Currently the VM bootargs load address is hard-coded at 8KB right before
kernel load address, this should work for Linux kernel only since Linux
kernel is guaranteed to be loadered high than GPA 8K so its load address
would never be overflowed, other OS like Zephyr has no such assumption.
Tracked-On: #5689
Signed-off-by: Victor Sun <victor.sun@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
ivshmem spec says that the size of BAR0 is 256 bytes. Windows
ivshmem driver will check the size of BAR0. It will refuse to
load the ivshmem driver if BAR0 size is not 256.
For post-launched VM hv land ivshmem BARs are allocated by
device model. For pre-launched VM hv land ivshmem BARs are
allocated by acrn-config tool. Both device model and acrn-config
tool should make sure that the BAR base addr are aligned to 4K
at least.
Tracked-On: #5717
Signed-off-by: Jian Jun Chen <jian.jun.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fei Li <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
This patch denies Service VM the access permission to device resources
owned by hypervisor.
HV may own these devices: (1) debug uart pci device for debug version
(2) type 1 pci device if have pre-launched VMs.
Current implementation exposes the mmio/pio resource of HV owned devices
to SOS, should remove them from SOS.
Tracked-On: #5615
Signed-off-by: Tao Yuhong <yuhong.tao@intel.com>
This patch denies Service VM the access permission to device
resources owned by pre-launched VMs.
Rationale:
* Pre-launched VMs in ACRN are independent of service VM,
and should be immune to attacks from service VM. However,
current implementation exposes the bar resource of passthru
devices to service VM for some reason. This makes it possible
for service VM to crash or attack pre-launched VMs.
* It is same for hypervisor owned devices.
NOTE:
* The MMIO spaces pre-allocated to VFs are still presented to
Service VM. The SR-IOV capable devices assigned to pre-launched
VMs doesn't have the SR-IOV capability. So the MMIO address spaces
pre-allocated by BIOS for VFs are not decoded by hardware and
couldn't be enabled by guest. SOS may live with seeing the address
space or not. We will revisit later.
Tracked-On: #5615
Signed-off-by: Tao Yuhong <yuhong.tao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fei Li <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
The logical processor scoped IWKey can be copied to or from a
platform-scope storage copy called IWKeyBackup. Copying IWKey to
IWKeyBackup is called ‘backing up IWKey’ and copying from IWKeyBackup to
IWKey is called ‘restoring IWKey’.
IWKeyBackup and the path between it and IWKey are protected against
software and simple hardware attacks. This means that IWKeyBackup can be
used to distribute an IWKey within the logical processors in a platform
in a protected manner.
Linux keylocker implementation uses this feature, so they are
introduced by this patch.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Different vCPU may have different IWKeys. Hypervisor need do the iwkey
context switch.
This patch introduce a load_iwkey() function to do that. Switches the
host iwkey when the switch_in vCPU satisfies:
1) keylocker feature enabled
2) Different from the current loaded one.
Two opportunities to do the load_iwkey():
1) Guest enables CR4.KL bit.
2) vCPU thread context switch.
load_iwkey() costs ~600 cycles when do the load IWKey action.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
KeyLocker is a new security feature available in new Intel CPUs that
protects data-encryption keys for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm. These keys are more valuable than what they guard. If stolen
once, the key can be repeatedly used even on another system and even
after vulnerability closed.
It also introduces a CPU-internal wrapping key (IWKey), which is a key-
encryption key to wrap AES keys into handles. While the IWKey is
inaccessible to software, randomizing the value during the boot-time
helps its value unpredictable.
Keylocker usage:
- New “ENCODEKEY” instructions take original key input and returns HANDLE
crypted by an internal wrap key (IWKey, init by “LOADIWKEY” instruction)
- Software can then delete the original key from memory
- Early in boot/software, less likely to have vulnerability that allows
stealing original key
- Later encrypt/decrypt can use the HANDLE through new AES KeyLocker
instructions
- Note:
* Software can use original key without knowing it (use HANDLE)
* HANDLE cannot be used on other systems or after warm/cold reset
* IWKey cannot be read from CPU after it's loaded (this is the
nature of this feature) and only 1 copy of IWKey inside CPU.
The virtualization implementation of Key Locker on ACRN is:
- Each vCPU has a 'struct iwkey' to store its IWKey in struct
acrn_vcpu_arch.
- At initilization, every vCPU is created with a random IWKey.
- Hypervisor traps the execution of LOADIWKEY (by 'LOADIWKEY exiting'
VM-exectuion control) of vCPU to capture and save the IWKey if guest
set a new IWKey. Don't support randomization (emulate CPUID to
disable) of the LOADIWKEY as hypervisor cannot capture and save the
random IWKey. From keylocker spec:
"Note that a VMM may wish to enumerate no support for HW random IWKeys
to the guest (i.e. enumerate CPUID.19H:ECX[1] as 0) as such IWKeys
cannot be easily context switched. A guest ENCODEKEY will return the
type of IWKey used (IWKey.KeySource) and thus will notice if a VMM
virtualized a HW random IWKey with a SW specified IWKey."
- In context_switch_in() of each vCPU, hypervisor loads that vCPU's
IWKey into pCPU by LOADIWKEY instruction.
- There is an assumption that ACRN hypervisor will never use the
KeyLocker feature itself.
This patch implements the vCPU's IWKey management and the next patch
implements host context save/restore IWKey logic.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
In order for a VMM to capture the IWKey values of guests, processors
that support Key Locker also support a new "LOADIWKEY exiting"
VM-execution control in bit 0 of the tertiary processor-based
VM-execution controls.
This patch enables the tertiary VM-execution controls.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
KeyLocker is a new security feature available in new Intel CPUs that
protects data-encryption keys for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm.
This patch emulates Keylocker CPUID leaf 19H to support Keylocker
feature for guest VM.
To make the hypervisor being able to manage the IWKey correctly, this
patch doesn't expose hardware random IWKey capability
(CPUID.0x19.ECX[1]) to guest VM.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@Intel.com>
Bit19 (CR4_KL) of CR4 is CPU KeyLocker feature enable bit. Hypervisor
traps the bit's writing to track the keylocker feature on/off of guest.
While the bit is set by guest,
- set cr4_kl_enabled to indicate the vcpu's keylocker feature enabled status
- load vcpu's IWKey in host (will add in later patch)
While the bit is clear by guest,
- clear cr4_kl_enabled
This patch trap and passthru the CR4_KL bit to guest for operation.
Tracked-On: #5695
Signed-off-by: Shuo A Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Current implementation, SOS may allocate the memory region belonging to
hypervisor/pre-launched VM to a post-launched VM. Because it only verifies
the start address rather than the entire memory region.
This patch verifies the validity of the entire memory region before
allocating to a post-launched VM so that the specified memory can only
be allocated to a post-launched VM if the entire memory region is mapped
in SOS’s EPT.
Tracked-On: #5555
Signed-off-by: Li Fei1 <fei1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Currently, we hardcode the GPA base of Software SRAM
to an address that is derived from TGL platform,
as this GPA is identical with HPA for Pre-launch VM,
This hardcoded address may not work on other platforms
if the HPA bases of Software SRAM are different.
Now, Offline tool configures above GPA based on the
detection of Software SRAM on specific platform.
This patch removes the hardcoding GPA of Software SRAM,
and also renames MACRO 'SOFTWARE_SRAM_BASE_GPA' to
'PRE_RTVM_SW_SRAM_BASE_GPA' to avoid confusing, as it
is for Prelaunch VM only.
Tracked-On: #5649
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
- RTCM is initialized in hypervisor only
if RTCM binaries are detected.
- Remove address space of RTCM binary from
Software SRAM region.
- Refine parse_rtct() function, validity of
ACPI RTCT table shall be checked by caller.
Tracked-On: #5649
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fei Li <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Physical address to SW SRAM region maybe different
on different platforms, this hardcoded address may
result in address mismatch for SW SRAM operations.
This patch removes above hardcoded address and uses
the physical address parsed from native RTCT.
Tracked-On: #5649
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fei Li <fei1.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
'ptcm' and 'ptct' are legacy name according
to the latest TCC spec, hence rename below files
to avoid confusing:
ptcm.c -> rtcm.c
ptcm.h -> rtcm.h
ptct.h -> rtct.h
Tracked-On: #5649
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
This patch fixes the following issues that break the build system:
1. The tag of the root nodes of board/scenario XML files are still acrn-config,
not config_tools. This patch reverts the XPATH that refers to these nodes.
2. HV_PREDEFINED_BOARD_DIR now also relies on BOARD which may not be
available at the time the variable is defined. As both board and
scenario XML files are placed under the same directory, this patch
refines the path calculation logic to get rid of mixing variables of
the different flavors.
Tracked-On: #5644
Fixes: 97c9b24030 ("acrn-config: Reorg config tool folder")
Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
Simplify multiboot API by removing the global variable efiloader_sig.
Replaced by constant at the use site.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Yi Liang <yi.liang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Remove include/boot.h since it contains only assembly variables that
should only be accessed in arch/x86/init.c.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Yi Liang <yi.liang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Split off definition of "struct efi_info" into a separate header
file lib/efi.h.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
This is done by adding the MAX_MMAP_ENTRIES macro in multiboot.h.
This macro has to be sync-ed with E820_MAX_ENTRIES manually though.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
The init_multiboot_info() and sanitize_multiboot_ifno() APIs now
require parameters instead of implicitly relying on global boot
variables.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Calling sanitize_multiboot() from init.c instead of cpu.c.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
This way, we void exposing acrn_mbi as a global variable.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
This function is a derivative of get_multiboot_info().
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Move "struct multboot_info" from multiboot.h into multboot.c.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Move multiboot specific declarations from boot.h to multiboot.h.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Create multiboot_pri.h and move the relevant declarations into this
file.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Create a multiboot module under the boot directory and move multiboot
files as part of this.
Tracked-On: #5661
Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
Remove vm_configs folder and move all the XML files and generic code example into config_tools/data
Tracked-On: #5644
Signed-off-by: Xie, nanlin <nanlin.xie@intel.com>
In order to enable changing the generated C configuration files manually,
this patch introduces the target `diffconfig` to the build system.
After generating the configuration files, a developer can manually modify
these sources (which are placed under build/configs) and invoke `make
diffconfig` to generate a patch that shows the made differences. Such
patches can be registered to a build by invoking the `applydiffconfig`
target. The build system will always apply them whenever the configuration
files are regenerated.
A typical workflow to create a patch is as follows.
# The pre_build target relies on generated configuration files
hypervisor$ make BOARD=xxx SCENARIO=yyy pre_build
(manually edit files under build/configs/boards and
build/configs/scenarios)
hypervisor$ make diffconfig # Patch generated to build/config.patch
hypervisor$ cp build/config.patch /path/to/patch
The following steps apply apply the patch to another build.
hypervisor$ make BOARD=xxx SCENARIO=yyy defconfig
hypervisor$ make applydiffconfig PATCH=/path/to/patch-file-or-directory
hypervisor$ make
After any patch is registered for a build, the configuration files will be
automatically regenerated the next time `make` is invoked.
To show a list of registered patches for generated configuration files,
invoke `make applydiffconfig` without specifying `PATCH`.
v2:
* Add target `applydiffconfig` which accepts a PATCH variable to register
an arbitrary patch file or a directory containing patch file(s) for a
build. `.config_patches` is no longer used.
Tracked-On: #5644
Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
This patch makes the build system of the hypervisor to cache the board and
scenario XML files in the build directory and generate C configuration
files from them at build time. The C configuration files that are cached in
the git repo is no longer used or updated. Paths to these generated files
in the prebuild Makefile is updated accordingly.
The following targets are introduced or modified.
* defconfig: Copy default configuration XMLs to the build directory and
generate C configuration files.
* oldconfig: No action.
* menuconfig: Print a message to redirect users to use the config app
and exit.
* showconfig: Print the BOARD, SCENARIO and RELEASE configured for the
current build.
* update_config: No action.
* (default): Build the hypervisor with defined configurations.
The following variables can be set on the command line to specify the
default configuration to be used.
* BOARD: Either a name of the target board or a path to a customized
board XML. When a board name is specified, the board XML file
is expected to be available under
misc/acrn-config/xmls/board-xmls.
* SCENARIO: Either a name of the scenario of a path to a customized
scenario XML. When a scenario name is specified, the
scenario XML file is expected to be available under
misc/acrn-config/xmls/config-xmls/$(BOARD).
* BOARD_FILE: Path to the board XML file to be used. This is now
obsoleted as BOARD provides the same functionality.
* SCENARIO_FILE: Path to the scenario XML file to be used. This is now
obsoleted as BOARD provides the same functionality.
BOARD/SCENARIO or BOARD_FILE/SCENARIO_FILE shall be used in pair, and
BOARD_FILE/SCENARIO_FILE shall point to valid files when specified. Any
violation to those constraints will stop the build with error
messages. When BOARD/SCENARIO and BOARD_FILE/SCENARIO_FILE are both defined
on the command line, the former takes precedence as the latter are to be
obsoleted.
Additionally, users can define the RELEASE variable to specify a debug or
release build. In case a previous build exists but is configured for a
different build type, the build system will automatically update the
scenario XML and rebuild the sources.
This patch also includes the following tweaks:
1. Do not use `realpath` to process search paths for generated
headers. `realpath` only accepts paths of existing files, while the
directories for generated headers may not be created at the time the
search paths are calculated.
2. Always expect `pci_dev.c` to be in place.
3. HV_CONFIG_* series now encodes absolute paths.
v3:
* Do not validate BOARD_FILE/SCENARIO_FILE if BOARD/SCENARIO are given.
v2:
* `defconfig` now also generates the C configuration files.
* BOARD/SCENARIO now accept either board/scenario names or XML file paths.
* Adapt to the new allocation.xml & unified.xml.
* Cleanup names of internal variables in config.mk for brevity.
Tracked-On: #5644
Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
In order to remove Kconfig from the build process, acrn-config shall
transform XML configuration files to config.h and config.mk by itself. This
patch adds XSLT scripts that do the trick.
Unfortunately, the scenario XML file along is not sufficient to generate
config.h and config.mk, though. In addition to resource
allocation (i.e. allocating physical RAM for the hypervisor), the
transformation also need to do the following:
1. Translate UART info in board XML into several configuration entries
depending on the UART selected in the scenario XML.
2. Use the MAX_MSIX_TABLE_NUM value in the board XML if the scenario
XML does not specify it.
In order to use XSLT to transform both XMLs in one shot, a template is
provided to create another XML that includes (using XInclude) both board
and scenario XMLs as sub-nodes. It will be instantiated once the
transformations are integrated in the following patch.
v2:
* Add `allocation.xml` to `unified.xml` to include the results from static
allocation.
* Use HV_RAM_START and HV_RAM_SIZE in allocation results if they are not
explicitly specified in the scenario XML.
Tracked-On: #5644
Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
In order for a unified interface for generating configuration sources from
board and scenario XMLs, this patch introduces a script named genconf.sh
which takes XML files as inputs and generate sources under the specified
directory. Once used in Makefiles, this script helps to minimize the
impacts on the Makefiles when we refine the configuration source generation
process in the future.
This patch also adds a non-zero return value to board_cfg_gen.py and
scenario_cfg_gen.py so that we do not need to inspect the logs to determine
if the generation succeeds.
Tracked-On: #5644
Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao <junjie.mao@intel.com>
The commit 'Fix: HV: VM OS failed to assign new address to pci-vuart
BARs' need more reshuffle.
Tracked-On: #5491
Signed-off-by: Tao Yuhong <yuhong.tao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
When "signal_event" is called, "wait_event" will actually not block.
So it is ok to remove this line.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
Now, we use hash table to maintain intx irq mapping by using
the key generated from sid. So once the entry is added,we can
not update source ide any more. Otherwise, we can't locate the
entry with the key generated from new source ide.
For source id change, remove_remapping/add_remapping is used
instead of update source id directly if entry was added already.
Tracked-On: #5640
Signed-off-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
This patch move the split-lock logic into dedicated file
to reduce LOC. This may make the logic more clear.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
This patch adds a cache register for VMX_PROC_VM_EXEC_CONTROLS
to avoid the frequent VMCS access.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
The TF is visible to guest which may be modified by
the guest, so it is not a safe method to emulate the
split-lock. While MTF is specifically designed for
single-stepping in x86/Intel hardware virtualization
VT-x technology which is invisible to the guest. Use MTF
to single step the VCPU during the emulation of split lock.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
For a SMP guest, split-lock check may happen on
multiple vCPUs simultaneously. In this case, one
vCPU at most can be allowed running in the
split-lock emulation window. And if the vCPU is
doing the emulation, it should never be blocked
in the hypervisor, it should go back to the guest
to execute the lock instruction immediately and
trap back to the hypervisor with #DB to complete the
split-lock emulation.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
When wrong BAR address is set for pci-vuart, OS may assign a
new BAR address to it. Pci-vuart BAR can't be reprogrammed,
for its wrong fixed value. That can may because pci_vbar.fixed and
pci_vbar.type has overlap in abstraction, pci_vbar.fixed
has a confusing name, pci_vbar.type has PCIBAR_MEM64HI which is not
really a type of pci BARs.
So replace pci_vbar.type with pci_vbar.is_mem64hi, and change
pci_vbar.fixed to an union type with new name pci_vbar.bar_type.
Tracked-On: #5491
Signed-off-by: Tao Yuhong <yuhong.tao@intel.com>
We have trapped the #DB for split-lock emulation.
Only fault exception need RIP being retained.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
xchg may also cause the #AC for split-lock check.
This patch adds this emulation.
1. Kick other vcpus of the guest to stop execution
if the guest has more than one vcpu.
2. Emulate the xchg instruction.
3. Notify other vcpus (if any) to restart execution.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
This patch adds the split-lock emulation.
If a #AC is caused by instruction with LOCK prefix then
emulate it, otherwise, inject it back as it used to be.
1. Kick other vcpus of the guest to stop execution
and set the TF flag to have #DB if the guest has more
than one vcpu.
2. Skip over the LOCK prefix and resume the current
vcpu back to guest for execution.
3. Notify other vcpus to restart exception at the end
of handling the #DB since we have completed
the LOCK prefix instruction emulation.
Tracked-On: #5605
Signed-off-by: Jie Deng <jie.deng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Check hardware support for all features in CR4,
and hide bits from guest by vcpuid if they're not supported
for guests OS.
Tracked-On: #5586
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
- The current code to virtualize CR0/CR4 is not
well designed, and hard to read.
This patch reshuffle the logic to make it clear
and classify those bits into PASSTHRU,
TRAP_AND_PASSTHRU, TRAP_AND_EMULATE & reserved bits.
Tracked-On: #5586
Signed-off-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com>
