+    """Tests for SSRFProtectedUrl Pydantic type."""
+
+    def test_valid_url_accepted(self) -> None:
+        """Test that valid URLs are accepted by Pydantic schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrl
+
+        schema = WebhookSchema(url="https://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx")
+        assert str(schema.url).startswith("https://hooks.slack.com/")
+
+    def test_localhost_rejected(self) -> None:
+        """Test that localhost URLs are rejected by Pydantic schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrl
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            WebhookSchema(url="http://localhost:8080")
+
+    def test_private_ip_rejected(self) -> None:
+        """Test that private IPs are rejected by Pydantic schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrl
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            WebhookSchema(url="http://192.168.1.1")
+
+    def test_cloud_metadata_rejected(self) -> None:
+        """Test that cloud metadata is rejected by Pydantic schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrl
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            WebhookSchema(url="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
+
+
+class TestSSRFProtectedUrlRelaxedType:
+    """Tests for SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed Pydantic type."""
+
+    def test_localhost_accepted(self) -> None:
+        """Test that localhost URLs are accepted by relaxed schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed
+
+        schema = WebhookSchema(url="http://localhost:8080")
+        assert str(schema.url).startswith("http://localhost")
+
+    def test_cloud_metadata_still_rejected(self) -> None:
+        """Test that cloud metadata is still rejected by relaxed schema."""
+
+        class WebhookSchema(BaseModel):
+            url: SSRFProtectedUrlRelaxed
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            WebhookSchema(url="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
+
+
+class TestRealWorldURLs:
+    """Tests with real-world webhook URLs."""
+
+    def test_slack_webhook(self) -> None:
+        """Test Slack webhook URL."""
+        url = (
+            "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00000000/B00000000/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+        )
+        assert is_safe_url(url) is True
+
+    def test_discord_webhook(self) -> None:
+        """Test Discord webhook URL."""
+        url = "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789012345678/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+        assert is_safe_url(url) is True
+
+    def test_webhook_site(self) -> None:
+        """Test webhook.site URL."""
+        url = "https://webhook.site/unique-id"
+        assert is_safe_url(url) is True
+
+    def test_ngrok_url(self) -> None:
+        """Test ngrok URL (should be safe as it's public)."""
+        url = "https://abc123.ngrok.io/webhook"
+        assert is_safe_url(url) is True

libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py

@@ -1768,6 +1768,8 @@ class BaseChatOpenAI(BaseChatModel):
         self,
         messages: Sequence[BaseMessage],
         tools: Sequence[dict[str, Any] | type | Callable | BaseTool] | None = None,
+        *,
+        allow_fetching_images: bool = True,
     ) -> int:
         """Calculate num tokens for `gpt-3.5-turbo` and `gpt-4` with `tiktoken` package.
 
@@ -1783,6 +1785,7 @@ class BaseChatOpenAI(BaseChatModel):
             messages: The message inputs to tokenize.
             tools: If provided, sequence of `dict`, `BaseModel`, function, or `BaseTool`
                 to be converted to tool schemas.
+            allow_fetching_images: Whether to allow fetching images for token counting.
         """
         # TODO: Count bound tools as part of input.
         if tools is not None:
@@ -1827,11 +1830,13 @@ class BaseChatOpenAI(BaseChatModel):
                         elif val["type"] == "image_url":
                             if val["image_url"].get("detail") == "low":
                                 num_tokens += 85
-                            else:
+                            elif allow_fetching_images:
                                 image_size = _url_to_size(val["image_url"]["url"])
                                 if not image_size:
                                     continue
                                 num_tokens += _count_image_tokens(*image_size)
+                            else:
+                                pass
                         # Tool/function call token counting is not documented by OpenAI.
                         # This is an approximation.
                         elif val["type"] == "function":
@@ -3528,10 +3533,62 @@ def _url_to_size(image_source: str) -> tuple[int, int] | None:
                 "`pip install -U httpx`."
             )
             return None
-        response = httpx.get(image_source)
-        response.raise_for_status()
-        width, height = Image.open(BytesIO(response.content)).size
-        return width, height
+
+        # Validate URL for SSRF protection
+        try:
+            from langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection import validate_safe_url
+
+            validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)
+        except ImportError:
+            logger.warning(
+                "SSRF protection not available. "
+                "Update langchain-core to get SSRF protection."
+            )
+        except ValueError as e:
+            logger.warning("Image URL failed SSRF validation: %s", e)
+            return None
+
+        # Set reasonable limits to prevent resource exhaustion
+        # Timeout prevents indefinite hangs on slow/malicious servers
+        timeout = 5.0  # seconds
+        # Max size matches OpenAI's 50 MB payload limit
+        max_size = 50 * 1024 * 1024  # 50 MB
+
+        try:
+            response = httpx.get(
+                image_source,
+                timeout=timeout,
+            )
+            response.raise_for_status()
+
+            # Check response size before loading into memory
+            content_length = response.headers.get("content-length")
+            if content_length and int(content_length) > max_size:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Image URL exceeds maximum size limit of %d bytes", max_size
+                )
+                return None
+
+            # Also check actual content size
+            if len(response.content) > max_size:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Image URL exceeds maximum size limit of %d bytes", max_size
+                )
+                return None
+
+            # close things (context managers)
+            width, height = Image.open(BytesIO(response.content)).size
+            return width, height
+        except httpx.TimeoutException:
+            logger.warning("Image URL request timed out after %s seconds", timeout)
+            return None
+        except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
+            logger.warning("Image URL returned HTTP error: %s", e)
+            return None
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning("Failed to fetch or process image from URL: %s", e)
+            return None
+
     if _is_b64(image_source):
         _, encoded = image_source.split(",", 1)
         data = base64.b64decode(encoded)