github/langchain
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/hwchase17/langchain.git synced 2026-02-21 06:33:41 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

docs(core): update load note to be precise (#35309)

Browse Source 
update load doc-string for precision
This commit is contained in:
Eugene Yurtsev
2026-02-18 15:22:59 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent b004103721
commit 8323f556d9
1 changed files with 12 additions and 6 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

18
libs/core/langchain_core/load/load.py
View File

@@ -13,13 +13,19 @@ allowlist. If the class is not in the allowlist, deserialization raises a `Value
## Security model
!!! warning "Do not use with untrusted input"
!!! warning "Exercise caution with untrusted input"
These functions instantiate Python objects and can trigger side effects
such as network calls, file operations, or environment variable access
during deserialization. **Never call `load()` or `loads()` on data from an
untrusted or unauthenticated source.** Even with the allowlist, allowed
classes may perform dangerous operations during `__init__`.
These functions deserialize by instantiating Python objects, which means
constructors (`__init__`) and validators may run and can trigger side effects.
With the default settings, deserialization is restricted to a core allowlist
of `langchain_core` types (for example: messages, documents, and prompts)
defined in `langchain_core.load.mapping`.
If you broaden `allowed_objects` (for example, by using `'all'` or adding
additional classes), treat the serialized payload as a manifest and only
deserialize data that comes from a trusted source. A crafted payload that
is allowed to instantiate unintended classes could cause network calls,
file operations, or environment variable access during `__init__`.
The `allowed_objects` parameter controls which classes can be deserialized: